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Preface
If there is not enough evidence of long waves in economic variables, the meet-
ing that spawned this book brought forth some evidence to show that at Least
interest in these phenomena manifests a wave-like form. It is exceptional for
any economist, due to the periods involved, to participate in two upswings of
interest. Much of what is said at the beginning of a period is usually forgotten
by the end. The participants of the International Meeting on Long-Term Fluc-
tuations in Economic Growth: Their Causes and Consequences (held in Weimar,
GDR, 10-14 June 1985), of which this volume is the Proceedings. were
privileged to hear of one such exceptional case.
In his welcoming speech, Professor Jiirgen Kuczynski recalled his
research, of 51 years ago, on long waves in the prices of industrial goods in
the years 1820-1933, when he said "Lange Wellen aber sind nicht zu finden"
[Kuczynski, flas Problem der langen Wellen und die Entwicklung der
Industriewaren-Preise in den Jahren 1B20-1933 (Philographischer Verlag,
Basel)]. "Since then," the speaker confessed, "I have come to acknowledge
the existence of long waves, without being able to find a satisfactory explana-
tion for them in my own or in other studies."
Professor Kuczynski stressed the necessity to develop a satisfactory
theory for long waves, and then to establish which factors are important com-
ponents of the general trend and which are not. He expressed his pleasure in
seeing an increased interest in structural change and innovation, and posed
the question: Once the mechanisms of long waves are known will this not bring
about their end? When it is so that a steady, even if slow, development sets
in, will long waves be but a temporary historical fact for which no theory is
necessary? Or perhaps two theories - one for their existence in the past,
and one for their future nonexistence?
It can be said that most of the deliberations that followed were an
attempt to respond to Professor Kuczynski's challenge.
Dr. Thomas Kuczynski (Chapter 5) examines the works of Marx and
Engels in relation to the processes responsible for fluctuations in the econ-
omy. He shows that when Marx and Engels spoke about "fluctuations extend-
ing over very long periods ... " caused by changes in the general rate of profit,
but also taking into account fluctuations caused by capital turnover as a
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"material basis for the periodic crises," they were aware of all of the basic
mechanisms that cause long waves and business cycles.
Based on Marxist views, Professor Yu. Yakovets (Chapter 20) introduces a
certain "taxonomy" into the cycles of science and technology and recognizes
the following cases:
(1) "Sequencing" of technology (machines) generation (for example, genera-
tion of robots).
(2) Transfer to new directions of technology (partial technological revolu-
tions).
(3) Periodical reproduction of fixed capital on a mass scale on the basis of
the gener'ation of new machines.
(4) Overall (general) technological revolutions, leading to basic changes in
the level of productive forces.
Individual cycles are structured into several phases, such as start-up, conta-
gion, maturity, obsolescence, etc. He argues that general technological revo-
lutions can be traced back to prehistoric times.
Professor G. Bruckmann in his brief contribution (Chapter 1) poses a
question that was more than just a rhetorical one, "Will there be a Fifth Kon-
dratieff?", pointing out that the recent economic "low" seems to be qualita-
tively different from previous ones. Also, there are indications that we may
be approaching a new socioeconomic age. Whether or not, in the new age, we
will continue to observe Kondratieff remains to be seen.
The search for trustworthy mechanisms behind cycles sharpens the view
of researchers. Dr. R.M. Goodwin (Chapter 4) points out that in the field of
economics, models are usually in search of data. In the long-waves issue it is
exactly the opposite. However, the search for a model is hampered by the
fact that in economics there are no universal constants as, for example, in
physics. Therefore, to explain a cycle of a longer period, the difficulty is in
finding a mechanism that remains unchanged over many decades. The model
Dr. Goodwin puts forward transforms the steady flow and cumulative growth of
knowledge into an alternating growth of the economy. He also discussed the
interrelationships of the variables involved. This model turns the economy
into an evolutionary pulsator.
Another interpretation of the long wave was presented by Drs. L.
Klimenko and S. Menshikov (Chapter 25), who apply catastrophe theory and
simulate non-equilibrium growth. Preliminary results suggest that the econ-
omy has a tendency to move close to two different equilibrium trajectories
(corresponding to either a maximum or minimum GNP over profit rate).
Changes in profit realization could cause switching from one trajectory to the
other. They have tested on real data for the US economy for the years
1889-1982.
A more microeconomy-based formal model of long waves is described by
Professor G. Mensch et al. (Chapter 27), who divide the analysis of product
life cycles into two parts:
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(1) Intrinsic dynamics - given by a "natural" maturing of the product.
(2) Interaction dynamics - describing how the life cycle is influenced by
technological and market interaction with competing products.
This interaction can enhance or hinder the maturing process. When these
relations are described by coupled differential equations it is possible to
show that, under certain conditions, this can lead to a swarming process (syn-
chronization of the maturing process).
Dr. A. Kleinknecht (Chapter 16) presents a well-documented essay on
rates of innovation and profits in the long wave. He uses patent statistics as
a proxy for the rate of innovation and differentiates between product and
process innovation. The data support the idea that patents are not emerging
randomly, but in swarms. It is difficult. though. to select the secular set of
innovations and distinguish between "basic" and other types of innovation.
Dr. Kleinknecht's analysis gives some hint as to the mechanism behind turning
points in long waves based on innovation, complementing rather than contra-
dicting other theories. The same is valid for profit rate, the declining ten-
dency of which can be counteracted by raising the labor productivity of grow-
ing new industries.
An application-oriented study of long waves can hardly ignore the issues
of structural change. Even if these issues seldom can explain the whole cycle,
they are important components of potential mechanisms behind the dynamic
behavior of the economy.
Professor W. Krelle et al. (Chapter 26) presents the preliminary results
from his multination model. He considers a long-term fluctuation in economic
growth to be a fluctuation in the equilibrium growth path of an economy. In
the model, the growth paths of economic variables (GDP, export, import,
manufacturing) are determined by four exogenous variables (saving ratio. rate
of technical progress, rate of growth of labor, and money supply) which, when
fluctuated, can cause switching between the different equilibrium growth
paths. The main candidate for fluctuation is, of course. technical progress
and the related entrepreneurship.
Dr. J. Sterman (Chapter 11) presents the System Dynamics National
Model which seems to integrate several hypotheses. The long wave is shown to
arise from the interaction of locally stable firms with a variety of self-
reinforcing feedback processes. These involve capital investment, employ-
ment wages, inflation, interest rates, etc. The linkages between long-wave
theory and innovation, social change. and political values are also discussed.
This model is based on the multicausality of long waves and explains the
phenomena solely through endogenous processes.
Professor K. Val'tukh (Chapter 13) tests the relation of two basic laws of
economy - the law of value and the law of reproduction - by means of dynamic
input-output tables. Changes in input-output coefficients were tested on the
real data of several countries. These changes could convey the general direc-
tion of shifts in the technological system.
Dr. E. Mosekilde et al. (Chapter 18) present a new derivative of the Sys-
tem Dynamics Model of long waves, trying to account for the qualitative
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changes in economy and society that occur with each upswing. One of the
important parameters - the growth rate of upcoming new industries when it
reaches 15-20% - of the model generates 50-60 year oscillations. It was
pointed out that the increase in this parameter reduces the wave period,
while in the MIT model the increase in the investment rate prolongs the wave
period. Attempts will be made to integrate both models.
Professor S. Menshikov (Chapter 7) approaches long-term economic
development from another viewpoint. He stresses that the best manifesta-
tions of a contradiction in capitalism are the structural crises characterized
by changes from intensive to extensive growth, waves in the organic composi-
tion of capital and general profit rate, changes in the flow of technical prog-
ress, and the overaccumulation and relative shortages of capital. Menshikov
shows that, in the course of structural crises, a radical recasting in the sec-
toral structure occurs, the technological and interindustry base changes. as
does the level of concentration, market control, and macroeconomic interven-
tion.
Dr N. Nakicenovic (Chapter B) shows some examples, reconstructed from
historical records, of how technological change took place in energy consump-
tion, steel production, and the merchant marines in the USA. To capture the
dynamics of these changes logistic substitution analysis was used.
How technical revolutions are influenced when changing economic effi-
ciency is described by Dr. H-D. Haustein (Chapter 15). He contends that it is
dynamic efficiency (the efficiency of a set of growth industries) that
predetermines the evolution of average efficiency in the production system
and, at the same time, directs the trajectory of technical revolution. Dynamic
efficiency is measured by the relation of net returns to productive funds. He
has tested these relations on a corresponding model with data that covered a
30-year period and obtained a cyclical pattern of dynamic efficiency.
Dr H. Maier (Chapter 6) pursues a similar concept, and shows how innova-
tion can influence employment. Maier also shows how "revolution in value"
enhances innovation and speculates on a potential new combination of basic
innovation which could generate the next long wave in productivity growth.
Dr. C.W.A.M. van Paridon (Chapter 12) argues that growth and change are
two inseparable companions. Many sciences have managed to merge them into
a single theory. The author argues that economics is not among them because
it considers change only marginally. Then he elaborates on the concept of
the structure in which he includes not only shares of branches in production,
but also consumption and external relations. This concept is especially useful
in small open economies, where an important determinant is the outside world.
The author described the multifaceted character of structural change during
the long-wave period.
In the early years of long-wave research, monetary factors played a key
role in explaining long waves. Later, especially after Schumpeter's ground-
breaking work, innovation took the lead as a factor of interest. Nevertheless,
any trustworthy theory of long waves should respond, and have an explana-
tion for, any important events that occur in both cost and monetary fields.
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Dr. P. Korpinen (Chapter 24) presents a model based on a neo-Keynesian
type of gr'owth model (a la Harrod, Kaldor, and Kalecki). After defining an
equilibrium growth he tries to find a monetary explanation for disturbances in
the equilibrium path, leaving money supply as an endogenous var'iable. The
model can show cyclic behavior and delivers information on the relation of
money supply, interest rates, wages, etc. Dr. Korpinen suggested the period
with high interest rate be called a "monetarist" regime, and the period with
low interest rate a "Keynesian" regime. The task of a researcher' then would
be to describe the mechanisms causing the change in regimes. When specula-
ting in wider terms he points out that economic policy has a tendency to be
late, and therefore "wrong", because reality determines consciousness, and
consciousness deter'mines the action. This process takes time and causes
delays. Dr Korpinen cites past cases to prove his point.
Dr. M. Di Matteo (Chapter 23) presents a model based on W.W. Rostow's
theory of long waves (relation of foodstuffs and raw material prices to prices
of manufactured commodities). He discusses ways to mer'ge the dynamics of
relative price processes with technical change.
Dr. J. Delbeke (Chapter 22) presents an interim report of his research
into long-term trends in the money supply of Belgium (1877-1984). He avoids
complicated statistical procedures by choosing a Juglar-oriented research,
and concentrates on money supply. He treats money supply as both the prod-
uct of the "base money" and as a multiplier. Dr. Delbeke manages to ttack
down a causal circle in the monetary domain where the growth of the base
money stimulates the growth of the other determinants, including private
banking, as a result of public optimism, and so a "virtuous circle" is created.
When the possibilities are saturated the relationships change and the "virtu-
ous circle" become a "vicious" one. In a small open economy such as that of
Belgium this depends on the competitive position of the country.
Dr. B. Sipos (Chapter 10) presents the results of his empirical research
on historical Hungarian and World data to explain long-term fluctuations. (Dr.
E. Gidai also presented a paper on a Hungarian study of long-term develop-
ment, but it is not included in this volume.)
An interesting attempt is presented by Drs. F. Foders and H.H. Glismann
(Chapter 3) on long waves in Argentinian economic development. The message
here is that several existing theories have to be adapted before application
to a country such as Argentina. For example, a lack of endogenous teohnologi-
cal innovation invalidates Schumpeter's hypothesis: distributional conflicts
have a more explanatory power. Related to this is the impact of an oversized
government sector that creates disincentives for private entrepreneurial
activity.
Drs. R.M. Entov and A. V. Poletayev (Chapter 9) discuss the fluctuation in
the rate of return that has a key position in Marxist theory. They also
present the methodological problems in collecting data, especially for the
pre-World War II period.
It seems sure that as long as long-wave research exists it will be accom-
panied by methodological issues, as explained by Professor Chizov (Chapter
2). His argument is that while spectral analysis of statistical time series
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shows the existence of long-term harmonics, nobody can estimate rigorollsly
long-term oscillations in a macroeconomic time series generated by a
macroeconomic model. The author has also tested business cycles in a
macroeconomic model, but several issues remain open. This is because during
the sample period many changes (structural, price changes) take place that
irlflucnce a business cycle. The question is how to represent these in the
model.
A sophisticated method to analyze data series was presented by Dr. R.
Metz (Chapter 28) using the theory of linear filters. After a criticism of the
original Kondratieff method (polynomial) he points out its main weaknesses:
(1) In trend determination.
(2) Potential "Slutzky-effect ".
(3) The pmblem of determining upper' and lower points.
After a discussion of the spectrum analysis he suggests a linear filter,
designed by W. Stier, that shows many advantages.
Professor Mensch et al. (Chapter 29) present the results of an extended
Mensch-Wold PLS (Partial Least Squares) method applied to Swedish and FRG
data.
Even the most outspoken critics of long waves do not expect (or consider
unlikely) a steady growth. The same holds true for territorial uniformity.
Development dynamics has its regional ramifications, which may contain some
determinants that are needed to comprehend the reality. Several papers
touched on this topic. Dr. G. Bianchi et al. (Chapter 14) present a com-
parison of Italy and Great Britain on a regional basis and have devised several
hypotheses for the regional takeoffs and tested them on real data. Professor
Nijkamp (Chapter 19) presents a method that tries to identify significant
parameters behind the diffusion of new technology in different regions of the
Netherlands. Among the parameters were education of the labor force, R&D
infrastructure, amenities, etc., that are important "social" parameters.
Baaske et al. (Chapter 17) has a similar orientation which tried to identify
growth retarding factors and paradigms of the new upswing. With data from
19 countries they show that many factors which helped economic growth
became growth retarding (government spending. economies of scale, social fac-
tors).
An interesting nonlinear model is presented by Professors Craig and
Watt (Chapter 30). It depicts the relation between use (depletion) of
resources and economic factors. The model also accounts for other relevant
factors (demography. 20vernment policy, etc.). It captures, with precision,
most of the temporal variation in wages and prices over a period of 100 years
for the USA. The authors suggest using the model to understand potential
changes induced by the impending transition away from an oil-based global
economy.
The conference that produced these proceedings had several specific
features, such as its wide scope and the participation of senior scientists
from socialist countries. All of the participants felt that, in spite of
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unresolved theoretical questions, we have to focus more on the applied side if
these theories are to prove of some utility to decision makers. The recent
problems of structural chan2e and employment, and the accompanying societal
problems, present an immense task and their solution, as practice shows, can
not be achieved by traditional means. Many participants felt that research
on long-term fluctuations could prove helpful.
Several scientists from socialist countries presented a time series for
their countries. However, when testing some models and lon2-term
hypotheses, they had to turn frequently to US data because of its con-
sistency. Many lon2-term theories cannot be tested on data from socialist
countries as most of them have existed for a shorter period than a full Kon-
dratieff cycle. Even in this period the real economic forces are distorted by
the excessive impact of World War II. In several socialist countries the war
theater swept throu2h twice in a five-year period.
This conference was organized and sponsored jointly by the Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, and
the Institute of Theory. History and Organization of Science of the Academy
of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic, Berlin.
Tibor Vasko
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis,
Laxenburg, Austria

Welcome Address
I am happy to say a few words of welcome to you. First, welcome from the
scholars of the German Democratic Republic! Second, welcome to the impor-
tant subject that you are dealing with! Welcome also from a social scientist
who, more than 50 years ago, wrote the first statistical study on long waves by
a Marxist, in which I denied their existence on the basis of the development
of industrial wholesale prices in the major industrial countries from the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century until 1933.
Since then I have come to acknowledge the existence of long waves -
without being able to find a satisfactory explanation for them in my own or in
other studies. If long waves are really a law of the development of capitalism,
it is necessary to develop a completely satisfactory theory to explain them.
And once such a theory has been developed for the economy as a whole,
it will be necessary to investigate trends in the major factors of the economy,
in order to establish which are or are not a necessary part of the general
trend. We know, of course, that prices do not necessarily follow the general
trend if there is strong inflation. But what are the current and future trends
with regard to unemployment? Many economists (and I agree with them) fear,
regardless of any waves, a steady rise of unemployment in the future, because
of the steady advance of the present technological revolution combined with a
low rate in the rise of production.
I am glad that structural changes and innovations are also being dealt
with here. Quite a number of scholars believe that they are the cause of long
waves in the economy. But the question is: Can they not also bring about the
end of long waves?
And if, as I suspect - naturally, not more than suspect! - long waves will
not be an aspect of capitalist development in the future, if there will only be
a slow, long-term development of capitalist industrial production, are long
waves really no more than an historical fact for which no theory is necessary?
Or would our task be to develop two theories, one for the existence of long
waves in the past and one for their future non-existence?
You see, I am as eager as I was more than half a century ago to deal with
these deliberations. But I must not allow this eagerness to lengthen my wel-
come to you.
Jurgen Kuczynski
Institute for the History of Economics
Academy of Sciences
German Democratic Republic
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PART I
Concepts and Theories on the
Interpretation of Long-Term
Fluctuations in Economic Growth

CHAPTER 1
Will There Be a Fifth Kondratieff?
Gerhart Bn1.ckmann
In recent years a substantial number of scholars have attempted to interpret
a number of phenomena of our time and/or the result of analyses of various
time series as the trough between the fourth and fifth Kondratieff waves. In
their (implicit or explicit) view, there will be a fifth Kondratieff, Le., an
economic wave of some 50 years' duration, carried by a new bunch of itmova-
tions (e.g., microelectronics, robotics, bioengineering, etc.).
In many respects, however, the present extended economic "low" seems
to exhibit characteristics different from the "lows" between earlier Kondra-
tieff waves. Indeed, many writings, from Daniel Bell onward, seem to indicate
that we find ourselves at the brink of a new socioeconomic age rather than
between two Kondratieff cycles. It may well be that future historians will
divide the economic history of man into three ages: the preindustrial age,
which lasted until the end of the eighteenth century; the age of industrializa-
tion (the 200 years from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth century,
subdivided into four Kondratieff cycles); and the postindustrial age, from the
late twentieth century onward. A variety of symptoms seem to support this
view.
Throughout the age of industrialization, the industrial process was
characterized by concentration and by growth in average size - car produc-
ers, airline companies, hospitals, supermarkets, mass media - and by stan-
dardization of products. But in recent years, we have begun to experience
trend reversals.
To quote just a few examples: Small firms make good money by adapting
standard automobiles to individual tastes. Tiny airline companies have found
ecological niches where they earn higher profits than large ones. Hundreds
of local or specialized newspapers have sprung up. The trend toward bigger
and totally comprehensive hospitals has given way to small, specialized care
centers. Supermarkets are yielding ground to "superettes". Twenty years
ago, the growth of city agglomerations seemed inevitable; in recent years,
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large cities have steadily lost population not only to suburbia, but to rural
areas.
There seems to exist an intriguing common explanation for all these
symptoms: Agrarian Society was decentralized, Industrial Society central-
ized, and in the Information Society the main tendency will be decentraliza-
tion (and diversification) again. Hence, what at first glance looks like a
regression to preindustrial times could rather be interpreted as a distinct
advance into the new socioeconomic age. Moreover, there is - at least - one
aspect in which Information Society will differ profoundly from Agrarian
Society.
Agrarian Society had its system of norms and values, fitting the exigen-
cies of agrarian life. Later, this system was replaced by a different set of
norms and values, as required by industrial (mass) production. As we proceed
into the Information Society, we neither return to the old values of Agr~rian
Society, nor is a new, generally accepted value system emerging. Rather, one
of the main characteristics of the Information Society is that, contemporane-
ously, several norms peacefully coexist. For example: Learning, work and lei-
sure were, in the Agrarian Society, integrated during all periods of life.
Learning (mainly non-formalized "learning by doing") and work took place
from early childhood to Ausgedinge; evenings and holidays were enjoyed by
all generations alike. The necessities of Industrial Society led to a separa-
tion: a number of years of (formalized) "learning", during which "work"
became increasingly banned. led to "work life", followed by a "retirement
period". Information Society, however, brings neither a return to the
integrated system of Agrarian Society, nor a new, generally valid system.
What we observe is a multiplicity of concurrent systems of distribution of
learning, work. and leisure over the lifespan of an individual. For highly spe-
cialized professions, e.g., surgeons or opera singers, the traditional succes-
sion of learning, work, and leisure periods continues; the majority of the
younger generation, however, chooses different mixes on an individual basis.
This may not be the only unique characteristics of current society.
Some· authors hold that this age represents the most distinct break in the
development of humankind. All earlier times were characterized by (a)" scar-
city and (b) no visible limits to development; "more" goods was synonymous
with "better off". In industrialized nations, for the first time in human his-
tory. neither feature holds true any more. We have arrived at a period
characterized by (a) affluence and (b) threateningly visible limits to growth.
Our generation, hence, is challenged with the most profound revolution in atti-
tude any generation ever had to face.
The purpose of these remarks is not to discourage researchers in their
attempts to dig out the fifth Kondratieff; but rather to sharpen their visions
with regard to a more appropriate interpretation of the phenomena they are
attempting to investigate. Maybe. in the Information Society of the centuries
to come, Kondratieff cycles will reappear. in which case we are living now in
the most fascinating of all times - the verge between two Kondratieff waves
plus the verge between two ages of civilized man.
Problems of Model Estimation of
Long-Term Economic Oscillations
YA. Chizho'U
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the results
of the spectral analysis of long-term statistical data from the USA, and in the
second part some approaches to the use of macroeconometric models for
investigating long-term economic oscillations are discussed.
Theoretically, there may be five types of long-term oscillations around a
trend (see Figure 2.1). Type I oscillations are described by a sinusoidal curve
with constant period (T) and amplitude (A). Types II and III have different T
and A, respectively. Type IV is an "in-step" line, where different develop-
ment types substitute one for another. Finally, Type V reflects the influence
of some short-term disturbances that occur periodically in an economy. In
reality, all five types of oscillations may take place and period and amplitude
instability of oscillations are more probable. Traditional methods of spectral
analysis enable oscillations to be effectively identified only in cases of A and
T stability, and the last condition is more important.
Long-term statistical series for the US economy have been analyzed in
order to identify long-term harmonics within a long sample period and for sub-
periods within it. Estimates of US industrial production (see Table 2.1) were
made for 65 observations (N) between 1920 and 1964 by varying investigated
frequencies (M) from 24 up to 40. Our results showed the existence of short-
term (four years), medium-term or cyclical (seven years), and long-term (16
years) harmonics. Using Kondratieff's methodology, the original time series
was modified with a seven-year moving average to exclude short- and medium-
term harmonics. As a result only one harmonic with an 16-22-year oscillation
was identified, whose spectral power (SP) was three times greater than the
maximum in the original series estimation.
The same experiments were made for producer price time series for 94
observations from 1691 to 1964 (see Table 2.2), and in the original series three
6 Modeling Long-Term Economic Oscillations
I
~
I 11
III
IV
v
V
Figure 2.1. Types of long-lerm economic oscillations.
Table 2.1. Induslrial producllon (IF), 1919-1984, N =65.
M T SP
24 16 2.3
7 3.7
4 3.3
28 16 2.5
7 3.8
4 3.6
32 16 2.7
7 4.0
4 4.1
36 16 2.7
7 4.0
4 4.1
40 16 2.7
7 4.1
4 4.3
Moving average - seven years
28 18-22
4
12.8
0.3
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Table 2.2. Producer prices (PP), 1891-1984, N =94.
M T SP
24 32 3.7
9 4.2
28 28 3.7
9 4.5
6 2.9
32 32 4.2
9 4.8
6 3.1
36 29 4.5
9 5.2
6 3.3
40 32 4.8
9 5.5
6 3.6
Moving average - nine years
30 30 16.7
6 0.8
1891-1938, N = 48
28 16-22 2.8
9 5.6
1939-1984, N = 46
28 37 6.0
5 5.1
harmonics (30. nine, and six years) were identified. Having modified the
series with a nine-year moving average. we identified only one harmonic with
an oscillation period of 30 years and with a fairly high spectral power. By
dividing the sample period into two equal subperiods (1891-1938 and
1939-1984) we were able to identify 16-22-year oscillations with a low spec-
tral power for the first period, and 37-year oscillations with a high power for
the second.
Similar estimates were developed for the GNP deflator time series for
the whole sample period as well as for two subperiods (see Table 2.3), and the
results were close to those for the producer price time series. Finally, GNP
per capita estimates (see Table 2.4) were close to those obtained for US indus-
trial production. with only one exception: the absence of reliable estimates
of long-term oscillations for the two subperiods. The results of these investi-
gations can be summarized as follows:
(1) Spectral analysis has enabled us to identify long-term oscillations in the
dynamics of US macroeconomic data. The use of moving averages
corresponding to the length of the business cycle is a fruitful method.
(2) In US production data for the last 60-90 years the identified oscillation
period was 20 years. whereas the long-term oscillation in prices was
about 30 years.
8Table 2.3. GNP deflator (GNPD), M =26.
ModeLing Long-Term Economic OsciLLa.tions
N T SP
94 (1691-1964) 26-37 6.5
9 4.1
6 2.3
46 (1691-1936) 22-26 5.0
9 5.3
6 1.9
46 (1939-1964) 36 7.6
5 5.7
Moving average - nine years
65 30 17.4
6 0.5
Ta.ble 2.4. GNP per capita (GNPC), M =26.
N T SP
94 (1691-1964) 16 3.2
7 4.0
3 2.3
46 (1691-1936) 10 3.2
6 4.0
3 2.9
46 (1939-1964) 11 6.6
4 1.4
Moving average - seven years
67 17-20 13.4
4 0.4
(3) The division of the sample period into two subperiods was inefficient in
the case of production dynamics, probably because of the lack of obser-
vations within the subperiods. In the case of price dynamics this divi-
sion enabled us to conclude that the oscillation period increased from
more than 20 years in the first subperiod up to 36-37 years in the
second.
The use of macroeconometric models for analyzing short-term (four
years) and cyclical (7-8 years) oscillations in the post-World War II US econ-
omy, combined with spectral analysis, thus enables oscillations in economy
dynamics and the sources that generate them to be identified (Chizhov. 1984).
The common algorithm for analyzing economic oscillations is based on the
investigation of harmonics generated endogenously by the model and tradi-
tional methods of simulation analysis. It is clear that the model should gen-
erate the same oscillations that have been identified in the real statistical
time-series data. The methodology provides answers to the following ques-
tions:
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(1) If the model generates long-term oscillations endogenously, are the given
interrelationships responsible for generating them?
(2) If so, within what limits of interrelationship parameter changes do these
oscillations occur, and how do the changes influence common dynamic
characteristics of the model?
This approach can be illustrated by a simple model:
C = a 1 W +a zP -1 + ...
1 = agP -a4K -1 +
Y = C +1
W =y-p
K =K -1 +1
(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
where C =consumption, 1 =investments, W =wages, P =profits, Y =national
product (income), K = capital stock, and at = coefficients > O. The negative
feedback created by equations (2.2) and (2.5) generates endogenous oscilla-
tions in the model dynamics. If 1 includes a change in business inventories
(CBI), the period of the main harmonics equals 4-4.5 years. If (CBI) , is
excluded the oscillation period increases to 8-9 years (all data for post-World
War II US economy).
If 1 and K in equations (2.2) and (2.5) are disaggregated into equipment
and structures (the Latter have much longer periods of service), this will lead
to the generation of an additional long-term harmonic. In that case the simu-
lation analysis based on the variation of the negative feedback parameters in
relation to investments and capital stock in construction will give an oppor-
tunity to estimate the features of the so-called "construction cycle",
Another approach is based on the use of the production function:
Y = 11 (L,K)
K = ~bt Ki
t
(2.6)
(2.7)
where L =labor. In function (2.7) the distribution of weights b t with lags i
enables the venture structure of fixed capital stock to be described. as well
as the influence of this structure (depending on the lifetime of each venture)
on long-term oscillations in an economy. Since the substitution of technology
generations might be reflected through changes in the venture structure, Le.,
parameters of function (2.7), this approach enables us to determine indirectly
the influence of technological progress (embodied in capital goods) on long-
term oscillations.
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The explicit (albeit partial) representation of technological progress
factors might be made through the insertion of a new variable in function
(2.6), such as expenditures on research and development:
(2.8)
where RDt _j =expenditures on research and development with a time lag j.
Estimates of coefficients for the US economy showed maximum sufficiency for
j = 5 years and the second peak of t -statistics for j = 1 year (see Figure
2.2). The existence of a relationship with such a long time lag might also influ-
ence long-term oscillation parameters sufficiently to transform irregular
dynamics of innovations into long-term oscillations in economic growth.
t-statistics dj
2 3 4 5 6
Lag j (years)
Figure 2.2. The t-stalislic values for the coefficient d.J estimates. The function
(2.8) was estimated by OLS for i = 0.1, ....6.
The main methodological problems that arise in such investigations are
connected first with a shortage of long-term statistical data: for spectral
analysis of long-term oscillations it is sufficient to have isolated time series
twice as long as the oscillation period, but for econometric model development
a complete system of national accounts over a long period is needed. The
second problem is due to the absence of reliable and disaggregated data for
various elements of fixed capital stock. A third problem is connected with
the need to exclude disturbances in statistical series caused by World Wars I
and II. It is possible that these two strong (even for the USA) disturbances
either generated their own long-term harmonics or destroyed long-term "inno-
vation cycles", "construction cycles", etc.
Finally, we consider the most important problem in long-term
econometric model development to be that during the sample period there
were many structural changes. price-system developments. and business cycle
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transformations. All of these led to important changes in medium-term
econometric model parameters and structures. What model structure and
parameters can represent the long-term sample period? This problem calls
for additional investigations. In this context we consider that an approach
based on preliminary transformation of the original time series data to
exclude short-term and business cycle oscillations (e.g., using moving aver-
ages) is interesting. But here there are many more questions than answers.
Reference
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CHAPTER 3
Long Waves in Argentine
Economic Development
Federico Faders and Hans H. Glismann
3.1. The Overall Picture
Every physical and moral development favoring the social order can
thus be grasped at one point: an increase in net product.
Mirabeau, 1976
Argentina's historical pattern of economic development differs in more than
one way from that experienced by comparable countries, and particularly so
in her poor growth performance during the last 50 years. In this respect
Argentina is an outstanding example of a country that is economically declin-
ing relative to both other countries and its own past record (Diaz-Alejandro,
1981). Yet Argentina's slow growth can hardly be explained by low or inade-
quate resource availability, for she is relatively richly endowed with human
and natural resources; in fact Argentina seems to match quite well the para-
dox of a resource-rich but poor country.
Analyses of growth cycles in less-developed countries are rare (but see
Kuznets, 1973; Lewis, 1978). This is surprising because slow economic growth
is generally acknowledged to be the main problem of these countries. The
reason for this deficiency may be that, rather than growth itself, underem-
ployment of factors of production, a lack of complementary factors like physi-
cal and human capital and/or basically noneconomic aspects (illiteracy, health
standards, and food shortages) have been held to be the important issues
(Lewis, 1984; Papanek, 1983). Also, a lack of a sufficiently reliable data basis
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is probably more commonly a hindrance for empirical studies regarding less
developed than developed countries (Randall, 1976).
Ji'igure 3.1 gives an overview of the Argentine economic performance
since 1864. The curves represent investment shares, and three- and nine-
year moving averages of the deviations of real gross domestic product and
investment from their exponential trends. At first glance the pattern of
Argentina's development does not show evidence of the long-wave behavior in
industrial countries' aggregate production, which suggests that the current
economic downswing (measured by social products, investment, and employ-
ment) began in the early (FRG) or late (France) 1960s (van Duijn, 1983; Free-
man,1983). Several particular features deserve to be mentioned:
(1) The regular pattern of economic upswings and downswings, resembling a
sinusoidal curve of the Kuznets rather than the Kondratieff type. Meas-
ured peak to peak, each cycle has a length of about 17 years.
(2) Amplitudes seem to have been declining continuously, in fact they have
virtually disappeared in recent years.
(3) Since the late 1930s economic development has been persistently below
its long-term average.
The peaks and troughs reveal that there have been at least three full
cycles since 1870: the first had its trough about 1880 and its peak in 1893;
the second "began" in 1900 and reached its zenith in 1909; and, finally, the
third trough can be located around 1918 with the upswing ending in 1926.
From then on one may speak of a continuous trough in development, with some
small indication of recovery starting around the early 1960s.
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss some hypotheses
that explain Argentine development. Specifically, it focuses on the distribu-
tional conflicts hypothesis, the inflation hypothesis, the world market
hypothesis, and the political cycle hypothesis. The Schumpeterian innovation
hypothesis is not mentioned here because it does not seem to be relevant to
developing countries.
3.2. Explanation of Argentine Long Waves
3.2.1. The diBtributional contIicts hypothesis
Hypotheses concerning distributional conflicts have been advanced since the
19708 (Glismann et ai., 1978) as the main cause of long-term cycles in economic
development. Such hypotheses had already been put forward by Karl Marx
and his followers, but today particularly by Mandel (1980) and Olson (1982).
Whilst Marxists place special emphasis on the exploitation of the "working
class" by "capitalists", non-Marxist authors study distributional conflicts
between organized interest groups, Le., between trades unions and employers'
organizations, among entrepreneurs, between consumers and producers,
between organized and non-organized labor, and between government bureau-
cracy and private productive factors.
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In the case of Argentina, two kinds of distributional conflicts can be
identified. First, that between organized labor and entrepreneurs: this
hypothesis states that any change in the relative position of one party
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Figure 3 ..1b Long waves in Argentine development. a Gross real investment as a %of
real GDP. 3-year and 9-year moving averages of deviations from trend, as % of
trend value. All values in 1960 prices. CFfgures for 1860-1900 based on estimates.
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adversely affects the other in a zero-sum fashion. If labor demands and
receives wage increases in excess of productivity growth, the profitability of
\::apital investment is reduced. In circumstances where the marginal product
of labor is equal to or even below real wages, such wage increases also lead to
unemployment. In the wake of falling profit rates investment in domestic
physical capital declines, and thus ultimately the social product decreases.
The second distributional conflict pertains to the bureaucracy exploit-
ing the productive sector. The model assumes that there is such a thing as a
growth-optimal degree of public goods production by the government. Taking
internal security as an example, inadequate law enforcement would prevent
economic growth reaching its maximum, whereas too much law enforcement
would present obstacles to economic development. This implies that govern-
ment can be very effective in constraining economic activity by engaging in
public goods production. Bureaucratic exploitation also takes place when
government supplies protection of any kind, Le., does not guarantee the open-
ness of markets. The ensuing establishment of a market for protection takes
resources away from productive use (in a macroeconomic sense) and allocates
them toward unproductive activities. Artificial bureaucratization of the
private sector should be closely related to the size of the official bureau-
cracy.
Trades unions have existed in Argentina since the late nineteenth cen-
tury and can be closely associated with immigration flows because European
immigrants brought with them the idea as well as the know-how of labor organ-
ization. The importance of trades unions grew with industrialization, particu-
larly since 1930, when import substitution policies were first implemented.
Concentration of workers in urban areas helped to create favorable condi-
tions for labor organization, and since the mid-1940s trades unions have
become a central element in social life. Under Per6n (1943-1955) a central-
ized union was empowered to raise and allocate membership fees which, due to
the quasi-closed-shop system in the manufacturing sector. virtually made
trades unions a part of public administration.
As regards distributional conflicts arising from government intervention,
two issues in Argentine economic history are worth mentioning: the nationali-
zation of manufacturing and service companies, particularly of foreign com-
panies, and bureaucratic redistribution. Foreigners had been the main source
of entrepreneurial impulses since the country's independence in 1810. Espe-
cially since the 1940s, nationalization of "key industries" - directed first
against British "imperialism" and later against US domination - brought with
it the emergence of a large number of state-owned companies. In the banking
sector, in public utilities and in industry, government became more and more
the dominating entity (Randall. 1978).
Also begun in the 19408 was a policy aiming at distributional justice
rather than at economic efficiency. Per6n believed that social justice would
ultimately lead to economic progress; but this turned out to be an invitation to
a permanent struggle for higher shares of the national income. Productivity
as a criterion for distribution has virtually not mattered since then. In
Argentina the bulk of transfer payments consisted of direct firm or sectoral
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subsidies; interpersonal transfers, very common in more-developed countries,
have been of only marginal importance.
Figure 3.1 highlights the relationship between the long-term cycles of
GDP and investment activity; Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between gross
domestic activity and indicators of income distribution. As regards GDP and
gross investment, their respective cyclical patterns match quite well. The
first impression is that the peak years 1909 and 1926 are identical for both
indicators and that the same holds true for the trough of investment develop-
ment at the end of Wold War I (1918), as well as for the one in World War II
(1941). From 1941 onward mainly shorter cycles of the Juglar type seem to
have dominated. It is noteworthy that the ratio of investment to GNP also
reveals a long-term decline since 19a7-1910 up to the present. Investment
activity helps to explain the weak performance of the Argentine economy
after the peak of 1926: this ratio did not again achieve that of the years
1904-1914 and 1923-1929. In other words, since 1929 consumption seems to
have been much more rewarding than savings and domestic investment.
Such developments can basically have two explanations:
(1) Income has been redistributed from the rich to the poor; this would
result in higher consumption.
(2) Investment profitability declined and thus either consumption or capital
exports increased.
In Figure 3.2 the wage-productivity ratio has been taken as an indicator of
both redistributional incomes policies and of labor costs. From 1919 to 1947
real wages increased faster than productivity, but after 1947 the "gap"
between real-wage growth and productivity declined again. though very slowly
at first. In fact, the time span between 1946 and 1956 resembles a high-wage
plateau.
Since 1956 the ratio of wages to productivity has been falling; indeed.
after 1974 this decline is extraordinary, due to the tremendous fall in real
wages (Paldam, 1985). The domestic dip in real wages of about 70% between
1974 and 1978 has no precedent in recorded economic history; one of the fac-
tors "explaining" it is the freezing of nominal wages by a new administration
in 1976 while inflation continued. The question to be answered is why overall
economic activity did not respond to this decline in labor costs. Possibly. the
distributional conflicts hypothesis - at least as far as the conflict between
labor and entrepreneurs is concerned - may not be symmetrical, Le., high
wages and low profit rates always dampen investment activity. whereas the
converse - low or declining real wages - does not necessarily encourage
investment; other conditions may be important. too. Second. expectations
matter: if entrepreneurs do not believe that the wage decline will last they
will tend to wait rather than to precipitate investment; investment data (Fig-
ure 3.t.) support this notion. Severe and sudden changes in economic vari-
ables, in whatever direction. inhibit investors; they prefer graduality to
shocks.
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The mirror image of the labor income-labor costs pattern is given by the
development of the residual incomes share in GDP. Again, there is striking
evidence for a low residual incomes share between the mid-1940s and the late
1950s, which alone may account for the persistently low level of investment
activity in this period. Since unions in Argentina have had the power to
strongly influence the wage level most of the time, the share of wages in total
national income can be assumed to have risen above the share that would have
been determined by labor productivity alone. Thus industrialization appears
to have been obstructed by the distributional effects of unionization, which
may therefore have neutralized any incentives for investment created by
import substitution policies.
The government's influence, as measured by total government expendi-
ture (Figure 3.2), increased drastically in 1937, but this may well have been a
singular event when compared with the expenditure levels achieved in adja-
cent years. In 1944, however, government activity expanded again and
remained at high levels until 1958. This does not mean, of course, that
government refrained from crowding out productive factors after 1958:
Argentina's current severe debt problems seem to be related to the deficit
spending policies implemented since the late 1950s. All in all, empirical evi-
dence suggests that the economic problems of Argentina did not start only in
the 1930s and 194Os, as is commonly believed. Rather, incomes and invest-
ment indicators exhibit much earlier distortions.
3.2.2. The intlation hypothesis
Inflation generally reduces economic efficiency for two reasons: one is con-
cerned with the rate of inflation: the other with the variability of the rate of
inflation. The first argument says that inflation per se alters resource alloca-
tion and produces losers and winners. Losers are those with fixed or lagging
incomes, such as savers and asset holders, employees, and pensioners;
winners are those whose incomes overadjust to inflation, such as real estate
holders, speculators, and other "shrewd" people. This reduces allocational
efficiency by reducing overall savings in favor of unproductive speculative
investment. In addition, inflationary monetary policy does not leave relative
prices unchanged because newly created money is injected into certain sec-
tors of the economy and spent only on certain kinds of goods and services,
the prices of which rise before other prices feel the pull (Hayek, 1966). In
this way relative prices are constantly moving, not according to real scarci-
ties but to monetary phenomena; in fact the link between real scarcities and
prices becomes very weak under hyperinflationary conditions.
The second argument says that the predictability of inflation rates
matters, too. Whilst in the case of comparatively steady inflation rates
entrepreneurs and consumers already have difficulties in extracting informa-
tion on relative prices from the markets, this information becomes totally
blurred in cases of volatile inflation rates: "the broadcast about relative
prices is as if it were being jammed by the noise coming from the inflation
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broadcast" (Friedman, 1977, p. 27). The overall allocational efficiency conse-
quently declines further with an increasing unexpected variation in inflation
rates.
Argentine monetary history can be divided into three important periods
on the basis of the standard by which the peso was defined. The gold
exchange standard prevailed until the late 1930s; following textbook wisdom.
money creation was strictly limited to the gold supply during this period [1].
According to Mises (1953) such a standard is the best insurance against
spendthrift governments. After a transitional period based on a Sterling
standard, the US dollar became the new currency standard after World War n.
Thus. Argentina became free to pursue monetary policies that were not sub-
ject to the automatic discipline of the gold standard.
One of the causes of inflationary growth of money was the nationalization
of bank deposits between 1946 and 1957, and later again between 1973 and
1976. Only up to 1949 did credit expansion of the central bank have an upper
limit (credits could be extended up to 25% of existing gold and foreign
currency reserves). In 1949 this limit was dropped. and credit creation has
been virtually uncontrollable since. Only in 1957 was a fractional reserve sys-
tem introduced, but the legal opportunity to control inflation was not used.
The central bank, still in the hands of the government. continued to pursue
expansionary monetary policies, maybe due to the political weakness of
governments vis-a-vis unions and other organized interests (Del Canto, 1982);
the same applies to the period after 1976.
F'igure 3.3 presents the highlights of Argentine monetary history. Infla-
tion (measured by the consumer price index) and money supply turn out to be
highly correlated during the periods studied. It becomes quite clear that
(1) Inflation posed no great problem before 1944. After that the money sup-
ply virtually exploded. leading to an average level of inflation of roughly
20%/year between 1940 and the late 1950s. The rates of inflation then
even increased and were followed by hyperinflation from 1970 on.
(2) With a grain of salt, trend deviations of money supply - as measured by
M2 (Le.. cash + demand deposits + time deposits) - support the
hypothesis that monetary discipline loosened slgnificantly in the late
1930s and early 1940s and again during the 1960s and 1970s.
These observations fit extremely well with the history of Argentine monetary
institutions. What is more, trend deviations exhibit that the monetary policy
of the 1960s and 1970s was by no means unprecedented. The "monetary revo-
lution" took place in the 1940s. whereas today's inflationary money supply
seems to be a follow up.
Liquidity coefficients of the Argentine economy - as measured by the
ratios of M1 (cash + demand deposits) and M2 to GDP - show the effects of
inflation on money holdings (Bernholz, 1985). The gap between M1 and M2
coefficients partly reflects the effects of inflation on savings. This gap has
been decreasing since 1940. with a small and relatively stable gap between,
say, 1959 and 19'75. The relative level of savings. however. also decreased in
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the "stable" phase. After 1975, the gap increased again, possibly due to posi-
tive real interest rates since 1976.
All in all, the pattern of inflation does not contradict the long-term
development of GDP. Indeed, in view of the regularity of the long wave of GDP
before the 1930s one could have expected a new upswing starting in the mid-
1930s. But this did not happen; in fact. under inflationary conditions GDP
never recovered again.
3.2.3. Two other hypothese8
The explanatory powers of the distributional conflicts hypothesis and the in-
flation hypothesis do seem to be quite strong. Nonetheless, other hypotheses
may also be important, given that our analysis covers a fairly long period of
Argentine history, involving substantial institutional and policy changes. Of
the many other approaches that also seem to fit the Argentine case the most
promising appear to be:
(1) Changes in the world market conditions that had an impact on domestic
economic activity.
(2) Uncertainties introduced into the Argentine economy through frequent
changes in political power that presented obstacles to investment and
production.
Argentina's international economic relations, both with respect to trade
and capital flows, have been characterized by concentration (Kawata, 1972).
Export trade was not only highly concentrated regarding commodity composi-
tion, but also regarding regional distribution. The main customer for Argen-
tine agricultural goods was the UK, from independence until, say, the end of
Worid War II. Since World War I the USA also gained importance as a market
for Argentine products. In the past 40 years the USA has gradually become
the dominant trade partner. followed by Western Europe (until 1973, when
trade relations with EC countries was brusquely reduced due to the EC's agri-
cultural protection), notably Italy. Commodity imports followed similar
regional (though not product-specific) patterns, with the USA being the most
important source of Argentine imports. Capital inflows into Argentina, as weil
as capital outflows. exhibit a similar geographical distribution.
Thus, it can be hypothesized that major changes in worid markets are
very likely to have had severe income effects. Examples of such exogenous
events can be seen in World Wars I and II and the Great Depression. Also, ad
hoc discrimination of Argentine exports on political grounds falls under this
heading, such as the EC's boycott in the wake of the 1982 Faikland/Malvinas
conflict, or as the one imposed on Argentina during World War II. Non-tariff
barriers on imports from Argentina, particularly beef imports. have been
applied by the USA (since the 1950s; the official reason given was the danger
of transmitting foot~nd-mouthdisease) as well as by the EC (since 1973 within
the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy). The hypothesis following
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from these experiences would be that the Argentine economy had strong
incentives to insure against such export risks - either by diversifying
exports, or through a reduction of imports and consequen tty through import
substitution. Indeed. import substitution has been the Leitmotiv of Argentine
economIc policies since the 1930s (Foders, 1983).
The political cycle hypothesis rests on the observation that investment
as well as capItal imports react sensibly to political risk. Such risk can be
seen in unexpected and frequent changes in government, particularly if this
is associated with fundamental changes in policy.
Figure 3.4 shows the long-term development of the index for the inter-
national integration of the Argentine economy, measured as the share of
exports plus imports in GDP and as the deviation of this Indicator from its
long-term trend. The degree of international integration of Argentina has
been constantiy declining over the period 1865-1980; since 1950. the average
share of foreign trade in GDP was about 20%. One may distinguish three
phases of international integration: the first and highest lasted until the
turn of the century; the second, on a considerably lower level, can be
observed between 1900 and 1920; then came a strong decline over 25 years
until, in 1950, the current relatively low level was reached.
The deviations from the long-term trend are further evidence of the
importance of these three phases. It turns out that the largest and longest
deviation from the trend of integration lies between the mid-1920s and the
19605. According to the world market developments discussed above, this may
be labeled the "import substitution belly". Thus, neither World War I nor the
Great Depression and World War II were the origin of the stepwise decline -
unless, of course. there are hidden time lags.
Export performance can contribute to an explanation of the pattern of
international integration. One can interpret the data as follows: exports
relatively increased from 1860 until 1917. From then on came a steady decline
until the early 1950s; exports never fully recovered in the sense of exceeding
the long-term trend. These developments can serve to r'econsider the above
refutation of the hypothesis concerning the impact of the wars. It seems
that, at first, World War I contributed to the expansion of Argentine exports,
but that in the longer term exports have been severely hampered - either by
a misguided domestic policy (import substitution), or by some sort of discrimi-
nation by its main trading partners. At this time (the 1930s) the British Com-
monwealth was consolidated. Argentina was not invited to participate, even
though Britain was the main market for Argentine goods, and this meant an
important loss of foreign markets to Argentina [2]. Neither the Great Depres-
sion nor World War II had any direct or discernible effect on exports or on
the integration of the Argentine economy into the International division of
labor.
The political development of Argentina can be divided into four periods.
First, a long and stable period prevailed until 1930 (see Figure 3.4). In the
"transition period" from 1930 to 1943 government instability incr:-eased for
the first time this century. After 1943 stability resumed, but this came to an
end in 1955, and since then a fairly long period of high instability has
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Figure 3.4. Indicators of international int.tgration and of institutional change.
aReal exports; see note b in Figure 3.1. Exports plus imports, as % of GDP.
cExports plus impor~. as %of GDP; see note b in Figure 3.1 (expressed as % of ex-
ports plus imports). Bars indicate times of changes in government.
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prevailed. This pattern by and large fits into the picture of economic
development - with the apparent exception of the period 1943-1955, during
which income redistribution, government expansion, and high rates of infla-
tion prevailed.
3.3. Summary and Conclusions
Argentine economic development from 1864 to 1985 can be roughly divided
into a period of economic progress featuring significant Kuznets-type waves
(1864-1934), and a period of economic decline with virtually no long-term fluc-
tuations in GDP (1934-1983). Of the many issues that could potentially
explain such an unprecedented development of a basically resource-rich
country, this chapter has dealt with distributional conflicts, inflation, exog-
enous shocks, and political instability. The analysis shows that redistributive
incomes policies in favor of labor and government, accommodated by a very
loose monetary policy, seem to lie at the heart of an institutionalized distribu-
tional conflict over a relatively stagnant national income.
The explanatory power of each of these hypotheses, however, has varied
over time. Argentine economic history may be described thus: the first
incisive event in Argentine economic development in the period under obser-
vation was World War I. This was an exogenous shock for a country heavily
dependent on foreign trade. The subsequent degree of integration of Argen-
tina into the world economy has fallen, and consequently GDP expansion has
slowed down. Starting in the 19308. this trend triggered inappropriate
domestic policies aimed at income distribution rather than at economic
growth. The rise of trade unions. of populism (P~ronism). and the implementa-
tion of import substitution policies gradually made government the main actor.
besides trade unions and entrepreneurs. in economic matters. In order to try
to satisfy the demands of the conflicting interest groups the government
resorted to an easy monetary policy, with the result that in periods when one
would have expected economic recovery in the wake of improved profits, high
price inflation and political instability obstructed economic activity.
Exogenous shocks on world markets that occurred after World War I do
not seem to have been of major importance for the Argentine economic
decline. Nevertheless, such shocks as the Great Depression, World War II,
the embargoes on Argentine exports by the USA and the UK, and also the EC's
agricultural policies, have served to reinforced the negative effects of
incomes and monetary policies.
Notes
[1J It should be noted that there has been one exception to this rule, namely the
Baring crisis of 1890-1891, when inflationary paper-money creation to cope
with public deficits disrupted the Argentine financial sector following the
suspension of gold convertibility in 1885.
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[2] Argentina lrled lo overcome lhis discrlminallon by signing a lrealy wilh Greal
Brllaln, known as lhe Roca-Runclman lrealy, bul lhls did nol Improve lhe
slluation much.
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CHAPTER 4:
The Economy as an Evolutionary Pulsator
Richard M. Goodwin
In economics we commonly have models in search of facts - by contrast, long
waves appear to be facts in search of a model. I would like to offer a prospec-
tive model. Generally. the shorter the period. the easier it is to explain why
a cycle may exist: the best theory is that of the pig cycles, with a period of
two lags. Then there is the stocks cycle, the best understood of all general-
ized economic oscillators. The longer waves of 5-15 years are less evident
and have a less agreed-on explanation. Cycles of 40-50 years are difficult to
establish and more difficult to explain. To begin with, the 200 or so years of
industrial capitalism are too short a time to establish the existence of a cycle
from highly disturbed statistical series, so that we do not even know whether
there is anything to explain. Second, if a cycle does exist. it is difficult to
find a mechanism that remains unchanged for that long a time to produce a
cycle. The pronounced turbulence of modern capitalism makes it more or less
impossible to determine any constant system parameters.
The hypothesis proposed in this chapter is that technological knowledge
accrues exogenously, in a noncyclical fashion: the rate at which it is incor-
porated into the production structure is conditioned by the endemic ten-
dency of private capitalism to exhibit cycles in growth rates, Le., first it
grows too quickly and then too slowly.
Our era is characterized by an unparalleled accumulation of knowledge,
which is cumulative and hence tends to be exponential. Since economies do
not grow in a steady-state manner, our basic problem is to formulate an
economic model that is a frequency convertor, from steady flow to alternating.
This can be exemplified by what is known as a Roman fountain. A cistern is
fed by a stream of water; in it is a siphon leading to a vent at a lower level.
When the flow of water fills the cistern, it primes the siphon, which then emp-
ties the cistern, and remains inactive until the vessel is refilled. Thus, a
steady flow is converted into a maintained oscillation of constant amplitude.
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The cycle has a constant periodicity if the flow of water is constant, but for
variable flow will exhibit no regular periodicity.
Whilst one does not expect any ex:aet analogy with economics, there is a
certain similarity. The knowledge of new processes and products comes in a
steady flow until, once activated, there ensues a complex process of absorp-
tion into the economy, which, after a time, again relapses into quiescence.
The essential point is that the rate of activation of innovations is not indepen-
dent of the state of the economy and, conversely, the adaptation of new ideas
depends on the buoyancy of the economy. What we wish to model is the
dynamical coupling between the flow of ideas and the alternating response of
the economy.
The key to this irregular morphological evolution of capitalism was pro-
vided uniquely by Schumpeter, basing himself on the profound insights of
Marx, who saw that one could not understand the essence of capitalism
without seeing its "law of motion". Whilst rejecting Marx's Ricardian method-
ology, Schumpeter translated the "vision" into the language and structure of
orthodox economics. My own variant of the "vision" goes like this: 'capitalism
is a system controlled by the search for profit rather than any static maximi-
zation of output or utility; when producers see ways of lowering costs or
increasing sales, they invest; investing, they generate demand which favors
further investment, accelerating the expansion; this happy progression, if
uninterrupted, is ultimately arrested by the constraint of available labor sup-
ply, both skilled and unskilled. There are dual effects: first, real wages rise
faster than productivity, squeezing profits and inhibiting investment; second,
since unemployment goes down in the expansion, output grows at a rate that
cannot be maintained, so that the consequent deceleration destroys the pros-
pects necessary for investment in durable plant and equipment. The economy
then collapses to a level that is determined by income and expenditure, and is
not dependent on the current level of production. Excess capacity and wages
bring a disastrous fall in profits and profitability.
Consequently, there begins an urgent search for labor-saving processes
or new goods, which may, or may not, be waiting for implementation. If found
and activated, investment recommences in spite of excess capacity and low
profits, because the new capacity restores profitability.
My suggestion is that such a reformulation of the essential
Marx-Schumpeter "vision" provides the conceptualization necessary to
explain both the so-called business cycle and long waves. It means accepting
the idea that the exogenous (to economics, narrowly formulated) events of
social history play an essential role in this Darwinian view of economic evolu-
tion, as envisioned by both Marx and Schumpeter. But it is not a one-way cau-
sation: the impact of technology on the economy is transformed by the inter-
nal dynamics of the system into an expansion, an overexpansion, collapse, and
subsequent recovery. Therefore, the wider historical processes, which do not
necessarily have a cyclical character, are reshaped into a rhythmical pat-
tern, both in the shorter, decade period and in the longer, half-century
period. This is an example of what is called self-organization. The structure
contains two aspects: there is the relatively fast expansion and contraction of
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either levels or rates of output growth, and there is the relatively slow accu-
mulation of capacity to produce both new, innovative types and the expansion
of preexisting types. The modern world has been transformed by the substi-
tution of natural energy for human and animal energy. Hence Schumpeter
rightly pointed to the long gestation periods of energy sources, e.g., steam,
electricity, oil. Therefore, the shorter cycle outlined above will only be a
hiccup in a longer continuing rise in investment and productivity. The col-
lapse is brief because the investment is soon renewed, with the vital result of
saving labor and recreating the industrial reserve army of labor, which is the
necessary but not sufficient condition for the expansion of output. This view
implies that there should be long waves in both output and prices, since one
can scarcely conceive of them as independent of one another.
To model this, it is convenient to use the concept of an economic poten-
tial to illuminate such a complex problem. Prices and costs provide the infor-
mation necessary to make decisions about changes in economic structure.
Current, variable costs provide a stable short-term reaction, but the system
is repeatedly disturbed by exogenous technological changes, so that it is kept
in varying degrees of turbulence. Although it is quite wrong to formulate the
problem in aggregative terms, I shall first do so to make the central issues
clear.
To pursue the Roman fountain analogy, imagine that new ideas form a flow
adding to the existing stock (as a lake) of unexploited ones, both useful and
useless. The economic potential is simply a general representation of how the
economy will move, given the level of the lake and its own position; it is not a
given, unchanging thing, like gravity, but will alter shape according to
technological-economic evolution. Take a cross-section of the lake as meas-
ured in aggregate output; the economy moves forward or backward along the
bottom, under the influence of investment, but it cannot surface. The level of
the lake may either rise or fall: it will rise with the availability of unex-
plaited innovations; it falls as they are exploited. If a constellation of innova-
tions is substantially incorporated into the structure of the economy in
roughly half a century, we may think of three characteristic phases: initially
it has limited success and the lake rises little; in the middle period. it may
either rise or fall, as new uses accrue but adoption of them is also at a high
level; in the final period routine adoption is facilitated along with few new
applications to other sectors, so that the levels tend to fall. Therefore, with
a succession of hills and valleys of variable shape, there will ensue a succes-
sion of varying growth rates, including negative ones.
The economic potential, V(q), a function of national output, q, may
roughly look like Figure 4.1, along with the phase portrait rate of growth as
a function of output q(q). A succession of variable levels of the lake are indi-
cated by vt. My hypothesis is that a long wave begins and ends with substan-
tially unchanging oscillations. First, there is a succession of weak rises in V;
then comes a higher average level of V, possibly occasioning one or more
reversals. Then follows a decline in the level of V, ending in a stable oscilla-
tion.
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F'igure 4.1..
Figure 4.1 is an imaginary simulation of an historically conditioned
interaction of technological change with the resulting evolution of output. It
begins with a stationary oscillation between qo and q1' Then. as a result of
the initiation of a major cluster of innovations, V rises from V1 to Vz• thus
bypassing the bifurcation point at qz and shifting the system to a lengthy
variable growth. accompanied by a further rise to V3 with changing positive
growth rates, up to the point q3 where it reverses. In the ensuing downswing
V declines to Vz. and in the recovery rises again to V3 and then to V4. In the
terminal phase, V declines slowly to V3 and finally to Vz, initiating a stagnating
cycle of constant average level, between q 4 and q5' There the economy
remains trapped. only edging slightly forward, with minor innovations com-
pleted within the cycle. Then the system awaits the rebirth of a group of
major innovations.
This model has been pushed as far as possible. indeed too far. The real-
ity is different and. alas, more complex. It is unsound to deal with technologi-
cal progress in aggregative terms, because it consists precisely of shifts in
the relative size of old and new sectors, thus destroying any homogeneity in
the aggregates and hence any constancy in the parameters. The same is true
of prices. It is not a case of parametric change inducing an alteration of
motion, but rather that, after 40 or 50 years, we are dealing with quite a dif-
ferent mechanism. What happens is that one or more industries introduce
either new products or new processes with lower costs or they provide better
services. This then offers lower unit costs to a number of, but not all, other
sectors. This in turn offers further similarly advantageous changes to yet
other sectors, and so on until, with continuing adaptations and improvements,
all the possible changes have been made. The result is a significantly dif-
ferent production structure from the one with which the process began.
Prices provide the information upon which the vast number of production
decisions are made. It appears valid to assume, with Schumpeter (following
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Walras), that with an innovation, prices gradually sink to their newer, lower
costs. Hence one can define a fairly stable potential as a function of all
prices. With each change of relative prices, the equilibrium point is shifted,
so that the system, if previously at or near equilibrium, is then out of equilib-
rium. Each succeeding change in prices brings further changes in cost struc-
tures, which induce further changes, so that, in effect, the motion of the sys-
tem itself shifts the equilibrium of prices. That is why such a long lapse of
time is necessary to exhaust all the effects of a major innovation. There is,
however, no reason to doubt that this sequential process, taken in isolation
from exogenous disturbances, does come to an end, Le., is convergent.
The output behavior is somewhat different, since in order to implement
the successive changes, investment is necessary: investment stimulates
demand and so, through a Keynesian-type multiplier mechanism, the result is
favorable to the incorporation of the innovation, producing Schumpeter's
"swarms". This explanation of the bunching of innovations was explicitly
rejected by Keynes, but, nevertheless, I find it a better, more powerful for-
mulation than his own. Furthermore, it explicitly brings in variations in the
degree of employment, which he, in the neoclassical tradition, tended to
ignore. The consequent swarm of investment initiates a cycle in output
growth, the business cycle. The subsequent collapse temporarily inhibits
innovational investment. How great is the inhibition depends on the cost
effectiveness of the innovations: thus, electricity generating capacity tended
to increase right through the Great Depression of the 193Os. In any case,
after a time, the innovational investment will be renewed, until the new tech-
nology is fully integrated into the whole production structure. Then the sys-
tem remains in a relatively quiescent state until a different major innovational
cluster initiates a further long-wave expansion.
To model at least some aspects of this complicated sequential process,
one may use a value potential in bilinear form:
V(p, q) = <p > [I - a Hq I
where p and q are measured deviations from equilibrium values as determined
by capital costs and labor costs. Both are treated separately: unit capital
costs are estimated and applied as mark-ups on variable costs; unit labor
costs as combined result of falling labor inputs and real wages, variable with
the scarcity of labor. At equilibrium V is minimal and null, as are p and q.
Then,
Gradient Vp = [I - a] Jq I (supply less demand)
and
Gradient Vq =<p > [I - a] (price less cost)
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Assuming simply the traditional price-market dynamic that output less
demand determines price change, and that profitability determines output
variation, the result is an automatic control system that can be formulated as
a Hamiltonian:
av
ap
d = + av
dt"q Bq
or, in a single, partitioned, block matrix
{i?} =[ [0] • -[I - a]]{p}q +[1 - a] [0] q
where adjustment-speed coefficients are omitted for simplicity. Hence,
p =- [I - a][I - a] p and q =- [I - a f [I - a] q
From the fact that, although [I - a] is not symmetrical, both of these
matrices are, we know that the dual systems have only real eigenvalues, thus
producing two sets of n simple harmonic, constituent motions. This result
applies to a given, unchanging structure of production, and therefore is valid
for short periods only.
The implementation of a major innovation with relevance to many indus-
tries must be preceded by investment, which then shifts the equilibrium point
of the potential basin. Then there ensues a fall in one price and sequentially
in many others, thus gradually altering the [a] matrix, and increasing the real
value of a given wage bill and consumption demand, which further shifts the
output basin. Using wage rate as numeraire, we obtain oscillating prices about
a falling level and oscillating outputs about a rising level. Consequently, one
sees that the representation in Figure 4.1 of a continuous output potential is
too simple: the reality is a shifting potential being continually deformed as
between different industries and as between net output and consumption. At
anyone time there is a given structure, with an oscillatory character. For
short periods it may be taken as substantially constant: the shifting equilib-
rium and the deformations occur only very slowly. The effective demand
resulting from total real wages varies in a complicated way, rising with pro-
ductivity, especially in the region of full employment. This region shifts
upward with productivity, introducing a nonlinearity that forces a decelera-
tion of growth.
There seems no reason to expect any approximate long-term periodicity:
there is simply no recognizable mechanism of long enough duration to produce
it. There is only the basic pressure to search for new profitable ventures in
the context of a continuing flow of new technologies. Viewed in this light the
economy acts more as a pulsator than an oscillator: given an historically
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conditioned push, it rises in a wavering motion and then relaxes. The duration
of the pulse depends on the time required to complete the absorption of the
new technology. Then it awaits a further burst of investment, independent of
its depressed state. In this conceptualization there is no identifiable mechan-
ism of a deterministic character that is generating a cycle. Consequently,
there is no theoretical or statistical basis for forecasting the length of the
"low" stretch, nor the time or shape of the "recovery". The "accidents" of a
wider social history enter as essential determinants of economic history, not
as merely disturbances of a given, predictable course.
Thus, we end up with no explanation of the observed, rough periodicity.
There seems no reason to expect major innovations to follow one another in a
neat sequence, nor for their duration to approximate half a century. To
achieve complete integration into the production structure, steam took about
a century, as has electricity and the internal combustion engine. Nor is their
incidence necessarily separated in time. I suggest that the most promising
line of investigation is that of the mutual dynamical coupling of constellations
of innovations with the perversely wave-like response of the economy to
investment. Investment makes the economy buoyant and a buoyant economy is
highly favorable to investment; hence innovations bunch into swarms. And
when the bulk of investment in a group of innovations has been completed in
this favorable atmosphere, the economy then relaxes into varying degrees of
stagnation.
To explain the continuing recurrence of the expansive phases, it may
prove fruitful to explore anew the phenomenon of replacement cycles, well
observed in the case of ocean-going ships. Traditional business-cycle theory
can explain the upper turning point, but not the lower one, because of the
fundamental dynamical asymmetry of durable goods: they can be produced in
quantity within a short period, but they cannot be reduced at anything like
the same pace. The depression is characterized by persistent excess capac-
ity as well as excess labor. A major cluster of innovations may begin tenta-
tively and then, through its self-reinforcing tendency by virtue of the buoy-
ant effects of investment on output, grow to a maximum followed by a slow
decline. The continuing growth of new technology can act as a catalyst in
launching a new wave of replacement of prematurely obsolescent equipment by
the newer, superior teChniques. In this fashion a Schumpeterian innovation
may perform the same function for the longer as for the shorter wave, Le., it
may explain the resumption of investment in spite of the existing excess
capacity. Thus, it may be possible to explain the bunching of replacement in
spite of the large variance in physical lifetimes of equipment. Consequently
the dynamical coupling of investment with growth can provide a link that
explains the self-organization necessary for the existence of both short and
long waves.
The concept of a dynamical coupling of a shorter business cycle with a
longer cycle of innovations introduces some complications in the analysis.
Assuming the existence of a short cycle given a constant level of innovational
investment, and a longer one given a constant level of output, the behavior of
both will be altered by their mutual interaction. Both systems will exhibit
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both cycles, but each of the periodicities will be altered, the longer one being
lengthened and the shorter one shortened. Thus, an innovational wave of 30
years could, by interaction with trade cycles, be extended to 45 or 50 years.
Not only this, but because the two constituent periodicities are almost certain
not to be integral multiples of one another, the resultant behavior is no longer
periodic: it will never repeat itself, even in the absence of exogenous distur-
bances (Goodwin, 1946, 1947).
To state the problem in its simplest possible form, assume that both
aggregate output, q, and innovational investment, Z, exhibit simple harmonic
motion for constant values of each other, Le., in deviations from equilibrium,
..
q + aq =0 Z =constant
..
Z + {lz = 0 q = constant
Then, taking account of linear dynamical coupling,
..
q + aq + -yz = 0
z + {lz + rSq = 0
The separate periodicities will be altered, and both variables will exhibit both
of the scrambled periodicities. Thus, if by itself output would have a period
of 12 years and innovations one of 25 years, then, depending on the degree of
coupling, both will exhibit periods of 11 years and 48 years. Naturally, the
shorter period will be more prominent in output and the longer one in innova-
tions. The fact that the longer period may be lengthened strikingly by the
coupling much eases the problem of explaining the long wave. Presumably, the
bunching of numerous independent technical changes into successive long
waves of investment may be explained by more complex models of this general
character.
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CHAPTER 5
Marx and Engels on Long Waves
Thomas Kuczynski
An investigation of the publications on long waves indicates that the subject
has itself cropped up in long waves. We can thus state that a downswing in
the real economy creates an upswing in the discussion on the subject, whereas
during an upswing the discussions take a downswing. Because of the length of
this cycle, few economists have taken part in two successive upswings of such
discussions, so that much of the knowledge gained in former investigations is
lost.
Most economists do not remember the long-term forecasts made about 20
years ago. For example, Pareto (1917) predicted that after World War I there
would be a long-lasting depression. but this was apparently forgotten during
the crash and the depression of the 1930s. In 1926 the Hungaro-Soviet
economist Varga said that only after a new war could there be a new upswing
in European capitalism, but no one seems to have remembered his words in the
19508. In 1944 Colin Clark not only predicted a new upswing for the period
immediately after World War II, but also a downswing that would develop in the
late 1960s. Yet to most of us the present downturn has come as a surprise.
Long-term forecasting, both in economic policy and theory, is no rewarding
job: in the long term such predictions tend to be forgotten, whether they
were right or wrong. As long as 2000 years ago Horace said that time devalues
the world. Although history has corroborated Horace's point of view - was he
really right?
A large part of the research work done in this field during the last
decade has produced interesting results, albeit results already known 50. 70,
or even 90 years ago. Very often we have been reinventing the wheel for the
second, third, or fourth time. For example, although articles by Kondratieff
were translated into German, his theoretical approach (1928) was published
only in Russian. There are fascinating similarities between Lewis's (1978)
approach and that of Sirol (1942), but apparently Lewis was not aware of the
earlier work. Similarly, in the introductory essay to the Italian edition of
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Kondratieff's articles (1981), no reference is made to the Italian discussion
that took place between World Wars I and II. Fortunately, Kleinknecht (1984)
provides a fairly exhaustive survey of the Dutch debate between van Gel-
deren and De Wolff, etc. This debate, and the essential ideas developed
within it, was conducted at a high level, and little progress has been made
since then (apart from modern mathematical and statistical techniques). But
we should, of course, also investigate the debate between the "monetarists"
and the "agrarians" in France, the results of Dupriez's school in the 1930s,
the Soviet debates in the 1920s, and the ideas of the German social democrats
before World War I. (The new "stagnation theorists" are quite obviously in an
even worse situation: in present-day discussions references to the stagnation
debates of the 18708 and the 1880s, and even those of the 1930s and 1940s,
are, so to speak, rarissima. Are the authors at least aware of the wave-like
nature of their own contributions?)
That a thorough historiographical investigation of our subject has
become an absolute necessity was made clear to me when I discovered that the
main points of my own theoretical approach had been formulated as long as
120 years ago - by Marx. Of course, it is not a bad thing when an economist
comes to the same theoretical viewpoint as Marx did 120 years ago. But what
would we think of a physicist who presented Maxwell's equations as a new
theoretical approach?
Before compiling and commenting on the thoughts of Marx and Engels. I
give a brief summary of their major points in the theory of long waves:
(1) The starting point is the law of the tendency of the general rate of prof-
it to fall.
(2) The main instrument for avoiding a fall in the profit rate is technical
progress.
(3) Every technical and/or technological system can be improved only within
its own limits, and the more it is improved the smaller become both the
further possibilities and the economic effects of the improvements.
(4) When improvements cannot halt the fall in profit rate, capital has to look
elsewhere, such as to basic innovations.
(5) Basic innovations are very risky, and are usually undertaken only in
adverse circumstances since their prospective profitability, market
behavior, technical requirements, etc., are uncertain.
(6) A successful basic innovation may be very profitable for the original
entrepreneurs, and certainly will be so for the first followers, whose
profit rates will be higher than the general rate.
(7) The higher profit rate secured by the first followers further reduces
the profit rate of other entrepreneurs, so they too will be compelled to
i'1troduce the new techniques.
(8) The diffusion of the new basic techniques takes time, because it requires
the restructuring of large areas of capital.
(9) The result of this diffusion process is that surplus profit dwindles away
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in the areas concerned, and the general profit rate is reestablished at a
new level.
(10) The cycle starts again.
These ten points summarize a purely endogenous theory of long waves, so we
have to conclude that if nothing happens on the political scene, Le., if there
are no revolutions, wars, etc., a new upswing will occur. But even in a down-
swing phase, when the system is old and no longer capable of coping with
exogenous disturbances, such disturbances will occur more often than in the
upswing phase - a point to be treated elsewhere.
In preparing this chapter an aphorism by Lichtenberg came to mind:
"Very many people and perhaps most of them must, in order to find something,
first know that it's there." Indeed. when Heinz-Dieter Haustein asked me
whether I was aware that Marx had written about long waves, I of course
answered "no". But Marx had in fact done just that - until now overlooked by
all - in the third volume of Capital:
In spite of the great changes occurring continually ... In the actual rates
of profit within the Individual spheres of production, any real change In
the general rate of profit, unless brought about by way of an exception
by extraordinary economic events, Is the belated effect of a series of
fluctuations extending over very long periods, fluctuations which
require much time before consolidating and equalizing one another to
bring about a change In the general rate of profit. In all shorter
periods (quite aside from fluctuations of market prices), a change in the
prices of production Is, therefore, always traceable prima. facie to
actual changes in the value of commodities ... (Marx, 1977, 3: 166; MEW
1956. 25: 175-176).
The "fluctuations extending over very long periods" must surely be cur
long waves. By contrasting them to "extraordinary economic events" he sees
them as neither the result of chance (in the sense of the Slutzky effect, 1937)
nor of erratic shocks (in the sense of Frisch's 1933 approach). Moreover. by
comparing them with "all shorter periods" their periodicity is assumed.
Marx wrote Volume 3 of Capital in 1864-1865, long before the so-called
Great Depression, and it would not surprise me if a thorough study of
nineteenth century political economy were to reveal much earlier thoughts on
the problem of long waves. In Volume 2 of Capital. Marx quotes Potter's
revised (1841) edition of Scrope's Principles oj Political Economy. which
dates back to 1833:
The capital which is embarked in buildings, as mills, shops, warehouses,
barns, in road, irrigation, ele .• may appear scarcely to circulate at all.
But, in truth, these things are ... consumed.... [T]he capital invested in
them may be turned perhaps every twenty or fifty years (Marx, 1977, 2:
190; MEW 1956, 24: 187).
If one takes the turnover of capital as "a material basis for the periodic
crises" (Marx, 1977, 2: 189; MEW, 1956, 25: 378), then it is but one step from
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Scrape and Potter to the first attempts in the 1920s to explain the
phenomenon of long waves using the theory of reproduction and investment
(e.g., Spektator. 1926; De Wolff, 1929). Whether Marx actually agreed with
Potter and Scrope can at best be decided by means of argumentum ex silen-
tio: since he criticizes their opinions on the turnover of circulating capital,
but not on fixed capital, it is likely that he was in agreement with the latter,
a line of argument that cannot be refuted, of course, but which is nonetheless
rather weak.
Marx also raised the subject of "fluctuations extending over very long
periods" in quite a different context, but he did not do so at the point quoted
first where the existence of long waves is only postulated and is not examined
closely. But knowing of the existence of this quote prompted me to search for
other supporting evidence elsewhere in his works and those of Engels.
Engels' considerations on this question resulted from his endeavors to
understand the so-called Great Depression. In his opinion, since 1815-1825,
three periods of economic crises could be distinguished, the turning points of
which he established as being nearly identical with the inflection points of
economic growth nowadays fixed in the theory of long waves. Thus, in 1886, in
the Appendix to the US edition of The Condition of the Working Class in
England, Engels wrote
The recurring period of the great industrial crisis Is stated in lhe text
as five years. This was the period apparently Indicated by the course of
events from 1825 lo 1842. But Industrial history from 1842 to 1868 has
shown that the real period is one of len years; that the intermediate
revulsions were secondary, and tended more and more to disappear.
Since 1868 the slate of things has changed again, of which more anon
(Engels, 1971: 364; MEW, 1956, 22: 270).
"Anon", in which he provided the text of his essay England in 1.B45 and
1885, he described the "state of things" as follows:
But lhen a change came. The crash of 1866 was, indeed, followed by a
slight and short revival about 1873; but that did not last. We did not,
indeed, pass through the full crisis at the lime it was due, in 1877 or
1878; but we have had, ever since 1876, a chronic slate of stagnation in
all dominant branches of Industry. Neither has lhe full crash come; nor
will the period of longed-for prosperity to which we used to be entitled
before and after il. A dull depression, a chronic glut of all markets for
all trades, that is what we have been living in for nearly ten years
(Engels. 1971: 368-369; MEW, 1956, 22: 275).
In a similar manner Engels describes the situation in his preface to the (1886)
English edition of Capital (Vol. 1, p. 17; MEW, 1956, 23: 40). The turning point
of 1842 quoted above was moved somewhat in the preface to the English edi-
tion of The Condition of the Working Class in England and a much more
basic significance was attached to it: "The revival of trade, after the crisis of
1847, was the dawn of a new industrial epoch" (Engels, 1971: 360-361; MEW,
1956, 22: 266).
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The question as to when the new upswing phase set in is still being
debated: was it as early as 1842. as Spiethoff (1925) and Schumpeter (1939)
thought. or only after the crisis of 1847-1848. as was suspected by De Wolff
(1929), Clark (1944), and Rostow (1978)? This problem has already been
reflected in Engels' work. But it would be mistaken to turn the observer into
a theoretician of long waves. Thus. Engels states in a footnote to Capital,
Vol. 3:
As I have already stated elsewhere (cf. Marx, 1977, 1: 17; MEW. 1956.
23: 40). a change has taken place [in the industrial cycle] since the last
major general crisis. The acute form of lhe periodic process with its
former ten-year cycle, appears to have given way to a more chronic.
long drawn out alternation between a relatively short and slight business
improvement and a relatively long, indecisive depression - taking place
in the various industrial countries at different limes. But perhaps it is
only a matter of prolongation of the duration of the cycle. In the early
years of world commerce, 1815-1847, it can be shown that lhese cycles
lasted about five years; from 1847 to 1867 the cycle is clearly ten years;
is it possible that we are now in the preparatory stage of a new world
crash of unparalleled vehemence? Many things seem to point in this
direction. Since the last general crisis of 1867 many profound changes
have taken place ... By means of all this, most of the old breeding
grounds of crises and opportunities for their development have been
eliminated or strongly reduced ... [But] every factor, which works
against a repetition of the old crises, carries within itself the germ of a
far more powerful future crisis (Marx, 1977, 3: 489; MEW. 1956,25: 506).
Engels did not predict a new upswing but a "world crash of unparalleled
vehemence." Thus, he had no intention of developing a theory of long waves;
on the contrary, ten years earlier, in a letter to Bebel in May 1883, he had
analyzed the then economic crisis in this manner:
It is an intermediate crisis as that of 1841-42 but on a far more colossal
scale. The ten-year recurring period has evolved distinctly only since
1847 (because of Californian and Australian gold production and, from
this, the complete development of the world market). At present, when
America, France, and Germany are beginning to break England's monop-
oly on the world market so that overproducUon is beginning again - as
before [18]47 - but more swiftly being brought to bear, now the five
year intermediate crises are also rising again. Proof of the tolal
exhausUon of t.he capitalist. mode of production [sic]. The period of
prosperit.y has not. yet. developed in full, and already after five years
overproduction is set.ting in, and even within t.hese five years all
proceeds in a paltry way, which is by no means a proof t.hat. we will not go
through a rather brisk business Ume In 1884-87 as we did in 1844-47.
But then t.he universal crash will quite definitely occur (MEW, 1956, 36:
27, aut.hor's translation).
But the "universal crash" did not happen as was the case in 1847, when he
and Marx were of the opinion that Germany "is on the eve of a bourgeois rev<r
lution ... " and that this would be "but the prelude to an immediately following
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proletarian revolution" (MEGA, 1975, 6: 519; MEW, 1956, 4: 493). Engels criti-
cized this overoptimistic prognosis in his introduction to Marx's Class strug-
gles in France (1895, p. 16): "History has proved us, and all who thought like
us, wrong. It has made clear that the state of economic development on the
Continent at that time was not, by a long way, ripe for the removal of capital-
ist production ... " (MEW, 1956, 22: 515).
In certain respects this 1895 critique also applies to the unfulfilled
predictions of 1883 and 1894, which were made under historically similar cir-
cumstances, in the downswing phase of the long wave. The "total exhaustion
of the capitalist mode of production" suspected by Engels from hindsight
turned out to be "only" the outmodedness of laissez-faire capitalism, Le., the
necessity of a transition to monopoly capitalism. Complete exhaustion of
laissez-faire capitalism! And how could a revolutionary fireball such as
Engels in such a situation not imagine that a collapse of capitalism was
imminent as a result of a socialist revolution? To the reproach that he should
have mentioned the other possibility - that capitalism would adapt to chang-
ing conditions - I call the reader's attention to the Bible (Revelations 3:16):
it is always the lukewarm whom the Lord spued out.
Having acknowledged these thoughts of Engels, most of which were pub-
lished before 1896, we should not be surprised that in 1896 Parvus, after the
start of the new upswing, had already developed a hypothesis that mechan-
isms within the capitalist mode of production alternately produce periods of
upswing and depression. What is surprising, however, is the fact that neither
Engels nor any other Marxist economist ever made use of Marx's theoretical
considerations. even though they had no relation to the actual history of the
capitalist mode of production. We must add, however, that Marx too, in his
presentation on the law of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, does not
refer to the "fluctuations extending over very long periods" he mentioned
earlier. Rather, we find the following "aside" in the Theories of Surplus
Value (1861-1863), in the midst of a polemic on vulgar economic views on
"Revenue and Its Sources ":
... the fluctuations in the rate oj profit in every sphere depend on the
exisUng level of market prices and their fluctuations around cost-
prices. The difference in the rates oj profit in the various spheres can
only be discerned by comparison of the market prices of the di,/ff1rent
commodities, witJJ the cost-prices of these commodiUes. A decline in the
rate of profit below the ideal average in a particular sphere, if pro-
longed, suffices to bring about a withdrawal of capital from this sphere,
or to prevent the entry of the average amount of new capital into it. For
it is the inflow of new, additional capital, even more than the redistribu-
tion of capital already invested, that equalizes the distribution of capital
in the different spheres. The surplus profit in the different spheres,
on the other hand, is discernible only by comparison of the market
prices with the cost-prices. As soon as any difference becomes apparent
in one way or another, then an outflow or inflow of capital from or to
parUcular spheres [begins]. Apart from the fact that this act of equali-
zaUon requires lime, the average profit in each sphere becomes evident
only in the average profit rates obtained, for example, over a cycle of
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seven years, etc., according to the nature of capital. Mere fluctuations
- below and above [the general rate of profit] - if they do not exceed
the average extent and do not assume extraordinary forms, are there-
fore not sufficient to bring about a transfer of capital, and in addition
the transfer of fixed capital presents certain difficulties. Momentary
booms can only have a limited effect, and are more likely to attract or
repel additional capital invested in the different spheres [Marx, 1972, 3:
463-464; MEW, 1956, 26(3): 455-456].
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Both before and after this paragraph Marx gives other reasons "why the
general rate oj profit appears as a hazy mirage in contrast to the jized rate
oJ interest [Marx, 1972, 3: 465; MEW, 1956, 26(3): 457]. In other words, at tois
point, he did not intend to demonstrate extensively the real mechanism of
redistribution of already invested and additional capital, Le., of replacement
and net investments. But his statements on this question are clear: the mere
fluctuations around the cyclical average of the general rate of profit - includ-
ing booms and slumps - set in motion a reorientation of net investment flows,
but these are not sufficient to bring about a reorientation of replacement
investment flows. The necessary preconditions for this are the long-term
existence of surplus profit and extra surplus value, respectively. How, then,
are surplus profits of this kind created? Marx maintained that
No capitalist ever voluntarily introduces a new method of production ...
so long as it reduces the rate of profit. Yet every such new method of
production cheapens the commodities. Hence, the capitalist sells them
originally above their prices of production, or, perhaps, above their
value. He pockets the difference between their costs of production and
the market-prices of the same commodities produced at higher costs of
production. He can do this, because the average labor-time required
socially for the production of these latter commodities is higher than
the labor-time required for the new methods of production. His method
of production stands above the social average. But competition makes it
general and subject to the general law ... As soon as the new production
method begins to spread, and thereby to furnish tangible proof that
these commodities can actually be produced more cheaply, the capital-
ists working with the old methods of production must sell their product
below its full price of production, because the value of this commodity
has fallen, and because the labor-time required by them to produce it is
greater than the social average. In a word - and this appears as an
effect of competition - these capitalists must also introduce the new
method of production ... (Marx, 1977, 3: 264-265; MEW, 1956,25: 275).
But, looked at in this general fashion, this happens each and every day
in capitalist industry and surely does not produce in its wake a long-term
reorientation of replacement investments. Long-term fluctuations in the rate
of profit that are thus brought about can in good conscience be diagnosed as
Slutzky effects and would therefore not be a suitable theory of long waves.
But there are significant differences between the "new methods of produc-
tion" (innovations). Their different effects are described by Marx, in another
context, as follows:
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uniformity or similarity of reproduction - the repetition of produc-
tion under the same conditions - does not exist. Productivity itself
changes and changes to conditions [of production]. The conditions, on
their part, change productivity. But Ule divergences are reflected
partly in superficial oscillations which even Ulemselves out in a short
time, partly in a gradual accumulation of divergences which either lead
to a crisis, [to a] violent, seeming restoration of the old relationships,
or very gradually assert themselves and are recognized as a change in
the conditions [Marx, 1972, 3: 51B; MEW, 1956, 26(3): 507].
At this point Marx had already approached a distinction between
improvement and basic innovations (for the reinvention, see Mensch, 1975).
The minor improvement innovations merely bring about oscillations. On the
contrary, basic innovations (as well as some radical improvements) frequently
succeed, and are recognized only very gradually as bringing a change of con-
ditions.
That basic innovations require much time before they spread throughout
the national economy is a historical fact that has been proved many times and
is essentially due to two factors. First, before their diffusion, they must
prove their profitability, and second, their diffusion generally requires not
only a reorientation of net investments, but also of replacement investments.
To some extent, old plants have to be replaced by entirely new equipment;
even though the old may not have physically depreciated, they have become
unprofitable and are therefore morally depreciated. But this replacement
only takes place either if definite losses have been recorded or if profit is
assured, which takes time. This applies with even greater force to the flow of
capital into other spheres of investment caused by basic innovations and
their diffusion. In this context I would like to draw attention to two observa-
tions made by Marx:
(1) The great difference in the cost of Ule first model of a new machine
and that of its reproduction ... (2) The far greater cost of operating an
establishment based on a new invention as compared to later establish-
ments arising ez suis ossibus. This is so very true that the trailblazers
generally go bankrupt, and only those who later buy the buildings,
machinery, etc., at a cheaper price, make money out of it [sic] (Marx,
1977,2: 104; MEW, 1956,25: 114).
However, the concentration and centralization of capital has now reached a
stage at which the "trailblazers" do not go bankrupt (provided these are
larger firms) even if the innovations do not create the desired results. Basic
innovations are risks that are taken much more rarely if profits are secure
and business is good, but which are taken precisely in extended periods of
depression when the profit rate is falling:
If the rate of profit falls, there follows, on the one hand, an exertion of
capital in order that Ule individual capitalists, through improved
methods, etc., may depress the value of their individual commodity beiow
the social average value and thereby realize an extra profit at the pre-
vailing market-price. On the other hand, there appears swindling and a
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general promotion of swindling by recourse to frenzied ventures with
new methods of production, new investments of capital, new adventures,
all for the sake of securing a shred of extra profit ... (Marx, 1977, 3:
259; MEW, 1956, 25: 269).
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Bearing in mind the findings of current research on innovations, we can
supplement and interpret Marx's contention as follows. Improvement innova-
tions ("improved methods, etc. ") are, in the first place, introduced during
periods of upswing and steady growth, whereas pseudo-innovations ("swin-
dling") are introduced during periods of transition from upswing to depres-
sion, and basic innovations ("new methods of production") during periods of
depression. Therefore, basic innovations per se cannot bring about an up-
swing because they first have to prove their profitability. But they set off
the new upswing because other entrepreneurs also have to switch to the pro-
fitable "new methods of production". To which the following should be added:
Improvements occur in rapid succession once new machinery is intro-
duced. Thus there is a continuous devaluation of a large part of the old
machinery, or it even becom.es totally useless before its period of circu-
lation is really up, or before its value has been recouped in the value of
commodities it has produced. As the period of reproduction shrinks, so
does this danger, and the more capable is the capitalist (after he has
regained the value of the machinery within this shortened period of
time) of introducing new improved machinery and selling the old cheaply.
This can, in turn, be used profitably by another capitalist because he
has, ab initio, purchased it at a reduced price [MEGA, 1975, 11(3.1):
305, author's translation].
As soon as the "new method of production" is applied generally - and
this can take one or two industrial cycles (so-called Juglars) or even the
entire period of an upswing - the surplus profit that was previously possible
has, of course, disappeared and.a new average profit rate has been estab-
lished. (Incidentally it is irrelevant whether this is lower or higher than pre-
viously, or whether it represents a real fall in the profit rate.) Now, of
course, efforts will be made to counteract the fall in the profit rate with
improvements, but finally, since every technological system is only capable of
being improved within its own limits, "swindling", Le., pseudo-innovations, will
be the order of the day and the "cycle" starts again ("cycle" is in quotes
because there is nothing automatic in the transition from a depression to a
new upswing).
The enormous difficulty of verifying these thoughts of Marx and Engels -
which I have merely compiled and commented on - historically and statisti-
cally cannot be ignored, since we have neither adequate data on the develop-
ment of the profit rate over the last 150 years, nor do we have sufficient
detailed information on the structure of net and replacement investments for
this period. We therefore have to construct auxiliary variables and check
them as to their meaningfulness. It would surely be worth analyzing the
changes in the structure of production of goods, particularly of industrial
products [as Kleinknecht (1979) has done for the FRG], in order to examine
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whether production data can be used as lag variables in the substitution of
missing investment data. As for the average profit rate, Marx himself pro-
posed a substitute that was intended precisely to give expression to long-term
changes, or long waves:
The average rate of interest appears in every country over fairly long
periods as a constant magnitude, because the general rate of profit
varies only at longer intervals ... And its relative constancy is revealed
precisely in this more or less constant nature of the average, or com-
mon, rate of interest (Marx, 1977, 3: 336; MEW, 1956, 25: 378).
Obviously, nominal as well as real interest rates need to be analyzed in
view of the inflationary processes that now dominate the scene.
Finally, I would like to add a remark on my own research work. Without
having being aware of Marx's statements on long waves quoted above. and
without having the benefit of the new angles that a number of the quotes
presented here have given me, I had developed and published similar but not
so far-reaching ideas that have aroused interest (Kuczynski 1976, 1978a,b,
1979, 1980, 1982. 1985). Now, knowing what Marx and Engels wrote on this
subject, I can only refer to what the German composer Brahms said about
Mozart's piano concertos: "People like us live off the fact that they are
unknown".
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CHAPTER 8
Basic Innovations and the Next Long Wave
of Productivity Growth: Socioeconomic
Implications and Consequences
Harry Maier
6.1. The Long-Wave Debate
It is not surprising that the debate on the economic long wave started again at
the end of a period of rapid economic growth (1950-1973), after more than 25
years of lack of interest. At this time the prevailing overoptimism in the
market economies about future economic growth had changed to deep pessi-
mism; the most important sign of this change in public mood was the first
report to the Club of Rome, Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972; Maier,
1977). At the end of .the economic upswing in the early 1970s the economic
debate about the long-wave phenomenon started with the same questions that
were posed earlier this century (Parvus. 1901; Kautsky, 190112; van Gelderen,
1913; De Wolff, 1921; Kondratieff, 1926; Schumpeter, 1912, 1939), to which we
still have no satisfactory answers:
(1) What are the causes of changes in the periods of long-term fluctuations
in economic growth?
(2) Are economic upswings and downswings with periods of 50-60 years the
result of endogenous changes in the economy or are they the result of
exogenous factors, such as wars, revolutions, extreme forms of class
struggle, etc.?
(3) Does the emergence of these upswings and downswings that have
occurred over the last 200 years mean that there is a strict law of
economic development that we have to accept fatalistically without being
able to influence its speed or socioeconomic consequences?
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Table B.1 shows the last four long waves in the development of productive
forces. One source of confusion is that we are often unable to assess the
importance of the various factors that influence the long-wave phenomenon
and its interrelationships. Changes in the rate of economic growth over time
are obviously connected with the development of social relations of produc-
tion, with changes in political and government institutions. and with the inten-
sity and forms of social inequalities. The uneven development of productive
forces in different countries is the cause of changes in the balance of power.
and hence of international tensions and confr·ontations. On the other hand,
all these factors greatly influence the development of productive forces. For
example. if a country is unable to implement the necessary changes in social
relations of production and political institutions during a period of global pro-
ductivity growth, it will also be unable to hold its place among economically
developed countries.
The search for causes of the periods of upswings and downturns in the
economy can be reduced to the question of why are some circumstances more
favorable to growth and increases in productivity than others? Obviously,
there are radical changes in the relationship between the quantitative exten-
sion of the utilization of elements of production (labor, equipment. raw materi-
als. land. the environment) and improvements in their efficiency. The latter
is the most important factor in an economic upswing. This can be illustrated
with the following growth equation:
~p =~R + ~E ~E > ~R
where ~ = growth in production, M = extension of the utilization of ele-
ments of production. and M =the contribution of improvements in efficiency
to production. During a slowdown phase the influence of efficiency improve-
ments on economic growth diminishes. and the possibility of speeding up
economic growth by quantitatively extending the elements of production also
diminishes due to steep increases in the prices of raw materials and
foodstuffs (the "revolution of value").
Both processes - the slowdowns in efficiency growth and the "revolution
of value" - have common roots: insufficient innovations in leading branches of
the economy. Innovations are both components and dynamic elements of pro-
ductive forces. The diminishing contribution of efficiency to economic growth
is the result of a development process itself. in the course of whicn the effi-
ciency potential created through basic innovations is absorbed.
The capitalist expression of this process is the tendency of the general
rate of profit to fall. This law is. as Karl Marx expressed it. "a mystery whose
solution has been a goal of all political economy since Adam Smith" (Marx. 1971
edn, Vol. 3. p. 213). He also explains why it is possible that the profit rate of
some producers who are able to implement innovations can increase: "A capi-
talist working with improved. but not as yet generally adopted methods of
production sells below the market price. but above his individual price of pro-
duction; his rate of profit rises until competition levels it off. During this
~
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equalization period the second prerequisite, expansion of the invested capi-
tal, makes its appearance" (Marx, 1971 edn, Vol. 3, p. 231).
The reason for the revolution of value of natural resources is not that
they become scarce in an absolute sense, but that they are scarce in relation
to the scientific and technological level of their utilization. This results in
sharp price increases for raw materials and a fall in the general profit rate,
or, in a socialist economy, in the contribution of efficiency improvements to
economic growth. The main result of the revolution of value (Marx, 1971 edn,
Vol. 1, p. 108) is the devaluation of existing products and production
processes. At the same time, the devaluation process reduces the new value
and thus also the surplus value per unit of production, and increases the
organic composition of average social capital.
Mandel (1980, p. 9) underlined the importance of the relationship
between long waves and fluctuations in the general profit rate in capitalist
economies, but he failed to notice the importance of the relationship between
technological revolutions and the "revolution of value". Thus, sudden falls in
the general profit rate are not discussed in his work. Rostow (1979), however,
emphasized the role of "revolutions of value" in explaining the long-wave
phenomenon, but he ignored the relationship between the "revolution of
value" and the fall in the general profit rate.
In socialist economies profit has lost its key role in decisions on the allo-
cation of resources, but increases in efficiency are a most important precon-
dition for improving living conditions. Under socialism, the contribution of
productivity increases toward increasing output has no fixed dimension, but it
will diminish through the revolution of value of natural resources and the
devaluation of existing products and technologies. It can only be extended
through the build-up of new efficiency potential with the help of basic innova-
tions. Federenko (1982, p. 485) has shown that the contribution of efficiency
increases to economic growth in the USSR was higher in 1960 (40%) than in
1980 (25%). This indicates that the efficiency potential created by means of
basic innovations between 1940 and 1970, in the course of developing produc-
tive forces, was absorbed by improvements and rationalization innovations or
devalued through new basic innovations.
The key problem in formulating the economic strategies of the USSR and
other socialist countries will therefore be in opening up new fields for pro-
ductivity growth by creating new efficiency potential with the help of basic
innovations in the next few decades. The most important criterion for this
intensive development of productive forces is to increase the value added per
unit of natural resources. Yakovets (1984, p. 75) stressed the importance of
understanding the long-wave phenomenon when elaborating long-term strat-
egies for the development of the Soviet economy.
6.2. Innovations and Long-Term. fluctuations in Economic Growth
In order to understand the mechanism behind the periodic fluctuations in the
development of productive forces it is necessary to assess the roles of the
various kinds of innovations. A distinction between major product. major
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processes, and incremental innovations is important at the level of the pro-
duction unit, but at the macroeconomic level it is difficult to distinguish
between major product and major process innovations. This is because the
product of one firm may be the process equipment, components for assembly,
or materials used by another firm, so that at the macroeconomic level the dis-
tinction between basic, improvement. and pseudo-innovations is much more
important (Haustein and Maier, 1979). Basic innovations create a new effi-
ciency potential, and open fields and directions for economic activities, while
improvement innovations absorb this efficiency potential through balancing
and improving the given system; most innovations are of the incremental type.
Improvement innovations become pseudo-innovations when they are unable to
improve the efficiency of the production unit above the average efficiency of
the whole system. A growing number of innovation experts currently argue
that the fall in industrial productivity growth rates is the result of the
absorption of the efficiency potential created by basic innovations between
1930 and 1960. Certainly, a wide range of factors influences industrial effi-
ciency. but if we look at countries where industrial performance is closely
connected to innovations, we find that there have been fewer basic innova-
tions and many more improvement and incremental innovations.
In searching for the mechanism behind long-term fluctuations in
economic growth it is important to consider accumulation and investment.
Forrester and his group have developed a method for analyzing growth rate
fluctuations, which concentrates on investment and the relationship between
the consumer and capital goods sectors (Forrester, 1977; Graham and Senge,
1982; Sterman, 1984). These are undoubtedly the key to the long wave
phenomenon. but we will achieve results only when we are able to determine
their relationships to the different kinds of innovation.
In many studies we find very one-sided interpretations of the relation-
ship between investment and innovation. It is usually assumed that innovation
is a function of investment: the recommendation for government policy is con-
sequently that all we have to do is to create the conditions for higher returns
on investment, but these are very much dependent on the efficiency potential
of innovations, which is incorporated in investment. We thus have to distin-
guish between innovations that are derived from investment (improvement and
incremental innovations), and innovations that stimulate investments (basic
innovations). These open new fields for investment with high potential effi-
ciency rewards, which is why the recommendation to stimulate investment in
order to create new employment opportunities is one-sided. Expansionary
investment without adequate innovations will have an adverse effect on the
efficiency of investments and only a short-term effect on employment. In
recent years in the market economies there has been an important change in
the direction of investment toward more rationalization and replacement.
It may be dangerous to ignore both the linkages between expansionary,
rationalization. and replacement investments and those between basic,
improvement, and incremental innovations. Recommendations that emphasize
only expansionary investment without taking into account their interrelation-
ships and linkages with special types of innovation may fail to provide
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appropriate guidance to innovation managers. Rationalization and replace-
ment investment that are not connected with improvement innovations to util
ize the efficiency potential created by basic innovations will render existing
jobs vulnerable to attack from innovative rivals or will create jobs with lower
efficiency that can only exist because of government protectionist policies.
The question to be answered is how the upswing phase of productivity
growth (or its capitalist manifestation. the increase in the general rate of
profit) obtains its momentum. Mandel (1980. p. 21) believes that the increase
in the rate of profit is the result of the impact of noneconomic factors:
"Although the internal logic of capitalist laws of motion can explain the cumu-
lative nature of each long wave, once it is initiated, and although it can also
exp~in the transition from an expansionist long wave to a stagnation long
wave, it cannot explain the turn from the latter to the former."
Mandel claims that, from a Marxist point of view, there can be no
mechanism within the system of productive forces that could lead to a new
upswing, since for this the system needs an external shock. that is, an
increase in the rate of surplus value by political means (e.g., fascism in the
19308), wars, extension of the field of capitalist operation, competition, or
technological revolution. It is surprising that for Mandel "technological revo-
lutions" are exogenous, noneconomic factors in the development of capitalism.
From the beginning Marx emphasized the fact that capitalism cannot exist
without technological revolutions. "Modern industry never looks upon and
treats the existing form of a [production] process as final. The technical
basis of that industry is therefore revolutionary, while all earlier modes of
production were essentially conservative. By means of machinery, chemical
processes and other methods, it is continually causing changes not only in the
technical basis of production, but also in the functions of the labourer, and in
the social combinations of the labour process" (Marx, 1971 edn, Vol. 1, p. 457).
Mandel's basic assumption seems to be unrealistic because only after a
sharp upsurge in the general profit rate with the help of "system shocks" is
capital searching for "a reserve of unapplied or only marginally applied inven-
tions and therefore has the material for an upsurge in the rate of technologi-
cal innovation" (Mandel, 1980, p. 25). As a rule, there is a very high demand
for basic innovations in a slowdown phase, when entrepreneurs have two
motives for implementing radical innovations: first, to improve their rate of
profit or to make extra profits. and second, to avoid a devaluation of capital
through the revolution of value. Thus, basic innovations have a better chance
of being implemented in a slowdown phase because there are no other ways of
improving productivity. In an upswing well established "trajectories of tech-
nologies" already exist, so that it is possible to increase productivity with the
help of improvement and rationalization innovations.
Each innovation is the result of a fusion of two components: a technolog-
ical in vention (problem solution) and an existing or laten t demand with pros-
pects of a sharp increase in productivity. The main feature of an innovation,
from a Marxist point of view, is its capability to create an "exceptionally pro-
ductive force" (ausnahmsweise Produktivkrajt; Marx, 1971 edn, Vol. 1, p.
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302), which must be higher than the average efficiency of the production sys-
tem as a whole. The length of the slowdown depends on the time needed by
the new combination of basic innovations (or new technological bandwagon) to
have a significant influence on productivity growth in national and world
economies. This requires a rapid diffusion of basic innovations, which must be
radical enough to compensate for the devaluation of products and technolo-
gies through the revolution of value. This indicates that it is impossible to
determine the relationship between basic innovations and long-term economic
fluctuations by counting the number of basic innovations. Basic innovations
are the dynamic elements of a new combination of productive forces or "new
technological bandwagons "; in order to understand the bandwagon effect it is
important to investigate the relationship between basic innovations and effi-
ciency growth; such innovations not only create a new level of productivity,
but also destroy the efficiency potential of existing products and technolo-
gies.
6.3. Basic Innovations and the Next Long Wave
In recent times. two processes have had a marked effect on structural
change in the world and in individual national economies:
(1) The radical change in the resource situation during the 1970s; the most
significant results of which have been an upward revaluation of natural
resources and a relative devaluation of existing products and technolo-
gies.
(2) The emergence of a new combination of productive forces, compromising
such basic innovations as microelectronics, flexible automation, new
energy options, biotechnology, and new materials technology.
Under the pressure of the altered resource situation, this new combination of
basic innovations is likely to trigger a radical innovation push in the next few
decades that will produce a new global economic structure with qualitatively
higher productivity levels. The revaluation of natural resources and devalua-
tion of existing products and technologies is the reason for the current revo-
lution of value that is deeply influencing structural change throughout the
economies of the world.
This revolution of value since 1973 has been seen in changes in the rela-
tive prices of oil, other primary raw materials, and manufactured goods. The
increase in the relative value of natural resources is demonstrated by the
movement of the real price of oil (the primary energy source, accounting for
42% of global energy consumption), which in real terms was ten times higher in
1983 than in 1973. Between 1951 and 1971 the relative prices of refined
petroleum products fell by 17%, and that of electricity by 43%. Raw materials
were relatively much cheaper in 1972 than they were in 1951 (Rostow, 1979, p.
6).
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The decline in the relative value of manufactured goods and production
technologies is reflected in the fact that the prices of mass-produced goods
are currently at their lowest levels for 30 years. It is well known that today
it is almost impossible for the producers of machines based on traditional
electronics to make any profits on the world market. On the other hand,
manufacturers who have been able to incorporate modern microelectronics
into their products have been rewarded with high growth rates in both pro-
duction and value added.
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Figure 6.1. Developmenl of labor productivily in Weslern Europe, the USA, and
Japan (UN, 1982).
Currently, the growth of value per unit of natural resources is 100 times
higher in the newer, microelectronics-based areas of machine engineering
than in traditional parts of the industry. This simultaneous revaluation of
natural resources and devaluation of existing products and technologies has
so far dominated the opposing effects of the emerging new combination of
basic innovations, which will tend to restructure the world economy and
increase productivity. This is why productivity growth rates in all industrial
countries have been declining in recent years (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).
The present decline in productivity growth rates, which is of course not
conducive to equalizing productivity levels worldwide, cannot be explained
simply in terms of the absolute levels of productivity reached. Instead, we
need to look for other fundamental factors that tend to produce similar
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(Statistical Yearbook 1984).
effects in all countries, regardless of their level of development. From the
historical point of view, we can point to the fact that the potential for
increased efficiency created through basic innovations in the 1940s and 1950s
has largely been exhausted; there appears to have been a lack of basic inno-
vations in recent years that could launch a new wave of productivity growth.
It is not overoptimistic to assume that through the new growth industries
(technological bandwagons) based on the new combination of basic innovations,
we will again see a significant increase in productivity in the next few
decades, which will result in higher average productivity in the economies of
the developed countries. The largest increases in productivity growth will be
achieved in the electronics industry, including flexible automation, telecom-
munications, office automation, and computerization of production processes;
the energy complex; biotechnology; new materials; integrated technologies for
the industrialization of developing countries; and social and technical innova-
tions in the fields of communications, the home, health care, and leisure.
Future productivity will depend very much on the creation of a new
potential for greater efficiency through the basic innovations being made
now. But there are many reasons why units show a strong tendency to follow
policies of improvement and incremental innovation rather than actively sup-
porting basic innovation, as shown in Table 6.2.
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Increases in productivity in the firm and national or world economies will
be impossible unless social and institutional barriers are first overcome; in
this context, fatalistic attitudes are not very helpful. Government policies
and company strategies can do a lot to improve conditions to increase produc-
tivity and its socioeconomic consequences. especially by
(1) Encouraging firms and corporations to implement basic innovations,
especially in the take-off phase.
(2) Strengthening the investment power of firms and corporations.
(3) Formulating long-term strategies to increase contributions made by basic
research to innovative production.
(4) Stimulating activities to bridge gaps and to overcome bottlenecks in the
development of production forces (especially energy).
(5) Maintaining full employment and a high rate of technological change.
(6) Developing conditions under which the quality of human resources can be
improved and become a decisive social and economic force.
(7) Maintaining a strategic perception of the global dimension of the new
combination of basic innovations and their social consequences.
It would be disastrous in this time of growing global interdependence to learn
only by cris is and to ignore the existing socioeconomic barriers to the next
economic upswing. Three main barriers will have to be overcome if there is to
be a new wave of growth in the world economy: accumulation. the arms race,
and the uneven development of the world economy.
6.3.1. The accUJIlulation problem
The problem of accumulation has always been a key issue in creating and util-
izing a new efficiency potential. At present, the problem can be character-
ized as follows:
(1) The growing expenditures necessary for the creation and diffusion of
basic innovations. For example, the cost of developing the new genera-
tion of microprocessors is currently in excess of $250 million, which is
much more than was necessary for the first generation in the early
1970s. Government programs in the USA, the UK, France, and the FRG
provided more than $200-300 million between 1981 and 1985 to support
microelectronics research work. In the field of medicine, expenditures
on cancer research were higher in the past ten years than the total
spent so far on all medical research (Rescher, 1981, pp. 92-93). Current
expenditures on nuclear fusion research are much higher than those on
nuclear fission in the 1940s and 19508. Fusion research projects around
the world will each require more than half a billion dollars. The first
experimental fusion reactor in the 1990s will cost more than $3-4 billion,
Le., much more than the cost of the first experimental fission reactor,
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Table 6.Z. Implications at the company level of adopting either improvement or
basic innovation strategies.
.~-------------------~-~
Areas of impact implications ofpolicy
Unit
Marketing
Production
Research
and
Development
Management
Society
Improvement
Demand relatively low,
weIlknown. and predictable
Risk of failure low
Acceptance rapid
Well-known marketing used
Existing labor, skills,
and patterns of cooperation
used to a maximum
Significant risk in
quality and process planning
Existing R&D potential used
Basic research not
needed
R&D risk relatively
predictable
Familiar management
systems used and well
tried organizational
solutions adopted
Unpredictable
problems relatively
rare or nonexistent
Basic technological change
Demand high and relatively
unpredictable
Risk of failure high
Acceptance initially slow
New marketing systems necessary
Existing labor, skills,
and patterns of cooperation
becoming obsolete
Problems of quality, costs,
and effects new and unpredictable
Advanced R&D potential needed
New research fields and
disciplines needed
R&D risk high and
unpredictable
New management skills
and organizational
solutions needed
Legal and social acceptance
unpredictable
more than the total R&D expenditures of many small- or medium-sized
industrial nations, or more than 30% of the R&D expenditures of all
developing countries in 1980 $11.7 billion).
There is a connection between the growing expenditures on imple-
menting basic innovations and the danger of basic innovations for the
next economic upswing being monopolized by some developed market
economies. As a result, we might have an extremely deformed and short
upswing, with many international tensions and confrontations. Thus,
detente and international cooperation is an important precondition for
the next upswing in the world economy.
(2) The upswing of productivity growth in the 19508 and 1960s created some
serious disproportions, particularly between economic growth and
energy supply. This was one of the causes of the revolution of value in
the early 1970s. Notable are the anticipated shortage of natural
resources, such as energy and minerals, and the inadequacy of technol-
ogy to substitute artificial resources for scarce natural resources. The
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) energy
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study (Hafele, 1981) showed that traditional sources of energy, such as
oil, coal, and gas, which currently account for more than 90% of our pri-
mary energy supply, will not be able to satisfy more than 65% of demand
by the year 2030. The remaining 35% will have to come from new
resources, such as nuclear power, solar energy, synthetic fuels, biogas,
etc., which will only be possible if there is a change in the entire struc-
ture of energy production, distribution, and consumption with the help
of basic innovations. But we will have to implement these innovations
using land resources which are even more marginal, and by making the
environment more vulnerable and safe disposal of waste more difficult.
To achieve the necessary shift from an energy system based on
cheap oil and gas to one based on coal, nuclear, solar, synthetic fuels,
etc., will require a considerable increase in the average net investment
rate. The worldwide investment required for the exploration, produc-
tion, conversion, transportation, and distribution of primary and secon-
dary energy was approximately $143 billion in 1975, and will increase to
between $925 billion and $1400 billion by the year 2030 (Figure 6.3).
(3) One important result of the investigation of the relationship between
innovations and the long-wave phenomenon is that it is much easier to
maintain full employment with a high level of technological innovation
than vice versa (Freeman et al., 1982), although a high level of innovation
does not automatically guarantee full employment. It depends on the
direction of the innovation process and the degree of workers' partici-
pation in this process, especially in the case of flexible automation,
which will be one of the most important technological bandwagons of the
next upswing.
Special-purpose automation, the predominant type of automation in the
past long wave, is now reaching saturation in terms of its contribution to pro-
ductivity growth (Haustein and Maier, 1981, 1985). This has no doubt been a
decisive factor in the decline of productivity growth rates in the industrial-
ized countries. Producers who invested heavily in this type of automation
during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., automobile, chemical, electrotechnical indus-
tries, etc.) have recently faced increasing economic difficulties, and have to
realize that their highly productive technology was unable to produce goods
that achieved an appropriate profit rate and return on investment. The rea-
son for such miscalculations was an inadequate understanding of the limits of
traditional automation in increasing productivity.
Special-purpose automation is an effective method for the mass-
production of standardized products, but it is not suitable for highly innova-
tive products. In the industrialized countries the automation coefficient of
equipment (the share of automated and semi-automated equipment in total
equipment by value) has now reached 50-60%. The automation coefficient of
labor, however, has failed to exceed 12-18%, and is showing a strong trend
toward saturation. There are three reasons for the trend toward saturation
in special-purpose automation:
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(1) All industrialized countries continue to produce many products in small-
and medium-sized batches.
(2) There is a contradiction between automated production processes and
product innovation. Normally, special-purpose automation emerges in the
saturation phase of the innovation cycle when the dynamic efficiency of
products is declining and moving rapidly toward average efficiency.
Thus, the production of high-technology products cannot be automated,
since this type of automation creates a productivity push only for mass-
produced goods. But the danger exists that this type of product will be
devalued very rapidly through the innovative success of new products.
(3) Special-purpose automation is only feasible in the main production pro-
cess. Outside the traditional fields of application are the auxiliary
processes, production and quality control, transport and storage, pro-
duction management. inspection, and product design. Automation of the
main production process at first improves productivity rapidly, but later
this growth slows down because of the growing costs of the auxiliary
processes.
Key elements in flexible automation were introduced in the last two
decades within the development of traditional special-purpose automation:
numeric control (NC) machines. industrial robots, and flexible manufacturing
systems. These elements have been islands in the production system, with low
levels of utilization, but microelectronics has given them a remarkable push,
especially through cost reductions and the increasing size of computer
memories. Before the application of microelectronics about 30% of the total
cost of NC machines was in control systems, but this has declined rapidly
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despite the machine's increased computing and programming capability.
These developments have meant that complex systems can be built and pro-
grammed at reasonable cost and convenient size. Today the control system
accounts for 15-171. of the total costs of each NC machine; the same is true of
robots. whose commercial and technical history began in 1962.
The most important advantage of flexible automation is the effective pro-
duction of highly innovative products in the rapid growth phase of the innova-
tion cycle and the reduced vulnerability of production systems to innovation.
But flexibility, the most important characteristic, is very difficult to assess,
especially in view of the short-term nature of decision making, which stresses
maximization of productivity, returns on investment, and financial control. A
conventional transfer line produces a few specified parts at the lowest possi-
ble costs. Thus there will only be an advantage to using flexible automation if
the firm is able to manufacture highly innovative products in an early phase
of their life cycle. The assessment of the economic efficiency of flexible
automation requires a high level of strategic management. Normally, firms
tend to underestimate the importance of flexibility. In the short term it may
be much better to use special-purpose automation. but the long-term results
of such decisions may be disastrous.
Two strategies of flexible automation can be differentiated: one is the
concept of the unmanned factory. adopted from special-purpose automation,
and the other is to make best use of existing workers by designing an effi-
cient system appropriate to people's skills. Flexible automation can easily be
adopted to different products. machining processes, and sequences, with the
aim of responding quickly to new market requirements and customer demands.
The human being is the most flexible and the only creative factor in a produc-
tion system. By experience we know that the price for the elimination of
humans to obtain the unmanned factory is a significant reduction in flexibil-
ity. But a new combination of advanced information technology and skilled
production work on the basis of flexible automation is not only socially
preferable, but is also clearly able to improve long-term efficiency and the
value added of products. The concept of the unmanned factory ignores the
fact that flexible automation is an integrated information system; it is not
clear why we should concentrate on the better use of the information-
processing capability of NC machines and robots, while at the same time wast-
ing the much higher information-processing ability of the human being.
According to Mike Cooley, an expert in the field of flexible automation. "A
human being using total information processing capability can bring to bear
synaptic connections of 1014• but the most complicated robotic device with
pattern recognition capability has only about 103 intelligence units. Why do
we deliberately design equipment to enhance the 103 machine intelligence and
diminish the 1014 intellect? Human intelligence brings with it culture, politi-
cal consciousness. ideology and other aspirations" (Cooley, 1980, p. 19).
Flexible automation needs a more highly qualified workforce that is able
to manage tasks of high complexity. In many cases, shopfloor workers do not
do special kinds of work. but must be able to manage, maintain. repair, and
program the process. Ray and Lamp (1983, p. 8), using data from 155 FRG
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companies applying computer numeric control (CNC) machine tools, point out
that 78% of machines are programmed in the planning department. but only
22% on the shop floor. The crucial bottleneck is not felt to be information-
processing skills, but knowledge and experience with tools, materials, feeds,
speeds, faults, and breakdowns (Sorge et al., 1981). The success of flexible
automation relies strongly on craft worker skill, which is why a reduction of
the differences between the skills and qualifications happens within the logic
of flexible automation.
The full utilization of the efficiency potential of the hardware of flexible
automation is dependent on the ability to conceive and develop new software.
Until now, software costs have not benefited from the experience curve
effect that has reduced hardware costs so dramatically. Software develop-
ment is evolving away from its present skilled-craftsman service context
toward an industry that offers well defined, rationally produced commodities.
The case of flexible automation demonstrates that there are different
options for using and implementing this kind of basic innovation. Thus, it is
one of the most important tasks of innovation research to discover new
options for implementing basic innovations in a way that is socially acceptable
and will lead to solutions to the fundamental problems facing mankind.
6.3.2. Basic innovations and the arms race
The most important political problem connected with the creation of the con-
ditions for a new wave of productivity growth is to prevent that new combina-
tion of basic innovations from becoming part of the arms race. The continued
arms build-up is serving to destroy many natural and creative resources, and
is consuming vast sources of investment and R&D expenditure that could oth-
erwise be used for solving the vital problems of mankind, such as to help the
development of Third World countries, to solve pollution problems. to stop the
destruction of tropical forests, the extension of deserts, acid rain, etc. If
the new basic innovations are incorporated into the arms race there will be a
short and deformed upswing in productivity in the US. Japan, and some West
European countries, and the situation in developing countries will deteriorate
further.
In 1984 worldwide military spending reached $600 billion (constant 1979
US dollars; Leontief and Duchin, 1983). According to the Leontief world model
of military spending (baseline scenario), assuming that the proportion of GNP
allocated to military purchases in 1980 remains unchanged to 1990 and 2000 in
all regions, military spending will reach $1100 billion (constant 1979 US dol-
lars) by the year 2000. A scenario of reduced military spending and increased
aid transfer to developing countries shows: "For each dollar of reduced mili-
tary spending, however, it is the poorest of the less developed regions whose
GNP and per capita consumption increase the most" (p. 42). Analogously,
results of a scenario of increased military spending show: "It is the poorest
of the less developed regions whose GNP and personal consumption fall the
most ... for each dollar of increased military spending" (p. 51).
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Multilateral agreements on arms control and disarmament. the creation of
an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence between nations, and the improvement
of economic. scientific, and technological cooperation between world regions
will be the most important contributions to the implementation of the new
wave of economic growth.
6.3.3 The uneven development of the world economy
The upward revaluation of natural resources and the relative devaluation of
existing products and technologies have had severe consequences for the
Third World. The increase in oil prices caused serious deterioration of the
balances of many developing countries. The main problem for these countries
is to find productive linkages with the new innovations and the emerging new
technologies that will be the driving forces of economic growth in the 1OO0s
and 1OO0s. At present productivity in the developing countries is 15-20 times
lower than in the developed countries. Traditional technology transfer (usu-
ally involving products and technologies in the saturation phase of the innova-
tion cycle) from the developed to developing countries is unable to create
such a linkage. since it is unable to improve the position of developing coun-
tries within the world market. In 1982 developing countries spent more than
$35 billion on this type of technology transfer, but their positive impact on
the economic situation of these countries was obviously very low.
An important precondition for the productive linkage to the new combi-
nation of productive forces is the development of the scientific and techno-
logical potential of the developing countries themselves. Between 1970 and
1980 the number of scientists and engineers in R&D institutions of these
countries increased by nearly 200% and R&D expenditure by nearly 900%.
These increases are significant, but until now there has been an enormous gap
between developed and developing countries in the ratio of scientrsts and
engineers per 10.000 inhabitants and per capita R&D expenditures. The
share of the developing countries (including China). amounted only to 6% of
the world's R&D capacity in 1980, and only 2.3% per capita.
At present, not only are the levels of technology in developing countries
low, but there are also great disproportions in internal technological develop-
ment. Sophisticated firms and producers, often multinational corporations,
are islands in an ocean of preindustrial production. These sophisticated ele-
ments in national economies are not integrated into the national division of
labor. but are isolated groups, more closely linked to foreign than to national
control. The production of the modern sectors in developing countries tends
to be oriented toward the demands and needs of the companies of some
developed country. Standing apart as they do, the sophisticated sectors of
developing economies are often disruptive; they not only fail to accelerate
development, but also often tend to destroy the traditional technological
basis without creating a new one able to meet national needs in the medium or
long term. These sophisticated elements are present to maximize profits and
to exploit the unsatisfactory human resource situation in these countries.
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Such a "dual economy" is a reflection of, and to some extent and apology for,
this situation, but it is not able to show the way to the establishment of an
integrated national technical basis, with a workable relationship between dif-
ferent technological levels.
Table 6.3 shows several technological levels that may exist in any coun-
try. In all countries the lower-level systems A to C exist side by side. But in
the industrialized countries the production volume of technologies A and B is
very low and the various technological levels function as parts of an
integrated national economy. The concept of intermediate technology is
largely directed toward developing semi-mechanized technologies (class B),
but this cannot help a developing country to increase its standard of living.
Table 6.3. Levels of technology.
Level Technology
A
B
C
D
Manual drive, task execution, ai
control and logical functions a2
a3
Substitution of mechanical for bi
human energy (power tools)
Substitution of mechanical cl
for human energy and task c2
execution c3
Complete substitution of di
mechanical-technical for
human operation, including
control and logical functions d2
Drop spindle
Spinning wheel
Improved spinning wheel
Spinning wheels with external
drive power
Self-activating
Ring machine
Open-end spinning
Special-purpose automation
equipment
Flexible automation
It is also not possible to jump from technology level B to level D. Most
developing countries have adequate investment resources, skilled workers, or
infrastructure to utilize technology D. This technology is also not appropri-
ate for creating a national technical basis that is capable of producing enough
goods for the population and simultaneously securing adequate employment.
The developing countries are thus faced with the problem of allocating their
limited resources and investments between different levels of technology in
such a way as to optimize their utilization of domestic natural and human
resources and thus produce the goods and services necessary to meet the
demands of their population.
The problem is to integrate such technologies within the national techno-
logical system; both extreme approaches of "small is beautiful" and "big is
wonderful" are inappropriate. Such a system must include hard and soft,
large and small, high and low technologies in appropriate proportions in order
to be able to improve economic efficiency and to help them to use the benefits
of the international division of labor.
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The main problem for planners in developing countries is thus to seek a
combination of technological levels that will lead to well proportioned develop-
ment. This combination could have the following features:
(1) The use of surplus manpower in labor-intensive activities.
(2) The concentration of imported advanced technology on the key opera-
tions of core processes. All other processes should be based on labor-
intensive technologies.
(3) The use of the limited stock of advanced equipment for demonstration
and education.
(4) The transfer of replaced production equipment to small-scale firms.
(5) The promotion of high-quality production strategies.
(6) The establishment of a closed technological cycle from raw materials to
final products on the basis of the national division of labor.
(7) The discouragement of unintegrated investment and technological con-
servatism.
At present, developing countries pay dearly for technology (more than $35
billion in 1982), but the results of this transfer have not helped to solve more
serious problems. The reasons vary - the most important are the social forms
in which this transfer takes place, the inappropriate nature of much of the
transferred technology, and social conditions that make them unable to
absorb new technologies. Two key measures that would help to ensure the
better use of technology include: assurances that the transferred technology
can be integrated into the national system of division of labor; and the crea-
tion of a scientific and technological basis that can effectively absorb the
technology.
The creation of a scientific and technological base able to meet domestic
needs is crucial for the linkage of developing countries with the new combina-
tion of productive forces. The efficiency of such a base depends on:
(1) The balance between basic, applied, and development research. Without
basic research it is difficult to react to and communicate with new scien-
tific and technological developments. The economic, social, and cultural
sciences are currently underestimated in most developing countries, but
they are crucial in the design and implementation of development strat-
egies that are directed toward social and cultural needs. Government
R&D policies must be employment-oriented, to avoid a "brain drain ",
frustration. and deskilling of highly educated people. It is very difficult
and dangerous to speed up the scientific and technological development
of a country if the culture remains non-scientific and non-technological.
The educational system must help to discredit obscurantism and super-
stition and to promote scientific understanding.
(2) More should be done in short-term basic and applied research in civilian
sectors related to the national economy, especially agriculture, rural
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industry, natural resources, health, and scientific education. In the
expensive innovation fields, such as nuclear energy, electronics, etc.,
stress should be laid on adaptation and utilization strategies.
(3) It is important to select and encourage a group of frontier technologies
and a few advanced areas of research (energy conservation, biomass con-
servation, solar energy, malaria and leprosy eradication, biological con-
trol of plant diseases, birth control, environment, social and economic
development planning, etc.).
(4) For most developing countries it will be difficult to establish the neces-
sary research capacities from their own resources, so that cooperation
between the developing countries on the regional level is very important.
The purpose of this chapter has been to show that we are faced with serious
problems if there is to be a new wave of productivity growth for the majority
of the world's population. There is no "invisible hand" that can solve these
problems for us; we have to solve them ourselves. And it will be a great and
creative challenge to all of us, and to our children and grandchildren.
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CHAPTER 7
Structural Crisis as a Phase in
Long-Term Economic F1uctuations
S. MenshiJcov
7.1. The Structural Crisis and Its Manifestations
Historically. the downswing phase of the economic long wave has been associ-
ated with deeper cyclical crises and the overall deceleration of economic
growth. Other important phenomena that occur during this phase include
long-term stagnation in traditionally important branches and sectors of indus-
try (while other, newer branches may expand at an accelerated rate); long-
term disorders in the monetary sphere. finance, and international trade; and
breakdowns in existing forms of organization and methods of regulating the
capitalist economy.
All of these phenomena may be considered as fairly isolated and auton-
omous occurrences, in which case they may be described as a series of coin-
cident long-term or structural crises. Menshikov (1984) has suggested that
they be treated rather as components or manifestations of one aggregate
structural crisis of the economy. Such a crisis indicates that further overall
economic expansion at or above the average long-term growth rates is impossi-
ble without a fundamental change in the sectoral output structure, the system
of interindustrial and technological ties, the international division of labor.
major forms of industrial organization, and existing methods of market and
government control.
Basically, the crisis occurs when the old economic structure comes into
conflict with demands of new technology, but is not yet ready for change. The
inertia of the existing structure serves to delay readjustment and transition
to new conditions. making it painful and quite slow to develop. While the old
S. Alensh.iko'IJ 67
structure prevails, growth rates stagnate, and there is disruption in markets
and the monetary sphere, so that business conditions are generaLLy unfavor-
able. The structural crisis is overcome when the old economic structure
finaLLy begins to recede and new branches and sectors develop. Fundamental
changes in the economic structure cannot be accomplished within a short time
Limits. Common to aLL manifestations of the structural crisis is that they tran-
scend the Limits of one business cycle, Le., 8-10 years. NaturaLLy the time
needed to overcome particular crises will vary; some drag on for two cycles
and more, others fOl' even longer.
During its history, capitalism has experienced several structural
economic crises, each involving a far-reaching change in structure consistent
with a certain level achieved in the development of productive forces. The
change over from manufactory to factory (in the late eighteenth century), the
spread of corporate property (from the 18208), the onset of the monopoly
stage (starting with 1870s), the rise of state monopoly control (1920s and
after), and the appearance of transnational state monopoly capitalism (from
the 1970s) have aLL been brought about by the objective need to overcome suc-
cessive structural crises. In other words, structural crises are an outcome of
the basic contradiction of capitalism between the social character of produc-
tion and the private form of appropriation.
This chapter does not purport to analyze aLL the forms and manifesta-
tions of the structural crisis, but deals with some of the causes of long-term
fluctuations in economic growth, which largely determine the onset of struc-
tural crises. In this analysis we draw upon the writings of Karl Marx and his
ideas on the nature of long-term fluctuations.
7.2. Marx on Long-Term Contradictions
One feels that those involved in the debate on long cycles were mistaken in
virtuaLLy ignoring or bypassing Marx's observations on long-term structural
contradictions of capitalist reproduction. For example, in his Theories oj
Surplus Value (1863), Marx clearly referred to different ways in which con-
tradictions of reproduction are overcome by: (1) short-lived and relatively
weak recessions; (2) cyclical and deeper-running crises; and (3) long-term
processes that take several cycles to resolve.
ProducUvity changes and allers lhe conditions of produclion. The con-
dilions, in lheir lurn, aller produclivily. The discrepancies lhus pro-
duced show lhemselves up parlly in surface fluclualions which level off
wilhin a short space of lime, and parlly in a gradual build-up of diver-
gences which eilher lead La a crisis and lo a forcible apparenl reversion
lo earlier relalions or only very gradually make lheir way for lhem-
selves and gel recognized as lhe changed condilions of producUon (Col-
lected Works, Vol. 26, pp. 544-545).
The "changed conditions of production" are, of course, qualitative or
structural changes, which may also follow a repetitive or fluctuating path.
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Of particular importance is Marx's early discovery that the payback time
of fixed capital lies at the material foundation of periodic fluctuations in the
economy. Having made this famous conclusion, he quite unequivocally pointed
to the active part of fixed capital, Le., capital invested in machinery and
equipment, as the material foundation for the medium-term cycle of 7-10
years. But having done that, he next turned to capital invested in buildings,
roads, irrigation networks, etc., with cycles of 20-50 years (Capital, Vol. 2,
p. 187). .Analyzing in particular the replacement of capital operating "for
example, as buildings, railways, canals, etc. only as a general condition for the
process of production," he pointed out that replacement in that case was
"practically infinitesimal". In other words, such components of fixed capital
(infrastructure) do not require replacement in every cycle of medium duration
and are replaced en masse at longer time intervals.
Marx went on to stress the particular importance of large-scale renewals
of capital having a long service life. Analyzing the consecuti ve stages of the
Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, he
called attention to a "revolution in the general conditions of the social prcr
cess of Production", that is, in the means of transportation and communica-
tions, and to its reverse effect on the whole process of reproduction and
technological progress (Capital, Vol. 1, pp. 384-385).
Far from overestimating the significance of individual components of
fixed capital involved in generating periodic fluctuations in production, Marx
attached far greater importance to the role of technological progress and the
changes it brought about in the composition of capital and in the profit rate.
Unlike later long-wave theorists, he did not link technological progress with
long-term fluctuations alone, but showed its integral connection with the
medium-term cycle.
Consequently, every new medium-term cycle represents yet another
stage of technological progress, but this is not a balanced and uniform move-
ment, monotonously repeating itself from cycle to cycle. Marx distinguished
intensive movements "involving more effective means of production" and
extensive movements, which means "nothing beyond expanding thf'! field of
production" upon the existing technological base. Indeed, this is borne out
by the history of economic fluctuations. Some medium-term cycles are dom-
inated by minor modifications and modernization of existing machinery and
technology, with new models of machinery replacing old ones. Other cycles
involve deeper changes from one generation of technology to another. Finally,
still other cycles see a large-scale introduction of basically new types of
machinery and technology, laying the groundwork for technological revolu-
tions, which, like chain reactions, spread from sector to sector, embracing
the whole economy and fundamentally revamping its technological base. It is
these periods that witness a fundamental replacement of fixed capital
invested in the "general conditions of reproduction", that is, transportation,
communications, durable industrial structures, production of basic structural
materials, energy and power resources. Such changeovers may span decades.
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The alternation of qualitative leaps by quantitative evolution of technol-
ogy takes place, Marx maintained, within the framework of the business cycle
as well as outside it, and is itself repetitive.
There are intervals during which technical revolutions are less notable
and accumulation appears to be, above all, a movement of quantitative
expansion upon the new technical base already achieved. What begins to
operate to a greater or lesser extent in such a case, whatever the
actual structure of capital, is a law whereby the demand for labor rises
in the same proportion as capital does. But Just when the number of
workers attracted by capital reaches its peak, the products become so
plentiful that the social mechanism seems to have come to a standstill in
case of the slightest obstacle arising in the way of their sale; it is the
process of alienating labor by capital in great proportions and in the
most violent way that comes into operation at once; the very disruption
of production makes it imperative for capitalists to strain every nerve
to save labor. Detailed improvements building up little by little are con-
centrated under that high pressure, so to speak; they find themselves
embodied in the technological modifications which revolutionize the
structure of capital throughout the entire periphery of major areas of
production (Collected Works, Vol. 49, pp. 220-221).
Consequently, the slowdown of technological progress (which Marx described
as "intervals If) creates a wide range of contradictions that cannot be resolved
except through accelerated technological progress and another technological
revolution. Such revolutions create new sectors and speed up the overall
pace of reproduction. But as new sectors gain momentum, technological modi-
fications become less notable and more ordinary, which leads, once again, to a
slowdown of reproduction and to sustained periods of crisis and depression.
Technological progress concentrates on labor-saving devices. The "high pres-
sure" of capital overaccumulation and mass unemployment thus created cause
the technological base to be revolutionized again, thus closing the circuit.
Long-term fluctuations in technological progress are reflected in the
composition of capital. One can see from the above passage that Marx con-
sidered the law of increasing organic composition of capital. Le., the rising
ratio of constant capital (invested in the means of production) to variable cap-
ital (invested in labor), as a historical trend operating with intervals. On the
one hand, "the purely quantitative extension of the factories absorbs not only
the men thrown out of work, but also fresh contingents" (Capital, Vol. 1, p.
454); this is a time when labor is not particularly saved. On the other hand, at
a certain stage of the technological revolution, when savings in both the
means of production and labor become the major direction of technological
progress, productivity outpaces the capital-labor ratio, and elements of fixed
capital become cheaper at a faster rate.
Marx made a special point of discussing "transient fluctuations" in the
operation of the law of the tendency for the profit rate to decline. Owing to a
set of counteracting factors, this trend "is really manifest only under certain
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circumstances and within lasting periods of time" (Capital, VoL. 3, pp. 239,
262). Long-term fluctuations in the profit rate are reflected in overaLL rates
of expanded reproduction and capital accumulation. With a rising profit rate,
production growth rates accelerate, while a sustained faLL in the profit rate
tends to slow down the rate of accumulation and economic growth, but within
certain limits. An excessive increase in the profit rate discourages
entrepreneurs from introducing technical innovations, and, conversely, if the
profit rate falls below a certain minimum it compels them to resort to new
technology as a way out.
When the general profit rate is low, the old technical base of production
moraLLy wears out and an opportunity for fundamental innovation presents
itself. But in this case, too, entrepreneurs act with caution: a new technolog-
ical revolution begins with instaLLation of machinery that enables production
costs to be reduced, usuaLLy at the expense of labor. Only as a second resort,
with improved overaLL business conditions, are new types of goods launched,
which give rise to new sectors and to a "quantitative extension of factories".
In the opening stages of a technological revolution, while individual
enterprises are still using inventions that are not yet in general use, the
profit rate associated with such inventions is high. However, once an innova-
tion has become a common asset, the additional surplus value disappears,
while the profit derived from secondary modification and partial moderniza-
tion of new machinery becomes substantiaLLy lower than it was when this
machinery was first instaLLed. Consequently, at a certain stage of the techno-
logical revolution, the general profit rate must faLL again.
7.3. Conclusions for the Long Wave
What main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis for a better under-
standing of the long-wave mechanism?
First, the long wave is directly associated with technological revolutions.
Le., with widespread qualitative changes in production technology encompass-
ing the whole economy. The principal moving force behind every long upturn
is the opening up of new directions in"technology, not just new generations of
existing directions, and not just new models of an existing generation. In the
course of such revolutions new sectors and industries are created and old
sectors and industries. undergo drastic technological change. What starts as
the sporadic introduction of new technologies in a Limited number of plants in
selected industries, continues as the diffusion of new technologies to a wider
range of industries. and finaLLy leads to a general spread of technologies that
are now recognized as the norm, rather than the exception. In the course of
this change the new technologies themselves are continuously perfected and
modernized, so that they become relatively inexpensive and readily available
in large quantities.
However, once this stage is reached, further development of the same
technological directions becomes less radical and more evolutionary in char-
acter, and the benefits from such development become more marginaL. ALL
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available capital and. perhaps. even more, has been invested in the prevailing
technological directions and is tied to their further progress. and it takes a
long time for this overall capital to pay back. This point is. perhaps. one of
the most crucial. By overall capital we mean not only capital materialized in
new production equipment and research facilities. but capital embodied in a
new economic structure. This includes:
(1) New industries are built up in the course of the technological revolution.
(2) New products - not only production equipment. but also a wide range of
consumer and producer goods, including new materials and types (or
sources) of energy.
(3) New infrastructure is installed to serve new industries.
(4) New kinds of business organizations are set up.
(5) New government institutions. regulations. and practices are established
to support the new economic structure.
All of these structural components have a vested interest in self-preservation
and self-promotion. A given economic structure will never resign or give way
to another until it has reaped most of its expected benefits. and unless a
more profitable alternative is available. For the expected benefits to be
reaped and more profitable alternatives to develop takes time. The length of
this time depends on two factors: (i) how soon the current technological revo-
lution exhausts its innovating potential and turns into evolution; and (ii) how
fast even newer technological directions present themselves as more profit-
able business opportunities. The change from qualitative technological change
to evolution is sufficient to start a downturn in the long wave. But the availa-
bility of profitable new technology is necessary to trigger developments that
make obsolete the prevalent technology and consequently the existing
economic structure.
However. the long downturn leads to a crisis even before the next tech-
nological revolution is ready to start. When a given economic structure is
created there is a lot of business activity. which takes a long time to estab-
lish. but it is temporary in nature. This includes investment activity that
d.irectly generates high demand for construction. equipment. and other capi-
tal goods, and ind.irectly creates additional demand for intermediate goods.
labor, and consumer goods. Once the economic structure has been created, or
even when it has passed its peak. this investment activity is substantially
reduced. adversely affecting aggregate demand. Excess capacity and high
unemployment become lasting features of the economy.
One result is long stagnation in industries that were once growth indus-
tries. and even served as instigators of growth in the preceding upturn.
Among them are some industries producing final-use goods, such as machine-
building. consumer durables. construction, but also and inevitably they
include industries producing basic materials and energy. Thus a structural
crisis is the logical outcome of a technological revolution, but it also serves as
the starting point for a new one.
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Second, it is important to understand the mechanism by which changes in
technology are translated into long waves and structural transformation
through the operation of fluctuations in the profit rate. From Marx's
analysis, it follows that the overall average profit rate in the economy, Le.,
the ratio of gross profit (including depreciation and taxes) to total fixed capi-
tal (including housing), depends basically on two factors: the composition of
capital, and the extent to which capital is used (or capacity utilization). The
composition of capital depends mainly on technology, as expressed by capital
intensity, or the ratio of fixed capital to the amount of labor, and by their
relative prices. If one ignores for the sake of simplicity oscillations of the
share of labor income in national product, then capital composition will change
more or less in line with the output-capital ratio, which can be directly
observed by comparing the rates of labor productivity and capital intensity.
Fluctuations of the general profit rate generally follow those of the
output-capital ratio. Both rise when labor productivity increases faster than
capital intensity, and both fall when labor productivity increases more slowly
than capital intensity. It was also shown that the long upswing is .positively
correlated with the intensive phase of technological revolution (when the
output-capital ratio rises), and the downswing is correlated with the exten-
sive phase of the same, Le., when the output-capital ratio tends to fall.
Capital or capacity utilization accentuates these fluctuations caused by
technological revolutions. The profit rate is positively correlated with capital
utilization. Since both movements (output-capital ratio and capacity utiliza-
tion) have approximately the same timing (the first, perhaps, slightly leading
the latter), they tend to superpose and support each other.
We now turn to the inverse relationship: the influence of the profit rate
on technological development (cf. Ta.ble 7.1). The most important point here is
the relative profitability of business alternatives and the relative risk
involved. The general or prevailing profit rate serves as a gauge against
which potential profit and risk associated with new undertakings are meas-
ured. The higher the prevailing profit rate the more investment would be
expected to go into existing technology, which has proved to be profitable,
and into relatively minor improvements. This in itself tends to slow down the
growth of profits and eventually to stop it completely.
It is true that when prevailing profit rates are high and financial possi-
bilities are ample, basic research would be expected to be more easily
financed. But the time lag between such research and actual resulting innova-
tions makes it more probable that the latter will appear as realistic business
opportunities during the downswing, rather than otherwise.
Not only the level, but also the direction of change in the prevailing
profit rate is important. While profits are rising, prospects for risk taking
and adventure investment are still encouraging, but once the the profit rate
starts falling, even though it is still high, the signal is given for more caution,
with fewer adventures and risk taking. This inevitably occurs at the crest of
the boom period. Therefore technological revolutions are doomed to evolution
and routine soon after they have reached their peaks. The upper turning
point in the long wave is thus established.
Clima.te for innova.tions
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Table 7.1. The influence of the average profit rate on technological development.
Profit ra.te Profit ra.te
(level) (cha.nge)
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Average Rising Favorable for spread and improvement
of prevailing technology
High LeveUng-off Favorable for improvements in
existing technology
High or Falling Unfavorable except for minor
average improvements
Low LeveUng-off Favorable for take-off in basic
innovations
Low Rising Favorable for the spread of basic
innovations
Let us now consider the lower turning point. It is sometimes claimed that
Marx did not see it, but the passages quoted above indicate that his logic was
quite different. While the prevailing profit rate is falling in the downswing,
there is little incentive to invest in new technology that has not yet proved to
be more profitable. However, the profit rate finally reaches such low levels
that the range of business alternatives, which are seductive due to the poten-
tially much higher profitability, becomes sufficiently large. As Marx under-
lined, the individual profit rate of the entrepreneur who first introduces a
qualitative innovation is substantially higher than that of those who follow his
lead and make the innovation a general rule rather than an exception. Risk
taking may become the only alternative when the general profit rate is very
low and when profits may indeed be nonexistent.
It is true that at this point in the downswing financial possibilities. are
limited for large investments in new technologies. However, once innovation
investments take off, even in relatively small amounts, they help slow down
and finally halt the downward trend in general profits. The latter may be still
low, but once they start to recover, the impulse is given to more moderniza-
tion in both production technology and new goods. By the time the prevailing
profit rate reaches its long-term average, new technology has established
itself as the rule, and its spread throughout the economy and the concomitant
change in economic structure are assured.
7.4. Observations on the Current Phase
It seems obvious that the new technological revolution. based mainly on
microelectronics and bioengineering, is still in its opening stage. The areas in
which it has progressed most of all - robots, flexible production systems.
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office automation - are predominantly labor-saving techniques characteristic
of a recession, or structural crisis. What confuses the picture is that this
new revolution started fairly early; Le., at the end of the first and the start
of the second regular business cycle within the long recession phase. This
does create quite a mixed picture: stagnation in many basic industries, but
high growth and spectacular technological progress in others, including those
where output is still at or below its 1973 peak. Equally mixed is the interna-
tional picture where, on the one hand, large differences exist in national and
regional growth rates, and, on the other, the instigative effect of the faster-
growing countries on the remainder is absent.
With a few exceptions the new revolution has not yet entered the stage
when qualitatively new consumer goods start appearing en masse, and when a
new economic infrastructure is being created. Until this happens one cannot
expect the basic industries to recover from stagnation, particularly because
the new revolution is also materials- and energy-saving.
Some new forms of organization belonging to the new economic structure
have appeared, namely, joint production and mergers by multinationals, inter-
nationalization of finance capital, and attempts to coordinate economic poli-
cies of different countries, but they have not as yet provided a positive influ-
ence. Structural policy and modernization, particularly in the multinationals,
has added to mass unemployment; anti-inflationary measures have helped
decelerate or reduce real wages; and attempts to alleviate budget deficits
have cut into social and welfare programs. All of these are typical of a crisis,
rather than a recovery stage.
For example, the American cyclical upturn of 1983-1984 has raised the
question as to whether the long-term recovery has already started. But aver-
age cyclical growth rates, which are roughly coincident indicators of the long
wave, do not support such conclusions (see Table 7.2). It can be seen that
growth rates in all major countries (excluding Japan in 1979-1984) have gone
down, not up, and in Japan there is a repetition of the growth rates of
1973-1979. In all cases, growth has been substantially slower than in
1960-1973, which belongs to the preceding long upturn.
Ta.ble 7.2. Average annual growth rates (X).
GDP
1960-1973
1973-1979
1979-1984
Industrial
production
1960-1973
1973-1979
1979-1984
OECD
4.8
2.7
1.9
5.9
1.8
1.1
USA
4.2
2.6
2.1
5.3
2.7
1.4
UK
3.2
1.4
0.7
2.8
1.2
-0.8
France
5.7
3.1
1.2
5.6
2.0
-0.1
FRO
4.8
2.4
0.9
5.1
1.3
-0.1
Japan
10.5
3.6
4.2
12.3
2.1
4.0
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There is some evidence of a turnaround in labor productivity. In the
USA. output per man-hour in the private sector has grown annually in
1979-1984 by 1.6%. up from 0.8% in 1973-1979. However. the current growth
rate of this indicator is still lower than in the upturn (3.1% in 1948-1957. 3.2%
in 1957-1966. and 2.3% in 1966-1973). Even more important. fixed capital in
the USA continues to rise faster than output. mea.ning that. as yet. there is no
turnaround in the overall output-capital ratio for the economy.
More attention should be given to the continuous analysis of such leading
indicators of the long wave as labor productivity. the output-capital ratio.
and the general profit rate. These may signal a definite turning point some-
what earlier than it occurs in the growth rates of GNP and industrial produc-
tion.
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CHAPTER 8
Technological Substitution and
Long Waves in the USA
Nebojsa Nakicenovic
8.1. Introduction
The analysis of historical replacement of old by new technologies has shown
that most of these processes can be described by simple rules that are cap-
tured in the logistic substitution model (see Marchetti, 1979; Marchetti and
Nakicenovic, 1979; Nakicenovic, 1984), and that technological substitution.
expressed in terms of market shares, follows characteristic S-shaped curves.
In order to illustrate and describe the properties of the approach we first
give examples of how new energy forms replaced their predecessors, since
technological changes in the energy system constitute one of the first and
most complete applications of logistic substitution analysis. To further
explore this method we then describe similar substitution processes in steel
production and the merchant marines.
The application of the logistic substitution model to the above examples
indicates that improvements and growth are achieved through a regular but
discontinuous process. Each new technology goes through three distinct sub-
stitution phases: growth, saturation, and decline. This regular pattern points
to a certain schedule and recurrence of structural change in competitive
markets. The structural change in the above examples occurred at intervals
of about 50 years.
The recurrence of changes every 50 years resembles the long-wave fluc-
tuations in economic development originally described by Kondratieff (1926).
One of the most extensive explanations of the long wave was given by Schum-
peter (1939), for whom innovations come in clusters and are not evenly distri-
buted or continuously absorbed, due to the basic principles that govern the
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process of capitalist development. The clustering of technological and
entrepreneurial innovations leads to the periodic emergence of new industries
and subsequent growth, but this growth necessarily leads to limits and even-
tual decline. Thus, wave-like forms of economic development are generated
with phases of growth and senescence at intervals of about 50 years.
A hypothetical relation between the 50-year period in the introduction
of new technologies and saturation of old ones, and the 50-year period in the
changing phases of growth and decline that is associated with the long wave
must be verified empirically before the exact nature of the two phenomena
connected with the process of technological change can be related to each
other. This analysis essentially consists of the use of a phenomenological
approach to extract long fluctuations from the time series in an attempt to
filter out the long-waves and to compare the fluctuation patterns thus derived
with the dynamics of technological substitution. The changing phases of the
long-wave fluctuations are illustrated with the same examples as those for
technological substitution: energy consumption, steel production, and the
merchan t marine fleet.
All of the examples illustrate the American experience. Thus, while the
results are equivalent to similar examples for some other industrialized coun-
tries and the whole world, it is inconclusive whether they may also be of a
more general nature. Unfortunately, historical data cannot be reconstructed
from available records for too many different cases, although the UK has been
analyzed with equivalent examples. All of the reported examples and histori-
cal data for the USA (and also the UK) are given in Nakicenovic (1984).
8.2. Technological Substitution
Substitution of an old way of satisfying a given need by a new path has been
the subject of a large number of studies. One general finding is that substitu-
tion of an old technology by a new one, expressed in fractional terms, follows
characteristic S-shaped curves. Fisher and Pry (1971) formulated a very sim-
ple but powerful model of technological substitution [1].
8.2.1. Primary energy consumption
The analysis of the competitive struggle between various sources of primary
energy has been shown to obey a regular substitution process that can be
described by relatively simple rules (Marchetti. 1977; Marchetti and Naki-
cenovic, 1979; Nakicenovic, 1979). The dynamic changes in this process are
captured by logistic equations that describe the rise of new energy sources
and the senescence of old ones. Figure 8.1 shows the primary energy con-
sumption in the USA since 1850; data are plotted on a logarithmic scale and
show exponential growth phases in consumption of the most important sources
of primary energy by piecewise linear secular trends. Thus it is evident that
energy consumption grew at exponential rates during long time periods, but
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Figure 8.1. Primary energy consumption in the USA since 1850.
no other regularities are directly discernible. However. the evolution of pri-
mary energy consumption emerges as a regular substitution process when it is
assumed that energy sources are different technologies competing for a
market. Unfortunately. the Fisher-Pry model cannot be used to describe the
evolution of primary energy consumption, since evidently more than two
energy sources compete for the market simultaneously.
In dealing with more than two competing technologies. we must generalize
the Fisher-Pry model, since in such cases logistic substitution cannot be
preserved in all phases of the substitution process. Every competitor under-
goes three distinct substitution phases: growth, saturation, and decline. The
growth phase is similar to the Fisher-Pry model of two competitors, but it
usually terminates before full substitution is reached. It is followed by the
saturation phase, which is not logistic, but which encompasses the slowing
down of growth and the beginning of decline. After the saturation phase of a
technology, its market share proceeds to decline logistically [2].
Figure 8.2 shows the primary energy substitution for the USA. Data and
model estimates of the substitution process are plotted on a logarithmic scale
using the quantity //(1-1) versus time (J representing fractional market
shares). The piecewise linear secular trends indicate logistic substitution
phases. The departure of historical market shares from their long-term
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Figure 8.2. Primary energy substilution in lhe USA since 1850.
paths, described by the logistic substitution model, sometimes last for over
two decades only to return to the trend after the prolonged perturbation.
This is the case with the market shares of coal and oil during the 1940s and
1950s, and fuelwood and animal feed during the 1860s and 1870s. This may
also indicate a possible absorption of the departure of coal and natural gas
market shares from their long-term paths during the last ten years.
Animal feed reached its highest market share in the 1880s, indicating
that draft animals provided the major form of local transportation and motive
power in agriculture despite the dominance of railroads and steamships as
long-distance transport modes. Horse carriages and wagons were the only
form of local transport in rural areas and basically the only freight transport
mode in cities. It is curious that the feed and crude oil substitution curves
cross in the 1920s as if to suggest the simultaneous substitution of the horse
carriage and wagon by the motor vehicle (see Nakicenovic, 1985).
The substitution process clearly indicates the dominance of coal as the
major energy source between the 18708 and 1950s after a long period during
which fuel wood and animal feed were in the lead. In the USA, wood remained
the principal fuel for the railroads up to the 1870s, although railroads are
considered the symbol of the coal age. The last phases of railroad expansion
up to the 1920s, the growth of steel, steamships and many other sectors are
associated with and based on the technological opportunities offered by the
mature coal economy. After the 1940s, oil assumed a dominant role simultane-
ously with the maturing of the automotive, petrochemical, and other modern
industries.
Figure 8.2 shows natural gas as the dominant energy source after the
19808, although crude oil still maintains about a 30% market share by the end
of the century. For such an explorative "look" into the future, additional
assumptions are required because potential new competitors. such as nuclear
80 Tech.n.oLogica.L Substitution. in. th.e USA.
or solar energy, have not yet captured sufficient market shares to allow esti-
mation of their penetration rates. The starting point for market penetration
of nuclear energy can be dated back to the 1960s, when nuclear power
acquired slightly less than a 1% share in primary energy. In order to explore
the behavior of the logistic substitution model when the competition between
energy sources is extended into the future, we assumed that nuclear energy
could double its current market share of about 4% by the year 2000. This
leaves natural gas with the lion's share in primary energy, advancing its posi-
tion to the major source of energy after this century.
Total
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Figure 8.3. Primary energy consumption since 1800.
The evolution of fossil energy use in the USA has a longer recorded his-
tory than the use of traditional energy sources such as draft animals and wind
power. Figure 8.3 gives the annual consumption of all fossil primary energy
sources, fuel wood, and direct uses of water power starting in 1800, while Fig-
ure 8.4 shows the substitution of these energy sources. In this example, the
logistic substitution model describes with great precision the evolution of pri-
mary energy consumption. Due to the dominance of fuelwood as the major
source of energy during most of the last century, the information loss
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associated with the lack of adequate annual estimates of energy use (feed
requirements) of draft animals is not very large. Direct use of water power is
included in the data set, but due to the low contribution to total energy sup-
ply, when expressed in terms of its actual energy inputs, water power is not
observable at the 1% level.
The regularity of this substitution process is due not only to the fact
that the penetration rates of various energy sources remain constant over
periods of about a century, but also due to the fact that the saturation levels
of energy sources are much lower than the full market takeover. The intro-
duction of new energy sources and the long time constant lead to maximum
market penetrations of between 50 and 70%. New energy sources are intro-
duced before the dominant ones have even reached a 50% share. In addition,
the maxima are roughly spaced at intervals of about 50 years, which
corresponds to the time constant of about 50 years for market share
increases from 10 to 50%.
8.2.2. Steel production and the merchant marine fieet
Figure 8.5 shows that steel production increased rapidly during the second
half of the nineteenth century, after Henry Bessemer patented the first
high-tonnage process for steel production in 1857. Figure 8.6 shows the
actual technological substitution in steelmaking according to the process
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Figure 8.5. Steel production in the USA since 1650.
used; prior to the introduction of the Bessemer process, all steel was pro-
duced by the traditional crucible methods used since antiquity. Figure 8.6
shows that the Bessemer process replaced traditional methods within two
decades, supplying almost 90% of all steel by the 1880s. The next improve-
ment in steelmaking was the introduction of the open-hearth furnace, which
supplied 50% of all steel by the end of the century. The use of the open-
hearth process continued to increase during the first decades of this century
and by the 1950s it accounted for more than 90% of the steel produced. The
first open-hearth process to be used widely was based on acid chemistry,
although later the basic open-hearth also found extensive use. The basic sys-
tems have a decided advantage in flexibility with regard to raw materials con-
sumed and grades of steel produced. The steelmaking processes were further
improved by the use of oxygen for excess combustion instead of air; this
offers many advantages, such as faster melting and reduced checker chamber
capacity. Consequently, the Bessemer process was also extended to basic
chemistry and oxygen use, the most spectacular application originating in
Austria as the Linz and Donawitz (L-D) process, now generally referred to as
basic oxygen steelmaking.
This process of technological substitution has continued over the last 40
years with the introduction of the basic oxygen and electric steel methods.
The electric arc process was introduced as early as 1900, so that it gained
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Figure 8.6. Technological substilution in sleel produclion in the USA since 1850.
importance before the basic oxygen process, but the latter process expanded
faster, probably because it is technologically similar to the open-hearth and
Bessemer basic variants. During the 1960s, the basic oxygen process showed
very rapid share increases, reaching more than 50'7. of the market in the
1970s. The electric process is gaining importance and will probably overtake
basic oxygen within the next two decades due to the saturation of demand for
domestic steel in the USA. The dwindling total production leads to higher and
higher percentages of scrap iron and steel inputs instead of iron ore. The
electric process has the advantage that it is suitable for making many grades
of steel and can almost exclusively use recycled scrap iron and steel (Miller
1984). Thus the stagnating demand for steel favors the electric process since
it allows for almost exclusive use of recycled inputs and flexible steel produc-
tion in smaller mills.
This example illustrates that the evolution of steelmaking technologies
portrays a regular pattern that is similar to energy substitution. Before
returning to the analysis of recurring periods in technological change and
long-wave fluctuations in economic development, we first consider the substi-
tution process in the US merchant fleet. As an example of the evolution of
one of the oldest modes of transport, the substitution process covers a period
of 200 years and includes fundamental transformations of propulsion systems,
increased speed and size of vessels, and changes in construction methods and
materials.
Traditional ship propulsion, in use ever since ancient times, was wind
power, and the traditional construction material was wood. But with the
development of the steam engine and the relatively high energy density of
high-quality coals, it was possible slowly to replace sails with steam engines.
The first designs were of a hybrid type employing both steam and wind power.
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With the increase in the size of vessels along with the expansion of overseas
trade, and with the growth of the iron and steel industries, wood was increas-
ingly replaced by iron and later steel as the basic construction material. In
fact, the number of vessels remained practically constant from the late
eighteenth century until the 1940s at about 25,000 ships, doubling during the
last three decades. During the same period the total registered tonnage of
the merchant fleet increased by almost two orders of magnitude, implying that
the average vessel is about 100 times larger today than in 1800. This enor-
mous increase in the tonnage capacity of an average vessel can only be
explained by continuous improvements in propulsion systems, construction
materials, and design.
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Figure 8.7. Tonnage of merchant vessels.
Figure B.7 shows the tonnage growth of the US merchant fleet since
1789. and Figure B.B shows the substitution of sailing by steamships, both
coal- and oil-fired, and later the market penetration of motor, diesel, and
semi-diesel ships in terms of their respective tonnage. Sailing ships dom-
inated the merchant fleet until the 1880s, although steamers had acquired a
1% share of the total tonnage in 1819, more than 50 years earlier and only two
years after coal reached a 1% share in primary energy (see Figure B.4). By
the 1920s steam vessels constituted more than 90% of merchant tonnage: thus
the replacement of the traditional sailing ship took 100 years. During the
same decade motorized ships were introduced and their share of total tonnage
has increased. ever since, although even today they have not acquired much
more than one-tenth of the fleet tonnage. Consequently, steamships remain
an important type of merchant vessel and are projected in Figure B.B to stay
in that position throughout this century, although today they are fueled by oil
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Figure 8.8. Substitution in merchant vessels by propulsion system.
and in some cases use steam turbines instead of coal-fired atmospheric
engines. During World War II, the share of motor ships increased sharply, but
this perturbation was rf(absorbed during the 1960s to return to the long-term
trend indicated by the logistic substitution model.
The application of the logistic substitution model to the historical
replacement of older by newer forms of energy. steel production, and propul-
sion of merchant vessels indicates that technological improvements and
growth are achieved. through a regular process. From the time of its first
commercial use, each new technology grows logistically until it reaches a
saturation phase and then proceeds to decline logistically while being
replaced by a newer and more promising technology. DL!ring each phase of
the substitution process the dominant technology appears to be strong and
unassailable. but with time it decays as emerging competitors "attack" the
newly exposed position of the mature technology. In general, the saturation
point is determined by the dynamics of the introduction of new technologies.
The limits to growth of an older technology are usually encountered before
the complete market takeover due to the inherent performance superiority of
the new technology. They are imposed by the structure of a given market
that is in turn related to overall economic and social development and not
necessarily to mere resource depletion. Once these limits are reached,
further growth becomes economically and socially unviable. Thus. technologi-
cal and economic changes have a regular pattern and rules that point to a cer-
tain rhythm and schedule in the structural change of human activities.
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Horse riding, wood fires, and sailing ships have become aesthetic and recrea-
tional activities in the developed economies after they have been replaced by
new technologies. while they still constitute a daily necessity in many
developing parts of the world as means of transportation and sources of
energy.
8.3. Long Waves and Technological Change
We have seen that technological advancement is an evolutionary process.
Technological change and diffusion follow regular substitution patterns
characterized by successive alternation of growth and senescence with a
duration on the order of 50 years for large systems and infrastructures. It is
therefore only natural to ask whether the whole process of economic growth
and development can also be considered as a series of leaps with periods of
rapid growth and periods of relative stagnation that are related to the rise
and fall of dominant technologies and economic sectors. From history we know
that this is at least an approximate description since a number of serious
depressions and crises. as well as periods of unusual prosperity and great
achievements, have been recorded since the beginning of the industrial age.
This hypothetical connection between technological substitution and the
long wave must be verified empirically before the exact nature of the two
phenomena connected with the process of technological and economic
development can be related to each other. Here we examine and document
the evidence for the presence of long waves in economic development of the
USA. Examples for other countries are reported elsewhere (Nakicenovic,
1984; Marchetti, 1981; Bianchi et al., 1983). The analysis essentially consists
of the use of a phenomenological approach to extract long fluctuations from
historical records in an attempt to filter out the long waves and to compare
the fluctuation patterns thus derived with the dynamics of technological sub-
stitution.
Kondratieff (1926) and Schumpeter (1935) used a similar approach in the
search for invariants in the dynamics of long waves. They assumed that every
sequence of annual eCDnDmic (or other) quantities and indicators can in princi-
ple be decomposed into two components - the secular trend and the fluctua-
tions around this trend. In practical terms, the method consists of first elim-
inating the secular trend from nonstationary time series and then determining
the residual time-series fluctuatiDns. The second stage consists Df eliminating
all other fluctuations shorter than the long wave. In general. trend elimina-
tion from time series that are nDt stationary is usually more difficult than the
decomposition of the stationary series intD fluctuatiDns. Specifically, it is not
always obvious which method Df trend eliminatiDn should be used. We have
used three different methods: moving averages over sufficiently long time
periods, exponential, and logistic growth curves. In many cases we have
applied more than one method of trend elimination in order tD test the sensi-
tivity of the obtained results with respect to such changes, since each
method is associated with some prDblems and specific disadvantages.
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8.3.1. Wholesale commodity prices
The regularity of fluctuations in price data was the phenomenon that first
stimulated Kondratieff and other long-wave researchers to postulate the
existence of long waves in economic development. These waves are pro-
nounced in the wholesale price indices for all commodities in the USA, as well
as other industrialized countries such as the UK, France, and the FRG. Fig-
ure 8.9 shows the wholesale commodity price index for the USA from 1800 to
1982. Wholesale prices appear to be stationary with long fluctuations over
almost the whole historical period. Only after the 1940s can a pronounced
inflationary trend be observed that had a magnitude greater than any previ-
ous fluctuation.
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F'igure 8.9. US wholesale price index since 1800.
The pronounced price peaks of the 1820s, 1870s, 1920s, and the
increases during the last decade are spaced at 40-50-year intervals. These
recurring long swings in prices are, in our opinion, not the primary causes of
the long-wave phenomenon, but rather a good indicator of the succession of
alternating phases of the long wave. We consider that the long swings in price
movements indicate the phases of growth and saturation with incr'easing price
levels, and phases of recession and regenerative destruction with decreasing
price levels.
In order to obtain a clearer picture of the succession of the long waves
in price indices, we have decomposed the time series into fluctuations and a
secular trend. Since the secular trend does not indicate a simple functional
form, we have used a 50-year moving average method to eliminate it from the
time series. We have smoothed the resulting residuals (i.e., the relative
difference between the actual price level and its secular trend expressed as
a percentage) with a 15-year moving average in order to eliminate business
and other cycles shorter than the long wave. The resulting series of
smoothed and unsmoothed residuals is shown in Figure 8.10 for the USA. The
average duration of the two fluctuations between the 1840s and 1940s is about
50 years with small variance in the duration and amplitude. The occurrence of
peaks and troughs varies by not more than a few years.
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Figure B.W. Long waves in wholesale prices since 1800.
8.3.2. Primary energy consumption
Energy use is one of the rare quantitative indicators that can, at least in
principle, be compared over long periods of time in spite of many technologi-
cal changes and substitutions of old by new sources of energy. This is possi-
ble because the use of different energy sources can be expressed in common
energy units. In the context of long waves we are interested in relative
changes in the levels of energy use over time, and at least three distinct
phases can be observed in the growth of primary energy consumption in the
USA (see Figure 8.3). After rather stable long-term growth rates. a phase of
more rapid growth started in 1900 and continued until 1930. After a short
interruption the rapid growth resumed a few years later and continued to the
1970s.
The secular trend of primary energy use in the USA can be captured by
a number of functional forms. Stewart (1981) used the logistic growth curve
to eliminate the secular trend, basing his estimate on five-year averages of
primary energy consumption, and the resulting fluctuations around this trend
showed pronounced long waves. The drawback of this approach is that he
used shorter time series starting in 1860, so that only the last and the
current wave were displayed. Our data base goes back to 1800 and extends
over one more wave. We use our extended data base (from Figure 8.3) and
employ three estimation methods of the secular trend: the geometric 50-year
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moving average, and the logistic and exponential growth curves. Figure 8.11
shows the historical primary energy consumption in the USA (fmm Figure 8.3)
with two alternative secular trends: the logistic fit with a saturation level of
about B TWyr/yr to be reached after the year 2050 and an exponential fit that
would lead to astronomical consumption levels in the far future. Being the
simplest of the three secular trends, the moving average is not shown in the
figure in order not to obscure the other two trends.
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Figure 8.1.1.. Primary energy consumption (with two secular trends).
Figure 8.12 shows the residuals, smoothed with a 15-year moving aver-
age, resulting from the three alternative methods of estimating the secular
trend (logistic and exponential estimates and the 50-year geometric moving
average). The fluctuations show the same regular and parallel movements as
the long waves in prices (see Figure 8.10). The second upper turning point in
energy consumption is not as pronounced as that in price movements, and it
occurred approximately a decade earlier. The first two fluctuations in pri-
mary energy consumption around the secular trends, however, may be to some
extent obscured by the fact that especially fuelwood, the most important of
all traditional energy sources during this period, with a 90% market share (see
Figures 8.2 and 8.4), was estimated primarily on the basis of per capita use
and population growth. In fact, fuelwood consumption (see Figure 8.3) is very
smooth, reflecting a continuous and regular secular trend in population
growth. Thus. since the fuelwood time series do not represent actual use, but
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Figure 8.12. Long waves in primary energy consumption (three estimates).
ralher serve as an indicalor of lhe relative imparlance of ils use, some of lhe
flucluations observed in olher energy sources may be obscured and nol con-
lained in lhe dala.
It should be noled lhal lhe lurning poinls of lhe flucluations are rela-
tively invarianl lo lhe estimation melhod. The amplitudes of lhe flucluations,
however, do depend on lhe estimation melhod, especially lhe amplitude of lhe
lasl upper lurning poinl in 1975. It is lowesl in lhe case of lhe exponential fil
since lhe low energy growlh rales during lhe lasl len years are below lhe
lrend of lhe exponential growlh curve. It is also inleresting lo nole lhal lhe
lower lurning poinl of lhe firsl wave in Figure 8.1.2 is daled al 1897 by lhe
moving average melhod and in 1883 in lhe case of lhe exponential and logistic
melhods. This confirms lhe facl lhal lhe moving average melhod is nol well
suiled for timing lhe lurning poinls of lhe long wave. Despile such relatively
small changes in lhe dating of lhis lurning poinl and a larger variance in lhe
amplitude of lhe lasl wave, lhe parallel fluclualions of all lhree long-wave
curves indicale lhal lhe broad fealures of lhe flucluations in primary energy
consumption are nol a function of lhe melhod used lo eliminale lhe secular
lrend from lhe dala. Apparently, all lhree melhods are suiled for lrend elim-
ination in lhis particular conlext, and since lhe moving average is lhe easiesl
lo compule, lhis sensitivily analysis offers an a posteriori justification for
using lhe simplesl melhod of lrend elilmination in olher examples.
The consumption levels of fossil energy sources are known wilh grealer
cerlainly lhan lhose of older, lraditional energy sources. This is especially
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Figure 8.1-3. Long waves in fossil energy consumption.
critical in the USA, where fuelwood was the major source of energy during the
last century. Figure 8.1:1 shows the fluctuations in fossil energy use (Le.,
fuelwood was eliminated from the data set given in Figure 8.3). The pro-
nounced fluctuations indicate the long wave more clearly than the total pri-
mary energy consumption from Figure 8.12. As mentioned earlier, fuelwood
consumption (see Figure 8.3) is very smooth, probably because population
growth was one of the most important secular trends used to estimate the
data. Thus, during the last century when fuel wood was the most important
source of energy, it obscured some of the fluctuations present in fossil
energy sources. Without fuelwood, primary energy consumption exhibits pro-
nounced long-wave movements.
8.3.3. Efficiency of energy use
There are many ways of determining the efficiency of energy use. The most
obvious indicators are the efficiencies of primary energy conversion to
secondary and final energy forms. Another possibility is to estimate the effi-
ciency of energy end use, e.g., the amount of fuel needed for travel or for
space conditioning. All of these efficiencies have improved radically since
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution along with the introduction of more
efficient technologies. In some cases the improvements span almost an order
of magnitude. For example, in 1920 the average efficiency of natural gas
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power plants in the USA was 9%, whereas today the best gas turbine power
plants can operate with efficiencies of almost 60%. Over longer periods the
improvements are even more impressive. For example, the second law effi-
ciency of prime movers increased by two orders of magnitude since 1700, that
of lamps by almost three orders of magnitude during the last century, and so
on (see Marchetti, 1979). All of these efficiency improvements of individual
technologies are translated into more effective use of energy and other
materials at the level of overall economic activity. Some efficiency increases
result from improved technologies and others from substitution of old by new
technologies.
Total primary energy
consumption (GWyr/yr)
'" Energy/capita (kWyr/yr)
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Figure 8.14. Primary energy, GNP, and energy intensity.
The extent of these changes and improvements can be expressed at an
aggregate level by the amount of primary energy consumed per unit GNP in a
given year. Figure 8.14 shows the total primary energy consumption (from
Figure 8.3), per capita consumption, and the ratio of energy consumption over
GNP (energy intensity) for the USA. The average reduction in energy con-
sumed to generate one dollar of GNP was about 0.9%/year over the last 180
years. The ratio decreased from more than 10 kWyr per (constant 1958) dol-
lar in 1800 to slightly more than 2 kWyr per dollar in 1982. Thus. a regular
decline in the energy intensity of the whole economy prevailed over a long
historical period, indicating that energy conservation is a historical process
that was discovered as a concept only during the last decade.
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Figure 8.15. Long waves in energy intensity.
Figure 8.15 shows the fluctuations in energy intensity in the USA after
the elimination of the secular trend by a 50-year geometric moving average.
The fluctuations show pronounced long-wave movements and a high degree of
synchronization with the price swings; during downswings in prices the
energy intensity' of the economy decreased more rapidly, and during the
upswings less rapidly. Thus during a downswing in economic activity general
rationalization measures of individual enterprises cause larger energy savings
compared. with the average historical reductions. As competition intensifies
during a recession and depression, energy savings become an important factor
in cost reduction. With recovery, new demands and prospects of continued
economic growth release many pressures associated with saturating markets.
Entrepreneurs in the new growth sectors must intensify their activities in
order to meet new demand, and low energy intensity ceases to be an important
competitive criterion. New technologies and energy forms offer possibilities
for continued expansion in new markets so that relative energy use intensi-
fies. Toward the end of the prosperity period the growth process encounters
limits once more. These are reflected in saturating demand and general price
inflation illustrated by the long wave in wholesale price movements (see Fig-
ure 8.10). Thus, during a downswing energy use reductions become important,
not only due to efforts to cut costs as a reaction to saturating demand, but
also due to a host of social constraints. Many energy technologies. along with
other economic activities, become socially and environmentally unacceptable
toward the end of the period of prosperity. This means that some
diseconomies that were socially acceptable during the growth phase become
internalized as additional economic costs or as explicit limits to further
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expansion. These causes of additional costs appear to offset the benefits of
the economies of scale achieved during the expansion phase. In fact. with the
demand reductions during the downswing, the large capacities that offered
economies of scale become sources of additional costs as excess capacity.
The relationship between primary energy consumption patterns and the
long wave appears to extend beyond the parallel changes in the relative level
of energy consumption and energy intensity with the fluctuations in other
long-wave indicators such as wholesale prices. A comparison of Figures 8.2
and 8.14 indicates that the upper turning points of energy intensity fluctua-
tions correspond to the saturation points of primary energy sources. The
upper turning point that occurred in 1860 is related to the saturation in
animal feed substitution, the 1915 turning point to the saturation in coal sub-
stitution, and the turning point of the 1970s to the saturation of crude oil. In
addition, new energy sources reached 1% market shares during times of low
energy intensity (during the 1880s and the 1950s). Thus, the dynamics of
energy substitution in the USA indicate a close relation to the succession of
the long-wave fluctuations.
8.3.4. Physical indicators: steel and ships
In addition to primary energy substitution, we have shown the examples of
technological substitution in steel production and merchant ships. Now we
will consider these two examples again in the context of the long wave. Fig-
ure 8.16 shows long-wave fluctuations in steel production derived from total
steel production since 1860 (given in Figure 8.5) using a 50-year geometric
moving average to eliminate the secular trend and a 15-year moving average to
smooth the fluctuations of annual residuals. It can be seen that long-wave
movements in steel production are out of phase with respect to the price
swings. The lower and upper turning points precede the corresponding turn-
ing points in prices by about one to two decades. This probably means that
the markets for steel are more sensitive to the first signs of economic
changes and thus respond before other sectors to the emergence of favorable
or unfavorable conditions. The reasons for this advanced response of the
steel industry may be relatively simple. It is possible that steel, as one of the
most important industrial materials, is by and large used in capital-intensive
goods that have relatively long lifetimes. Typical examples from the last cen-
tury are railroads and ships: today they are power plants, refineries, large
buildings, factories. automobiles, etc. Even small reductions in the demand
for these goods. if they occur simultaneously, would have an important effect
on steel production. Thus it is possible that the first signs of economic
change may be visi ble in fluctuations in steel production because the effect of
smaller reductions in other sectors is amplified when translated into demand
for steel. If this is actually the case, then one could use fluctuations in steel
production as an early warning of the upcoming turning points in the long
wave.
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F'igure 8.1.6. Long waves in steel production.
Figure S.17 shows the long-wave fluctuations in the tonnage of merchant
vessels. The same data were used as in Figure 8.7 where we considered the
technological substitution by type of vessel employed by merchant fleets.
The fluctuations correspond to the long waves in prices, although a major
irregularity occurred after the last wave. A second peak follows immediately
after the upswing and downswing between the lS90s and the 1930s. This
second peak rises during the 1940s, reaches a maximum in 1950, and then
declines in the 1950s and 1960s. It is interesting to note that this second
peak can also be detected in other indicators, but it is not so pronounced as
in this case. For example. the fluctuations in primary energy consumption
also portrayed such a peak over the same period, but it appeared to be only
an acceleration and deceleration during the upswing phase of the Long wave
that was initiated in 1944 with a global peak in the 19S0s. Even the wholesale
price index shows a subdued fluctuation over the same period with a local
peak in 1955, a decline, and a renewed rise after 1971. Although this fluctua-
tion is also present in some other long-wave indicators. it is much less pro-
nounced than in the case of merchan t fleet tonnage. Thus. it is not clear from
the empirical evidence alone whether the current long wave should be divided
into two waves of shorter duration, or whether this intermediate fluctuation is
an integral part of a single long wave initiated in 1944. If the first alternative
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8.4. Dynamics of Change
At the risk of overgeneralizing, we can state that there is strong evidence
that symmetric or at least similar changes in patterns of energy consumption
and price levels occur from one long wave to another, although the historical
content and individual manifestations may change profoundly so as to make
the symmetry apparent only at a higher level of abstraction. In order to
understand the actual mechanisms behind the long-wave phenomenon and
change in technology, we must acquire better statistical and analytical
descriptions of various mechanisms and causal relationships of what we gen-
erally call historical experience. This would also imply that we need to under-
stand the course of specific events and their individual manifestations that
lead, for example, from a period of rapid growth after World War II to the oil
shocks of the 1970s, saturating world markets, changing industrial structure,
increasing national debts in many parts of the world, and the economic slow-
down of the last decade. For the time being, we can only observe that the
particular circumstances change from one long wave to another, but that the
sequence of fluctuations and structural change at a higher level of abstrac-
tion indicate a striking regularity. The annals of business cycles (see, for
example, Thorp and Mitchell, 1926; Mitchell, 1927) show that the severe crises
or so-called Great Depressions occur regularly during the downswing of the
long wave. It suffices here to mention the Great Depressions and financial
panics of 1819, 1874, and 1929 in the USA that with small variance occurred
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throughout the rest of the world. This immediately suggests an obvious his-
torical manifestation of the prolonged periods of stagnation, but this does not
answer the question of whether these Great Depressions are a necessary
characteristic of the downswing.
8.4.1. Synchronization and recurrence
The analysis of technological substitution in steel production. merchant
vessels, and energy showed that the same basic approach can be applied to
describe the observed structural changes. In all three cases older technolo-
gies were replaced by new ones with regular, recurring patterns. Figure B.W
shows these three substitution cases. Besides the now obvious similarity in
substitution patterns, it should be observed that the timing of the saturation
phases is also synchronized in the three examples. In order to facilitate the
comparison we have shifted the curves in time so as to align the saturation
phases. In comparison with the saturation of coal in the example of primary
energy substitution, the saturation of open-hearth steel technology and
steamships lags by about 20 years. Once the curves are shifted in time by two
decades, as shown in Figure B.W. other saturation phases correspond to each
other as well. For example, the saturation of hay as the energy source for
animal feed was reached in the 1870s and the saturation of Bessemer steel
about 20 years later. A similar correspondence can be observed for the last
saturating technologies - crude oil and basic oxygen steel.
The substitution of other merchant vessels by motor ships corresponds
to market penetration of electric steel and natural gas with a lag of about 20
years; this may be indicative of the continuing synchronization of the dynamic
substitution processes in the future. It should be noted that the lag of 20
years spans a shorter period of time than the duration of the upswing or
downswing phases of the long wave. Although the timing of the introduction of
new technologies at the 1% level differs in the three examples. the change in
leadership from the old to the new dominant technology is strikingly similar.
The open-hearth steelmaking process emerged as the dominant technology (in
1907) about 21 years after coal replaced fuelwood as the major source of
energy (in 1886). The lag was even shorter in the case of steamships. which
overtook sailing ships in 1892. Thus all three takeovers took place within two
decades. A similar correspondence can be observed again 50 years later.
Crude oil surpassed coal in 1950. and basic oxygen steel overtook the open-
hearth process in 1969 - again a lag of two decades. Just as in the case of the
long-wave fluctuations, we find that the substitution dynamics can be charac-
terized by coordinated 50-year phases of change in market domination from
old to new leading technologies and energy sources.
A possible explanation of this similarity in substitution patterns is that
the specific changes that led to the replacement of old by new technologies
and energy sources were interrelated; e.g.. the new steel processes and
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Figure 8.1.9. (a) Long waves and (b) substilution dynamics.
marine propulsion systems were dependent on new energy technologies. On
the other hand, the new energy sources could only be developed with
increased intensity of energy use, such as in the new industrial and urban
complexes that emerged as the availability of transport possibilities and basic
materials increased (symbolized here by steel and merchant vessels). This
kind of interdependent lacing of technological development and demand
growth indicates that a certain degree of synchronization in the substitution
processes could be expected. This of course still leaves the question of the
precise nature of the 50-year time constant unanswered. Since we have
already shown that the three substitution processes appear to be synchron-
ized after allowing for a 20-year lag in the timing of crucial market saturation
and takeover events, we now consider the timing of long-wave fluctuations and
energy substitution (taking it to be indicative of other technological substitu-
tion processes).
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Figure 8.1.9(a) shows the long waves in energy consumption, energy
intensity, and wholesale prices (from Figures 8.12, 8.1.fj, 8.W), and Figure
8.1.9(b) shows energy substitution (from Figure 8.Z). In toto, Figure 8.1.9 sum-
marizes the results of the phenomenological analysis of the dynamics of tech-
nology and long waves in the USA. A careful examination of the timing and
patterns of changes shows that they are all in tune. The saturation periods of
energy technologies coincide with the peaks in prices and energy intensity.
The period of decline from saturation to loss of dominance (Le., loss of the
highest market shares) lasts on the order of 25 years, or about as long as the
downswing phase of the long wave, which is characterized in Figure 8.19 by
the fluctuations in energy consumption, intensity, and the price index. By
symmetry, the upswing of the long wave is paralleled by the growth of the new
energy source from newly acquired dominance to saturation.
8.5. Conclusions
The fact that all of the events that characterize profound changes in technol-
ogy and economic structure occur in tune is striking, but it leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. For instance, we have observed that technological substi-
tution in steel production and merchant vessels lags by about two decades
behind equivalent events in energy substitution. This would imply that these
other dominating technologies do not saturate during the end of the prosper-
ity phase, but rather during the onset of the downswing. Perhaps this is an
artifact of the choice of technological substitution processes in that they are
very closely related to the changes in the structure of the energy system.
Yet, given the sparse statistical records, it is difficult to find other examples
that span equivalent historical periods.
Nevertheless, the importance of the energy system and related infra-
structural developments appears to be crucial with respect to the observed
pulses in economic activity. For example, the construction of great canals
throughout Europe and the USA during the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries was initiated by the ever-increasing need to transport timber and
other goods in larger quantities over longer distances. Later, railroads were
associated with a similar boom period basically due to the same reasons - the
concentration of production in urban areas required a more efficient trans-
port system that also helped in the acquisition of new and larger markets.
Thus, canals and railroads expanded existing markets and "created" new ones
for new products. In terms of the energy system, the large canals are associ-
ated with the transport of fuel wood that was at that time the primary source
of energy in many industrial activities such as iron smelting. The railroad era
is very closely related to the widespread diffusion of steam- and coal-related
indus tries.
In terms of the long-wave fluctuation, we name the upswing phase from
1773 to 1810 the "age of canals" and the upswing from 1840 to 1869 the "age
of railroads". Accordingly, we name the upswing from 1895 to 1920 the "age of
electricity" because of its significant contribution to the rapid development
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of new industries and communications technologies. The last upswing, from
1945 to the 1970s, we symbolically identify with the automobile, aircraft, and
petrochemical industries. Unfortunately, it is not possible to time this last
turning point with any precision; but in view of the empirical evidence in the
synchronization of technological substitution processes, energy efficiency,
and other indicators, it probably occurred during the "oil crises" of the early
1970s that mark the saturation of crude oil and its eventual replacement as
the dominant source of primary energy. Let us assume for the sake of naming
a particular reference year that it in fact occurred in 1973. If this were
actually the case, and assuming the continuation of the long-wave fluctuations,
the next turning point can be expected sometime around the turn of the cen-
tury. Going further into the future, the following upswing phase can be
expected to last until the 2030s.
The overall picture that emerges suggests that each upswing phase is
associated with large infrastructural development. This development first
opens many new product and factor markets and toward the end of the pros-
perity phase leads to eventual saturation of these markets and full adoption
of the technologies that were introduced during the recovery period: This
was the process that occurred between the end of World War II and the initia-
tion of a downswing 10-15 years ago. Some of the developments of the
current downswing period we can already anticipate. For example, the energy
intensity curve in Figure 8.15 indicates that during the next decades we can
anticipate further relative improvements in the energy efficiency of the
economy (Le., reductions in the amount of primary energy consumed per mone-
tary unit of GNP in real terms). Thus, we can expect further dissemination of
energy efficient technologies and institutional measures during the downswing
phase until the end of the century.
As far as energy technologies are concerned, the market penetration
analysis suggests natural gas as the best candidate for eventual dominance as
the major energy source during the up'Swing period after the 1990s. Natural
gas is the cleanest fossil fuel and from that perspective alone it is attractive.
It could also become a very efficient source of electricity and clean fuels.
Widespread use of natural gas would require new infrastructures for produc-
tion, long-distance transport, conversion to fuels and electricity, and distri-
bution to the final consumer. Thus, construction of large grids and new indus-
tries based on natural gas would be required. Candidates for future growth
sectors related to the wider use of natural gas range from technologies for
control and management of large distribution grids for transport and distribu-
tion of energy and other goods, to bioengineering technologies that would
allow for greater efficiency and low-temperature chemical and industrial
conversion and production processes based on methane and electricity. Thus,
enzymes and microchips may be the hardware that could allow the transition
to a methane-based energy system. These are just some of the possible candi-
dates, but they are consistent with the apparent requirements that emerge
from the overall pattern of economic pulses and technological substitution
dynamics since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Before these and
other new technologies can expand during the next upswing, the next decades
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will bring a period of renewal and "gales of creative destruction". A period of
rapid (relative) deflation can be expected, together with prolonged unemploy-
ment and further economic slowdown. These are the selection mechanisms
that in the past distilled the successful from a wide range of promising new
technologies and entrepreneurial innovations. The existing patterns will have
to be destroyed before new ones can emerge, and their destruction will mark
the beginning of renewal and a promise of prosperity.
Most of these speculations on the nature and timing of future events is
based on the dynamics of equivalent changes in the past. Some of the pat-
terns of these dynamic changes can be projected into the future. Our
analysis of market substitution mechanisms has indicated that the invariance
in the timing of market saturation and takeover times also allows ex post pro-
jections over periods that span the duration of the long wave (see Marchetti
and Nakicenovic, 1979). Similarly, our analysis of the long swings in many
indicators, ranging from energy efficiency to price fluctuations and
Marchetti's invention and innovation pulses (see Marchetti, 1981), provide
strong historical evidence that these events are precisely timed and invari-
ant.
Perhaps the most important question is why the clock that tunes such
events as the dynamic changes in technology and long waves in economic
activity operates on a 50-year scale. Since we have shown that the events
that mark structural changes are synchronized and follow a logical order, the
question of the time scale and invariance is crucial. If it were answered all
the other events, since they occur in logical order apparently as required,
would fit the grand pattern like pieces of a puzzle.
Notes
[1J The basic assumption postulated by Fisher and Pry is that once a substitution
of the old by the new has progressed as far as a few percent, it will proceed
to completion along the logistic substitution curve:
-.l..- = exp(at +p)1-/
where t is the independent variable usually representing some unit of time, a
and p are constants, / is the fractional market share of the new competitor,
while 1-/ is that of the old one.
[2J We assume that only one competitor is in the saturation phase at any given
time, that declining technologies fade away steadily at logistic rates not influ-
enced by competition from new competitors, and that new competitors enter
the market and grow at logistic rates. The current saturating competitor is
then left with the residual market share (Le., the difference between 1 and
the sum of fractional market shares of all other competitors) and is forced to
follow a nonlogistic path that joins its period of growth to its subsequent
period of decline. After the current saturating competitor has reached a
logistic rate of decline, the next oldest competitor enters its saturation phase
and the process is repeated until all but the most recent competitor are in
decline. A more comprehensive descrlpUon of the model and the assumptions
is given in Nakicenovic (1979).
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CHAPTER 9
On the Long-Term Dynamics of the
Rate of Return
R.M. FJntov and A. V. Poletayev
9.1. Introduction
Relatively little work has so far been done on the long-term dynamics and
fluctuations of key economic indicators. This can be explained by the absence
of reliable and comparable statistical data, and by the number of significant
technical difficulties involved in attempting to isolate long economic cycles
using short time series data (see Petzina and Roan, 1981).
Several hypotheses regarding the nature of long waves and their under-
lying economic mechanisms have been advanced over the last few decades.
Alongside statistical verification of the general hypothesis on the existence
of long waves (for those who believe that the data do not allow a rejection of
this hypothesis, more detailed empirical investigations are necessary) are
analyses that isolate the most probable assumptions concerning the nature of
long waves in economic development. As a first step. it is useful to consider
empirical evidence on fluctuations in the main economic indicators, such as
cost and profit. the rate of return, interest rates, relative prices of various
groups of commodities, etc.
In this chapter we discuss a number of problems related to the formation
of statistical series that characterize long-term fluctuations in the rate of
return in the USA. Empirical analyses have been made of the rate of return,
but up to the mid-1970s the problem of its long-term dynamics was not dis-
cussed [although a series for 1926-1958 was calculated by Stigler (1963)].
Two exceptions were Gillman (1957) and the Labor Research Association
(1948), whose estimates of rate of return dynamics were based on censuses of
manufacturing industries, but in both cases the estimation methodologies raise
substantial objections.
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Within the framework of the discussion begun by Nordhaus (1974),
several alternative appraisals of the long-term dynamics in the rate of return
of US non-financial corporations were made, but only for the postwar period.
For example, Wolff's original (1979) calculations were made on the basis of bal-
ances of the US economy between 1947 and 1967. Problems related to the
methodology of empirically estimating the rate of return have been investi-
gated, but the problem of long-term fluctuations has not been discussed. The
few exceptions are Kleinknecht (1981) on the FRG, Menshikov (1985) on the
USA, and Sautter (1978) on Japan.
In this chapter we discuss the possibilities of estimating various annual
characteristics of profitability in US manufacturing industries in 1850-1983,
and non-financial corporations in 1897-1983. Evidently, not all the estimates
mentioned correspond strictly to a theoretical concept of the rate of return,
but nevertheless they do give a general impression of long-term trends (for
the period 1929-1983 it is possible to ensure that the fluctuations in these
indicators reflect exactly the basic changes in profitability).
The period under investigation does not exceed 135 years. This,
together with incomplete data (in the best case, for the first part of the
period considered, it is only possible to make discrete estimates, while for
the second part continuous annual data series were available), means that the
use of "strong" methods of cycle isolation, such as spectral analysis, is virtu-
ally impossible. The general outlines of trajectories calculated may confirm
the existence of long waves, but they do not allow conclusions to be drawn on
their periodicity.
Fluctuations in the rate of return form a central element in the long
wave mechanism described by Marx (see Menshikov and Klimenko, 1985): the
estimates made may be considered as empirical confirmation of this concept.
At the same time, the trends exposed may show the existence of a number of
factors (wars, changes in corporate taxes, inflation etc.) that have consider-
ably modified the cyclical nature of changes in the rate of return. Within the
framework of these calculations, certain hypotheses are put forward on the
existence of a general mechanism of lowering (raising) costs, which ensure
long-term periodic increases (decreases) in the rate of return.
Marx showed that in most economic situations an increase in the rate of
return forms the necessary condition for a further expansion of production.
Proceeding from a number of general considerations. it is possible to assume
that long waves of changes in the rate of return should lead in relation to long
waves in the development of production. In principle. our results confirm this
hypothesis. The lags revealed in a cyclical development of production cannot
be considered constant: their value depends to a great extent on the general
conditions of the economic development.
9.2. Problems of Estimation
An empirical analysis of the dynamics of profitability encounters serious sta-
tistical complications. Such estimates couLd be made on the basis of accounts
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of the US joint-stock companies, but before the introduction of taxes on prof-
its at the turn of the century, such accounts were published only occasion-
ally. In addition, in spite of the fact that in the late nineteenth century cor-
porations produced more than half of total manufacturing output, there were
no aggregate data on profits and available estimates were restricted to non-
representative company samples. This situation prevailed even after the
introduction of taxes on profits, so that relatively reliable and complete
aggregate information on the profits and assets of joint-stock companies are
only available from the 1920s.
The Censuses of Manufactures, another source of data, were performed
every 10 years before 1900, every five years between 1899 and 1919, and
every two years between 1919 and 1939, so that estimates can be made of
profitability in manufacturing industries since 1849-1859 (before 1900 the
censuses covered the period 1 June to 31 May). However, the census data
have a number of significant deficiencies: (i) they are confined to manufac-
turing industries; (ii) they do not provide continuous data series (this is par-
ticularly important in estimating profitability, which is subject to intense
short-term fluctuations); and (iii) profits are not separated from overhead
costs [1]. At the same time, it is known that by the turn of the century over-
head expenditures constituted a significant and growing part of costs.
Numerous theoretical complications are involved in the choice of method-
ology to appraise changes in profitability. First, profits can be considered as
an operational income or as a holding income - the different components of
income are correspondingly included (see Shaven and Bulow, 1975). From our
point of view, an interpretation of profit as an income from operations
appears to be more acceptable within the framework of this analysis of long-
term fluctuations in profitability. However, the consistent use of an "income
from operations" concept requires a range of corrections to the primary sta-
tistical data in order exclude those types of income that arise as profits
(losses) from revaluation of inventories, income from changes in the value of
capital assets, etc. Also, data on the amount of amortization that should be
estimated on the basis of the replacement value of fixed capital require
correction (until recently, in the US accounting system, amortization was
estimated from the historical cost of fixed capital).
Second, opinion varies as to whether it is necessary to include in profits
the net interest payments of non-financial corporations, imputed incomes and
costs (including imputed interest), dividends obtained from companies,
incomes from foreign subsidiaries, etc. An essential problem is whether prof-
its should include taxes, particularly taxes on profits. In this chapter net
interest payments and taxes are included [2], but dividends obtained by non-
financial corporations are excluded (to eliminate repetition).
The methOdology of calculating the rate of return is debatable (particu-
larly the estimation of the volume of advanced capital). When analyzing long
waves. a sum of assets has been used because the rate of return calculated for
the equity capital characterizes the conditions of movement of individual
industrial capital [3].
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Taking into account a lack of direct estimates of assets, we have used a
number of "substitutes" for advanced capital assessments to estimate the rate
of return. Indicators of fixed capital, repr-oducible assets (including invest-
ments in inventories), and tangible assets (including investments in real
estate) are usually used as such substitutes, and may be considered appropri-
ate only if there is reason to believe that the structure of assets remains
more or less stable.
Another indicator - the share of profits in sales (or the ratio of profits
to annual costs) - may also be used to assess profitability dynamics. It is evi-
dent that the differences in the dynamics of this indicator and the rate of
return are defined mainly by the rate of capital turnover, one index of which
may be the ratio of annual production costs to advanced capital. Our calcula-
tions showed that over the last 50 years the ratio of annual production costs
to assets showed mainly short-term fluctuations defined first of all by the
course of a business cycle. Taking into account the incompleteness of data
and the need to use a number of approximate indicators, we believe that prof-
itability dynamics should be investigated on the basis of a system of indica-
tors. Attempts to isolate any "solely correct" indicator of the rate of return
and to limit ourselves to its consideration would be unjustified from either a
statistical or a theoretical point of view.
9.3. Empirical Results
The first group of estimates was obtained for the rate of return dynamics of
US non-financial corporations, which currently produce over 60% of the GOP
in this country. Even at the turn of the century this sector played a dominant
role in the US economy: in the 1890s, about 78% of all investments were made
by corporations (70% in manufacturing and mining, 99% in public services, and
30% in commerce, other services, and construction; see Goldsmith 1955) [4].
Several of our estimations of the rate of return of non-financial corporations
are shown in Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1. The methodology is described in detail
in Appendix I, and below we explain briefly the indicators used.
Indicator I is the ratio of profit after tax (net income) to tangible assets
(fixed capital, inventories, and land) for the beginning of the year. Continu-
ous annual observations are available from 1897. In order to exclude violent
short-term fluctuations, we calculated the mean cyclical values of Indicator I
(between minimum values corresponding to the business cycle troughs of the
National Bureau of Economic Research - see Table 9.1) with the center in a
given cycle.
Indicator II is analogous to indicator I, but the profit before tax is used
in the numerator.
Indicators calculated for total assets may be considered as another and
slightly better approximation of the rate of return. However, for the period
before 1946, we have only estimates obtained by Goldsmith for the end of
1900, 1912, 1922, 1929, 1933. 1939, and 1945. These years are not entirely
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Figu.re 9.1. Alternative estimates of the rate of return in US non-financial cor-
porations (%). (a) On tangible assets and (b) on total assets. Solid curves are cycli-
cal averages. Sources: See Appendix I; roman numerals relate to appropriate
columns in Table 9.1.
comparable in their cyclical characteristics, and the corresponding discrete
estimates for a disclosure of long-term fluctuations in the rate of return
dynamics should be used taking this into account [5].
The following procedure was used to obtain discrete estimates before
1946. Estimates of the rate of return on assets were divided by a coefficient
equal to the ratio of the rate of return on tangible assets in the same year to
an average cyclical value of the rate of return on tangible assets (for a
corresponding cycle). It was assumed that the estimate related to the center
of the corresponding cycle. The rate of return for tangible assets in 1901 (we
use the ratio to assets at the beginning of the year as theoretically prefer-
able) is evidently a local cyclical minimum. The estimate for this year was
used to calculate mean cyclical indicators for the periods 1897-1901 and
1901-1904 (see Table 9.1).
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Using this method, four indicators of the rate of return on total assets
were calculated (there are continuous observations since 1946): indicator III
has profits after tax in the numerator; indicator IVhas profits before tax in
the numerator; a sum of net interest payments by non-financial corporations
(excluding imputed interest where possible) was added to the numerator of
indicator V; and indicator W"includes foreign profits.
All indicators show approximately the same dynamics: the rate of return
of non-financial corporations fell between 1900 and the mid-1930s, rose to the
late 1940s-early 1950s, and after that fell again up to the early 1980s.
The second sector for which we calculated estimates of profitability was
US manufacturing industry. Profits were estimated on the basis of data pro-
vided by King (1919, 1930) and Kuznets (1941, 1946), and from official statis-
tics on income data for 1929 (profits of corporations and net income of non-
incorporated businesses). Alternatively, census data were used: profit was
defined as a residual of the value added excluding wages of all workers (up to
1889-1890, only wages of production workers; see Appendiz 11).
Three indices were used as values to which profits were related. The
first is the value of fixed capital at historical cost (according to data pro-
vided by King, Kuznets, and Creamer et al.,). The second is the total assets
(at historical cost, according to data provided by Goldsmith and Creamer et
al. and at replacement cost according to Creamer et al.). The results are
shown in Table 9.2. All estimates confirm the growth of profitability in
manufacturing industry from 1880 to 1900 and its subsequent decline up to the
end of the 1920s (calculations for later periods were not made using these
data). Estimates for 1850, 1860, and 1870 (based only on data on fixed capital
provided by King) appear to be unreliable.
In the third case, the profits in manufacturing industry were related to
the volume of sales (for before 1929, we used the sum of expenditures on raw
materials and value added). For from 1919 profits were adjusted for "paper"
income from revaluation of inventories [see Figure 9.2(c)]. Before 1919 we
have only discrete estimates that can considerably distort long-term dynam-
ics, as shown above. However, from our calculations, the dynamics of this
indicator in the twentieth century correspond on the whole to rate of return
dynamics in the non-financial sector. As for the nineteenth century,
separate estimates may be interpreted as evidence for the growth of the
share of profits in sales during 1850-1860, its fall in 1860-1880, and its
growth again in 1880-1900.
It should be noted that all the estimates given are approximate; at best
they give only an impression of trends of changes in the rate of return.
Nevertheless, a combination of results obtained allows us to speak of the
existence of protracted alternating periods of rising and falling profitability.
At the same time, our calculations show no strict periodicity nor stable ampli-
tude is obser'ved in the rate of return fluctuations. For example, if in the
first half of this century the rate of return showed intense fluctuations (and
was even negative during the crisis of 1929-1933), after World War II there
has been a moderate falling trend, more distinct since the mid-1960s. Periods
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Table 9.2. AlternaUve estimates of rate of returna In US manufacturing Industry
(%).
On total assets
On fized. assets
at historical cost At historical cost At replacement cost
Year King Kuznets Creamer Gold.smith Creamer Creamer
1850 64.2 1860
1870 76.5
1880 19.1 36.7 14.4 15.5
1890 39.9 39.3 37.2 18.3 18.6
1900 45.8 45.8 43.3 20.4 22.4 21.1
1909 10.1 11.0 10.4
1910 32.3
1912 24.7
1914 9.4 10.3
1918 16.6
1919 10.4 11.4 7.3
1922 12.0
1929 16.8 7.8 8.0
acolumns 1-5, income of non-incorporated businesses plus net income (before tax)
of manufacturing corporaUons. Column 6, as above, plus inventory valuation ad-
justment. Sources: see Appendix II.
of rising and falling rate of return differ in duration and intensity. An espe-
cially significant influence on the value and dynamics of the rate of return
was exerted by wars, such as the Civil War, the two world wars, Korea, and
Vietnam. Such fluctuations due to wars and peculiarities in the development
of the business cycle thus make it difficult to isolate the long waves in the
rate of return dynamics.
9.5. Concluding Remarks
If our results are not statistical artifacts, then they raise a number of prob-
lems. First, according to our analysis, the periods of growth in the rate of
return include a considerable part of the downswing phases of long waves [6].
One possible explanation lies in the fact that the rate of return is a leading
indicator of long waves [7].
Another problem is related to the mechanism of the rate of return move-
ments. During a business cycle, the dynamics of costs conditioned by raw
materials and wages is characterized by stable regularities, but it was impos-
sible to trace these in long-term fluctuations in costs and profits [8J (see Fig-
ure 9.2).
A lack of analogy in superficial mechanisms of the formation of cyclical
fluctuations and long waves in profitability dynamics does not mean an
absence of more profound analogies. In particular, as proved by Marx, a
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Figure 9.2. Price structure in US manufacturing (%). (a) Material costs, (b) labor
costs, and c) profits. Source: See Appendix II. Profits include taxes, net interest,
and inventory adjustments.
long-term, even cyclical, fall in the rate of return is conditioned by an over-
accumulation of capital. Changes in the rate of return are closely related to
the law of capitalist crises. Declining profitability engendered by the
development of a productive labor force constitutes a law that at a certain
time collides severely with the development of the productive labor force and
that can only be overcome by means of crises (Marx, 1975, Ch. 15).
This cyclical crisis is always engendered by an explosion of all the
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, but not all of these con-
tradictions may find a complete (temporal) resolution during the course of the
cyclical recession. Some conflicts take a long time to reach the crisis point,
in which case they are "transferred" from one cycle to another while gradu-
ally becoming aggravated. A prolonged accumulation of these disproportions
inevitably paves the way for more destructive crises and changes of general
conditions of the economic growth.
A further problem is related to the investigation of mechanisms of the
influence of long-term fluctuations in the rate of return on the general course
of development of the capitalist economy. It is evident that the relation
between the rate of return dynamics and other economic indicators is not
linear. A period of intensive economic growth may continue for a certain
period of time alongside a declining rate of return. In addition, the latter may
stimulate the introduction of new, more efficient techniques and technologies,
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but at the same time may restrain new investments due to financial restric-
tions and low expectations of return on new investments. The process of
accumulation of capital and conditions of the functioning of the capital market
playa significant role in the mechanism by which the rate of retur'n influ-
ences the process of accumulation. In this connection, the correlation of long
waves with changes in industrial profits and interest rates is of special con-
cern.
Notes
[lJ
[2J
[3J
[4J
[5J
[6J
[7J
[8J
Only one component of overhead costs - salaries of non-production workers
who are employed directly within enterprises - can be estimated beginning
from the census of 1889/1890.
Otherwise, distribution processes that represent an independent object of
investigation are placed in the forefront.
It is natural in using accounting data on the amount of assets to make correc-
tions that are conditioned by the transition from the historical to the replace-
ment value of tangible assets.
When estimating the rate of return in this sector we used Goldsmith's esti-
mates for the period 1897-1947 and data from the Flow of Funds section of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System thereafter. Statistical
data on national income and GNP were obtained from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the US Department of Commerce.
The instability of results obtained when using discrete observations may be
demonstrated as follows. If we take the ratio of adjusted profits before tax to
assets in replacement prices for the end of the year then, for example, in
1900 the rate of return of non-financing corporations was 4% and in 1912 it
was 3.5%, I.e., it was lending to fall. If we take the ratio of profits to assets
for the beginning "f the year then the rate of return grew from 4.1% in 1901
to 4.9% in 1913, I.e., it was rising.
Just because of this, we cannot accept such an approach to the analysis of
long waves that excludes long-term trends in changes in the rate of return
from empirical analysis, and simply suggests that we should proceed from the
fact that production dynamics themselves are characteristics of these
changes (see Mandel, 1980, pp. 8-11). Mandel also suggests the use of interest
rates as indicators of the rate of return (pp. 19-21), but our estimates sug-
gest the direction of changes in interest rates over long periods is opposite
to the rate of return changes. Even Mandel's factual malerial may confirm
that in a number of cases both indicators (the rate of production expansion
and the interest rate, which are both used as rate of return characteristics)
moved in opposite directions over the same period.
During the business cycle the rate of return begins to fall at the end of the
growth phase, before the onset of a recession. The leading role of the rate of
return in the downswing phase is expressed less obviously because this phase
is short, but in this case it is also possible to assert that the rate of return,
or profitability, to be more precise, begins to rise before production starts.
As shown in Figure 9.2, increases in profitability may be accompanied by
reductions in both the share of material costs in prices (1880-1890) and in
the share of labor costs (1850-1860, 1890-1900). Conversely, both an
increase in the share of material costs in prices (1860-1880, 1900-1919,
1970-1980) and in the share of labor costs (1951-1970) may be typical for
periods when the rate of return falls. At the same time (e.g., in the 1870s and
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1970s), reduced profitability and lower labor costs may occur simultaneously,
and In 1950-1970 the drop in profitability was accompanied by a fall in the
share of material costs. The growth of the share of profits in prices may be
accompanied by both a growth in the share of labor costs (1880-1890) and a
growth in the share of material costs (1890-1900, 1933-1950).
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Appendix I. US non-financial corporations
Profit Estimates
(1) Adjusted net income (without profit taxes)
(a) 1897-1919: Goldsmith (1955), vol. I, pp. 917, 937, 939; with dif-
ferent adjustments (pp. 914-915, 937, 941, 946, 953).
(b) 1919-1928: Kuznets (1941), vol. I, pp. 312-313, 316-317; with dif-
ferent adjustments (vol. I, pp. 310-313; vol. II, tables IV, VIII).
(c) 1929-1983: [6], [8], table 1.13.
(2) Profit taxes
(a) 1909-1919: Goldsmith (1955), vol. I, pp. 917, 937; vol. III, pp.
434-435.
(b) 1929-1983: [6], [8], table 1.13.
(3) Net interest payments
(a) 1919-1929: Kuznets (1941), vol. I, pp. 318-319.
(b) 1929-1946: [6], table 1.13.
(c) 1946-1983: [6], [8], table 8.7.
(4) Foreign profits
(a) 1923-1929: Kuznets (1941), vol. I, pp. 318-319
(b) 1929-1983: [6], [8], table 1.12.
Capital Estimates
(1) Tangible assets at replacement cost (beginning of year)
(a) 1897-1946: basic points, Goldsmith (1963), vol. I, table III-4b;
interpolation and extrapolation up to 1897, Goldsmith (1955), vol.
HI, pp. 14-15, cols. 5,6,11,16,22.
(b) 1946-1983: [2], pp. 36-43.
(2) Total assets at replacement cost (beginning of year)
(a) 1901-1946: basic points, Goldsmith (1963), vol. I, table III-4b.
(b) 1946-1983: [2], pp. 36-45.
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Profit Estimates
(1) Profits with overhead costs (1890-1921, without non-production workers'
salaries), census years
(a) 1850-1919: [4], pp. 214-215.
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(2) Net income (without corporate taxes on profits)
(a) 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900,1910: King (1919), p. 263.
(b) 1909-1919: King (1930), pp. 108, 278.
(c) 1919-1929: Kuznets (1941), vol. I, pp. 312-313, 316-317.
(d) 1929-1983: [6], [8], table 6.16, 6.20.
(3) Inventory valuation adjustment
(a) 1919-1929: Kuznets (1941), vol. n, table VII.
(b) 1929-1983: [6], [8], table 6.18.
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(4) Taxes on profit
(a) 1919-1929: [7], p. 336; Kuznets (1941), vol. I, pp. 312-313,
316-317.
(b) 1929-1983: [6], [8], table 6.22.
(5) Net interest payments
(a) 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910: King (1919), p. 261.
(b) 1909-1919: King (1930), p. 186.
(c) 1919-1929: Kuznets (1941), vol. I, pp. 318-319.
(d) 1929-1983: [6], [8], table 6.19.
Capital estimates
(1) Fixed assets at original cost (end of year)
(a) 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910: King (1919), pp. 256, 258.
(b) 1880, 1890, 1900, 1912, 1918, 1922: Kuznets (1946), pp. 202, 213,
220.
(c) 1890, 1900, 1929: Creamer (1960), p. 248.
(2) Total assets at original cost (end of year)
(a) 1900,1909,1914,1919: Goldsmith (1955), vol. I, p. 927.
(b) 1880,1890,1900,1909,1919,1929: Creamer (1960), p.241.
(3) Total assets at replacement cost (end of year)
(a) 1880,1890,1900,1909,1919,1929: Creamer (1960), p.252.
Sales and Costs Estimates
(1) Sales
(a) 1850-1929 (census years): [4], p. 214 (value of shipments).
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(b) 1929-1958: [4], pp. 260-261.
(c) 1958-1983: [5], p. 289.
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(2) Labor costs
(a) 1850-1889 (census years): [1], p. 5 (production workers' wages).
(b) 1889-1929 (census years): [1], p. 5 (total industrial wages).
(c) 1929-1983: [6], [8], table 6.5.
(3) Material costs
(a) 1850-1947 (census years): [4], pp. 214-215.
(b) 1947-1961: [3].
(c) 1961-1981: [1], p. 5.
[1] Annual Survey of Manufactures, 1981. M81 (ASr1 (Washington, 1983).
[2] Balance Sheets for the US Economy, 1945-82 (Washington, 1983).
[3] Bureau of Census Workfile 1205-04-07 (Unpublished).
[4] The Economic Almanac, 1962 (New York).
[5] The Economic Report of the President, 1985 (Washington).
[6] The National Income and Product Accounts of the United states,
1929-1ffl6, Statistical Tables (Washington, 1981).
[7] statistics of Income for 1949. Part 2: Corporation Income Tax Returns
(Washington, 1953).
[8] Survey of Current Business, July 1982, 1984.
CHAPTER 10
Empirical Research and Forecasting Based on
Hungarian and World Economic Data Series
B~la Sipos
10.1. Introduction
Estimates have been made of many basic economic elements to demonstrate
the existence of Kondratieff cycles. With time series data for over 100 years,
the existence of such cycles could also be proved. We have analyzed Soviet
and Hungarian industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as the world econ-
omy. With the exception of Hungarian agriculture, long waves have been
Table 10.1. Hungarian industrial production and foreign trade, and parameters of
the approach using a second-degree parabolic curve.
Parameters
RZ
Degrees oj
Industry Period b O b 1 b Z freedom
Iron ore 1876-1982 0.17678 -0.00212 0.00001 0.9461 104
Iron 1876-1982 0.07646 -0.00289 0.00004 0.9886 104
Steel 1920-1982 0.16892 -0.00727 0.00009 0.9957 60
Hard coal 1890-1982 0.29114 -0.00732 0.00008 0.9637 90
Brown coal!
lignite 1890-1982 0.57200 -0.00261 0.00019 0.7650 90
Bauxite 1927-1982 0.24498 -0.00864 0.00009 0.9920 53
Aluminum 1937-1982 0.02690 0.00056 -0.00001 0.9998 43
Cement 1946-1982 0.13007 -0.01038 0.00013 0.9955 34
Crude oil 1937-1982 -0.58747 0.01262 0.00005 0.9922 43
Electricity 1926-1982 3.80145 -0.12651 0.00107 0.9928 54
Exports 1882-1982 0.24018 -0.01298 0.00015 0.9524 98
Imports 1882-1982 0.25901 -0.01409 0.00016 0.9460 98
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Table 10.2. Kondratieff cycles in Hungarian industry and foreign trade (in
kg/capita).
First period Second period Third period
Upswing Downswing Upswing Downswing Upswing Downswing
Industry (peak point) (peak point) (peak point)
Iron are 1880(?) [1906] 1924 [1978](?)
(-82.18) (117.54) (-75.44) (26.67)
Iron 1880 [1910] 1948 [1974]
(-34.74) (43.02) (-39.29) (23.77)
Steel [1926](?) 1946 [1966]
(12.34) (-28.97) (21.35)
Hard coal 1894 [1910] 1948 [1966] [1978](?)
(-9.53) (36.34) (-43.55) (121.47) (-86.82)
Brown coal!
lignite 1894 [1911] 1946 [1962] 1978(?)
(-85.78) (296.99) (-405.02) (692.63) (-412.29)
Bauxite 1932 (1940] 1948 (1952] 1960 1975
(-8.76) (21.62) (-16.97) (8.23) (-12.40) (18.89)
Aluminum (1941](?) 1949 (1964] 1978(?)
0.29 (-0.73) (0.48) (-0.22)
Cement (1951] 1959 (1964] 1972 (1977]
(9.43) (-11.30) (3.56) (-7.83) (14.29)
Crude oil (1943] 1949 (1966] 1978(?)
(13.98) (-17.10) (13.75) (-3.36)
Electricity 1930(?) (1939] 1948 (1975]
(-7.12) (47.42) (-41.13) (73.34)
Exports 1886(?) (1914] 1966 (1978](?)
(-85.55) (82.67) (-129.49) (173.03)
Imports 1886(?) (1914] 1965 [1978](?)
(-92.58) (92.04) (-147.75) (203.47)
proved. Similar fluctuations can be expected in the future. It is likely that
the downswing in the Kondratieff cycle began in the 1970s, and coincided with
a downturn in a century-old trend-curve. The downswing could end at dif-
ferent times for individual items. The start of the next upswing can be
expected in the 1995-2000.
On behalf of the Tannery of Pees, I began business cycle research in
order to make price forecasts. The importance of periodic fluctuations in
prices was proved, when the company saved a large amount of hard currency
through taking into consideration the probable price movements of hides. At
the core of this examination were the seasonal fluctuations caused by the
business cycles. In the course of my research, I used the findings of the Far-
kas Heller school, the members of which had studied Soviet long-wave
researchers. On Lenin's initiative, the first Institute for Business Cycle
Research was established in 1920, with N.D. Kondratieff as director. By 1925,
there were three institutes for long-wave research in the USSR, and 30 years
later Hungarian historians started to deal with the works of Kondratieff.
The business cycle in the leather industry changed in the late 1970s.
The amplitude and the length of the cycle increased dramatically (especially
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Figure 1.0.1. Kondratieff cycles in Hungarian iron are, hard coal, iron, and sleel
production (y estimaled on lhe basis of a second-degree parabolic lrend; y = a
nine-year moving average of Yi - Yi ). Production time series were divided by po-
pulation lo oblain lonnes/capilal. The nine-year moving averages representing tile
long wave are multiplied by 1000 to give kg/capila.
the upswing), probably due to the coincidence of a long-term wave and short
cycles. In this chapter I attempt to summarize the first results of our
research on Hungarian and world economic cycles.
10.2. Hungarian Industry and Foreign Trade
Industrial production and foreign trade dala are presented in Table W.t.
(Note that data for iron ore and iron production cover 1.06 years, while those
for cement production cover only 36 years). The Kondratieff cycles in Hun-
garian industrial output are shown in Table W.2, and the results are
presented graphically in Figures W.1-10.3.
Table 10.3 is based on the results in Table W.2, and summarizes more
clearly the periods of the Kondratieff cycle. In general, two cycles can be
traced.
The question marks in Tables W.2 and W.3 show that the upswing prob-
ably started earlier, and that the downswing will continue to fall.
For bauxite, cement and electricity production we obtained very short
periods (from 12-17 years; consequently, there are Labrousse cycles with
periods of 10-12 years and Kuznets cycles with periods of 20 years). The
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F'igure WA. Kondratieff cycles in output of the Mlizaszi1szv,k coalmine.
average length of the first period (except for bauxite, cement. and electricity
production) is 62.83 years with a deviation of 15.05 years (see footnote, Table
10.3). The relative deviation (deviation/average) is 23.95%, so that the lengths
of individual periods differ from the average of 23.95%. The upswing was
shorter (24.16 years) than the downswing (32.50 years).
The second period length is 30 years, so that the period of the Kondra-
tieff cycle has been halved. This result could be considered an estimate,
because only the upswing of the second period is known for iron ore. iron and
steel, and exports/imports. The end of the downswing can only be forecast
with large uncertainly. The long cycles of output of the Mazaszaszvar coal-
mine between 1817 and 1983 are also similar (see Figure 10.4).
The years 1902, 1910, and 1917 were disastrous, and output fell signifi-
cantly. 1875, 1933, and 1960 were the low points in the long cycle, whereas
the maxima occurred in 1900, 1950, and 1978. The amplitudes before 1945
were at about the same level; after 1945 they diminished, the waves became
irregular. and in the 1970s a downswing began. A survey at the level of the
firm (on the basis of 166-year data) has shown that the period of the Kondra-
tieff cycle has become remarkably shorter (Sipos, 1985. pp. 249-250).
In our analysis of agriculture, the production of potatoes. wheat, and
maize has been studied. together with the analysis of 50-year time series data
on pig and cattle populations. However, with these series, long-term trends
can be determined only up to 1945. Since that year. the large farm estates
have been broken up. and agricultural output has fluctuated irregularly.
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Table 10.3. The periods of the Kondratieff cycles in Hungary (year).
First period Second period
------
Industry Total Upswing Downswing Total Upswing Downswing
Iron are 44(?) 26(?) 18 54
Iron 68 30 38 26
Steel 20 20
Hard coal 54 16 38 3O(?) 18 12(?)
Brown coal!
lignite 52 17 35 32(?) 16 16(?)
Bauxitea 16 8 8 12 4 8
Aluminum 8 29(?) 15 14(?)
Cementa 8 13 5 8
Crude oil 6 29 17 12
Electricitya 17 9 8 27
Exports 80 28 52 12
Imports 79 28 51 13
Average 51.25 20.25 22.92 24.46 18.91 11.66
Deviation 24.93 8.89 17.48 9.89 13.05 3.20
Averagea 62.83 24.16 32.50 30.00 21.22 13.50
DeviaUona 15.05 6.08 15.83 14.82 12.96 1.91
aBauxite, cement. and electricity production are not taken into account be-
cause the length of the period is less than 20 years, and is thus not a Kon-
dratieff. but may be a Kuznets cycle.
10.3. World Production
In making calculations for the world economy, corrections for population were
not made due to incomplete data. Changes in the state boundaries were not
significant so that the corrections mentioned above were unnecessary.
Results are shown in Figures 10.5 and 10.6. Data are available for the world
output of hard and brown coal for the period 1894-1983 (Figure 10.5), and for
bauxite/aluminum production for 1932-1983 (Figure 10.6). The lowest point
of the long wave occurred in 1945 for coal and in 1960-1962 for bauxite and
aluminum production. It can be seen that before World War I there was a
strong upswing in coal output, followed by a fall during the war.
World War I was followed by a ~ong upswing, which turned into a long.
sharp downswing. The depression of the 1930s emerges as a downswing in the
cycle, which continued to the end of the 1940s. The brown coal and the lig-
nite cycles have recovered since 1960, as has that for hard coal production,
but in the latter the upswing was caused by the increases in the price of oil.
The long waves in world aluminum and bauxite production are similar (see
Figure 10.6). The first upswing occurred in the late 1930s. with a minimum in
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Figure W.5. Kondrat.ieff cycles in world hard coal, brown coal, and lignit.e produc-
t.ion (y estimat.ed on t.he basis of a second-degree parabolic t.rend).
1961. From then we can trace an upswing in the cycle, but in the late 1960s
there was a minor decline. The calculations of production of Hungary, the
USSR, and the world prove that long waves in industrial production and,
within this, in the production of the raw materials show similar time trends.
10.4. Calculation Method
In choosing the trend we represented the differentials of the original data,
which are usually located a~ong a_line Yl =Co + C 1 D t. If we denote th_e trend
of the original data Jt = b o + b 1 t + b z t Z , then Co =b1 and C1 =2b z. The
quadratic parabola was chosen because the lin~ is derived from it. Having cal-
culated the estimated values of the parabola Yi from the original data Yi , we
used a nine-year moving average of (Yi - 9i ). which we represent by fi.
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the value of the ith timepoint estimated by the parabolic trend).
The authenticity of parabola parameters was also verified by a t -test. We
noted that the elimination of the trend by a first-, second-, or third-degree
parabola does not significantly affect the trends in the Kondratieff cycles.
We are now processing 40,000 sets of data from 30 countries, with the
support of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Because of the elimination of
the 20-25-year Kuznets cycle, we also use a 21-year moving average, using a
dynamic analysis of delayed relations.
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CIfAPTER 11
The Economic Long Wave:
Theory and Evidence
John D. St erman
11.1. Introduction
The economic malaise of the 1970s and 1980s has revived interest in the
economic long wave or Kondratieff cycle (Kondratieff. 1935, 1984). Numerous
theories of the long wave have emerged in the past 10 years, including
theories stressing innovation. labor dynamics, resource scarcity, and class
struggle [1]. Since 1975 the System Dynamics National Model (NM) has pro-
vided an increasingly rich theory of the long wave (Forrester. 1981. 1979,
1977, 1976; Graham and Senge, 1980; Senge, 1982; Sterman, 1985a,b). Though
the model focuses primarily on economic forces, the theory emerging from the
NM is not monocausal: it relates capital investment; employment, wages. and
workforce participation; inflation and interest rates; aggregate demand;
monetary and fiscal policy; innovation and productivity; and even political
values. The NM is unique among recent theories of the long wave in that it
views the long wave as a syndrome consisting of interrelated symptoms and
springing from the interactions of many factors. The NM integrates diverse
hypotheses about the genesis of the long wave. The NM also provides an
analytical framework in which alternative theories can be tested in a rigorous
and reproducible manner.
This chapter describes the integrated theory of the long wave that has
now emerged from the NM. The behavioral underpinnings of the theory are
discussed and contrasted against traditional economic theory. The major
sources of the long wave are presented and analyzed through simulations.
Though not intended as a definitive treatment of empirical evidence for long
waves. the chapter presents some of the basic corroborative evidence to show
how the NM endogenously generates a wide range of economic data.
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The NM is a dynamic. disequilibrium model. These features distinguish the NM
from econometric and optimizing models (such as general equilibrium models)
in several important r·espects.
11.2.1. Macrobehavior from microstructure
The NM is a structuraL model. Structure as used her'e includes the physical
structure of the economy (the stock and flow networks of capital, goods, peo-
ple, and money). flows of information about the state of the system. and the
behavioral decision rules people use to manage their affairs. The structure of
the economy is represented at the microeconomic level of individuals and
firms. By modeling decision making and physical structure at the microlevel.
the macroleveL dynamics of the economy emerge naturally out of the interac-
tions of the system components. Because such models provide a behitvioral
description of the economy firmly rooted in managerial practice, they are well
suited for examining the dynamic effects of policy initiatives.
11.2.2. Disequilibrium dynamics
The model does not assume that the economy is always in equilibrium, or that
it moves smoothly from one equilibrium to another. Although individuals may
be striving for balance, disequilibrium is the rule rather than the exception.
To properly model adjustment dynamics. one must not presume the stability of
the system: rather one must model the pressures tha.t may lead to equilibrium.
including the ways people perceive and react to imbalances. and the delays.
constraints, and inadequate information that often confound them.
11.2.3. Bounded rationality
The behavioral a.ssumptions of the model rest on the theory of bounded
rationality (Cyert and March, 1963; Merton, 1936: Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Simon, 1947, 1957. 1978, 1979). The essence of the theory is summarized in
the principle of bounded rationality, as formulated by Herbert Simon (1957):
The capacity of lhe human mind for formulaling and solving complex
problems is very small compared wilh lhe size of lhe problem whose solu-
lion is required for objectively ralional behavior in lhe real world or
even for a reasonable approximalion lo such objeclive ralionalily (p.
19B).
Behavioral modeling emphasizes the heuristics used by real people to make
adequate decisions in a reasonable period of time, given the constraints of
human cognitive capabilities and the limited information available.
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The theory of bounded rationality stands in stark contrast to the classi-
cal rationality of traditional economics. Unlike classical economic theory, the
NM does not presume that individuals and firms have perfect information or
the ability to optimize their performance. Such behavioral models are often
criticized because they assume people rely on decision making heuristics,
"irrationally" failing to optimize their performance. Performance, it is
argued, could be improved by using more information or more sophisticated
decision rules. But a good model of economic dynamics must be descriptive:
to simulate the behavior of a system accurately, decision making must be por-
trayed as it is and not as it might be if people were omniscient optimizers. An
extensive empirical literature documents these heuristics and numerous sys-
tematic biases that often occur, providing a firm foundation for behavioral
modeling in economics [2].
11.3. Multiple Modes of Behavior
Figure 11.1 shows the behavior of important economic variables in the USA
from 1800 to 1984. The data exhibit many modes of behavior. The behavior of
real GNP. for example, is dominated by the long-term growth of the economy,
which has averaged 3.4%/year since 1800. GNP also exhibits the short-term
business cycle. and there is a hint of longer-term fluctuations in the rate of
output - output is lower than normal between 1830 and 1840, during the 1870s
through 1890s, during the Great Depression, and from the 1970s to the
present. These dates coincide with the timing of the long wave established- by
van Duijn (1983).
The long wave is more apparent in the behavior of unemployment, aggre-
gate prices, and interest rates. Unemployment fluctuates strongly with the
business cycle, but also exhibits major peaks during the 1890s and the 1930s.
Unemployment rates in the early 1980s are the highest since the Great
Depression. Consumer prices likewise fluctuate over the business cycle but
also exhibit a fairly regular long wave, with peaks roughly coincident with the
peaks of the long wave in real activity. An additional mode of behavior
develops after World War II as inflation has carried the price level to unpre-
cedented levels, dominating the long-wave pattern in prices. (Note, however,
that the reduction in inflation since 1980 is consistent with the deflationary
forces of the long-wave downturn). The postwar inflation coincides with the
expansion in the relative size of government from about 10% of GNP in the
1920s to about 35% in the 19BOs, and with the increasing reliance on deficit
financing and monetization of the public debt.
Interest rates likewise rise and fall within a roughly 50-year period.
Note that interest rates are approximately in phase with the price level.
Like prices. interest rates have risen above historic levels in the last decade
as inflation reached double-digit rates.
The data reflect the interaction of several distinct modes of behavior,
including long-term population growth and technological progress. the busi-
ness cycle, the relative growth of government, postwar inflation, and the long
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Figure 11.1. Behavior of economic variables in the USA, 1800-1984. (a) Real GNP
(1972 dollars); (b) unemployment rate; (c) consumer price index; (d) interest rates
(Homer, 1977: 1860-1899, average yield on higher grade railroad bonds;
1900-1975, prime corporate bonds; 1975-1984, Moody's AAA bonds.
wave. The interaction of the modes makes it difficult to establish the
existence of the long wave through purely empirical means, especially since
reliable numerical data are not available over a long enough period (3].
Because the National Model represents behavior at the microlevel of
individuals and firms, it generates the multiple modes of economic behavior
that appear in the historical data. Compare the historical data against Fig-
ure 1.1...2, which shows a simulation of the NM from 1800 to 1984. All the
macroeconomic aggregates are generated endogenously (see Table 1.1...1), as are
a host of variables at the sectoral level. The only exogenous variables are
population (which in the simulation shown is assumed to grow at a uniform rate
of 2X!year): and per capita government activity (which grows in response to a
constant pressure starting in 1930). In addition, a small amount of random
noise has been added to production and ordering rates. The noise serves to
trigger the business cycle and causes the point-by-point behavior to be some-
what irregular.
Simulated unemployment, real GNP, interest rates, and prices all exhibit
the long wave and business cycle. The period of the long wave is approxi-
mately 50 years. In addition. GNP exhibits the long-term growth of the econ-
omy, and prices show the postwar inflation due to the growth of government
and the partial monetization of growing government deficits. Because histori-
cal data series are not used as inputs. the behavior, and in particular the long
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Figure 11.2. Simulated economic variables in the USA, 1800-1984. (a) Real GNP;
(b) unemployment rate; (c) consumer price index and interest rates.
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Table 11.1. Major variables in lhe National Model (NM).
---- .__._----~------- ------------------
GNP
Consumption
Inveslmenl
Saving
Governmenl
expendi lure
Tax rales
Prices
Wages
Inflation rale
Employmenl
Unemploymenl
Workforce
participation
Weallh
Inleresl rates
Money supply
Privale debl
Public debl
Banking system
reserves
Monetary policy
(open markel
operations)
Endogenous
-----
Fiscal policy
(lransfer payments,
governmenl purchases,
employmenl, defici l)
Secloral variables
for the consumer goods and
services seclor
and plant and
equipmenl seclor:
Produclion
Capacily
Capilal slack
Employmenl
Inveslmenl
Price
Debl
Dividends
Relurn on inveslmenl
Taxes
Balance sheel
Income slatement
Exogenous
Population
Technological progress
Aulhorized governmenl
services per capita
Random noise in order
and production rales
wave, is the endogenous result of the interaction of the system components.
It is not driven by the exogenous variables. Yet, the simulation captures the
major patterns in the development of the economy over almost 200 years [4].
11.4. Origin of the lDng Wave
The long wave is characterized by successive waves of overexpansion and
decline of the economy, particularly the capital-producing sector. Overex-
pansion means an increase in the capacity to produce and in the production of
plant, equipment, and goods relative to the amount needed to replace worn-out
units and provide for growth over the long run. Overexpansion is undesirable
because, eventually, production and employment must be cut back below nor-
mal to reduce excess.
How does the long wave arise? In particular, how does overexpansion of
the capital-producing sector of the economy arise? The explanation is divided
into two parts. First, the internal structure and policies of individual firms
tend to amplify changes in demand, creating the potential for oscillation in
the adjustment of capacity to demand. Second, a wide range of self-
reinforcing processes significantly amplify the response of individual firms to
changes in demand, increasing the amplitude and lengthening the period of
the fluctuations generated by each firm. Through the process of entrainment,
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the fluctuations generated by individual firms become coherent and mutually
reinforce one another (Homer, 1980).
11.4.1. Amplification of demand by individual firms
Production systems amplify changes in demand. Consider a retailer of consum-
er goods in stationary equilibrium who experiences a sudden, unanticipated
step increase in orders, say, of 10%. In the long run, the retailer will increase
orders to its suppliers by 10% and will probably hold 10% more inventory to
provide the same coverage of demand. But during the adjustment period, or-
ders placed wi th suppliers must exceed the long-term level: delays in react-
ing to the change in demand and in receiving new goods from suppliers mean
retail inventories must fall. Backlogs will rise. Retailers must therefore
place more orders with suppliers, expanding orders above customer demand.
Orders must remain above customer demand long enough to replenish inven-
tories and work off the excess backlogs.
But the situation is worse: a higher volume of business requires a larger
stock of inventory to maintain the same coverage ratio, causing additional or-
ders. Further, the lead time for supplies may rise, since suppliers face
delays in ordering their own parts and materials, hiring new workers, and
expanding capacity. Faced with rising delivery times, firms may hedge by
ordering still more and placing orders with more than one supplier, a process
described as early as the 1920s by economist Thomas W. Mitchell (1923).
Other sources of amplification include growth expectations and the spread of
optimism, as described by Wesley C. Mitchell (1941, p. 5):
Virtually all business problems involve elements that are not precisely
known, but must be approximately estimated for the present, and fore-
cast still more roughly for the future ... This fact gives hopeful or
despondent moods a large share in shaping business decision ... Most
men find their spirits raised by being in optimistic company. Therefore,
when the first beneficiaries of a trade revival develop a cheerful frame
of mind about the business outlook, they become centers of infection,
and start an epidemic of optimism.
Additional amplification arises because the increase in customer demand and
lagged response of production will boost prices, causing further expansion of
orders and output as profits rise (Mass, 1980).
Thus each stage in the production-distribution network of the economy
tends to amplify changes in demand. The amplification increases at each
stage as demand, swollen by adjustments for inventories, supply lines, expec-
tations, and anticipated profits, is passed back from retailers to wholesalers,
manufacturers of finished goods, manufacturers of intermediate goods, and
finally to capital and raw materials producers. Amplification in successive
stages of the production chain explains why the volatility of an industry
tends to increase as it becomes further removed from consumer demand (Han-
sen, 1951). The capital-producing industries (construction, raw materials,
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machinery manufacturing, etc.) are the farthest removed from final demand
and hence experience the most instability.
The amplification of demand by stock adjustments is a fundamental
characteristic of production, and is responsible for several oscillatory modes
of behavior including the four- to seven-year business cycle and the Kuznets
or intermediate cycle of approximately 15-25 years [5].
The mechanisms responsible for the business and intermediate cycles
have been identified and are distinct. The business cycle is primarily the
result of inventory and employment interactions. The intermediate cycle is
primarily the result of attempts to balance the mix of capital and labor as fac-
tors of production. The difference in period arises from the differences in
the relatively short time required to adjust inventories and change employ-
ment, compared with the longer time required to acquire and discard capital
and alter the mix of factors.
Simple models show that the amplification of demand by inventory and
backlog adjustments leads, in isolation. to highly damped oscillations in capital
investment with periods of approximately 20 years (Mass. 1975; Sterman,
19B5b). Yet the long wave is a 50-year fluctuation which does not die away.
The long period, large amplitude, and persistent nature of the long wave arise
from a wide range of self-reinforcing processes that operate in the economy
as a whole. These positive feedback loops couple different firms to one
another and to the household and financial sectors of the economy. The
effect of these self-reinforcing processes is to further amplify the oscillatory
tendencies of individual firms, stretching out the period and increasing the
the amplitude of the fluctuations. Analysis of the model isolates several
independent processes that contribute to the 50-year cycle of overexpansion
and decline.
11.4.2. Capital sell-ordering
The National Model distinguishes producers of capital plant, equipment, and
basic materials from other firms in the private sector. The capital sector
differs from others due to the existence of "self-ordering." In order to
expand capacity, producers of capital plant and equipment must order addi-
tional plant and equipment from each other. In the aggregate, the capital-
producing sector acquires capital from itself, hence self-ordering. Though all
sectors of the economy are linked to one another to some degree. self-
ordering is strongest in the industries that produce capital plant and equip-
ment, basic industries such as steel, and other heavy industry (Sterman.
19B2).
To illustrate the role of self-ordering in the long-wave. consider the
economy in equilibrium. If the demand for consumer goods and services
increases, the consumer-goods industry must expand its capacity and so
places orders for new factories, equipment, vehicles, etc. To supply the
higher volume of orders. the capital-producing sector must also expand its
capital stock and hence place orders for more buildings, machines. rolling
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stocks, trucks, etc., causing the total demand for capital to rise still further
in a self-reinforcing spiral of increasing orders, a greater need for expansion,
and still more orders.
Figure 11.3 shows the behavior of real GNP, consumption, and invest-
ment generated by the National Model. Population growth, technical progress,
and the relative growth of government have been suppressed to highlight the
long wave. In the simulation there are no exogenous variables whatsoever, and
the behavior is entirely the endogenous result of the interaction of the
assumed decision rules with the physical structure of the economy [6]. Real
GNP fluctuates with the business cycle but is dominated by a long wave with
an approximately 50-year period. The long wave tends to be asymmetrical,
with a gradual expansion over about 20 years followed by a relatively swift
decline and a depression period of 15-20 years. The long wave is by far the
largest in real investment. The large amplitude of investment relative to con-
sumption reflects the destabilizing influence of capital self-ordering: changes
in the demand for capital deriving from the goods sector are amplified by
self-ordering to cause a much larger swing in the total demand for capital.
The strength of self-ordering depends chiefly on the capital intensity
(capital-output ratio) of the capital-producing sector. A rough measure of
the strength of self~rderingcan be calculated by considering how much capi-
tal production expands in equilibrium in response to an increase in investment
in the rest of the economy. It is easily shown that the equilibrium multiplier
effect created by self-ordering is given by [7]:
where CORk = capital/output ratio of the capital sector (years), and ALCk =
average lifetime of capital in the capital sector (years). Assuming an average
life of capital of 20 years and an average capital/output ratio of three years
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136 The Economic Long Wave: Theory and Evidence
(approximate values for the aggregate economy) gives an equilibrium multiplier
effect of 1.18. In the long term, an increase in the demand for capital from
the rest of the economy yields an additional 18 percent increase in total
investment through self-ordering.
The long wave is an inherently disequilibrium phenomenon, however, and
during the transient adjustment to the long run the strength of self-ordering
is greater than in equilibrium. During the adjustment to the long term, the
disequilibrium effects that lead to amplification of demand all act to further
augment the demand for capital, creating a number of additional positive feed-
back loops.
Amplification Caused by Inventory and Backlog Adjustments
Rising orders deplete the inventories and swell the backlogs of capital-sector
firms, leading to further pressure to expand and still more orders. During
the downturn, low backlogs and involuntary inventory accumulation further
depress demand, leading to still more excess inventory. Figure 11.4 shows
the effect of inventory and backlog pressures on desired production in the
capital sector. The "output discrepancy" measures the need to adjust pro-
duction above or below the order rate in order to bring inventories and back-
logs into balance with their desired levels. A positive output discrepancy
indicates inadequate inventory and bloated backlogs are boosting desired pro-
duction above orders. As shown, the output discrepancy of the capital sector
builds up during the expansion phase of the long wave, forcing desired pro-
duction well above orders, even as orders are rising, and substantially rein-
forcing the demand for capital. Peaking shortly before the peak of real GNP,
the output discrepancy collapses precipitously during the long-wave decline
as excess inventories rapidly accumulate.
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Amplification Caused by Rising Lead Times jor Capital
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As shown in Figure 11.5, the delivery delay for capital rises well above normal
during the long-wave expansion. Delivery delay tends to peak 4-10 years in
advance of real GNP and drops well below normal during the downturn. Back-
logs rise as demand for capital outstrips capacity during the long-wave expan-
sion. Capital producers find it takes longer than anticipated to acquire new
capacity, causing capacity to lag further behind desired levels. creating still
more pressure to order and further swelling demand for capital. In addition,
longer lead times force capital producers to order farther ahead. further aug-
menting orders.
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Figure 1.1..5. Simulation: delivery delays for guods and capilal.
The delivery delay for goods likewise fluctuates with the long wave. Cap-
ital is scarce during the long-wave expansion and the goods sector cannot
increase capacity fast enough to meet demand, causing the delivery delay for
goods to rise. But note that the amplitude of the fluctuation in the availabil-
ity of goods is much less than that in the delivery delay for capital, showing
the powerful role of self-ordering in destabilizing the capital sector.
The availability of capital also exhibits the 20-year Kuznets or construc-
tion cycle, which creates smaller and narrower peaks in delivery delay
between the major surges that occur during the long-wave expansion. The
intermediate cycle is primarily the result of efforts to balance the mix of cap-
ital and labor as the availability and price of these inputs vary. The slowdown
in growth and drop in delivery times in the USA between 1958 and 1962 were
probably a manifestation of the Kuznets cycle (Zarnowitz. 1962).
Amplification Caused by Growth Expectations
Growing demand. rising backlogs, and long lead times during the long-wave
expansion all encourage expectations of additional growth in demand for
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capital. Expectations of future growth lead to additional investment, further
swelling demand in a self-fulfilling pr·ophecy. During the downturn. pessimism
further undercuts investment. As shown in Figure 11.6, capital producers'
long-term expectations of growth in demand for capital fluctuate substantially
over the long wave. Note that growth expectations in the capital sector peak
2-8 years before the peak of real GNP. Due to perception lags and institu-
tional inertia, growth expectations are highest just before real investment
peaks and begins to decline (compare Figure 11.6 with the timing of real
investment shown in Figure 11.3). Thus growth expectations exacerbate the
excess capacity that develops at the peak of the long wave.
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Figure 1.1..6. Simulation: expected long-term growth in demand.
The Sufficiency oj SelJ-ord.ering
The positive feedback loops created by self-ordering significantly reinforce
the tendency of firms to amplify changes in demand. Once a capital expansion
gets under way, the self-ordering loops amplify and sustain it until production
catches up with orders, excess capacity is built up, and orders begin to fall.
At that point, the self-ordering loops reverse: a reduction in orders
further reduces the demand for capital, leading to a contraction in the capital
sector's output, followed by declining employment, wages, aggregate demand,
and production of goods and services. Capital production must remain below
the level required for replacement and long-term growth until the excess
capacity depreciates - a process that may take a decade or more due to the
long lifetimes of plant and equipment. Once the capital stock is worn out,
investment rises, triggering the next upswing.
To illustrate, consider the development of the US economy after World
War II. The capital stock of the economy was old and severely depleted after
15 years of depression and wartime production. Demand for all types of capi-
tal equipment - roads, houses, schools, factories, machines - surged. A
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massive rebuilding began. In order to satisfy long-run demand, fill pent-up
demand, and rebuild the capital and infrastructure, the capital-producing
sector had to expand beyond the long-term needs of the economy. The
overexpansion of the capital-producing sector was exacerbated by self-
ordering: as the demand for consumer goods, services, and housing rose,
manufacturers of capital plant and equipment had to expand their own capac-
ity, further swelling the demand for structures, equipment, materials, trans-
portation, and other infrastructure. By the late 1960s, the capital stock had
been largely rebuilt, and investment began to slow to levels consistent with
replacement and long-term growth. Excess capacity and unemployment began
to show up in basic industries. Faced with excess capacity, investment in
these industries was cut back, further reducing the need for capital and rein-
forcing the decline in investment as the economy moved through the 1970s
and into the 1980s.
The capital self-ordering component of the long-wave theory predicts a
growing margin of excess capacity, especially in heavy manufacturing indus-
try, as the economy moves through the long-wave peak and into the downturn.
Excess capacity has in fact been one of the dominant symptoms of the malaise
of the 1970s and 1980s, and has been amply documented elsewhere. Figure
11.7 shows the aggregate index of industrial production and capacity for the
postwar period in the USA. As predicted by the theory, utilization rates were
high during the expansion period of the long wave, peaking in the mid-1960s.
But since 1966 the growth of industrial production has slowed markedly while
capacity continued to grow. And as predicted by the theory, the excess
capacity is concentrated in capital goods, raw materials, and other basic
industries. As of the end of 1984, despite two years of vigorous business
cycle expansion, industrial production in more than half the key sectors of
the US economy had not yet recovered the levels attained around 1979, the
peak of the previous cycle. More than 20 industry groups were producing at
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rates less than 80% of their peak production rate, including the steel. metals
mining, automobile, rail and farm equipment, building equipment, and other
capital-producing sectors.
Self-ordering is one of the most important and fundamental causes of the
long wave. Simple models that include only the most basic self-ordering feed-
backs can generate a robust long wave (Sterman, 1985b). Players of a simple
role-playing simulation game of the self-ordering process also generate long
waves, even with perfect information (Sterman and Meadows, 1985). Self-
ordering thus seems to be a sufficient cause of long waves [8].
11.4.3. The role or labor and wages
Self-ordering, though it may be sufficient to generate the long wave, is not
the only process at work. Other positive feedback loops operate through the
labor markets to add additional amplification (Figure 11.8). At the end of the
downturn period, labor is in abundant supply and real wages are relatively low
(Figure 11.9). As the economy expands, firms throughout the economy expand
employment. Employment growth in the capital-producing sector, stimulated
by self-ordering, is particularly rapid. As employment rises, the labor market
tightens. Real wages rise. As the long-wave expansion matures, high and ris-
ing real wages provide a powerful economic incentive for firms to substitute
capital for labor. Employment growth slows, but the demand for capital is
further stimulated as firms invest in labor-saving technology, further rein-
forcing the demand for capital and the pressure on wages, and adding addi-
tional amplification to the direct self-ordering feedbacks. But just as the rise
in wages strengthens the growth of invest'ment in the expansion, so too does it
reinforce the decline in investment during the downturn. As excess capacity
in the capital sector begins to depress employment, real wage growth slows.
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Low real wages during the trough of the long wave further undercut the incen-
tives for capital investment during the depression phase.
If the positive loops surrounding labor and wages playa significant role
in the long wave, the historical record should show higher than average real
wage growth during long-wave upturns and lower than average real wage
growth during downturns. Real wage growth has in fact fluctuated signifi-
cantly over the long wave with the phasing predicted by the theory. Figure
11.m shows the real wage in the USA since World War II. Between the end of
the war and 1972 (the upturn period of the long wave), real wages grew by an
average of 2.6%/year. Since 1973, real wages, though fluctuating with the
business cycle, have been stagnant. The average rate of growth of real wages
over the 115-year period since 1870 is 1.7%/year, a reflection of technological
progress (Table 11.2). But the rate of growth is far from uniform; during
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Table 11.2. Real wagea growth in the USA, 1870-1984.
Average
Downturn
Upturn
Downturn
Upturn
Downturn
hriod
1870-1894
1870-1894
1894-1923
1923-1938
1938-1973
1973-1984
Growth rate t%/lIear)
1.69
0.95
2.01
0.97
2.76
0.01
aReal wage ... nominal wage Index/consumer price Index.
Sources: Consumer price Index:
1870-1946: Historical. Statistics o/the United States, CoLoniaL 'I'l.mes to
1.970, HSUS Series E135.
1947-1984: Bureau of Labor StaUst.lcs (BLS) , CPI/or urban wage earners and cLer-
icaL workers.
Nominal wage Index constructed from:
1870-1900: Average annuaL earnings, non/arm empLoyees, HSUS Series D-735.
1901-1946: Annual earnings 0/ employees excLuding armed forces, HSUS Series
D-724.
1947-1984: Compensation per hour. employees in non"lhrm business sector, BLS.
periods of long-wave downturn. real wage growth averages less than l'%/year,
while during the upturns it exceeds 2'%/year.
The theory also predicts systematic variations in the mix of capital and
labor as factors of production. In particular. the early phase of the long wave
expansion should involve the simultaneous expansion of labor and capital. As
real wages rise and firms substitute capital for labor, employment should stag-
nate while capital stock and output continue to grow. Such patterns have
been documented for the USA, Europe, and Japan [F'igures 11.11(a) and
11.12(a); see also Freeman et ai., 1982]. Compare these against Figures
11.11(b) and 11.12(b), which show the shifting balance of labor and capital
generated by the NM simulation shown in Figure 11.2. Although the growth of
population and technology causes both labor and capital to rise. the long wave
causes significant fluctuations in their relative rates of growth. Between the
1890s and 1918, employment in the USA doubled; capital stock increased even
faster. But between 1918 and 1929, employment grew by only about 5'%, while
capital stock increased by one-third. Employment collapsed between 1929
and 1933, while capital stock peaked in 1931 and fell only gradually during the
1930s. The cycle ended with the gradual recovery of employment as capital
stock fell.
The postwar long-wave cycle exhibits the same pattern. Employment in
US manufacturing grew by some 5 million between 1950 and 1969, and capital
stock more than tripled. But since 1969 manufacturing employment has stag-
nated (though it fluctuates strongly with the business cycle), while capital
stock nearly doubled once more.
Like the historical data, simulated labor and capital rise together as the
long-wave expansion begins [9]. Labor growth then slows as wages rise and
workers become scarce. At the long-wave peak, labor falls sharply, while cap-
ital. due to construction lags. continues to increase for a few more years.
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During the downturn, capital stock declines while employment remains
depressed. Finally, the decline in real wages causes employment to rise while
capital continues to decline. completing the cycle [10].
The feedback process described above also accounts for the slowdown of
productivity growth in recent years. During the long-wave expansion. capital
stock per worker is rising rapidly. and productivity grows. But eventually,
the "capital deepening" process begins to suffer from diminishing returns,
slowing the growth of productivity though capital-labor ratios continue to
rise. Finally. the decline in investment in the downturn period reduces the
growth of capital per worker, further slowing productivity gains.
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11.4.4. Real interest rates and inflation
Another major mechanism that contributes to the long wave revolves around
the dynamics of interest rates and inflation. Figure 11.13(a) shows the real
interest rate from 1960 to the present [11]. Real rates declined gradually
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real interest rate.
from 1960 to the mid-1970s, when they were generally negative. After 1979
real rates rose sharply and remained at the high levels.
The high level of real interest rates has been blamed on restrictive
monetary policies and high government deficits. Yet the NM generates the
same pattern (low, then sharply rising real interest rates over the long-wave
expansion, peak. and downturn) without a tightening of monetary policy or
large deficits. Figure 11.13(b) shows the simulated behavior of real interest
rates over the long wave. Real rates fall steadily during the expansion.
becoming negative just before the peak. As the economy declines. real rates
rise sharply and remain high through the trough.
The role of real interest rates in the long wave is described in detail by
Senge (1983) and summarized in Figure 11.14. During the long-wave expan-
sion. the demand for goods and especially capital is growing faster than
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capacity, putting upward pressure on prices. As firms come to expect high
and rising prices for their products, the expected profitability of investment
projects increases relative to the costs of financing. Investment projects
that would not be acceptable in a period of stable prices become more attrac-
tive when insufficient capacity is forcing prices up. In effect, inflation in the
prices of capital and durables lowers the real interest rate, encouraging still
more investment. The resulting expansion in investment demand and the
demand for assets such as land and housing puts further upward pressure on
prices, and the resulting rise in the inflation rate for these assets further
reduces real interest rates. During the downturn, the process reverses:
caught between growing excess capacity and falling demand, the prices of
capital, land, housing, and other assets fall; inflation subsides. The invest-
ment climate rapidly changes: firms can no longer expect inflation to boost
future revenues, so the expected present value of investment projects falls
relative to the cost of financing. Such increases in the real interest rate
further discourage investment, creating still more downward pressure on
prices, and reinforcing the rise in real interest rates.
If the real interest rate dynamic described above plays a significant role
in the long wave, the historical record should show low real interest rates in
the expansion periods of the long wave and high real interest rates during the
downturns. Table 11.3 verifies the expected pattern. Because real rates of
interest can be measured many ways, the real rate is calculated for both com-
mercial paper and for long-term corporate bonds, using both the wholesale
and consumer price indices as measures of the inflation rate. The results are
consistent. In the three long-wave downturns since 1870, average real
interest rates have been significantly higher than during the intervening
upturns. The results are robust with respect to the particular interest rate
or measure of inflation used.
If nominal rates rapidly and accurately adjusted to the rate of inflation,
then the real rate would remain quite stable, and the process described above
would be weak. The data in Table 11.3 show that nominal interest rates incor-
porate inflation only imperfectly and with a long lag. At the beginning of the
Joh.n D. StermtJn
Table 11.3. Real1nleresl rales in lhe USA, 1870-1984.
Interest ra.te Commercial paper Long-term corpora.te bonds
DefLator WPI CPI WPI CPI
Downlurn 1870-1894 8.0 7.3 7.0 6.2
Uplurn 1894-1923 1.6 2.2 0.9 1.5
Downlurn 1923-1838 4.3 4.1 5.4 5.2
(1923-1932 )a 8.0 6.7 8.3 7.0)
Uplurn 1938-1979 -1.1 -0.7 -0.1 0.3
(1950-1979)b 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.2)
Downlurn 1979-1984 10.2 9.7 10.9 10.5
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Souroes:
Wholesale price Index (WPI)
1870-1890: WPI, all commodities, HSUS Series E52.
1891-1970: WPI, all commodities, BLS.
1971-1984: Produoer Price Index, all commodities, BLS.
Consumer price Index (CPI):
1870-1947: HSUS series E135.
1947-1964: CPI, all urban oonsumers, BLS.
Commercial Paper:
1870-1900: Annual average, oommerolal paper (Homer, 1977, Table 44).
1901-1936: Prime oommerolal paper, 60-90 days (Homer, 1977, Table 51).
1937-1975: Annual average, prime oommerolal paper (Homer, 1fJ77, Table 51).
1976-1984: Commerolal paper, bank dlsoounl basis, 6 monlhly (Federal
Reserve).
Corporale Bonds:
1870-1890: AdJusted average of higher grade railroad bonds (Homer, 1977,
Tables 42, 43).
1891-1975: Prime corporale bonds (Homer, 1977, Tables 45, 47, 49).
1976-1964: AAA oorporale bonds (Moody's).
long-wave expansion, demand for capital and goods is nsmg while capacity
lags behind. The gap between orders and capacity begins to push up prices.
At the same time, firms expand capacity, thus boosting credit demand and
bidding up nominal interest rates. The pressure on interest rates and the
pressure on prices arise from the same source - the surge in investment and
consumer demand during the long-wave expansion - and therefore prices and
interest rates move roughly in phase. Real interest rates, however, are the
level of nominal interest rates less the fractional rate of price change. Price
change (inflation) reaches its peak approximately when excess demand is
highest, while prices and nominal interest rates continue to rise until the
excess demand has been dissipated. Thus during the long-wave expansion,
nominal rates rise more slowly than inflation, leading to low real interest
rates. Near the peak of the long wave, nominal rates again lag behind declin-
ing inflation, leading to a sharp increase in real interest rates. Figures
11.1(c) and (d) show that, historically, prices and nominal interest rates have
in fact moved in phase, with inflation leading nominal interest rates. Figures
11.2(c) and 11.1fj show that simulated prices and interest rates exhibit the
same pattern.
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Sensitivity analysis shows the positive feedback loops surrounding
interest rates and inflation to be powerful destablizers of the economy. Like
self-ordering, the interest rate dynamics are sufficient to create the long
wave and contribute to the self-sustaining nature of the long wave by substan-
tially amplifying the inherent oscillatory tendencies of individual firms.
11.•.5. Debt!deftallan spiral
Another major process that contributes to the long wave, closely related to
the behavior of real interest rates, lies in the dynamics of debt and aggregate
prices.
As shown in Figure 11.18, debt levels and aggregate prices are rela.tively
low at the end of a long-wave downturn, the result of liquidation and price cut-
ting in the face of unemployment and idle capacity. As the expansion phase
gets under way, firms, particularly in the capital sectors, take on more debt
in order to finance the expansion. Debt relative to GNP rises and the money
supply expands. Vigorous growth, high rates of capacity utilization, high
profitability, and low real interest rates all encourage expansion of external
financing. Debt relative to GNP rises and the money supply expands.
Toward the later years of the expansion, investment in capital begins to
soften as excess capacity develops. The upward momentum of prices and
money growth may then trigger a continuing expansion of debt through specu-
lation in land, stocks, precious metals, or other assets. Near the peak of the
long wave, overcapacity develops and investment falls, depressing employment
and aggregate demand. With declining income, the ability to service the debt
falls, and bankruptcies increase. Prices soften as the growing debt burden
depresses aggregate demand, further squeezing debt service ability and forc-
ing additional liquidations. In such a debt/deflation spiral (Fisher, 1933),
defaults and liquidations reduce the stock of money, squeezing nominal
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incomes and wealth. forcing further cutbacks in aggregate demand and
further price cuts. The dynamics of such speculative manias and panics have
been beautifully described by Kindleberger (1978).
As an example. consider the postwar behavior of farmland prices in the
USA [Pigure 11.17(a)]. Between 1950 and 1970, farmland prices rose slightly
faster than the aggregate rate of inflation. The real rate of interest a farmer
or speculator faced when contemplating the purchase of additional acreage
was therefore slightly less than the real interest rate for the economy-as a
whole. Figure 11.17(b) shows the real rate of interest on farmland. computed
as the prime lending rate less the rate of inflation in the price of farmland.
In the early 1970s. aggregate inflation accelerated dramatically, with interest
rates lagging behind. But farm price inflation rose even faster. Between 1973
and 1981, farm price inflation averaged 13.5%/year. compared with 7.7% for
the economy as a whole. Despite rising interest rates. a prospective buyer of
farmland faced a real interest rate as low as negative 16%/year. making farm-
land one of the best inflation hedges and stimulating demand still further. By
1980 farmland prices had risen so far that revenues from agricultural use
could barely cover the debt service. The only motivation for purchasing farm-
land at such prices was speculative - the expectation of continuing price
rises. But with the high debt burdens acquired during the speculative frenzy,
depressed agricultural prices, and the decline of aggregate inflation, the
demand for land softened. Prices started to fall. Declining prices increased
the supply of farmland as speculators attempted to liquidate their holdings
and as defaults and foreclosures resulted in distress sales. With the prime
rate remaining well above 10% and rapid deflation in the price of farmland.
the real interest rate on land jumped to over positive 20%. As farmers
become increasingly unable to pay interest and principal. bank failures and
the collapse of other lending institutions increase. The same scenario is
being played out to varying degrees in the energy markets, in certain housing
markets. and in basic commodities. In all cases, the price rises of the 1970s
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encouraged the expansion of debt. The end of the inflation is followed by a
wave of rescheduling agreements. defaults, and the collapse of the more
highly leveraged and least diversified lending institutions.
In the extreme, the debt/deflation spiral can cause the collapse of the
banking system and international trade, as occurred in the 1930s. Whether
the liquidation is orderly or whether it takes the form of bankruptcies and
defaults, possibly leading to a panic, cannot be predicted in advance. The
greater the degree of speculation during the expansion, the more likely is a
panic during the downturn. The record post-Depression rate of bank and
business failures, the collapse of major institutions such as Continental Illi-
nois, the Ohio and Maryland bank holidays, and the current Third World debt
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crisis are all manifestations of the pressures that may trigger the
debt/deflation dynamic on a broader scale.
11.4.6. Technological innovation
Following in the tradition of Schumpeter (1939), much of the renaissance of
interest in long waves has centered on the role of technology and innovation
(see note 1; also Mansfield, 1983; Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1983). Fifty-year
long waves in innovation have been independently identified by several inves-
tigators (Figure 1.1..1.8; Mensch, 1979; Hochgraf. 1983; Kleinknecht. 1984).
Renewed commitment to R&D and other policies to stimulate "leading edge"
high-technology sectors such as information processing and bioengineering
are often recommended as prime components of an effective strategy to
counter the long wave (Freeman et al.. 1982; van Duijn. 1983; Dickson, 1983).
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In contrast to the innovation theories of the long wave, the National
Model suggests that a long-wave theory of innovation better describes the
situation. The NM shows how fundamental physical processes in the economy
can create the long wave without any variation in innovation rates. The
bunching of innovations can thus be explained as the result of entrainment of
the innovation process by the long wave (Graham and Senge. 1980, pp.
283-284):
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The long wave creates a shifting historical context for the implementa-
tion of new inventions. Midway into a capital expansion, opportunities
for applying new inventions that require new types of capital become
poor. The nation is already committed to a particular mix of technolo-
gies, and the environment greatly favors improvement innovations over
basic innovations. During a long-wave downturn, basic innovation oppor-
tunities gradually improve, as old capital embodying the technologies of
the preceding buildup depreciates. Near the trough of the wave, there
are great opportunities for creating new capital embodying radical new
technologies. The old capital base is obsolescent. bureaucracies that
thwarted basic innovation have weakened, many companies committed to
producing old types of capital are bankrupt, and traditional methods are
no longer sacrosanct.
Although innovation is not necessary to explain the long wave, there is
little doubt that each long wave is built around a particular ensemble of basic
technologies. including particular forms of energy, transport, communications,
and materials. These ensembles evolve synergistically and, like species in an
ecosystem, compete against other candidates for a limited number of available
niches.
The impact of technology and innovation on the long wave itself, on its
strength. period, and character, remain less certain. The strong influence of
the self-ordering, labor, and interest rate dynamics suggests innovation is not
likely to be a high leverage point for countering the long wave (Sterman, 1983;
Forrester et al., 1983). Much work needs to be done to examine how innova-
tion might feed back and affect the other mechanisms that create the long
wave. Can fluctuations in innovation amplify the long wave? Can policies
directed at stimulating innovation shorten the depression period or reduce
the amplitude of the long wave? These questions remain, so far, unanswered.
The proper framework for addressing them is an endogenous theory of innova-
tion and technological change coupled to the other mechanisms capable of
generating the long wave.
11.4.7. Social and organizational innovation
Just as the long-wave downturn provides a window of opportunity for techno-
logical innovation, so too it creates the opportunity and motivation for social
and organizational change. During the long-wave expansion the economy
"works" - growth is rapid, unemployment low, optimism the norm. Existing
organizations and social contracts are successful. Changes originating within
organizations tend to be minor, consisting of "improvement" rather than
"basic" innovations. The prevailing attitude is "if it works, don't fix it."
Indeed, economic success during long-wave expansions fosters the growth of
overhead, unnecessary layers of management. and a decline in entrepreneur-
ship and innovation. But during a downturn, the tried and true no longer
works. It becomes clear that the future will no longer be more of the past.
Competitive pressures intensify. Individual firms, whole industries, and even
nations find they must change or face long-term decline.
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Thus it is during the long-wave downturns that the most radical organiza-
tional and social innovations occur. But as with technological change it is not
immediately obvious what ought to be done. One measure of the organizational
flux today is the frenzied search for excellent companies, new management
techniques. entrepreneurship, an industrial policy. Past long-wave downturns
have also been periods of radical organizational innovation. Although hard
data are scarce, one indication of the changes in the organization of industrial
society is given by the pace of mergers and acquisitions. Figure 11.19 shows
mergers and acquisitions in the USA since 1895. Three distinct merger waves
are visible, with the peak in activity corresponding to the late expansion and
early downturn periods of the long wave (Nelson, 1959; Eis, 1969). The British
data show similar merger waves (Hannah. 1974).
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Figure 11..19. Number of firm disappearances by merger and acquisition in the
USA, 1895-1980 (Nelson, 1959; Eis, 1969; FTC Report on Mergers and Acquisitions).
Why should merger activity be highest during long-wave downturns? Con-
sider the frequency of merger activity in terms of means, motive, and oppor-
tunity. The means: at the end of the long-wave expansion opportunities for
physical investment become limited. Overcapacity, declining profitability,
and high real interest rates dampen physical investment, reducing cash out-
flow. However, firms continue to collect depreciation on past investments,
hence cash flow improves and liquidity rises. Flush with cash, firms can build
a "war chest" to position themselves for takeover bids or to protect them-
selves from hostile offers. (The cash surplus arising from the decline in
investment has also been used to buy back outstanding shares, pay high divi-
dends, or to pay "greenmail".) The motive: since growth through investment
in physical capacity becomes unprofitable at the long-wave peak. there is a
strong temptation for firms to continue their growth by merger or acquisition.
Through merger and acquisition, firms in declining industries can diversify
into emerging sectors such as microelectronics and financial services. Most
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important, competitive pressures intensify during the long-wave downturn.
Faced with excess capacity and declining demand, indi vidual firms cut prices
in an attempt to maintain market share, sometimes leading to price wars. As
the weaker firms are forced out of business, they are bought up by the
stronger firms, who by consolidating control of the market can restrict output
and support profit margins. The opportunity: concentration of economic
power through merger and acqlJisition is normally viewed with suspicion by
government. Antitrust and anti price-fixing laws normally constrain the
opportunities for industrial reorganization through mergers and takeovers.
However, as the prosperity of long-wave expansion gives way to stagna-
tion and decline, government becomes less willing to enforce antitrust and
other regulations that might impair the ability of the private sector to
recover. For example, the Sherman Antitrust Law was passed in 1890 in
response to the concentration of economic power that built to a crescendo
between 1870 and 1900. Before 1870, the majority of firms were small, owner-
run, operated in a local market, and neither vertically or horizontally
integrated. The la'st 30 years of the century saw the birth of the modern,
limited-liability, professionally managed, integrated corporation and the
greatest concentration of economic power in industrial history. But because
these same decades were a period of long-wave downturn that included three
severe depressions, two major financial panics, and unemployment that
reached as high as 18% (Rezneck, 1968), the government was reluctant to pur-
sue antitrust too aggressively. Similarly, it was not until 1897. as the economy
began to recover from the depression of 1894, that the Supreme Court
outlawed price-fixing agreements and other forms of collusion between firms.
As the economy continued to grow robustly during the first decade of the new
century, sentiment against the trusts increased. William Jennings Bryan
called for federal regulation of interstate railroads. The Democratic party of
New York demanded the nationalization of the coal industry in the wake of the
1902 attempt of the coal industry to break the mineworkers union (Mowry,
1958). In 1902 the government initiated a suit under the Sherman Act against
the Northern Securities Company, a railroad holding company whose investors
included Morgan. Rockefeller and other members of the capitalist elite. The
government won the dissolution of Northern Securities and, when upheld by
the Supreme Court. the floodgates of antitrust were at last opened. This was
the Progressive Era, the era of the trustbusters and muckrakers. During this
expansion period, the government initiated dozens of suits against major
conglomerates. succeeding in the break-up of such giants as Standard Oil and
American Tobacco. and bringing such powerful industries as the railroads
under federal regulation for the first time. Not surprisingly, the data show a
sharp decline in merger activity after 1902.
During the 1920s, the government was similarly reluctant to regulate the
investment trusts and other financial innovations that sprang up during the
great bull market. But after the market crash and depression, the inevitable
backlash against the excesses of the roaring 1920s brought the financial
industry under federal and state regulation, including the forced divestiture
of investment and commercial banking, the creation of the Securities and
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Exchange Commission, federal deposit insurance, and a host of other regula-
tory measures.
In like manner, the stagnation of the 1970s fostered deregulation of
numerous industries in an attempt to restore economic growth and competi-
tiveness. Yet even as the Administration continues to deregulate industry and
to tolerate the growing merger wave, the forces of the coming regulatory
backlash are already visible. For example, the panic and run on Ohio's state-
insured thrift institutions, triggered by the collapse of an unregulated
government securities dealer, led immediately to calls by some members of
Congress for re-regulation of the banking and securities industry and to the
forced switch to federal insurance for the state-insured thrifts.
The long wave thus modulates the pace of economic and social evolution
by altering the incentives for organizational change within and among firms,
and between the private sector and government. During expansions, organiza-
tions are successful and change is incremental. The organizational theories of
the day are reified, overhead grows, rigidity develops. As expansion gives
way to stagnation and then decline, the old ways increasingly fail; new
theories become attractive. Industry needs and finds opportunities for
change. Government permits many such changes to avoid garnering the blame
for the stagnation. But after the worst of the downturn has passed and
recovery starts, the government exerts more pressure on the private sector
to redress the excesses of the previous period. The downturn thus creates a
window of opportunity for change. As with technological innovation, the par-
ticulars of the social changes in each long-wave downturn are quite different.
11.4.8. Political and social values
Substantial evidence exists that political and social values in Western nations
fluctuate with the period and phasing of the economic long wave (Namenwirth,
1973; Weber, 1981). Independent content analyses of political tracts in the
USA and the UK reveal statistically significant 50-year value cycles in both
countries that coincide with each other and with the phasing of the economic
long wave. During periods of long-wave expansion, material wants are satis-
fied, and social concerns turn to civil liberties , income distribution, and social
justice. During the later phases of the expansion. foreign policy concerns
predominate. As the expansion gives way to decline, conservatism grows, and
political attention returns to material needs. Economic policy takes center
stage in legislative agendas. During the downturn, the accumulation of wealth
becomes the overriding concern, at the expense of civil rights, equity, and
the environment. The most dramatic example of this cycle is, of course, the
rise of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. The student rebellion of the 1960s and
growing conservatism of the 1980s in many Western nations are also consistent
with the current long-wave cycle.
The variation of political values is primarily the result of entrainment by
the economic cycle. It is quite natural to emphasize material needs during
depression periods. People find it easier to be charitable and to extend the
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rights and privileges of society during good. economic times when incomes are
rising than in times of economic retrenchment and depression.
As in the case of technology, the effects of social value shifts on the
severity and length of the long wave remain terra incognita. The connection
between political values and international conflict may be especially impor-
tant here, especially in view of the theories that relate war to the long wave
(Goldstein, 1983; Bergesen , 1983; Thompson and Zuk, 1982). Long-wave
research should broaden the boundary of analysis to include the effects of
the long wave on international relations, including trade, foreign aid, and con-
flict.
11.5. Conclusions
The National Model has been the vehicle for the development of an integrated
theory of the economic long wave. Analysis of the full NM and of simple
models has shown that the long wave is a complex phenomenon that influences
a wide range of economic and social factors. In contrast to several recent
theories, the National Model shows there is no single cause of the long wave.
Rather, the long wave is the result of the interaction of the physical struc-
ture of the economy and the decision making of individuals and firms. The
long wave springs from fundamental processes and structures in industrial
economies. It is generated endogenously, and does not depend on random
shocks such as gold discoveries to account for its persistence or for turning
points.
In essence, the long wave arises from two fundamental characteristics of
economic systems:
(1) Inherent oscillatory tendencies of firms. Due to the inevitable lags in
acquiring factors of production and reacting to changes in demand, firms
tend to amplify unanticipated changes in demand, creating the potential
for oscillation in the adjustment of production capacity to demand.
(2) Self-reinforcing processes amplify the instability. Though individual
firms are likely to be stable, a wide range of positive feedback loops are
created by the couplings of individual firms to one another, to the labor
markets, and to the financial markets. These reinforcing mechanisms
substantially amplify the fluctuations in the demand for capital created
by individual firms, boosting the amplitude and lengthening the period of
the inherent oscillatory tendencies of firms. The major self-reinforcing
processes involve capital self-ordering, labor market interactions, and
real interest rate dynamics.
Other processes such as technological innovation, organizational change,
and social progress also change substantially over the course of the long
wave. These changes in the surface structure of the economy are captured
and entrained by the pulse of the long cycle, which itself is caused by the
deep structure of the economy. That deep structure consists of the
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interactions between the physical system and the behavior of human decision-
makers.
Because the NM represents the physical structure of the economy and
the decisionmaking routines used by individuals and firms to manage their
affairs, it generates the multiple modes of behavior most important in modern
economies, including the long wave, the business cycle, government growth
and inflation, and the long-term growth of population and technology. The
model shows that it is possible to integrate in a single analytic framework the
processes responsible for each of the modes, examine their interactions, and
evaluate the likely effects of policies.
More importantly, diverse hypotheses and theories on the origin of each
of the modes can be integrated and tested rigorously and in a reproducible
manner. The relative strengths and synergies of the various processes can be
evaluated. The model thus provides a flexible framework for the development
of an integrated theory of economic dynamics and a consistent understanding
of the problems facing the world economy.
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Notes
[1] Van Duljn (1983) provides an excellent overview of long-wave theories, new
and old. For innovation theories, see Schumpeter (1939) and Mensch (1979).
Freeman et al. (1982) focus on unemployment and innovation. See Rostow
(1975, 1978) and Mandel (1980, 1981) for theories based on resource scarcity
and class struggle, respectively. See also Freeman (1983) for a survey of
contemporary long-wave theories.
[2] Good overviews are provided by Hogarth (1980) and Kahneman et al. (1982).
Common fallacies of causal attribution include the gambler's fallacy and the
regression fallacy. See Morecrofl (1983) on the connection of bounded
rationality and system dynamics. Nelson and Winter (1982) also apply bounded
rationality to macroeconomic modeling.
[3] For discussion of the issues Involved in the Identification of long waves from
empirical data, see Forrester et al. (1983). Anecdotal and other descriptive
data (e.g., Rezneck, 1968) are extremely useful and corroborate the timing of
the long waves established through examination of the numerical data.
[4] Although population and technological progress are exogenous, they are
assumed to grow at absolutely uniform fractional rates. Thus, the long wave
and Its timing in the simulation are not due to exogenous variables.
[5] See Metzler (1941), Mass (1975), Low (1980), and Forrester (1982) for dynamic
models of the business and Kuznets cycles that stress the role of stock adjust-
ments. For empirical work on the Kuznets cycle, see, e.g., Kuznets (1930) and
Hickman (1963).
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[6] Exogenous random noise is still active in the simulation.
[7] The multiplier effect can be derived by assuming that in equilibrium (i) capital
production equals the investment of the goods sector plus the investment of
the capital sector: PRk = INVg + INV k; (Ii) production is related to capital
stock by the capital output ratio: PRk = Ck/CORk; and (iii) the investment of
the capital sector in equilibrium equals physical depreciation. In equilibrium,
discards are given by the capital stock divided by the average life of capital:
INV k =Ck/ ALCk. See Frisch (1933) and Sterman (1965b).
[8] Sterman and Meadows (1965) describe a participatory simulation game that
vividly demonstrates how self-ordering and investment behavior can create
long waves. Players manage the capital-producing sector of the economy and
attempt to match production capacity to the demand for capital. The game can
be played manually or on personal computers. It has been used successfully
with students, professional economists, and corporate executives. Copies of
the game and floppy disks suitable for the IBM PC are available from the
author at: System Dynamics Group, E40-294, MIT, Cambridge MA 02139.
[9] Simulated employment and capital stock in the capital sector are shown.
Because no historical time series are used to drive the model and because of
the noise included to excite the business cycle, the point-by-point behavior of
the model differs from the data. Nevertheless, the model captures the quali-
tative patterns of the actual data extremely well.
[10] Note also that in both the simulated and actual data the amplitude of the busi-
ness cycle (as shown by the fluctuations in employment) increases as the econ-
omy moves towards the peak of the long wave. The rising amplitude is a result
of the developing margin of excess capacity as the economy nears the peak.
[11] The real interest rate shown in Figure 11.13 (a) is given by the yield of three-
month Treasury bills less the rate of inflation as measured by the implicit
price deflator.
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CHAPTER 12
The Crucial Influence of Structural Change
on Long-Term Fluctuations
in Economic Growth
C. W.A.M. van Paridon
12.1. Introduction
The observation that growth and change are two indivisible notions applies to
nearly all aspects of reality, ranging from human life and scientific knowledge
to economic development. It is therefore not surprising to see that this rela-
tionship has been an important object of study in many sciences. In some of
them this attention has resulted in theories in which the notions of growth
and change, their determinants, and consequences were integrated in a fruit-
ful way. It is questionable, however, whether economics belongs to these sci-
ences. Of the two notions, growth has been studied intensively, while change
normally has been assumed away or treated only marginally. Maybe the reason
for this difference in treatment has to be sought in the fact that economic
growth, as opposed to structural change, is relatively easy to recognize, to
measure, and to influence, whereas structural change is a slow process that is
difficult to distinguish. This development, however. has been at the cost of
the awareness that both economic growth and structural change are closely
interrelated and cannot develop or function well, in the long term, without
each other. In short, without growth no change, without change no growth.
(For similar opinions, see Lindbeck, 1983; DEeD, 1985.)
In this chapter I argue that (in the long term) no acceptable rate of
economic growth - acceptable in terms of a country's employment situation -
is possible without an adequate rate of structural change. Furthermore, this
process of change shows an alternation of periods with faster and slower
C. W.A.M. van Parid.on 163
levels of development, ultimately causing the long-term fluctuations in
economic growth known as long waves. After a short discussion of structure
and structural change, the determinants and the consequences of the process
of structural change are analyzed, and their influence on long-term economic
development, creating wave-like fluctuations, is described.
12.2. Economic Structure and Structural Change
At any given time, a national economy is capable of producing goods and ser-
vices: whether or not this capability is fully used depends on the decisions of
the relevant economic actors and on the way the decision-making process is
organized. What and how much can be produced depends on the available
economic structure, Le., on the precipitations of decisions made in the past.
By "structure" we mean a whole array of elements that can be treated as con-
stant in the short term, such as the environment, the volume and quality of
the labor force, existing capital stock, and the level of technological
knowledge.
However, the notion of economic structure must not be confined to the
production side alone. Based on the assumption that final demand is the soLe
end and purpose of the economic process, the volume and composition of
intermediate and final demand are elements that also have to be taken into
account. Demand also has a strong influence on the structure of the external
relationships of a country. Availability, as well as demand preferences due to
price or quality, shape the volume and content of the imports of a country, in
the same way as the interplay between the internal structure of production
and external demand shape its exports. Both demand and, to a lesser extent,
external relations have the same characteristic quality as economic structure:
they change slowly.
This broad concept of economic structure, with its attention to produc-
tion, consumption, and external relations determines the growth possibilities
of a country. As will be made clear below, all the aspects mentioned here,
although treated as constants in the short term, show gradual changes over a
longer period of time. When these changes are one-way and normally irrever-
sible, then they can be called structural changes. Mentioning a structure
inevitably means some kind of sectoral division. Depending on the question to
be investigated, several criteria can be used to divide an economic structure.
Differences in long-term growth, productivity, income elasticity, innovative-
ness, competitive pressures (internal or external), are all criteria according
to which a structure can be divided into more homogeneous parts (see, for
example, Rostas, 1948; Salter, 1969; Pratten, 1976; Wohlin, 1970; Carlsson,
1981).
The basic level to be distinguished is that of an individual product, be it
a good or a service. For each product, it is possible to sketch a produ<;:t life
cycle, indicating the several periods of introduction, rapid growth, stagna-
tion, and decline. During such a cycle, changes occur with respect to demand
and thus output, to productivity, and to price. Aggregating these individual
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life cycles gives the economic development at the level of a firm, an industry,
or a sector. Of course, each higher level makes the underlying changes within
a certain unit invisible, but it is clear that they must be fulfilled to realize
the required economic growth.
To give a first impression of the extent Df the phenomenon Df structural
change, Tables 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 show some data at a very high level of aggrega-
tion. Table 1.2.1 gives the distribution of employment and value added in the
three main sectors of an econDmy: agriculture, industry, and services.
Table 12.1. Development of employment share and value added share of agriculture,
industry, and services, 1960-1983, for some major industrial countries.
Employment share Value added share
Sector Regiona 1J}60 1972 1984 1J}60 1972 1984
Agriculture OECD 21.6 12.7 9.1 6.5 5.0 3.0
EC 21.1 12.0 8.9 8.4 5.7 3.7
USA 8.5 4.4 3.3 4.0 2.8 2.0
Japan 30.2 14.7 8.9 12.6 5.5 3.2
FRG 14.0 7.7 5.6 5.8 3.0 1.9
UK 4.7 3.0 2.6 3.4 2.5 1.9
France 23.2 12.2 7.9 10.6 6.5 3.9
Industry OECD 35.4 36.4 31.3 39.9 38.4 34.4
EC 39.8 40.8 34.3 43.5 41.1 35.8
USA 35.3 32.5 28.5 38.3 34.1 31.7
Japan 28.5 36.3 34.8 44.5 45.6 40.8
FRG 47.0 47.8 41.3 53.1 47.1 37.2
UK 47.7 42.9 32.9 42.8 38.8 36.4
France 38.4 39.6 33.0 39.0 38.2 34.4
Services OECD 43.0 51.1 59.5 53.6 56.6 62.2
EC 39.1 47.1 56.7 48.1 53.5 60.6
USA 56.2 63.1 68.2 57.7 63.1 66.3
Japan 41.3 49.0 56.3 42.9 49.0 56.0
FRG 39.1 44.5 53.1 41.0 49.9 60.9
UK 47.6 54.1 64.5 53.8 58.7 61.8
France 38.5 48.1 59.1 50.4 55.4 61.7
aOECD .., mean of the 24 member states. EC - mean of the 10 member states.
Source: OECD (1986), Historical Statistics, 1.DtJO-1984.
Even at this high level of aggregation, neglecting all the intrasectoral
changes, major developments have occurred over the period considered. For
instance, for the OEeD a decline in the employment share for agriculture,
from 21.6'% to 9.1'%, and for industry, from 35.4'% to 31.3'%, gave way to an
increase in the employment share for services from 43.0'% to 59.5'%. Individual
countries showed similar changes.
Another remarkable structural change occurred in the external rela-
tions of countries. Although with important differences between countries in
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futile 12.2. Exports and imports of goods and services, as a percentage of GOP,
1960-1984, for the major DECO countries.
Export Import
Region 1960 1972 1.984 1960 1972 11J84
DECO 11.6 14.0 18.2 11.1 13.4 18.7
EC 19.9 23.1 31.9 19.7 21.7 30.9
USA 5.1 5.7 7.5 4.4 6.1 10.5
Japan 10.8 10.6 15.1 10.4 8.3 12.4
FRG 19.0 20.9 31.1 16.5 18.9 28.6
UK 21.1 22.2 29.1 22.5 22.2 29.0
France 15.0 17.2 25.4 12.9 16.3 25.2
Souroe: DEeD (1986), Historical Statistics, tDtJO-:1.984.
level, the trend toward stronger integration among the developed countries
can be clearly distilled from the figures in Table 1.2.2. For the whole OEeD
area, the export or imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP
increased considerably, from 11.4% to 18.2%, in less than 20 years.
These structural changes, as represented in Tables 1.2.1 and 1.2.2,
occurred in a period in which indicators as real GDP per capita and the rate
of employment initially showed very prosperous results. Eventually, however,
the situation has deteriorated rapidly, as can be seen from Table 1.2.3.
futile 12.3. Development of GOP per capita and standardized rate of unemployment,
1960-1984, for the major DECO countries.
Indica.tor Region 1960-11J67 11J67-1973 1973-1979 1979-1984
Real GOP DECO 3.9 3.9 1.9 1.1
per capita EC 3.5 4.3 2.2 0.7
USA 3.2 2.5 1.6 0.9
Japan 9.1 8.0 2.5 3.1
FRG 2.9 4.5 2.6 1.0
UK 2.3 3.0 1.4 0.5
France 4.3 4.7 2.7 0.6
Standardized DECO 2.7 3.1 4.9 7.4
rate of EC 2.3 2.9 4.9 9.4
unemployment USA 4.2 4.4 6.7 8.2
Japan 1.2 1.2 1.9 2.4
FRG 0.6 1.0 3.2 6.0
UK 2.5 3.4 5.3 10.7
France 1.2 2.5 4.6 7.9
Souroe: DEeD (1986). Historical Statistics, 1DfJO-W84.
With these data in mind, giving a first indication on the direction and the
importance of the process of structural change, in the following section we
will describe and analyze the determinants and consequences of this process.
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12.3. Determinants and Consequences of Structural Change
In describing the process of economic development in an open economy, a pro-
cess in which economic growth, structural change and increasing internation-
alization are essential features, it is useful to base the analysis on the
development of an individual product, along a product life cycle (see van Pari-
don, 1985). Depending on the characteristics of each product and on the
behavior of the relevant actors, product life cycles differ with respect to the
duration. potential market size. the process of market expansion, demand for
labor, capital, and other inputs. etc. At a given time, an examination of a
national economy reveals a whole spectrum of products. all at different points
in their respective product life cycles. Some products are still in the intro-
ductory phase, others are in the phase of rapid growth, while the remainder
can be placed in the phases of stagnation or decline. When this observation is
compared with an earlier one, it is possible to observe the changes that have
occurred.
On the one hand, these changes are caused by developments on the sup-
ply side. Because of technological progress, both disembodied through
"learning by doing", for instance, and embodied through investment (both of
which vary for each product/industry/sector), changes can occur in the
structure of productivity, in turn causing changes in the price structure and
the demand for labor and other inputs. The level of investment depends
strongly on the rate of profit, Le., on the performance of the product in an
earlier period. The higher the rate of profit, the better are the opportuni-
ties for new investments and so for productivity increases, thus improving the
market chances of the product. Because of structural differences in produc-
tivity development between products and in the opportunities to utilize
embodied technological progress, this process must give rise to major changes
in the structure of productivity, relative prices, and employment.
On the other hand, demand also exerts an influence. Preferences for
individual products - for final demand, intermediate use, or for investment -
depend on the way the quality of a product is appreciated by the buyers, on
the per capita income level, on the necessity to use certain products as
inputs or as investment. and on the relative prices. In the long term, price
elasticity is judged to be less decisive (see Goergens, 1975). This preference
can be represented by the income elasticities of the products. Because of
differences in income elasticity between several products/industries/sectors,
growth in income must result in a change in the structure of total demand.
For an individual product, a "virtuous circle" of development can now be
outlined. This process is based on the ideas of Kaldor; for a description see
Thirlwall (1983). High output in an earlier period has resulted in high profits.
These profits are used for new investments. embodied with the most recent
available technological knowledge, also allowing organizational changes. This
allows productivity increases and an improvement of the price/quality rela-
tionship. which can expand output sales once again. Continuation of this pro-
cess depends on productivity increases on the one side, and on market expan-
sion, creating further economies of scale, on the other. Le., on the way the
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several market signals are recognized and incorporated in the production pro-
cess and marketing strategy. Of course, a "vicious circle" of development is
also possible, due to bad starting conditions or hitches that may occur in the
cumulative process.
The cumulative way of reasoning can be equally well applied at the level
of the national economy, with two adjustments. First, at that level, the indivi-
dual cycles are interconnected through intermediate deliveries and invest-
ment. A higher demand for one product can create a higher demand for
inputs (backward linkages), or a new product or a technology can create new
(market) possibilities in those sectors that use this innovation through invest-
ment or intermediate deliveries (forward linkages). This mixture of individual
product life cycles, all of which gradually change over time, and also of chang-
ing input-output relations result in a complex pattern of structural change at
the level of the national economy from the supply side. This complexity is
reinforced on the demand side by changes in the pattern of consumption,
described in Engel's law. An increase in per capita income, a consequence of
a sufficient rate of economic growth, results in changes in the consumer
preferences, and so in income elasticity. Normally, the income elasticities of
existing products decline over time; new attractive products start with a high
income elasticity. With these points in mind, a cumulative process of economic
development can be sketched, as shown in Figu.re 12.1.-.
In this process, economic growth and structural change are treated as
inseparable elements, each one a necessary condition for the fruitful develop-
ment of the other. The main point is that necessary changes to create new
products and/or new markets have to be realized - in the right volume, in the
right direction, and at the right time - to maintain a sufficiently high rate of
economic growth and adequate level of employment, bearing in mind that pro-
ductivity increases and/or stagnating demand reduce labor requirements in
the production processes for existing products. As long as these changes are
realized, the prospects for economic growth can be considered favorable,
economic growth that in turn creates the basis for further structural change.
So far, a closed economy has been assumed. With Table 12.2. in mind, this
cannot be called a realistic description of the actual economic development.
The introduction of external economic relations has several consequences.
Each country can try to make use of export opportunities to expand their
markets, thus benefiting from further economies of scale. At the same time,
each country has to be aware of competition in internal markets. Of course,
some products have to be imported to satisfy intermediate or final demand, if
no substitutes are available. For most industrial products and services, how-
ever, the more industrialized countries have the option of producing them
themselves or importing them, which implies that they can compete on foreign
as well as domestic markets in order to realize their expected sales. This
relationship means a further strengthening of the relationship between
economic growth and structural change [this description resembles certain
export-led growth theories, such as that of Lamfalussy (1963)].
The consequence of economic growth may be that consumers develop a
stronger preference for imported products. Further, other countries can
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Situation at point t:
Starting
Products
Industries
Sectors
Fast-
growing
Products
Industries
Sectors
Stagnating
Products
Industries
Sectors
Declining
Products
Industries
Sectors
.....-----..... Movement over time along
respective product life-cycles
!
/
Changes in the
structure of:
Production
Productivity
Prices
Employment
causing
1
Changes in:
Per capita income
Consumer demand
Economic growth
Figure 12.1. The relationship between economic growth and structural change in a
closed economy.
show higher growth rates, which may imply that the price/quality charac-
teristics of their products show relative improvements. making their products
even more attractive to domestic consumers. A country now also has to take
into account changes in demand in all other relevant countries. Besides these
demand-oriented effects, there is a very strong supply-oriented element that
makes the growth/change relationship crucial. Countries differ in their level
of technological knowledge, and in their factor rewards, more or less accord-
ing to their per capita income levels. Countries that are in a leading position
then have to ensure that sufficient new products/technologies are developed
in order to keep that position. The countries that follow try to improve their
positions by increasing their level of technological knowledge, buying patents
or licenses, or by allowing direct investment/joint ventures, and to profit from
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their relatively lower factor rewards, especially for labor. In this way they
start to compete on those markets that have so far been out of reach to them.
This process can be recognized at every level of development.
Situation at point t:
Low level of
Income
Technological
knowledge
Medium level of
Income
Technological
knowledge
High level of
Income
Technological
knowledge
Movement over time
!
causing
/
Country I:
Changes in
structures of
production
Structure of I+-__C__~
production
Changes in
income and
consumer demand
Structure of
consumption
A 8
C
Rest of the world: Structure ofproduction 1+-----+1
Structure of
consumption
Figure 12.2. The relationship between economic growth and slructural change of
production and consumption in an interconnected world.
Figure 12.2 gives a schematic representation in which A gives the exter-
nal relations with respect to intermediate demand, direct investments and
technology streams. creating international trade and/or capital movements.
Not so important is the international "keeping up with the Joneses" effect
under B. With C the internal relationships between consumption and produc-
tion are given, while D gives the same relationship but now between different
countries, implying international trade in final products.
The description of the determinants and consequences of structural
change thus yields a picture of a complicated and important relationship
between economic growth and structural change. In the following, a possible
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explanation of the long-wave phenomenon is given. which stresses the impossi-
bility of continuing the two interrelated processes of economic growth and
structural change over a longer period of time.
12.4. Long Waves: Long-term Growth Fluctuations Caused by
Structural Change
The influence of structural change on long-term fluctuations can be attached
to the four phases usually discerned in a long wave: recovery, prosperity,
recession, and depression. Figure 12.3 shows a wave-like pattern of economic
development, seen as smoothed deviations of the long-term trend. The dating
of the phases is connected with the points of inflection of this cycle, and
three possible courses of the recession (and depression phase) are given. In
these last phases human decisions determine the length of the phases, making
their course less determined than in the phases of recovery and prosperity,
where technology ultimately determines the course.
Recovery
Figure 12.3. Possible courses of a long-wave developmenL, showing smooLhed devia-
tions of Lhe long-Lerm Lrend. and Lhe timing of Lhe various phases.
The recovery phase begins when the several necessary conditions fDr
growth are fulfilled. These cDnditions CDncern the eCDnDmic structure of a
cDuntry in the broadest sense, the mDtivatiDn Df the eCDnDmic actDrs tD react
tD necessary changes, and the develDpment Df relative factDr CDStS. The mDst
impDrtant cDnditiDn that has tD be met is that there should be a clDse
cDrrespDndence between the DUtPUt produced and the intermediate and final
demand, with regard tD vDlume, quality and price, at hDme and abroad: what
can be produced, can be sDld. The preceding depressiDn phase has especially
influenced the productiDn structure; DId declining sectDrs are trimmed, disin-
vestment in unprDfitable sectDrs has taken place, and labDr has moved DUt.
These processes Df scrapping invDlve high eCDnDmic and social cDSts, and at
first meet heavy resistance. After a time, this resistance declines and
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changes are reluctantly accepted. This process of scrapping has also to take
place within the existing institutional framework, where adjustment is needed
to cope with changing requirements.
As soon as these adjustments are realized, a period of economic recovery
can begin, but this requires two other necessary conditions: sufficient
motivation of all relevant actors and a favorable international economic cli-
mate. The process of starting new investment projects, of taking risks, of
moving to other sectors or locations, of looking for something new, is strongly
connected with a determinant that is not often mentioned in economic theory
- motivation (see Neuberger and Duffy, 1976, for a clear exception). This
relates to the way economic actors are willing or forced to bring about those
changes or to cooperate in their fulfillment; without motivation the process
of change will end in deadlock. In this respect, the postwar "reconstruction"
comes to mind as an example, as does the way the Japanese are involved as
participants in the economic process. The risk of new investments is also
reduced because of the decline in factor costs, as a result of a prolonged
situation in which supply of factors of production exceeds demand.
Such a situation in which old, non-profitable parts are scrapped, motiva-
tion is high, and factor costs are relatively low, can positively influence
investment and so bring about a process of economic recovery. An added
impetus can be given by governments, such as through increasing investment
in infrastructure. But such an economic recovery is only possible on a global
scale, when all these requirements are fulfilled in most of the developed coun-
tries. Only then will the urgently desired situation of higher demand on a
global scale, with all its connected advantages, be realized. It was this neces-
sary resemblance between the industrialized countries in the postwar period
that boosted their economic recovery.
The transition from the recovery to the prosperity phase can be charac-
terized by definitive breakthroughs of certain new sectors and/or technolo-
gies whose development had previously been hampered because of the high
risks for investment, and the still unknown technological possibilities and
potential markets. As soon as those temporary, but often large, problems are
overcome, demand increases, which stimulates further investment, raising
productivity and so lowering relative prices. Some of these new sectors
develop into leading ones and influence the economic structure profoundly
through backward and forward linkages. The whole economy shows a rela-
tively high growth rate. So far, this higher demand has not resulted in fric-
tions on the several factor markets. As long as all available factors are not
yet completely utilized, prices remain at their initial levels. Only when
demand and supply more or less balance, an upward pressure on prices
begins. On the one hand, this stimulates final demand once again because of
higher wages, hut on the other it implies higher production costs. This
increase in costs can sometimes be neutralized through higher productivity,
but for many sectors, especially the service-oriented and sheltered ones, only
price increases can restore the old level of profits.
The rise in factor costs, followed by more general price increases, stimu-
lates the search for process innovations at the cost of product innovations.
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This change is strengthened because of the growing stock of accumulated
investments that can only remain profitable through streamlining the produc-
tion process and removing all redundant elements. Disinvesting and moving the
capital to other, more promising products/industries/sectors becomes a more
difficult strategy. These are the first signs of rigidity, just at a time when
major adjustments are needed.
Two other processes put even stronger pressure on adjustment. First,
the fall in unemployment means an increase in real wages, and thus in per cap-
ita income, creating structural changes in demand toward those (new) prod-
ucts with high income elasticities. These changes in demand are normally
attended by stronger preferences for imported products, because of unique,
non-price characteristics (this is in line with the trade approach; see Linder,
1961). Of course, similar developments can be noted in other countries with
respect to their products.
The second impetus for major adjustments emanates from developments in
other countries in two different ways. During recovery and prosperity, coun-
tries can follow a cumulative growth process, either a virtuous or a vicious cir-
cle of development, as described above. Those countries with a virtuous cir-
cle of development show high growth rates, and favorable productivity and
export development, and thus encourage new investments and necessary
adjustments. As long as these changes occur in the right volume, in the right
direction, and at the right speed, the process can continue without major
problems. When these changes fail, however, the country can end in a vicious
circle of development with less prosperous results and prospects. Once in
such a circle, extraordinary measures are required to break out of it.
Another external influence has a different source. As the phase of
prosperity continues, the resources to realize more process innovations grad-
ually dry up. Some countries try to overcome such a position by diverting
their research and development expenditures and investments into new direc-
tions, making use, if possible, of knowledge created elsewhere. Those coun-
tries that do not anticipate in this way makes themselves economically more
vulnerable, because firms can decide to invest in other countries. One reason
to adopt such a strategy may be to lower transport costs or to be closer to an
important market; another reason can be to profit from differences in the
level of technological knowledge in two ways. Firms can invest in countries
with higher levels of economic development, normally with more advanced
technological knowledge, for instance, to upgrade their own technological pos-
sibilities or to be close to markets that are receptive to high-technology
products. Or they can invest in countries with lower levels of economic
development, particularly with much lower labor costs. In both ways, profits
are higher than they would be otherwise. At the same time, this development
creates new competitors on already stagnating markets.
All in all, changes in demand, cumulative differences in growth rates
between countries, and increasing competitive pressures from other coun-
tries, both at the high and at the low technology markets, are arguments for
stronger adjustments in the economic structure of a country. And just when
firms are exhibiting a more conservative investment behavior, creating a
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negative influence on overall demand and expectations. several sectors are
starting to lose in competition with other countries. profits are undermined.
and unemployment starts to rise. making workers reluctant to move. Instead
of realizing the adjustments necessary to turn the tide. all the economic
actors have good reasons to choose a more defensive attitude to prevent
further erosion of their position. It is this stalemate that induces the
economic contraction into the downward phases.
The recession phase can be characterized by the ever-widening gap
between required and actual structural changes. Economic actors try to pro-
tect their interests. also by invoking government assistance through subsi-
dies. employment guarantees, and trade protection measures. Wages remain
high at first. On the whole neither the capital nor the labor market function
as required. Besides increasing rigidities on those markets, the institutional
framework (designed in the recovery and fast growth phases) also starts to
show signs of rigidity. It was built for different purposes, not for coping with
new circumstances. As long as one country or an unimportant minority of
countries is hit by these recessionary tendencies, the situation at the global
level can still return to more prosperous development. But as more and more
countries show these tendencies, further aggravations of the economic situa-
tion become visible because of a trade slump or an unexpected oil price
increase, for instance. and the depression phase is ushered in.
The main process in the depression phase is that of the adjustment of
the economic structure to a new global equilibrium between demand and sup-
ply. These adjustments range from a downward movement of real factor
rewards to the reconstruction of certain sectors. It will be clear that the
costs of this process, personal as well as social, are considerable. implying a
strong resistance to such measures. It is not only a long and painful process,
it can also be dangerous. Nationalistic feelings and the search for scapegoats
sometimes predominate if no realistic alternative is available. Such a realistic
policy alternative has to be effective and acceptable: effective in realizing
the necessary changes and in implementing new promising activities than can
generate new growth and employment; and acceptable in the sense that the
public is aware of the fact that this policy, with its current sacrifices. is
necessary to create the right conditions for renewed economic prosperity.
12.5. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the importance of structural changes in long-term economic
development has been analyzed. After showing some important changes
(albeit at an aggregated level) in the economic structure of the major industri-
alized countries, the determinants and the consequences of structural change
were analyzed. It is clear that structural changes are a multiform
phenomenon. working on several levels, on the supply and demand side. within
and outside national economies. The main conclusion is that economic growth
and structural change are strongly interdependent, in such a way that a posi-
tive development of the one is a necessary condition for a positive
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development of the other. In other words, growth is stimulated by structural
change and influences it at the same time, while the achievement of structural
change is necessary to continue the process of economic growth.
The process of structural change is embedded in a theoretical explana-
tion of long-term fluctuations in the economic process. Roughly, structural
changes in the production structure show long-term fluctuations in such a way
that the production structure changes relatively more during the depression
and recovery phases and relatively less during the prosperity and recession
phases. Long-term economic growth enters its upswing when the production
structure, after a long and painful process of adjustment, more or less bal-
ances the consumption structure in combination with a balance of payments
equilibrium. Then, because of important changes in technology, of the emer-
gence of new leading sectors, and of changes in the volume and content of the
external economic relationships, the production structure changes consider-
ably. Inevitably, the time comes when the process of structural change in the
production structure slows down because of increasing rigidities on several
markets. the lack of new products/technologies to provide employment and to
guarantee further economic growth, the exhaustion of possibilities to
increase productivity, and the increased competition on the world market.
This slowdown takes place at a time when major adjustments are needed. When
a majority of the economically more important countries are caught in such a
web, a depression is inevitable.
A solution is possible only when all those countries break the circle as
described in this chapter. This requires a radical and deliberate long-term
economic policy, both at the national and the international level. It has to be
radical to realign the structure of production with that of demand. It has to
be deliberate in its weighing of present adjustment costs and future returns.
It has to be on both the national and international levels to restore a more
stable pattern of economic development within each country and, equally,
more reliable economic relationships among countries. Doing nothing or react-
ing inadequately will only prolong the depression. This chapter has, it is
hoped, given some insights toward designing such a policy. The depression of
a long wave is not necessarily unassailable.
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CHAPrKR 13
The Law of Value and Structural
Shifts in a National Economy
KK Val'tukh
The purpose of this chapter is to describe methods and first results of anal-
yses of interconnected changes in production expenditures and in production
structure, taking into account direct material and labor costs. In accordance
with the theory of value. they are to be combined and generalized in the total
labor input coefficient w:
w =wA +1 (13.1)
where w =(w1"'" Wi ,... , w,,); j =1•.... n is an index of production items; n
is the number of production items; A = faii I is a quadratic matrix [1] of
material input-output coefficients; aii (i = 1 ..... n); and 1= (L 1 ..... Li , .... L,,,)
is a row vector of direct labor input coefficients. Data from input-output
tables are used. together with analogous information on the intersectoral dis-
tribution of labor inputs.
Calculations have been performed for market economies; w can be con-
sidered as a first and sufficiently correct approximation of commodity values.
Dynamic input-output tables were used to analyze essential interconnections
between structural changes in productive inputs and in gross outputs in so far
as one part of gross output. e.g.. material input compensation fund H. is
presented in each table as a vector that depends on matrix A:
Q=H+Y (13.2)
where H =A Q; Q =(Q1 •...• Qi ..... Q,,) is a column vector of gross output; H is a
column vector of the part of gross output destined for material input
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compensation; and Y is a column vector of net output. Since the coefficients
of matrix A are simultaneously used to calculate w. it is possible to analyze
the interconnected changes in the structure of commodity output and values.
In market economies. the law of value forms a socioeconomic mechanism
of technological progress. It is a process of change in individual technologies
toward reducing the value of individual commodities. which can be expressed
by
wf =waf + If (13.3)
where wf are individual total labor expenditures per unit of product j by
firm k; k E E. where E is a set of firms in a given economy; ajk =(afj ,.... a~j) is
a column vector of direct material input-output coefficients in firm k; ljk is an
analogous direct labor input coefficient; and w is the value vector [see equa-
tion (13.1)]. Given w for the economy. technologies reveal a tendency to
decreasing wf values. Let values wj(t) and wf(t) be considered given for a
time period t. Then it can be predicted that there will be a general tendency
to expand for technologies k such that wf(t) < Wj(t). Changes of technolo-
gies are nothing else than some interconnected changes in coefficients afj
and lr It should be added that changes in various technologies' shares in
production. taken independently of shifts in afj and If. cause changes in the
generalized coefficients aij and lj because the latter are average quantities:
where
Analogously.
where Ej is a set of firms k such that Qf > 0 (by convention all production
expenditures of multiproduct firms are directly and completely distributed
among all outputs). Changes in the coefficients comprising matrix A and vec-
tor I are thus functions of changes in technological coefficients at and If.
and in the shares of technologies in production (outputs Qj~' Changes in the
technological system influence shifts in the production structure through the
process of forming the compensation fund H.
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Hence, the law of value determines the direction of shifts in the produc-
tion structure through changes in structure of both production and non-
production requirements. These are the result of technological progress
which, in turn. tends to reduce commodity values. In a market economy the law
is also an economic mechanism through which structural shifts in production
occur; this is the well known competitive market mechanism "demand-
supply-prices". Interconnections between commodity values, growth rates.
and structural shifts in production are discussed here. An elaborated analyt-
ical scheme has been applied to input-output statistics for the USA,
1959-1975, in particular, for 1963-1973. In limited aggregated form, the
results of calculations are shown in Tables 1.3.1-1.3.4 (in constant 1972 dollars)
[2].
Table 1.3.1 is an input-output table for 1963 for three groups of indus-
tries obtained by aggregating the initial 147 industry input-output table.
Table 1.3.2 is an analogous table for 1973. Table 1.3.3 shows increment rates
derived from the transition from Table 1.3.1 to Table 1.3.2. Table 1.3.4 presents
increment rates of a set of coefficients indicated. Increment rates are desig-
nated by J; for example. JAi ! is an increment rate of At!; Le.,
JA i! =(All'131 Ai~963) -1, etc.
There are 153 sectors in the original data, but non-commodity sectors
such as banking, credit agencies, insurance. real estate, and nonprofit organ-
izations were excluded from our calculations since the set of processes is con-
sidered from the point of view of the theory of value (Le., the law of commod-
ity prices). Correspondingly, material expenditures in these sectors are only
a part of net output Y, and are not part of c:ompensation fund R The 147
commodity-producing industries (including services), as shown in Tables 1.3.1
and 1.3.2, have been aggregated into three groups (I-III) using an index of the
growth rate of hourly labor productivity. Group I contained 47 industries
with the lowest growth rates, and groups II and III contained 50 industries
each, with middle and highest labor productivity growth rates. Regularities
can be determined from such highly aggregated data.
In theory, the main goal of technological progress is to increase labor
productivity. The data are of sufficiently high precision to test this theory.
Labor productivity growth rates are thus taken as an indicators of tech-
nological progress. Table 1.3.3 shows that technological progress estimated in
such a way increases more rapidly in expanding sectors of the economy:
increment rates of production IQ grow from group I to group III, and the
groups were constructed based on labor productivity indices. The same can be
seen in Table 1.3.4 (column 5), where average labor productivity growth rates
are calculated per worker (instead of hourly).
These observations are theoretically important: increases in output are
achieved with the use of advanced technology. the spread of which is faster in
such industries that are able to meet rising demand for their products by
increasing output at a correspondingly rapid rate. Higher growth rates in
industrial production are achieved by firms that introduce advanced technol-
ogy, and these firms are obviously characterized by higher labor productivity
growth rates.
180 TILe Law of Value and Structural SIL1Jfs
Table 13.3. Input-output table for 147 US industries, 1963 and 1973. Large groups
by hourly labor productivity growth rates. Increment rates of flow (%).
IAtJ
IQt
i\j II III IUt IYt IQt ILt IWt in current prices
I 35 44 78 45 40 42 37 21 124
II 26 36 93 42 55 48 16 12 102
III 49 83 78 71 86 77 7 15 132
A.verage 35 48 81 53 53 53 24 16 119
Table 13.4. Input-output lable for 147 US industries, 1963 and 1973. Large groups
by hourly labor productivity growth rates. Increment rates of coefficients (%).
IAt}
i\j I II III I{Qt / Lt ) IWt IPt
I -5 -3 0 4 -15 58
II -11 -8 9 28 -24 38
III 5 22 0 65 -35 31
Average -5 0 2 23 -24 43
Moreover, the demand for labor falls as production growth rates
increase: ILl =37%, ILo = 16%, and ILm = 7% (see Table 1.:3.3). The higher is
the output growth rate, the higher is the share of labor productivity in the
production increment. An additional statistical corroboration of this assump-
tion is that technological progress is achieved more rapidly in expanding
industries in order to economize expenditures on labor, and thus the demand
for labor.
The use of additional labor resources in production was a feature of the
first (conservative) group of industries. Hence, the industrial structure of
labor is a much more conservative economic phenomenon than the output
structure. Moreover, it is clear that the real increases in jobs achieved by
conservative technelogies was the source for the growth in output of group I
(without noticeable increases in labor productivity; see Table 1.:3.4). But it
may be justified to assume that national economic development can be
achieved without a large technologically conservative sector. In the absence
of such a sector, it can be questioned whether there would be an increase in
employment; it is theoretically not excluded that in capitalist economies, the
higher the growth rate, the higher will be the rate of unemployment. Note,
however, that in Japan in 1960-1970 the analogous third group of industries
achieved high growth in output with real employment reduction (P.N. Tesla's
unpublished calculations). The cause could be the interconnection between
increases in growth rates and the use of new technologies that are less labor-
intensive than previous ones.
The increase of some industries share in gross national output Q orig-
inates in their increased share in the entire fund of material production
expenditures. For example, in group III the sum of material expenditures (in
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1972 dollars) grew in the period considered by 81%, with an average increase
in fund H of 53% (Table 13.3). This is an example of the theoretical law of the
tendency for firms to produce goods that are then used in other fast-growing
(progressive) industries. Increases in the output of progressive industries
can be achieved without increases in labor expenditure; but this is connected
with the use of an increasing proportion of all material resources. The oppo-
site (relatively high incremental rates of labor expenditures with low rates of
material ones) is characteristic of conservative industries (group I, see Table
13.3). It can thus be concluded that in the USA in 1963-1973 there was a com-
bination of two essentially different types of technological development.
There is an additional factor of high increases in material expenditures in
group III, Le., an increase in the total of input-output coefficients (see Table
13.4), but this is not an essential property of technological progress [3].
Note that each large group shown in Tables 13.1-13.4, includes industries
belonging to various sectors of the economy (e.g., agriculture. metallurgy,
machinery etc.). It is remarkable that such groups (constructed on the basis
of indicators of labor productivity increases) have tight internal production
connections (see Tables 13.1, and 13.2). In 1973 the internal flow AI,I = $105.4
billion, which accounts for more than 46% of the total HI; the corresponding
quantities for group II was $158.1 billion (more than 50%), and for group III
$166.9 billion (50%). Roughly the same picture can be seen for 1963. Internal
(diagonal) flows within the groups form 40-60% of their entire material expen-
ditures. Each group therefore represents a relatively autonomous part of the
economy (at least as far as material expenditures are concerned). This con-
clusion should be considered together with the above observation that various
types of technological progress are characteristic of the different groups.
Consider flows Am,m for 1963 and 1973. The incremental rate IAm •m =
78%, with IHm = 71% (Table 13.3). A growing proportion of products from group
III is used to produce these products. This could be interpreted as an exam-
ple of the theoretical law of the tendency for progressive industries to pro-
duce resources for their own consumption or for the sake of their own pro-
duction. The accelerated technological progress in group III and this law are
essentially interconnected. At the same time, one can ask whether the effect
of the operation of this law is the tendency to exhaust the efficiency of pro-
gressive technologies and, consequently. the production of corresponding
resources.
There are obviously ~ome shortcomings in observations based only on
input-output data, so if possible these should be combined with analyses
based on fixed capital investment and stock information. We use such data for
the US economy for the same period (in 1972 dollars) in Tables 13.5-13.7 [4]
(no data on circulating capital were available). In Tables 13.5-13.7 the follow-
ing notation is used: X = fixed capital, Xe =capital in equipment; Xc = capital
in structures; I = fixed investment; Ie = investment in equipment; Ie = invest-
ment in structures.
Calculations show that the larger increases in labor productivity require
faster growth of the capital-labor ratio [Table 13.7, columns I <At I Lt ) and
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K(Ket / Lt )]. This should be considered together with the fact that the
capital-labor ratio is initially higher in rapidly expanding industries [see
Table L'1.5, columns 14. / L t ) and ( Ket / L t )].
At the same time it is observed that in group III, in contrast with the
others, increments in the capital-labor ratio are smaller than that of labor
productivity, so that the capital-output ratio falls. Thus. group III demon-
strates that new, progressive technologies tend to increase their
output-capital ratios simultaneously the largest growth rates in the
output-labor ratio. The opposite can be seen in group I industries, which
show properties of traditional technological expansion: a decrease in the
output-capital ratio with a very low labor productivity growth rate.
These contrasting properties highlight the similarity between the
growth rates for fixed capital and the labor force: both rates are highest in
group I and lowest in group III (Table L'1.7, columns [Kt and [Lt ). Progressive
industries are those that utilize advanced technological equipment, which
enables production to be increased without a concomitant demand for addi-
tional labor.
We now reconsider the input-output data: Wt were calculated for each
of the 147 industries. and then Wt = w t Qt (i = 1 •...• 1(7) were aggregated into
three groups (Tables L'1.1. L'1.2. quantities Wt ), and then [wt were calculated:
lw = [.!L = [Wt (1973) . Qt (1973) _ ]t Q
t
W
t
(1963) . Q
t
(1963) 1 i = I, II, III
(see Table L'1.4). These are now analyzed in comparison with
([Qt + 1) in currenl prices
[Pt = - 1 i =I, II, III([Qt + 1) in conslanl prices
([Qt in current and constant prices, see Table L'1.3; [Pt in Table L'1.4). The fol-
lowing properties of price formation can be stated:
(1) Inflationary property: "+" for [Pt' "-" for [w t ' i =I, II, III. It is highly
improbable that this is caused by the fall in value of real money (gold).
(2) The notion of value as the theory of price dynamics is corroborated: the
ranking of [Pt is identical to that of [Wt (see Table L'1.4). It is remarkable
that, in turn, rankings of the increment rates of total values are the
same as those of increments in labor productivity (the latter being
ranked in inverse order). in exact correspondence with the theory of
value. It should also be noted that the transition from group II to group
III is connected with the increase in the ratio ([Pt + 1)/ ([Wt + 1): 1.81
for group II and 2.0 for group III (calculated using data from Table L'1'4)'
The highest production growth rate is connected with a lag in the reduc-
tion of relative prices compared with the reduction of relative value.
This lag is theoretically expected, and forms a mechanism whereby prcr
gressive industries increase their profitability (in comparison with the
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average for the whole economy), which is a necessary condition for their
accelerated growth.
(3) An increase in labor productivity is a major factor in reducing total
value: on average, labor expenditures per unit of production in the
whole economy were reduced by 19%, with the average reduction in total
value of 23% (Table 1.3.4). The additional reduction in the total value is
caused by structural shifts in material expenditures toward the use of
materials produced by progressive industries, with relatively rapid
reduction in the values of corresponding products.
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Notes
[1] Strictly speaking, since matrix A is used to evaluate w, we should include
among coefficients a tj those that describe elements of fixed capital removal
(or depreciation) per unit of output in each industry. In our calculations,
however, we use matrices A that do not include such specific coefficients atj'
The error could be estimated as non-essential since the dynamics of coeffi-
cients w, and not their absolute magnitudes, are being analyzed.
[2] See Historical and Projected Input-Output Tables 01 the Economic Project
(1979), Vols. lA, B (Washington); Time Series Data lor Input-Output Indus-
tries (1979), BLS Bulletin 2018 (Washington).
[3] Some different types of corresponding processes were revealed in calcula-
tions by P.N. Tesla (for Japan, 1960-1970) and V.V. Krupchatnikova (for the
FRG, 1954-1972). A rapid output growth in an analogous third group of indus-
tries was connected with a combination of rapid labor productivity growth and
moderate reductions in the total material input-output ratio.
[4] From Capital Stock: Estimates for Input-Output Industries: Methods and
Data. US Department of Labor, Bulletin 2034 (Washington) pp. 46-117. There
is no information for the 147 industries. In order to combine the data for
them with those on fixed capital, the information on 147 industries was reag-
gregated into 25 large sectors, one public sector, and the rest private sec-
tors. Statistics on the fixed capital containing data on the private sectors
only were first aggregated in the analogous 24 sectors; all data then were
aggregated into three large groups by annual labor productivity (per worker)
growth rates.
PART II
Technical Revolutions
and Long Waves

CHAPTER 1.
Long Waves and Regional Take-Offs
in Italy and Great Britain:
Preliminary Investigations into
Multiregional Disparities of Development
Giuliano Bianchi, Stefano Casini-Benvenuti, and Giovanni Maltinti
14.1. Introduction
The multiregional differentiation of Italian development is a manifold one:
(1) Differentiation of forms, structures, and levels of growth (namely, indus-
trialization as measured, e.g., by the ratio of industrial employment to
total labor force); a differentiation leading to the recognition of the
coexistence, at any given time, of regions at different stages of develop-
ment.
(2) Differentiation in terms of the pace and direction of structural changes
so far undergone.
(3) Differentiation of the reactions of Italian regions to short-term cycle
shocks and to the impact of international and national processes and pol-
icies.
According to these differentiations (and to corresponding similarities),
Italian regions may be grouped into "families" according to their different
industrial take-off times. Preliminary investigations have proved the plausibil-
ity of a possible link between these take-off times and long-wave impulses
(Becattini and Bianchi, 1982). So, from this point of view, the long-wave
approach, normally felt as far away regional analysis. seems to be not only
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relevant and fruitful to regional analysis, but also specifically "addressable"
to the very core of regional science: the explication of spatial (both quantita-
tive and qualitative) disparities in socioeconomic development.
Two major points must be underlined here. First, despite the low level of
attention so far paid to the inherent "multiregionality" of economic develop-
ment, Pollard's warning should be remembered: "industrial growth is essen-
tially a local rather than a national affair" (Pollard, 1981). Second, the
regional level seems to be a particularly appropriate and suitable level for
analyzing whether and how long-wave impulses may affect the economic per-
formance of a given system: indeed, at this level long-wave up- and down-
swings can be assumed and, in general, treated as exogenous. Within this
frame of reference a new exercise has been developed in an attempt to apply
to regions in the UK the methodology already applied to Italian ones (Bianchi
st a.l., 1983).
14.2. Assumptions
A previous work (Bianchi st a.l., 1983) was based on two assumptions: (i)
regional development is expressed by industrialization processes; and (ii)
industrialization processes can be meaningfully measured by means of a sim-
ple. and single, indicator: the ratio of industrial employment to population.
Assumption (i) is a standard assumption in studies of long-term movements of
economies after the Industrial Revolution. Assumption (ii) perhaps needs to
be justified in order to make clear that the simple indicator adopted here is
not due to lack of data (a well known difficulty in long-term analyses) nor that
other indicators (e.g., total or per capita values of industrial output or GNP,
etc.) might (if available) have been more appropriate.
Where the analysis is specifically addressed to the shift in the economic
basis of a given system from agriculture to industry, and from industry to ser-
vices, the control variable is the sectoral composition of labor force. Nor-
mally the transition of a national (or regional) economy from agriculture to
industry means a tremendous increase in per capita agricultural output
accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the rural labor force. The so-called
post-industrial society is characterized by rapidly decreasing levels of indus-
trial employment but not necessarily by decreasing volumes of industrial out-
put. which are normally maintained and very often expanded.
14.3. Preliminary Findings
1•.3.1. Italian regions
The principal findings of the numerical exercise carried out on regional indus-
trialization process in Italy over the last 120 years (1861-1981) may be
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Figure 1.4.1.. Induslrialization in Ilaly (1861-1981) and Brilain (1841-1971): indus-
lrial employees per 1.000 inhabilanls.
summarized as follows. Observed data of our variable (industrial employees
out of 1.000 inhabitants) when plotted (see Figures 14.1 and 14.2) suggest an
interpretation of the evolution of the regional industrialization process as it
followed five different stages (more or less corresponding to those of Rostow.
1978):
Table 1.4.1.. Paramelers of funclion (14.1): Ilalian regions 1861-1981.
Region a b c u-Theil
Piemonle 48.9 1.20 164.4 922
Lombardia 53.3 0.47 182.4 965
Venelo 92.5 0.58 140.4 948
Liguria 28.4 2.10 122.8 947
Emilia Romagna 97.7 1.30 139.3 940
Toscana 97.4 0.95 156.3 961
Umbria 94.6 0.72 117.1 946
Marche 99.8 1.50 126.3 929
Lazio
Abruzzo 99.2 3.20 95.4 907
Campania 90.6 31.60 110.6 934
Puglia 68.7 85.20 104.9 921
Basilicala 100.7 3.60 91.7 929
Calabria
Sicilia 196.0 0.50 144.1 928
Sardegna 75.9 3.00 79.1 937
Italy 84.2 2.20 126.7 968
(1) An initial decline in total industrial employment.
(2) Stagnation of industry before the actual take-off.
(3) Rapid growth starting from the take-off.
(4) A reduced employment increase during industrial maturity.
(5) Decline of a "post-industrial" economy.
The logistic function that is often used for this kind of phenomenon does
not permit the inclusion of the first and the last stages, so a similar function
has been adopted that is able to consider all five stages:
t - a1= +cb (t - II)e
(14.1)
where I = industrialization level in terms of industrial employees per 1,000
inhabitants; t =reference year; a =the year when the growth rate begins to
decrease; b =annual growth rate; and c =the long-period level of industriali-
zation (maximum). Function (14.1) fits very well with the actual data for the
Italian regions, with few exceptions, as the Theil index shows (Table 14.1).
The estimated function suggests the following:
(1) Within the same period, regions exist at different stages of development.
(2) The take-off period seems to influence the long-term level of industriali-
zation (according to the implicit I1.lle: "the earlier the take-off, the
higher the level ").
(3) After 1981, the level of industrialization does not increase in any region.
The parameter values and the trend of the regional curves identify four
main clusters of regions (see Figure 14.2):
(1) The oldest industrialized region (Liguria) is now declining to a lower level
of industrialization.
(2) The next oldest industrialized regions (Piemonte and Lombardia) have
reached a post-industrial maturity, with a high long-term industrializa-
tion level already attained.
(3) The "second-comer" regions are in a phase of early maturity, with no
increase in industrialization, at a lower level than the previous ones
(Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche).
(4) Regions of miscarried development (Campania, Calabria, Sicilia) have
long-term industrialization levels that will remain very low.
14.3.2. British regions
The same methodology has been (tentatively!) applied to British regions (using
data for 1841-1971), but the functional form estimated for Italian regions did
not fit onto British data, which fluctuate up and down around a secular growth
trend (see Figure 14.3), so a new function, able to represent both the secular
trend and periodical fluctuations, has been estimated.
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Figure 1.4.2. Industrialization in Italian regions, 1861-1981: industrial employees
per 1,000 inhabitants,
I = a' + bt + c' sin (dt) (14.2)
where t =reference year; I = industrialization level (as above); a' = initial
industrialization level; b =annual growth rate; c' =amplitude of fluctuation
band; and d =time interval between two fluctuations. Function (14.2) proves
to fit quite well with observed data (Figure 14.3); parameter values are shown
in Table 14.2.
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'l'a.ble 1.4.2. Parameters of function (14.2): British regions 1841-1971.
Region a b c a db
South East 85.67 4.24 8.94 51.37
East Anglia 67.36 2.90 10.30 115.64
South West 82.89 2.07 7.83 57.67
West Midlands 141.04 7.51 7.69 51.17
East Midlands 134.60 3.55 6.56 52.07
North West 222.13 -1.53 4.76 51.87
Yorkshire 207.73 -1.36 4.95 51.47
North 83.99 3.43 13.74 53.07
Wales 55.01 3.87 17.18 52.87
Scotland 139.16 0.76 2.16 46.18
Great Britain 123.94 2.82 6.06 51.57
ac Is expressed as a peroenlage ot a.
bd Is expressed In years.
Also here it is possible to group the regions into clusters which seem to
make sense:
(1) The "overdeveloped" regions have levels of industrialization that have
fluctuated around a sloping downward trend since the beginning of the
period considered here (Yorkshire and Humberside, the North East).
(2) The most "dynamic" regions (East and West Midlands) have levels that
fluctuate around a rising long-period trend (not necessarily reaching,
however, the starting level of other regions).
(3) Some regions took off later (Wales, South East, North) and have moved
along a rising trend, whose maxima generally remain lower with respect
to the starting point of the previous group.
(4) Finally, there is a mixed group whose main feature is a narrower fluctua-
tion band (Scotland, South West, East Anglia).
The provisional results of the simple numerical exercises so far
presented do not of course allow us to go beyond a preliminary testing of
research hypotheses. Nevertheless, once we have recalled cautions and
warnings contained in Bianchi st al. (1985), it is legitimate to list hypotheses
not disproved by the tests based on the British and Italian case studies.
14.4. Testing Research Hypotheses
We are looking for the existence of meaningful ties between long waves and
regional take-offs. Therefore our task is not to explain the national take-off,
which we take as given. but to assess why certain regions participate in and
contribute to the national take-off, whereas other regions do not. Our idea is
that the interplay of socioeconomic structural characteristics (which are to
some extent measurable), regional (both formal and informal) institutions, and
local "social culture" selects regions more apt and/or ready to grasp the
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Figure 1.4.3. Induslrialization in British regions, 1841-1971: induslrial employees
per 1,000 inhabilants.
opportunities of the international long wave and national take-off (Becattini
and Bianchi, 1982, 1984).
With reference to the national level, it has been argued (and, to some
extent, proved) that national take-offs usually take place during the upswing
phase of a long wave. This thesis has been integrated into the hypothesis
that says "after a country has taken-off, it will be less affected by the next
downswing" (van Duijn. 1983). These long-wave "behavior rules" also seem to
be confirmed at a regional level:
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(1) The North West, Yorkshire, Humberside, Scotland, and the East Midlands
took off during the first Kondratieff upswing.
(2) The West Midlands took off during the second Kondratieff upswing.
(3) The South East, Liguria, Piemonte, and Lombardia took off during the
third Kondratieff upswing.
(4) Toscana, Emilia Romagna, and Veneto took off during the fourth Kondra-
tieff upswing.
It should also be noted that no region (either in Britain or Italy) took off
during a downswing phase, and regions that took off within a given long-wave
upswing (Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia during the third upswing, and Toscana,
Emilia Romagna, Veneto, during the fourth) have been less affected by subse-
quent downswings (or have not been affected at all).
Our indicators suggest the idea of a "ceiling" on regional growth, in
terms of industrialization levels, according to the implicit rule "the earlier
the take-off, the higher the level". Indeed, only earlier developed regions
reach the level of more than 200 industrial employees per 1,000 inhabitants
(West and East Midlands, Lombardia, Piemonte), the level from which the
North West and Yorkshire have moved since 1841. This is not the place to
attempt an explication; the research has not yet reached the stage of empiri-
cal proof. However, we may generally assume the influence of saturation
processes, from which stem increasing flows of external diseconomies, not to
mention the increasing levels of interregional competition as the number of
regional take-offs increases. A final remark on this point is that should a
"ceiling" constraint really operate, it would depend on the interplay of local
factors.
Another hypothesis can be derived from the data analyzed so far.
Because none of the regions considered has increased its level of industrial
growth in the 1980s, the current long wave seems to act as a "wall" against
any further regional growth (of industrialization). As we have already pointed
out (Bianchi et al.. 1983), should this statement be true, two consequences
would follow: entire regional trajectories through take-off/developmentl matu-
rity would be contained within the present long wave; and thereafter, trajec-
tory lengths, given the end point (dies ad quem), would only depend on the
starting point (dies a quo: take-off date).
This "ceiling and wall" hypothesis corresponds to the idea that the
current long-wave downswing will close the whole "hypercycle" consisting of
the four Kondratieff waves. As far as the Italian and British regions are con-
cerned, it is true that the maximum level of industrialization has already been
or is about to be reached, whereas the effects of the industrialization era
seem to be exhausted, thus giving rise to the so-called "post-industrial age".
It is worth stressing that the "wall hypothesis" would depend (this time
almost entirely) on international, worldwide factors and processes. The "ceil-
ing and wall" hypothesis - naive though it might appear - deserves some
attention, especially from the point of view of the possible consequences of
coping with the existence and effects of international and interregional
disparities. This is briefly discussed below.
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Some explanation of the different functional forms of industrialization
processes assumed in Britain (and British regions) and Italy (Italian regions) is
required. In both cases growth trajectories move through a five-stage
sequence from initial decline to post-industrial phase. In Britain, owing to the
length of the time trajectories, national and regional growth processes are
affected by the upswings and downswings, which induce fluctuations around
the long-term trend. This latter looks like a sinusoidal fluctuation around a
straight line and does not assume, as in the Italian cases, the quasi-logistic
form due to the lack of data from the take-off phase (around 1780) up to 1841,
the starting year of our statistical series. On the other hand, the Italian
curves seem to be unaffected by the long-wave impulse, given the proximity
(in time) of the take-offs, so that we may assume that the secular trend and
cyclical fluctuations overlap.
14.5. Final Remarks and Proposals
On the one hand it is obvious that all economic activity ... occurs within
time and space. On the other hand, it is also fairly obvious that almost
all economic theorizing has ignored both time and space. In one sense, it
was a major objective of classical theory, ... and even more so of the
neoclassical variant, to abstract the analysis precisely from lime and
space ...
As we all know, the question of the appropriate spatial unit of
economic analysis has come to the forefront of social science in the last
two decades. The slate as the appropriate unit has come under chal-
lenge in two spatial directions. Some of us have argued for the
epistemological priority of a larger space called "a world-economy".
And others have argued in favor of a smaller space called "a region".
These two opposite thrusts are quite compatible with each other, in that
both insist on the imporlance of economic boundaries and of the neces-
sity of determining them on the basis of economic criteria (Wallerstein,
1985).
This authoritative statement works splendidly as the motto for an
attempt to interrelate' pulsations of the world economy, such as long waves,
and local change processes, such as regional take-offs of industrialization.
Regional long-wave analysis still plays a marginal role within this research
field, whereas it seems to be one of the more promising and fruitful directions
for study.
Spatial effects of long-wave impacts are relevant to multiregional
analysis, in order to explain the coexistence, within one country, of regions
at different phases of development. Naturally, to study the spatial effects of
long-wave impact means to stress the time dimension of spatial analysis in the
sense that spatial disparities in growth are dependent, to large extent, on the
scattering of take-offs over time.
Interregional disparities and regional take-offs (as the main outcome of a
long-wave impulse) are also interdependent from another point of view. Fig-
ures 14.1-14.3 and Tables 14.1-14.3 show that British regions, even if they
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Table 14.3. Inlerregional disparilies: varianl
coefficienl (X).
Yea.r Grea.t Brita.in Ita.ly
1841 40.9
1851 38.4
1861 37.1 27.7
1871 36.6 30.4
1881 34.9 28.8
1891 34.7 38.3
1901 33.0 36.2
1911 34.5 38.5
1921 35.6 41.9
1931 35.8 37.7
1936 34.7
1951 29.8 34.2
1961 27.4
1971 20.1 25.7
1981 24.8
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have very different starting points. tend to converge. On the contrary. the
variance among Italian regions increases considerably over the first part of
the period here considered (lB61-1921). Thus another behavioral issue of
regional systems worthy of investigation is the relationship between take-off
time and disparate structures and trends.
If the "ceiling-and-waU" hypothesis has a basis in reality, we should
assume that, whereas in the past a sequence of long-wave upswings and
downswings could lead to equilibrated regional growth levels. the possible lack
of a new Kondratieff could consolidate the current states of interregional
disparities. However. the "ceiling and wall" hypothesis requires careful test-
ing not only on the basis of empirical data, but also taking into account the
industrial to post-industrial transition: "ceiling and wall" seem to limit only
levels of industrialization; nothing can be said about growth-driven sectors
such as service sectors.
A final comment must be made to replicate the warnings of our previous
work: "the authors of this paper are not so candid as to believe that regional
development processes might be represented by means of simple functions".
Nevertheless, what we really believe is that regional behavior and differences
in regional take-off times are meaningfully related, as exercises so far
developed about British and Italian regions have (preliminarily) demonstrated.
Thus it may be worthwhile to go into them more deeply with further research.
Our intention (and hope) is to be able to promote a joint effort aimed at
expanding the exercise to French and German regions. and to replicate within
British. French. and German case studies the factoral analysis applied in
order to identify the propensity of various Italian regions to capture the
opportunity of long-wave impulses.
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CIfAPTER 15
The Pathway of Dynamic Efficiency:
Economic Trajectory of a
Technical Revolution
Heinz-Dieter Haustein
15.1. Introduction
Technological progress is a highly uneven process in space and time. creating
and absorbing a new efficiency potential. Among the underlying causes we
find historical pushes to the organic composition of capital. realized by
technical revolutions. The problem of technical revolutions has a long tradi-
tion in Marxist thinking. dating back to a letter from Engels to E. Bernstein in
1883 about the coming "electrotechnical revolution" (Marx/Engels. Vol. 35, p.
444). Substantial contr'ibutions to the problem were made by Soviet historians
(Milonov. 1922), and in the 1950s the difference between the Great Industrial
Revolution and technical revolutions was noticed. Quantitative estimates of
long waves in the history of technology are also not recent inventions. One of
the first attempts to draw a general historical curve of technological progress
was made by Lilley (1952).
15.2. Revolutions in Productive Forces and Technical Revolutions
Technical revolutions consist of bunches of basic innovations that bring about
changes in the value structure and in the profit rates of the whole production
system. These are not the same as major revolutions in the productive forces,
such as the use of fire. the transition to agriculture, the Industrial Revolu-
tion, or the scientific-technological revolution; such big changes in
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productive forces create a new societal mode of production, and they are
themselves realized in certain qualitative steps, called technical revolutions.
Thus, in the Industrial Revolution there were upheavals in productivity such
as steam power, railways, and the eleetrotechnical and chemical industries.
Ta.ble 1.5.1. Hierarchy of revolutionary changes in productive forces.
Order of Changes Changes in eco-
change Category Example in demand nomic stru.ctu.re
7 Revolution of ScienUfic- Reslrucluring of CreaUon of a
productive lechnological lhe whole syslem complelely new
forces revolution of needs mode of
production
6 Technical Revolulion in New demand Massive renewal
revolution informalion complexes of existing pro-
lechnology on duclive capital.
lhe basis of Crealion of new
micro- growlh com-
eleclronics plexes, chain
reaclion
5 Basic Microprocessor Major modifica- CreaUon of new
innovalion lion of lhe induslries
demand syslem
4 New major 16-bil New lypes of Substanlial
generalion microprocessor demand changes wilhin
exisling
induslries
3 New parlial Gale-array Major modifica- New produclion
generation chips lion of exisling lines
demand lines
2 New producls Molorola 16-bil Parlial modifica- ExcepUonal
and processes microprocessor lion of exIsting value
demand lines
1 Improved Exlension of More value
producls exisl1ng added
and processes demand
Technical revolutions establish new technological systems within the
existing principal mode of production and bring about changes in labor func-
tions, demand. resources, and organizations on a wide scale. Kuczynski (1975)
has drawn a clear line between the two kinds of revolutionary changes in the
production system. He pointed to the fact that some technical revolutions
play an extraordinary role in creating transitions to new modes of production.
His approach was heavily disputed, but since then all further technological
and economic developments have proved the substance of his arguments.
Technological progress is a spiral or knotted line of qualitative and quan-
titative relations (Hegel, 1812), where changes of different orders and magni-
tudes are superposed and linked together (see Table 1.5.1). Changes of the
first order are simply improved products and processes. At the next level are
new products and processes, e.g., a new incandescent lamp with a higher
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efficiency and longer lifetime. Changes of the third order are transitions to a
partially new generation, e.g., the development of halogen lamps. At the next
level are major new generations, e.g., the transition from incandescent to gas
discharge lamps. Changes of the fifth order or basic innovations contribute
directly to a technical revolution. For example, the basic innovation of the
electric lamp was an important element in the electrotechnical revolution, but
it was not a technical revolution itself. Basic innovations are unevenly distri-
buted over the 40-50 years of a technical revolution; some help to create the
new upswing (key technologies), and later others help to exhaust the effi-
ciency potential of the revolution itself and to prepare for the next change of
the fourth order. Such revolutions bring about major changes in industrial
structures and a massive renewal of fixed capital in all spheres of production.
At the same time, they are linked with substantial changes in labor functions
and resource systems.
Generally speaking, lower-order changes have two functions toward the
higher-order changes. They help to create an efficiency potential for the
higher-order change, and later they exhaust the efficiency potential of those
higher changes. The superposition of logistic curves is the geometric
equivalent of such an evolution. Thus it is not so important to identify single
innovations as to determine their position within the pattern of change within
the entire production system.
When our innovations research began at IIASA in 1979, we chose an
approach that was quite different from the current line of thinking. Looking
at the great stock of innovation studies, we saw two main gaps: the first was
the microeconomic approach taken in most of them; the second was the fact
that innovation had been considered a single process, a single "technological"
change in the narrow sense of the word.
An innovation can be regarded as a change in the technological system
that has a great impact on the given socioeconomic system or subsystem, such
as that of demand (e.g., for lighting); resources (e.g., energy sources); and
resource-processing cycles from primary to final stages (e.g., the wood cycle).
These large systems have three goals: (a) to ensure their continuing
existence and function by counteracting inhibiting factors; (b) to balance the
inner and outer relations of the system to reduce bottlenecks; and (c) to find
new ways of ensuring long-term efficiency in a changing environment. From
this point of view (the impact of a given technological change on a large sys-
tem), we can identify three controlling functions: continuing, compensation,
and push (Haustein and Maier, 1979).
Thus a basic innovation is a technological change that contributes con-
siderably to the productivity push of a new technical revolution. These are
major changes in the production and consumption system of a society,
representing a discernible step in a revolutionary change in productive
forces that has two main features:
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(1) Each change is caused by a bottleneck or gap in the production system.
For example, railways became necessary because of the need for an effi-
cient means of transporting the coal and cotton produced in ever-
increasing quantities through the use of machinery.
(2) Each change appears in one area of the production system and then
passes through a chain or network, step by step, affecting the whole
production system, and later, lifestyles and consumer patterns (see Fig-
ure 15.1). For example, the spinning machine led to the mechanization of
weaving, and later to the improvement of bleaching, textile printing, and
dyeing (Marx, 1867, p. 506). The steam engine proved to be the
appropriate power source for these processes. Machinery soon
developed to the point where machines could be produced with machines:
as the demand for steel for produce machinery increased, more coal was
needed to produce the steel, and so on.
Production of production goods
Production of
working machines for
Consumer
I
Working
goods machines
~ ~Engines
I (driving Transmission
I machines) .,.. systems ---,II !j l I .-I ControlI ! L-------------·Ito equipment
I
Raw I··········~ !materials Ii I IEnergy I
I 1 .1I ~ Communicationl-._._._._ Transportation ... and information
equipment equipment
Production of consumer goods
Figure 115.1. The t.wo production sectors and t.heir inner feedbacks.
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The balance of industries in input-output relations is one thing, whereas the
balance of the technological level of industries is another. Using historical
examples of many industries and such indicators as productivity, automation
coefficients, patent applications, etc., we have tried to analyze the factors
that create and destroy a technological equilibrium (Haustein and Neumann,
1965; Haustein, 1975).
Table 115.2 gives an overview of general periods of industrial development
since 1780 and their characteristics. Each period can be described in terms
of changes in resource systems, demand systems, and labor functions. gaps in
the production and consumption system as a whole, and the main growth indus-
tries. It is difficult to define an exact time-frame for each historical periods.
so that Table 115.2 presents a qualitative judgment based on several sources.
Since 1760 we can define five technical revolutions in five major areas:
(1) Textiles; use of steam power.
(2) Railways; iron and steel industry.
(3) Electrotechnology; production. distribution. and use of electrical
energy.
(3) Chemicals and petrochemicals industry.
(4) Electronics. information technology.
In Table 115.3, 297 innovations are arranged together with their coeffi-
cients of importance Wand the average times between invention and innova-
tion T (weighted EW I F: see Haustein, 1980; Haustein and Neuwirth, 1982).
Two conclusions can be drawn from this quantitative investigation:
(1) Technological progress, measured by the number of innovations. in their
sum of importance EW, the average time between invention and innova-
tion, and their innovation power coefficient EW I ij2 are highly uneven in
time and space. Innovation peaks, measured by their number or impor-
tance. were reached in the 1880s and 1930s. 1880 seems to be the turn-
ing point of the logistic curve, begun in the Industrial Revolution. The
realization period T is also quite different. becoming shorter. but some-
times longer. After 1940, with the onset of the transition to a qualitative
change in all productive forces. the scientific-technological revolution.
T became considerably shorter.
(2) Peaks of innovations in textiles and steam power were observable in the
1790s; railways. iron. and steel in the 1820s; electrotechnology in the
1880s; chemicals in the 19308; and electronics and information technol-
ogy in the 1950s. But these areas also had other local maxima connected
with upswings in the Leading industries. For example. chemical innova-
tions peaked in the 1880s together with the electrotechnological revolu-
tion. Thus, technical revolutions are changes in the entire production
and consumption system.
A theoretical question that was fervently discussed in the 1970s was the
date of the great scientific-technological revolution. We believe that the
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downswing phase of the Industrial Revolution from 1880 to about 1950 was
overlapped by the very long upswing phase of the scientific-technological
revolution. beginning in the 1940s. But in the 1970s there was a partial
downswing. marked by the 1930-1980 technological revolution, and so it is
easy to see why some authors after 1970 concluded that the
scientific-technological revolution was still far away. This was the time when
the microprocessor was born. It is. of course. much better to take notice of
downswings than to ignore them.
Another question is, if the scientific-technological revolution is a real
complement to the Industrial Revolution. which brought the age of machines?
Some authors argue that this age of machines has destroyed the fundamental
unity of man and nature, which will be renewed on a higher level by the forth-
coming ecological revolution. The technical revolution in information technol-
ogy by microelectronics may be a first major step in this direction.
15.3. Measuring the Efficiency Impact of a Technical Revolution
If technical revolutions give a push to the efficiency of the production and
consumption system, this should be observable in economic indicators. For
example, in 1930-1980 the most dynamic industries were oil extraction and
refining. automobiles. chemicals and petrochemicals, plastics. synthetic
fibers. and electrotechnical industries. But it is hard to determine the key
indicator of industrial efficiency - the profit rate on capital - for a period
covering more than two decades. We have taken as an example the rate of
return on production funds. one of the"major efficiency indicators of industry
in the USSR. There has been a rapid revolution in chemicals and petrochemi-
cals in the last decades; major structural changes have occurred, and the lag
behind leading capitalist countries in this field could be reduced considerably
and partially converted into a lead. Using data on production funds and net
returns for the 12 branches and the industry as a whole, it is possible to
identify the development of average and dynamic efficiencies and their inter-
dependence. The rate of net return on productive funds is the relation
between the profit of an enterprise (in current prices) and the productive
funds valued on a mixed price basis. Dynamic efficiency is the efficiency of
the group of industries representing the leading branches of the chemical and
petrochemical revolution. Empirical data are available for 32 years; although
this is not quite enough to trace the long efficiency cycle of a technical revo-
lution, it does provide a representative window.
The problem is one of how to investigate this development. A widely used
approach is the logistic function or a sequence of logistic functions. Many
authors were fond of the idea of finding an escalation function able to reflect
any sequence of fluctuations in technological evolution. The ultimate ratio of
this approach is, of course, a polynomial of any order. or a function with an
empirical foundation. Zeidler (1984) put forward a proposal that I would now
like to take up. Insofar as the process will be guided by goals. it is also
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necessary to bring into the function changes in strategy. Zeidler's model is a
generalization of logistic growth. It includes growing and decreasing logistics,
and their stepwise development according to different values of the control
parameter u (t). It is thus obvious that the limits of the logistics can be
higher or lower than their predecessors in sequential periods of time.
15.4. A Model of the Economic Trajectory of a Technical Revolution
Industrial efficiency is influenced by five main factors: the efficiency poten-
ti;al. which can be determined from the diffusion and utilization of a complex
of basic innovations and should be given as a goal variable; external and inter-
nal control parameters for industrial development; ability to utilize the effi-
ciency potential; and starting conditions. In order to understand the dynam-
ics of these factors, it is necessary to study the growth conditions for net
returns R and funds F, generally given by
[Jiill] = w (t F) [Ji.illJ _[JiilljF(t) • F'(t) F(t) (15.1)
'-..ill..-kF =F R(t)
where w (t. F) is the growth rate of funds; /cF is a modified form of the accu-
mulation coefficient and is a control parameter established by industrial
planners taking into account major strategic decisions and a wide spectrum of
political and economic factors. The relation R(t)/F(t) is the net return on
productive funds, and is the variable to be analyzed.
We now turn to the differential quotient of marginal values R'(t)/F'(t).
which depends on the marginal coefficient of dynamic efficiency 9B or
R'(t)/F'(t), for a group of dynamic industries; the marginal coefficient for
other industries gv; and the ratio of the increase in funds for dynamic indus-
tries F~(t) to those for other industries F~(t).
!i.ill, =(1 - u) 9v + u 9B
F (t)
(15.2)
u =
F~(t)
F~(t) gv =
R~(t)
F~(t) 9B =
R~(t)
F~(t)
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where u is a control parameter within the industry (established in practice
by decisions of specialized ministries of industrial branches). 9B and 9vare
limits to efficiency growth. These limits are twofold. Type A, which
represents upper limits under conditions of increasing marginal efficiency
and a rapid diffusion of basic innovations. The marginal coefficient peaks
before the relation R (t)/ F(t): the distance to the upper limit becomes
minimal. Type B represents lower limits under conditions of decreasing
marginal efficiency. Rationalization of existing productive funds on the basis
of previous technical solutions leads to higher net returns. but decreasing
average efficiency. If we make 9lJ the limit for 9B and 9; the limit for 9v, the
total marginal efficiency limit is
I j*dR t * *~ = (1 - u) 9v + u 9B = c (15.3)
How can c be interpreted? The relation 1/ c is an indicator of the shortage
of investments. During an economic upswing the amount of investments real-
ized increases rapidly, the gap between investment demand and supply closes.
and 1/ c is relatively low.
In capitalist economies low interest rates reflect the same processes,
but in a downswing 1/ c increases. as do interest rates. triggering new basic
innovations. In socialist economies, 1/ c reflects planned normative effi-
ciency, which is much higher in a downswing than in an upswing phase of the
efficiency cycle: Letting TF be the time differential of the net return on
funds and b =the differential growth rate of net returns, we can determine
the efficiency function by
b = R'/ R = w (t . R) = /cF c
Therefore
(15.4)
(15.5)
(15.6)
On the basis of equations (15.3) and (15.6) one can study the main factors
that determine growth of efficiency: the accumulation coefficient /cF' and the
difference between potential and real efficiency c - TF(t), which depends
upon u and the limits u; and 9;'
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Figure 115.2 shows the development of average efficiency in comparison
with the long-term mean in the four phases of a technical revolution:
(1) Introduction phase, when the real efficiency is lower than the long-term
mean.
(2) Rapid growth phase, when average efficiency increases to a maximum
value that is higher than the long-term mean.
(3) Maturation phase, when average efficiency falls to the mean.
(4) Saturation phase, when average efficiency falls below the long-term
mean.
(Note that the "fifth" phase shown in Figure 115.2 represents the introduc-
tory phase of the next upswing.) But now the question arises as to why
downswings in efficiency growth occur. The reasons may be seen in the
growth mechanism itself:
(1) Industrial growth always occurs within a limited number of branches.
(2) Growth in output in certain industries is always connected with subse-
quent diminishing relative growth rates while absolute growth rates are
still increasing.
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(3) The net returns or profits grow more slowly than turnover, because of
the growing organic composition of capital, especially in mature indus-
tries. Net retur"ns increase according to
(15.7)
where a o and at are statistical parameters.
The growth of productive funds shows another pattern. New industries
normally have a relatively (on average) low organic composition of funds.
Thus, the growth rates of funds are high, despite rapid product innovation
and low economies of scale. But later, in the maturation and saturation stages,
growth rates of funds remain at a high level due to the absence of the inhibit-
ing factors just mentioned. The development of funds therefore follows the
function
(15.8)
From (15.7) and (15.8) we derive
The net returns on funds reaches a maximum at t = atl b t , and decreases
asymptotically thereafter,
approaching a maximum at t = (at -1)1 b t .
15.5. Identification of the Trajectory of a Technical Revolution
Our investigation has used data for Soviet industry since 1950, published in
the statistical Yearbooks of the USSR. Productive funds and net returns are
given for 12 industrial branches (electricity production, oil extraction and
refining, gas, coal. metallurgy, chemicals, wood, paper, and pulp). From these
we took a group of dynamic industries that included oil extraction and refin-
ing, chemicals, and oil petrochemicals, engineering, and metallurgy.
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FiguTe 15.3 shows the development of average efficiency under the
impact of dynamic efficiency. The major upswing of the 1950s and 1960s can
be clearly seen. The trend from 1960 to 1968 for dynamic industries is
ln TF(t) = -35.993 + 9.9324 lnt - 0.11122 t
t max =89 (TF)max =27%
and for R'/F',
t max =80 (R'/ F'>max =28.5%
In the case of nondynamic industries,
ln TF(t) =-26.641 + 7.2924 lnt - 0.08857 t
t max = 82 (TF)max = 17.1%
and for R' / F',
t max =71 (R'/ F'>max =18.3%
Using U and the maxima of R'/F', we can calculate the efficiency limit from
equation (15.3) as 22%, which is not much higher than the real value in 1970. A
similar calculation can be done for the downswing using the variable 1 - TF(t)
instead of TF(t). Now let us look at the partial historical periods of effi-
ciency development in FiguTe 15.3.
From 1950 to 1956 average efficiency is much lower than the long-term
mean of 14.62%. The accumulation coefficient kF is high (near 1), and the con-
trol parameter U is increasing from 23%. Concerning R'(t)/ F'(t) the dynamic
complex is already better than average, but the relative efficiency TF(t) is
still somewhat lower. The planned normative efficiency (1/ c) is relatively
high.
Between 1956 and 1960 dynamic efficiency reaches the average level
(Le., the relative efficiency = 1). kF is much lower (near 0.75), but U is con-
siderably reduced after 1958. This leads to the stagnation of TF(t).
Between 1960 and 1966 relative efficiency grows rapidly to reach a local
maximum in its marginal form in 1965. Both kF and u are stabilized at a lower
level. The standard deviation of TF(t) for the 12 industries is growing. The
planned normative efficiency (1/ c) is higher than in the earlier period.
Between 1966 and 1970 there is a very rapid growth in TF(t).
R'(t)/ F'(t) reaches its highest point in 1967, as does TF(t) in 1970. u is
stable, but kF is drastically reduced; this is a very plausible reaction. The
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standard deviation of efficiency for the 12 industries reaches a maximum in
1968.
Between 1970 and 1976 the dynamic and average efficiencies fall, but not
because of a change in u. Average efficiency is still higher than the long-
term mean of 14.62%. After 1972 relative efficiency increases as a result of
the reduction in average efficiency. The standard deviation of rp reaches a
minimum; 1/ c is very high. (In 1972 the 24th Party Congress developed the
economic strategy of intensification on the basis of scientific-technological
progress.)
Between 1976 and 1981 the efficiency downswing becomes slower, but
average efficiency is now lower than the long-term mean. Standard deviation
of Tp(t) begins again to grow, which is obviously a process of increasing
negentropy, and establishes a new efficiency potential for the next upswing.
In 1981 the downswing ends and in 1982-1983 Tp(t) begins to grow again.
For the six periods all variables and parameters are given in Table 1.fi.4.
These were the basis for the estimated values of Tp(t) in Table 1.fi.5.
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Ta.ble 1Jj.4. Estimated parameters for each period.
Year
WtJO- W56- 1960- 1966- 1970- 1976-
T-b.riable W56 1960 1966 1970 1976 1D82
lei' 1.120 0.834 0.766 0.467 0.525 0.560
u 0.380 0.393 0.367 0.366 0.398 0.479
gB 0.114 0.221 0.218 0.356 0.082 0.076
gv 0.105 0.243 0.078 0.474 0.023 0.118
e 0.108 0.243 0.129 0.434 0.046 0.098
lie 9.3 4.3 7.8 2.3 21.7 10.2
a 456.956 392.492 376.998 377.459 167.324 249.098
b 0.2348 0.2005 0.1936 0.1916 0.0843 0.1265
a 236.555 282.202 194.241 398.711 47.795 108.482
b' 0.1210 0.1952 0.0988 0.2027 0.0242 0.0549
a,6 Logistic funotion paramet.ers for dynamio industries.
a -,6 - Logistic function paramet.ers for t.he nondynamic Indust.ries.
If fluctuations in the dynamic and average efficiency are the objective
result of the evolution of a particular historical complex of basic innovations,
it becomes clear that forecasts will become less reliable the nearer we come
to a new upswing. Two signs of the coming upswing are the growing standard
deviation of net returns on funds since 1976 and the end of the downswing in
1981. The core of the new technical revolution will be the diffusion of modern
information technology, which is connected with the rapid growth of flexible
automation, communications equipment, etc.
Assuming c =0.146 for the first phase of the upswing (with u =0.38,
gB = 0.16 and gv = 0.137, and b = 0.18), one obtains variant I in Table 15.6.
However, an accumulation rate of 1.23 would be needed to obtain such a trend,
and this is obviously unrealistic; we therefore assume a higher control param-
eter. If we take u =0.55 and b =0.12, we obtain variant II in Table 15.6.
Such variants can be created by simulation procedures; on the basis of the
philosophy outlined in this chapter, systems dynamics models DYNAFOR A and
B have been developed, with which the economic trajectory of a technical
revolution can be simulated, using control parameters u and kF and partial
goals for the net returns on funds.
15.6. Conclusions
The long cycle of dynamic efficiency resulting from a technical revolution and
its impact on average efficiency is not generally recognized in socialist
economic theory, especially in efficiency theory. It is easy to explain cycles
in special technological fields, but it is much more difficult to explain longer
cycles. But, as the empirical evidence grows, the nature of fluctuations in
socialist economies will become clearer. Recently, an investment cycle of 4-6
years has been identified using the example of industries in the GDR, which is
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7hble 115.5. Estimated and actual values of net returns on funds (%).
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1956
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1966
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1976
1979
1960
1961
1962
Estimated values
7.6
6.3
6.7
9.1
9.4
9.7
9.6
10.7
11.9
13.0
14.0
13.6
13.6
13.5
13.4
13.3
13.2
16.4
16.4
20.5
21.7
20.3
19.0
17.9
16.6
15.6
14.3
13.7
13.3
12.9
12.5
12.2
11.9
Actual values
6.0
6.3
6.4
6.7
9.6
10.3
9.2
10.6
12.6
13.4
13.6
13.4
14.6
14.0
14.0
13.0
13.3
17.1
20.1
20.5
21.5
19.6
19.3
16.0
17.7
15.6
14.4
14.0
13.5
12.6
12.2
11.5
12.6
-0.2
o
0.3
0.4
-0.2
-0.6
0.4
0.1
-0.7
0.4
0.4
0.4
-1.2
-0.5
-0.6
0.3
-0.1
-0.7
-1.7
o
0.2
1.5
-0.3
-0.1
-0.9
o
-0.1
-0.3
-0.2
0.3
0.3
0.7
-0.9
7hb18 115.6. Variants of future development
in net returns on productive funds.
Variant
Year I II
1962 12.6 12.6
1963 13.1 13.0
1964 13.4 13.2
1965 13.7 13.4
1966 14.0 13.6
1967 14.3 13.6
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a result of internal delays in the reproduction of fixed capital (Roesler et ai.,
1983).
This has been well known to industrial planners but it was not reflected
in theoretical works, and longer cycles are not accounted for in many works
on efficiency and strategic planning. This seems a little strange in view of
Soviet history: the first long-range national plan (GOELRO), initiated by
Lenin, was connected with the eleetrotechnical revolution from the outset,
and was not a result of pure macroeconomic extrapolations (Lenin, 1920). But
a br:eakthrough in thinking on cycles is not far. Recently, Yakovets (1984)
published a study of long technological cycles, in which it was made clear that
an historical evaluation and location of industrial growth complexes is vitally
important for long-range investment, education, and science policies and stra-
tegies.
Ignorance of long cycles contributes in critical decades to devaluation
pushes, misguided investments, and delays in monitoring the new upswing.
Thinking in cycles is therefore a key to making more efficient decisions.
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CHAPTER 18
Rates of Innovations and Profits
in the Long Wave
Alfred Kleinknecht
16.1. Introduction
The severe economic problems in most Western coun.tries during the last
decade have helped to reveal a decisive weakness in economic theorizing: none
of the different schools of economic thought. whether Marxist or non-Marxist,
have a satisfactory theory of long-term economic development. There is vir-
tually no economic theory or paradigm which, beyond pure speculation. would
allow any well founded economic forecast of what will happen to economic
growth and employment in the next ten years or so. In judging the character
of the present economic crisis, even the most basic Questions are still open:
Have some medium-term business cycles run out of their normal course since
the mid-1970s, due to exogenous shocks and policy mistakes (end of the Bret-
ton Woods system, oil price shock. budget deficits)? Will there be a return
towards full employment and price stability once these policy mistakes are
corrected and the shocks absorbed, as the McCracken report of the OECD
(1977) puts it? Or do the low growth rates since the mid-1970s rather indicate
a return to a "normal" long-term growth path once the postwar reconstruction
boom had faded (reconstruction hypothesis)? Or, to sketch still another pos-
sible interpretation: can the economic problems of the last decade be taken
as evidence that capitalism has reached the final stage of its life cycle, its
last stage of decadence and stagnation? Are we experiencing the Final
Crisis of Capitalism?
With the continuation of the current crisis, the McCracken et al. (1977)
report has lost much of its appeal. The alternative reconstruction hypothesis
can explain why there was fairly strong growth up to the 1950s (see
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Abelshauser and Petzina, 1980), but it can not explain why the growth boom
continued up to the early 1970s. According to Janossy (1966), the postwar
reconstruction period terminated somewhere between 1955 and 1961 in the
various European countries concerned. And what about the Final Crisis
hypothesis?
During the 1920s, many Marxists took that hypothesis for granted. In
particular. the severe crisis after 1929 seemed to confirm that capitalism was
facing its definite decline. However, the economic growth boom that took
place from the late 1940s up to the early 1970s caused a complete setback to
this version of crisis theory. At the same time. adherents of the market sys-
tem considered the growth boom to be striking evidence of the obsolescence
of Marxism.
In recent years. another interpretation of the economic crisis has been
gaining appeal: the theory of the long wave in economic life Ironically,
theorizing on long waves seems to move itself along a long-wave path. Begin-
ning with the publications by the two Dutch Marxists, Van Gelderen (1913) and
De Wolff (1915), up to Kondratieff (1926) and Schumpeter (1939), the prewar
years saw a fairly large number of contl'ibutions on long waves (for a survey
see Barr, 1979). During the euphoric boom of the 1950s and 1960s. however,
the subject moved into the background of economic literature. Within the
present renaissance of long waves, Schumpeter's (1939) hypothesis proves
particularly attractive: the upswing of the long wave is fostered by a thrust-
ing introduction and rapid diffusion of radical innovations. Each long wave is
characterized by the emergence of a particular set of basic technologies
whose diffusion imparts a deep material change to the reproduction process.
Schumpeter's scheme of long waves can be summarized in Table 16.1.
Table 1f3.1..
Firsllong wave:
(induslrial
Kondratieff)
Second long wave:
(bourgeois
Kondratieff)
Third long wave:
(neomercanUlisl
Kondratieff)
Upswing
(A-period)
1787-1813
1843-1869
1898-1924
Downswing
(B-period)
1814-1842
1870-1897
1925-
Innovation
Substilution of sleampower
for waler power. coal, and
iron for wood; emergence
of lhe lexUle induslry
Railroads, sleamships;
substilution of sleel for iron
Eleclrical and chemical
innovations, inlernal
combustion and diesel engines
If we were to make a simple extrapolation of Schumpeter's scheme, we
would take the interwar period as well as the 1970s and 1980s as (depressive)
B-periods, While the late 1940s up to the early 1970s appear as an A-period.
A new A-period would have to be expected sometime in the 1990s.
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Schumpeter's approach received strong criticism from Kuznets (1940),
who not only considered that Schumpeter had failed to prove that radical
innovations occur in clusters; he also emphasized that there was no convincing
explanation of why such a clustering should occur: Schumpeter seemed to
explain the clustering of major innovations as a clustering of heroic
entrepreneurs - a deus ex machina theory. Furthermore, Kuznets doubted
whether the alleged 45-60-year Kondratieff cycle existed at all. It is beyond
doubt that Kuznets (1940) was right on almost all points when criticizing the
shortcomings of Schumpeter's theory. Since the 1950s and 1960s theorizing
on long waves has more or less stagnated, and the critical questions raised by
Kuznets remain unanswered. On the other hand, Schumpeter's theoretical
propositions, if correct, have very far-reaching and important policy implica-
tions.
Recently, I have finished a research project on this subject (see Klein-
knecht, 1986). In the following, some outcomes of that research are briefly
discussed,. In a first step, I examine whether the alleged 45-60-year long
waves exist at all, and then deal with theoretical and empirical aspects of the
cluster-of-innovations hypothesis. Thereafter, I report on findings about pat-
terns of innovation, growth, and profit rates during the post-World War II
boom.
16.2. Do Long Waves Exist?
The early long-wave pioneers relied very heavily on long waves in price series
or in price-affected series. As Garvy (1943) in his criticism of Kondratieff
(1926) pointed out, evidence of long waves in "real" series (production, invest-
ment, etc.) is poor. Now that longer time series on industrial production and
GNP are available for various countries, several attempts have been made to
test the long-wave hypothesis in such indicators of general economic activity.
The outcomes of the various tests are contradictory, ranging from full accep-
tance of the long-wave hypothesis (e.g., Mandel, 1973; van Duijn, 1979;
Glismann et al., 1983) to outright rejection (e.g., Van der Zwan, 1980; Van
Ewijk, 1981, 1982). Between these two extremes some studies reach very cau-
tious conclusions, neither refuting nor accepting the long-wave hypothesis,
but pleading in favor of further research efforts (see, e.g., Kuczynski, 1978,
1980; Metz, 1983; Spree, 1978).
In this chapter the results of a new test on long waves by Bieshaar and
Kleinknecht (1984) are outlined. Although we do not claim to have developed
the ultimately correct and reliable method of testing long waves, we do claim
that this test imparts some methodological progress as compared with other
tests published so far. In the test by Bieshaar and Kleinknecht (1984), aver-
age growth rates for the alleged A- and B-periods of the long waves have been
estimated, using the time series listed in Table 16.2. We used a generalized
least squares estimator (GLS), taking into account a second degree of autore-
gression in the residues. With the aid of a one-sided t -test (see Schmidt,
1976, p. 18), we tested whether the differences in average growth rates for
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the A- and B-periods are different from zero. For the timing of A- and B-
periods the time scheme by Mandel (1973) was used because, among all modern
time schedules of long waves, it is closest to the "orthodox" periodization of
long waves (Van Gelderen, De Wolff, Kondratieff). Moreover, the Mandelian
time scheme implies a relatively strict periodicity and strong synchronization
of the national long waves in a world market context.
Table W.Z. Time series tested in Bieshaar and Kleinknecht (1984).
Country
United
Kingdom
France
Germany
Belgium
USA
Italy
Sweden
World (1)
World (2)
Variable Time coverage Source
Industrial 1801-1938 Mitchell (1981)
production 1946-1981 OECD (1983)
GDP 1830-1979 Glismann et al. (1981)
Industrial 1815-1913 Mitchell (1981)
production 1919-1938 OECD (1983)
1947-1981
Net domestic 1900-1913 Glismann et at. (1981)
product 1920-1979
Net national 1850-1913 Glismann et al. (1981)
product (NNP) 1925-1941
1948-1979
Industrial 1831-1913 Gadisseur (1979)
production 1920-1939 Mitchell (1981)
1946-1981 OECD (1983)
GNP 1889-1979 Glismann et al. (1981)
GDP 1861-1979 Glismann et al. (1981)
GDP 1861-1979 Glismann et al. (1981)
Industrial 1780-1979 Kuczynski (1980)
production Haustein and Neuwirth
(excl. mining) (1982)
Total industrial 1850-1976 Kuczynski (1980)
production
(incl. mining)
The results of the test on the Mandelian scheme of long waves are sum-
marized in Table 1.8.3, from which it will be noted that in the post-1974 period,
significance levels are relatively low, probably because of the relatively small
number of observations. The same holds for the beginning periods of the
Swedish and Italian series, both starting in 1861 (instead of 1848), for the
USA, 1889-1893; and for France, 1900-1913 (instead of 1893-1913).
Table 1.8.3 can be summarized as follows.
(1) In both world production series, as well as in the series for Germany,
France, and the USA, from 1893 to 1974 the variation in growth rates is
consistent with the long-wave hypothesis; Le., average growth rates for
the A-periods (1893-1913 and 1939-1974) are higher than growth rates
in the B-period (1913-1939). According to the t-test, the differences
are significant; for a part, even highly significant. Before 1893, how-
ever, there are no significant differences in average growth rates for
the A- and B- periods. In some cases, growth rates even vary in the
Ta
bl
e
1B
.3
.
A
ve
ra
ge
gr
ow
th
r
a
te
s
fo
r
A
-
a
n
d
B
-p
er
io
ds
o
f
lo
ng
w
a
v
e
s
,
th
ei
r
a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
e
s
ta
n
da
rd
e
r
r
o
r
s
,
a
n
d
th
e
s
ig
ni
fi
-
~
c
a
n
c
e
o
f
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
in
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
gr
ow
th
r
a
te
s,
a
c
c
o
rd
in
g
to
M
an
de
l's
lo
ng
-w
av
e
c
hr
on
ol
og
y.
C
ou
nt
ry
a
n
d
v
a
r
ia
bl
e
W
or
ld
W
or
ld
in
do
in
do
B
el
gi
um
F
ra
nc
e
U
K
pr
od
.
pr
od
.
in
do
G
er
m
an
y
in
do
F
ra
nc
e
Sw
ed
en
It
a
ly
U
SA
in
do
UK
.
P
er
io
ds
a
(1
)
(2
)
pr
od
.
N
N
P
pr
od
.
ND
P
G
D
P
G
D
P
G
NP
pr
od
.
G
D
P
A:
17
92
-1
82
5
g:
2.
63
%
-
-
-
0.
13
%
-
-
-
-
2.
64
%
SE
:
(0
.2
5)
-
-
-
(1
.3
2)
-
-
-
-
(0
.2
5)
s
ig
n.
o
f
di
ff
.:
1.
1%
-
-
-
15
.4
%
-
-
-
-
2.
7%
B:
18
25
-1
84
7
g:
3.
89
%
-
1.
99
%
-
1.
88
%
-
-
-
-
3.
47
%
2.
18
%
SE
:
(0
.3
5)
-
(0
.6
2)
-
(0
.5
9)
-
-
-
-
(0
.2
3)
(0
.4
2)
s
ig
n.
o
f
di
ff
.:
34
.9
%
-
98
.4
%
-
38
.8
%
-
-
-
-
11
.7
%
59
.3
%
A:
18
47
-1
87
3
g:
3.
66
%
2.
32
%
3.
85
%
2.
52
%
1.
61
%
-
3.
02
%
0.
92
%
-
3.
00
%
2.
33
%
SE
:
(0
.3
2)
(0
.3
6)
(0
.3
3)
(0
.5
7)
(0
.4
8)
-
(0
.5
7)
(1
.2
1)
-
(0
.2
0)
(0
.2
5)
s
ig
n.
o
f
di
ff
.:
66
.2
%
23
.3
%
99
.9
%
34
.0
%
56
.9
%
-
85
.5
%
61
.1
%
-
99
.1
%
76
.9
%
B:
18
73
-1
89
3
g:
3.
38
%
2.
80
%
1.
46
%
2.
95
%
1.
44
%
-
2.
20
%
0.
45
%
4.
27
%
2.
02
%
1.
95
%
SE
:
(0
.4
2)
(0
.3
7)
(0
.4
1)
(0
.6
1)
(0
.6
2)
-
(0
.2
9)
(0
.8
6)
(2
.9
8)
(0
.2
6)
(0
.3
2)
;;
s
ig
n.
o
f
di
ff
.:
75
.4
%
45
.8
%
99
.5
%
43
.6
%
60
.3
%
-
98
.6
%
97
.0
%
46
.9
%
12
.2
%
29
.7
%
it
A:
18
93
-1
91
3
g:
3.
90
%
2.
73
%
3.
48
%
2.
77
%
1.
73
%
2.
81
%
3.
31
%
2.
65
%
4.
01
%
1.
47
%
1.
64
%
Q ~
SE
:
(0
.4
2)
(0
.3
6)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.6
3)
(0
.6
0)
(1
.8
7)
(0
.2
6)
(0
.6
2)
(0
.5
3)
(0
.2
6)
(0
.3
2)
iI ... ...
s
ig
n.
o
f
di
ff
.:
99
.9
%
97
.5
%
99
.9
%
97
.7
%
96
.9
%
91
.0
%
96
.8
%
98
.0
%
99
.0
%
16
.2
%
93
.8
%
Q it
B:
19
13
-1
93
9
g:
1.
95
%
1.
63
%
-
0.
19
%
0.
83
%
-
0.
01
%
-
0.
42
%
2.
55
%
0.
66
%
2.
16
%
1.
88
%
0.
88
%
.. iI
SE
:
(0
.2
9)
(0
.2
6)
(0
.3
1)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.8
1)
(0
.1
9)
(0
.4
4)
(0
.3
3)
(0
.2
0)
(0
.3
2)
it
s
ig
n.
o
f
dl
ff
.:
99
.9
%
99
.9
%
99
.9
%
99
.9
%
99
.9
%
99
.9
%
99
.9
%
99
.9
%
99
.8
%
99
.9
%
99
.9
%
iI.
A:
19
39
-1
97
4
g:
4.
68
%
3.
53
%
3.
30
%
4.
50
%
4.
83
%
4.
32
%
4.
46
%
4.
29
%
3.
80
%
3.
06
%
2.
52
%
~
SE
:
(0
.2
4)
(0
.2
1)
(0
.2
4)
(0
.3
4)
(0
.3
7)
(0
.6
4)
(0
.1
5)
(0
.3
6)
(0
.2
7)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
8)
~ ...
s
ig
n.
o
f
dl
ff
.:
61
.9
%
50
.8
%
79
.8
%
77
.4
%
92
.5
%
52
.4
%
99
.9
%
64
.3
%
74
.8
%
99
.9
%
73
.0
%
.. ..
.
B:
1
97
4-
g:
3.
94
%
3.
46
%
1.
95
%
2.
65
%
1.
95
%
4.
04
%
-
0.
14
%
3.
26
%
2.
17
%
-
0.
56
%
1.
64
%
it
SE
:
(2
.3
1)
(3
.5
5)
(1
.4
8)
(2
.2
7)
(1
.7
8)
(4
.1
8)
(1
.2
8)
(2
.6
1)
(2
.2
8)
(1
.0
1)
(1
.3
4)
..
. i)' '"
a
g
_
e
s
ti
m
at
ed
gr
ow
th
ra
te
;
SE
-
s
ta
n
da
rd
e
r
r
o
r
o
f
gr
ow
th
r
a
te
(o
al
cu
la
te
d
by
a
fi
rs
t-
or
de
r
T
ay
lo
r
a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
io
n)
;s
ig
n.
o
f
cU
ff.
-
t-.. Q it
s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e
o
fd
lf
fe
re
no
e
be
tw
ee
n
gr
ow
th
r
a
te
s
fo
r
tw
o
s
u
o
o
e
s
s
iv
e
pe
ri
od
s.
!Q ~ ~
ALj'rea KLein.knech.t 221
"wrong" direction; these (inverse) fluctuations are characterized in
Table 16.3 by significance levels of less than 50%.
(2) While in the above series there is a dichotomy between the pre-1890s
and the post-1890s. the Belgian series has a highly significant long-wave
pattern throughout from 1832 to 1974. This result is remarkable insofar
as Belgium is a small and open economy. which is Likely to be influenced
strongly by the world market.
(3) The Italian and Swedish series also show a significant long-wave pattern
not only in the period 1893-1974, but also before 1893. During
1861-1873, however. significance levels are below the 95% level; this
might result from the smaller number of observations.
(4) As opposed to all other series considered. the two British series do not
fit into the time scheme of long waves. Bieshaar and Kleinknecht (1984)
concluded from a graphical inspection of the series that the British data
obviously reflect a kind of hegemonial life cycle of rising and declining
world market hegemony of British industry (with a "peak" in the 1870s).
This hegemonial life cycle can also be seen in the growth rates given in
Table 16.3.
The results shown by Table 16.3 are twofold: on the one hand, all series
(except the British) show a variation in growth rates between 1893 and 1974
that is consistent with the long-wave hypothesis; on the other hand, the
results remain ambiguous as to the pre-1890s. While the two series on world
industrial production, as well as the series for the FRG, France, and Great
Britain show no long-wave pattern during that period, the series for Belgium.
Italy, and Sweden are consistent with the long-wave hypothesis even before
the 1890s.
In particular. the result for 1893-1974 contradicts critics such as Van
Ewijk (1981. 1982) or Van der Zwan (1980) who state that in aggregate "real"
series there are no fluctuations that fit into the scheme of long waves. At the
same time, Table 16.3 also seems to contradict theorists such as Mandel (1973)
who take the long wave as a characteristic phenomenon of the entire indus-
trial era from the end of the eighteenth century to the present day. In a nut-
shell, the results achieved by Bieshaar and Kleinknecht show that the long-
wave concept appears to be relevant primarily for the eras of Hochlcapital-
ismus and Spiitlcapitalismus, and is less important for the infant phase of
capitalism. However, this latter conclusion can be objected to on grounds
that the statistical quality of the series tested in Bieshaar and Kleinknecht
(1984) has not been examined. It is obvious that the series for the nineteenth
century are less reliable than those for the present century and that there-
fore any positive or negative result on long waves for the pre-1890 periods
has to be interpreted with the utmost caution.
There is yet another important limitation to the test by Bieshaar and
Kleinknecht. We have demonstrated that, during the last 100 years, a number
of countries have shown statistically significant fluctuations that fit into the
long-wave time scheme; however, this does not say anything about the possible
cyclical nature of the long-wave pattern. Since we observed a fairly limited
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number of A- and B-periods, critics may argue that the ups and downs have
been caused by historically unique, exogenous factors, and that there is no
reason to assume that such movements will continue in the future. In fact, a
purely quantitative test cannot help us to decide whether this objection is
justified or not.
As Spree (1978), for example, has clearly pointed out, the question of
whether or not we can speak of true cycles depends decisively on whether
convincing endogenous explanations of the upper and lower turning points of
the waves can be given. In their early contributions on long waves, the two
Dutch Marxists Van Gelderen (1913) and De Wolff (1915) reflected on the pos-
sibly endogenous nature of factors such as the opening of new industrial
branches, the export of capital into new territories, over-accumulation of
capital, expansion and contraction in the capital market, scarcity and abun-
dance of raw materials, migration, discovery of new gold mines, etc. The fol-
lowing section is dedicated to a more thorough consideration of the first
topic: the opening of new industrial branches. This point is closely related
to Schumpeter's innovation hypothesis.
16.3. Long Waves in Technological Innovation?
In recent years, various attempts have been made to collect long-term histori-
cal innovation indicators, and principally to distinguish a few radical break-
throughs in technology from the large stream of smaller piecemeal changes.
To put it metaphorically, there is a considerable difference between innova-
tors who introduce improved horse cars and those who abolish horse cars by
introducing railways or automobiles. In the more recent literature, a number
of imaginative notions have been invented to describe this difference in more
general terms. For example, Dosi (1982) recommends that innovations that
establish new "technological paradigms" be distinguished from innovations
that occur within existing paradigms. Others speak of "basic innovations"
versus "improvement innovations" (e.g., Mensch, 1975; van Duijn, 1979; Hau-
stein and Neuwirth, 1982), of "new technology systems" (Freeman et al., 1982),
of "new technological webs" (Roobeek, 1984), or simply of "major" or "radical
innovations".
All these notions are similar in that, in empirical investigations of inno-
vations, it is very often difficult to distinguish more important from less
important cases, whatever notion is chosen. This is not the place to investi-
gate the various sets of innovation data and concepts more thoroughly (see
Kleinknecht, 1986, Part II, for that); here we restrict ourselves to document-
ing the results of various innovation studies for the twentieth century (Table
16.4).
These figures clearly contradict the hypothesis that important innova-
tions are distributed randomly over time. A remarkable concentration of
innovations occurred, reaching from the second half of the 1930s up to the
1950s. Thereafter, the numbers of innovations seem to decline (with the
exception, perhaps, of columns 2 and 4).
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Ta.ble ~6.4. Important innovations in five-year periods during the twentieth century
according to various sources and definitionsa .
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1900-1904 0 0 1 5 0 1
1905-1909 1 1 0 2 1 3
1910-1914 0 0 7 6 2 3
1915-1919 0 0 1 2 0 1
1920-1924 6 6 3 6 4 2
1925-1929 0 0 0 4 3 5
1930-1934 5 5 6 5 7 6
1935-1939 9 11 B 14 13 12
1940-1944 2 5 6 6 5 10
1945-1949 7 B 5 5 3 6
1950-1954 1 3 5 7 4 6
1955-1959 1 2 2 B 1 3
1960-1964 2 7 4 10 1
1965-1969 1 5 1 4 3
1970-1974 1 4
a(1) "Radically new products" (excluding scientific Instruments) according to the classi-
fication by Kleinknecht 1981), based on Mahdavl (1972); (2) "radically new products" (In-
cluding scientific Instruments) according to the classification by Kleinknecht (1981); (3)
"basic Innovations" according to Van DulJn (1979), based on Baker (1976), De Bono (1974),
Enos (1962), Freeman (1974), Jewkes et a.L. (1969), Van der Kooy (1978), Landes (1969), Mah-
davl (1972), Mueller (1962), Habseth and Ray (1974), Robertson (1974); (4) "basic Innova-
tions" according to Hausteln and Heuwlrth (1982), based on various sources (not speci-
fied); (5) "basic Innovations" according to Mensch (1975), based on Jewkes et a.l. (1959);
(6) Mensch's "basic Innovations", extended and revised according to the suggestions by
Freeman et a.l. (1982).
The reliability of such innovation data has been seriously questioned,
however. In particular, the original version by Mensch (1975) of innovation
clusters in the troughs of long waves (1880s, 1930s) has met with strong skep-
ticism (see Scholz, 1976; Clark et al., 1981) as to the representativeness of
data sources, the selection modes, the exact determination of innovation
years, the definition of "basic innovations", etc. (see, e.g., Clark et al., 1981,
p. 148). Freeman et al., (1982, p. 49) claim that similar criticisms hold for the
set of data used in Kleinknecht (1981).
Critics have suggested a number of corrections and extensions to
Mensch's list of basic innovations (see Table 16.4, column 6). Moreover, they
suggest that the data from Kleinknecht (1981) be grouped differently (see
column 2). A comparison of columns 1 and 2, 5 and 6 shows that the results
indeed become slightly different. In addition to a concentration of innova-
tions in the late 1930s, there seem to be more cases during the 1940s and
1950s; Le., in the early upswing phase of the long wave. Nevertheless, even
the modified data do not corroborate the position of Clark et al., (1981, p.
150), who emphasize that, due to the high risks and uncertainties of radical
innovation projects, it is highly unlikely that such innovations will cluster in
the depression phase of the long wave.
Each source of innovation data can be criticized in one way or another.
If we are to judge Schumpeter's cluster-of-innovations hypothesis with
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Figure 1.8.1.. Baker's product-related key and master patents according to classifi-
calion by Kleinknecht (1966).
greater certainty, we should compare as many long-term innovation indicators
as possible from different sources. Therefore. in Kleinknecht (1986) another
set of innovation data has been analyzed consisting of some 1,000 patents
selected by Baker (1976) as being particularly important "key" and "master"
patents during the period 1640-1971. Baker started with a list of 363 items.
In alphabetical order, these range from the addressograph to the zip
fastener. From the numerous patents registered at the British Patent Office,
he selected for each of these items what he considered to be the decisive
breakthrough patent(s). The use of Baker's patent data as an indicator of the
rate of important innovations in the long-term involves a number of method-
ological problems a~d drawbacks that cannot be dealt with here (see Klein-
knecht, 1986, ch. 4). With the help of a newly developed classification scheme
(see Coombs and Kleinknecht, 1984), Baker's 1,000 patent cases have been
classified by process- versus product-related patents, the outcomes for the
latter being given in Figure 18.1. An inspection of the original data showed
that, during the period 1640 to 1750, noteworthy fluctuations in the series did
not occur. Figure 16.1 is therefore restricted to the period 1750-1971.
Two long waves of product-related patents are illustrated: the first
extends from the late 1870s up to about 1905, covering the depression phase
of the second Kondratieff and the early upswing of the third Kondratieff; the
second extends from the early 1930s up to the early 1960s. In both cases it
seems that the decline in the number of innovations occurred some ten years
before the decline of the economic long wave.
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Before 1850 fluctuations in the rate of important patents were
apparently smaller. The wave from about 1830 to 1855 would fit with the
above interpretation of the two waves, since it covers the depression phase of
Schumpeter's second Kondratieff and the early upswing phase of the third
Kondratieff, although this wave is rather weak. So far, the innovation data in
Figure 16.1 seem to confirm the impression gained from the economic series
in Table 16.3, Le., that the concept of long waves might be less relevant for
the early phase of capitalism.
Baker's process-related patents are not documented here, since their
interpretation is more difficult than that of product patents (see Klein-
knecht, 1986, Ch. 4). Process-related patents seem to correspond more with
the classical medium-term business cycle than with the long wave. In each
case, the process series shows peaks not only during the depression phase,
but also during the later prosperity phase of the long wave. During the post-
World War II period, it appears even that product- and process-related
patents moved in opposite directions (Ibid. ch. 4). A similar pattern can be
found in yet another set of data presented by the critics of the cluster-of-
innovations hypothesis and covering 195 "radical innovations" in British
industry from 1920 to 1980. The cases are selected from a larger set of some
2,000 innovations, collected by means of interviews with managers in about
50% of British manufacturing industries (see Freeman et al., 1982).
The distribution of these 195 radical innovations over the 1920-1980
period is given in Figure 16.2. As Freeman et al. indicate, the data may
underestimate the innovations of the inter-war period, which has been inves-
tigated less thoroughly than the period 1945-1950. War-related innovations
may also be underrepresented since the aircraft industry is not included.
From Figure 16.2 it can be concluded that the critics of the cluster-of-
innovations hypothesis are not supported even by their own data. A clear
peak in the late 1930s is shown. The second peak in the late 1950s is still
consistent with the impression gained from other sets of innovation data,
especially if we consider that Figure 16.2 is concerned with British innova-
tions. British innovations may in many cases follow the first introduction of
an innovation on a world level with some time lag.
To summarize our empirical considerations, it seems that the impression
from important innovations in Table 16.4 is consistent with two other sets of
data from independent sources: the product-related key and master patents
in Figure 16.1 and the radical innovations in Figure 16.2. The various sets of
data contradict the hypothesis that radical innovations are distributed ran-
domly over time. Instead, they appear to be concentrated during the depres-
sion and early upswing phase of the long wave.
How can this observation be explained? Why are such risky radical inno-
vations introduced during the depression phase of the long wave, when risks
and uncertainties of economic and social development are highest? Why are
they less frequently introduced during prosperity phases? An answer could
be that in the prosperous periods, not only innovation risks but also incen-
tives for radical innovations are lower. As long as existing product lines
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Figure 1.6.2. 195 radical innovations (five-year moving averages) In British Indus-
try according to Freeman et ai. (1962).
continue to expand, it is more profitable to concentrate innovation and R&D
efforts on gradual improvements within those lines. The tendency to concen-
trate innovative efforts on the gradual improvement of existing technologies
rather than undertaking radical innovations can be enhanced by the fact that
radically new technologies often represent an uncomfortable substitution
competition against existing technologies and industries: in a process of
"creative destruction" (Schumpeter) the steam engine competes against the
water wheel, and later the steam engine is threatened by the internal combus-
tion engine and the diesel engine; the position of railways has been under-
mined by automobiles and airplanes; synthetic materials replaced natural
fibers; petroleum competes against coal; and so on. Entrepreneurs who have
invested in the old technologies are naturally not interested in the emergence
of such substitution competition; and they might have ways and means to
oppose it.
Rosenberg and Frischtak (1983) have emphasized that firms that adhere
to their old technologies are favored by the fact that the educational sys-
tems, and especially the training of technicians and engineers. are shaped by
the needs of established industries and their political lobby. Moreover. there
is the so-called "sailing ship" effect: the emergence of a new competing tech-
nology can be considerably impeded by efforts to improve the established
technology. Rosenberg (1982. p. 115) cites a number of examples:
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The water wheel continued to experience major improvements for at
least a century after the introduction of Watt's steam engine; and the
wooden sailing ship was subjected to many major and imaginative
improvements long after the introduction of the iron-hull steamship.
During the 1920s the competition of the internal combustion engine is
said to have been responsible for much technological improvement in
steam engines, while in the same period the competition from the radio
stimulated experiments that led to the new and improved type of cable
that was introduced in 1924. The Welsbach mantle, perhaps the single
most important improvement in gas lighting, was introduced after the
electric utilities had begun to challenge the gas utilities over the
respective merits of their lighting systems. The Welsbach gas mantle
brought about a dramatic increase in the amount of illumination pro-
duced by a standard gas jet. Not only the diffusion of technologies but
also the effort devoted to the development of new technologies may be
decisively shaped by expectations as to future improvements and the
continued superiority of existing technologies. One explanation for the
limited attention devoted to the development of the electric motor for
many years was the belief that the economic superiority of the steam
engine was overwhelming and beyond serious challenge. The decision to
neglect research on the electrically powered car in the early history of
the automobile industry reflected the belief, justified at the time, in the
total superiority of the internal combustion engine (this neglect may
soon be repaired!). Similarly, the limited shift to nuclear sources of
power over the past quarter century has been influenced by continued
improvements in thermal efficiency based upon the "old-fashioned" but
still apparently superior fossil fuel technologies.
How far can this explain the clustering of radical innovations in the
depression and early upswing phase of the long wave? According to the sail-
ing ship argument, radically new technologies would have to "wait" until the
decisive improvement possibilities of the existing technologies are exhausted,
Le., the power of existing technologies to impede new substitute technologies
would depend crucially on their ability to realize further improvements, both
in quality and production costs. There are indications that this ability is not
equally strong in all phases of the long wave. For example, according to
Schmookler's demand-pull argument (1966), innovative activity within existing
technological paradigms could be expected to be much stronger in the pros-
perous phases of the long waves than in the depression periods. Verdoorn's
law tells us a similar story. Furthermore, as Freeman (1982) has pointed out,
there may be some features of "industry life cycles": in their early phase,
new industries and technologies have a high rate of product and process
improvements that help considerably to improve sales figures, whereas
expanding sales figures and profits give extra incentives for an expansion of
R&D budgets, and so on. However, to the extent that technologies reach a
certain degree of maturity and standardization, there may be, in the course of
time, some law of diminishing returns on further improvement efforts, and
hence the sailing ship (exclusion) effect would become weaker.
The effect is likely to be weakest during the long-wave depression with
saturated markets and overcapacities. If entrepreneurs are then to obey the
ironic statement by Karl Marx, "akkumuliert, akkumuliert: das ist Moses
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und der Propheten!", then they have no choice but to face fierce competi-
tion within the saturated industries or to take the risk of opening up new
spheres of economic endeavor. A long-lasting depression phase is not the
most welcome time in which to do this. This may reflect a more fundamental
contradiction of the development of technology, at least in its capitalist form:
the pressure to switch to new technological paradigms is strongest at a time
when uncertainties of economic and social development are highest. A refer-
ence to Germany in the 1930s may illustrate what this can imply for society at
lllrge.
With our emphasis on clusters of radical innovations being triggered by
long-lasting depressibns, we do not intend to construct a monocausal explana-
tion of the lower turning point of the long wave. A satisfactory theory of the
long wave should be open to include a number of enhancing factors. In this
context, the contributions by Freeman et al. (1982), Hoeksema (1984), Huber
(1982), Perez (1983), Salvati (1983), and Screpanti (1984) are important and
point to various aspects of social, political, institutional. or cultural change
during a long-lasting crisis. Our argument about profound technological
change should be interpreted as part of a more general social "struktur-
bruch" (Altvater. 1982) that changes not only the technological base but also
the "social structure of accumulation" (Gordon et al., 1982). This is not the
place, however, to discuss hypotheses about structural change in the "Uber-
bau" of society; rather. we continue to focus on changes in the technological
base of capital accumulation.
The latter expresses itself in opposite movements of various innovation
indicators. Freeman et al. (1982. p. 58) have opposed the argument about
clusters of innovations. pointing to data on R&D and patenting:
There is however one further piece of relevant empirical evidence which
does have a bearing on the controversy ... If there were evidence that
firms responded to depression by stepping up their Rand D activities
and increasing their applications for patent protection then this would
provide rather strong support for the Kleinknecht view of firm
behavior, even though these activities could not be directly related to
the "output" of f)asic innovations.
If. on the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests that firms
respond to depression by cutting back on their research, inventive and
technical development activities generally, then this must cast further
doubt on the hypothesis of depression-Induced acceleration of basic
innovations, ...
As to R&D figures, Freeman et al., refer to data by Terleckji (1963), who
found a 10% decline in R&D expenditures in US industry during the period
1931-1934. Moreover, they present a graph on patent applications and
patents granted in the USA which shows a considerable decline of patenting
activity during the 1930s (p. 60). From both sets of data they conclude that
the depression of the 1930s brought down innovative activity. Do these con-
siderations contradict the conclusions reached above?
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The contrast between the two can be understood if a distinction is made
between types of innovation. If we apply Dasi's (1982) distinction, the data on
patenting and R&D stand primarily as indicators of the broad stream of inno-
vations taking place within existing technological paradigms. The declining
rate of innovation in this latter category is an expression of the increasing
frustration with mature technologies in saturated markets and of the growing
need for reorientation towards new fields of economic endeavor. The latter is
expressed in a high rate of radical innovations. So far, the evidence by Free-
man et al., is completely consistent with the data discussed above. This con-
clusion is supported by data for US manufacturing industries on the opening
of new industrial research laboratories. These showed a rapid increase dur-
ing the period 1929-1936, in spite of the 10% decline of general R&D expendi-
tures (see Table 1.8.5).
Table 1.6.t5. Laboralory foundaUons within US manufacturing induslry (annual aver-
ages for sub-periods from 1899 to 1946).a
1.899- 1JJ(}9- 1.91.9- 1.929- 1.937-
Industry 1JJ(}8 191.8 1.928 1.936 1.946
Food and beverages 2 3.2 5 6 4
Tobacco products 0 0.1 0.2 0.375 0.1
Textiles 0.4 1.1 1.6 3.5 1.7
Apparel 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.2
Lumber products 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.625 0.5
Furniture 0 0 0.2 0.125 0.1
Paper 0.6 1.5 3.8 3.25 1.3
Publishing 0 0 0.2 0.375 0.1
Chemicals 5.6 8.8 17.8 18.25 10.7
Petroleum 0.3 1.5 2.5 3.875 1
Rubber products 0.2 1.6 1.9 1.625 0.5
Leather products 0 0.4 0.9 0.375 0.1
Stone/clay and glass 1.2 2.4 5.4 4.875 1.2
Primary metals 1.9 3.0 4.2 3.625 1.4
Fabricated metals 1.7 2.4 5.3 4.625 2.8
Non-electrical machinery 1.4 4.9 6.5 7.875 3.0
Electrical machinery 1.8 2.8 5.3 8 4.4
Transport machinery 0.4 1.2 1.6 1.25 2.0
Instruments 0.4 1.7 2.3 4 3.6
Tolal manufacturing 18.2 37.1 66 73.75 38.8
'7hls t.able has been reconst.ruct.ed from Mowery (1981, p. 57). Figures such as "3.2
researoh labs" Indlcat.e t.hat. Mowery's figures have had t.o be divided by years to allow
for Int.ertemporal comparisons.
If these data are interpreted as lead indicators of a switch towards new
technologies. then they are consistent with other indicators of radical innova-
tions. Moreover. considering that the costs of new research labs are included
in Terleckji's figures. on general R&D expenditures, we can conclude that
budget cuts in the older research labs must have been much more dramatic
than is indicated by an overall average of 10%.
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In summar'y, there is no conlr'adiction between the data on r'adical inno-
vations and those on patenting and R&D. The opposite direction, in which
both types of data have been moving during the 1930s, is in line with the argu-
ment that the long-lasting depression brought down old industries and techno-
logies and, at the same time, triggered the emergence of new "technological
paradigms". If this conclusion is correct, it should be possible to demonstrate
that new technologies, emerging during the depression and early upswing
period of the long wave, have played a decisive role in fostering economic
growth during the subsequent prosperity period. We shall consider this argu-
ment in the next section, using data for the postwar period.
16.4. Innovation, Economic Growth, and Profit Rates
in the Postwar Boom
The task of determining the contribution to economic growth of individual
technologies faces many difficulties. First, the classification of statistical
data is rarely fine enough to trace the growth paths of young, innovative
industries, and in most cases data on longer timespans are not available.
Moreover, the "forward" and "backward linkages" of new industries are diffi-
cult to measure. Rostow (1978) tried to make such estimates for the US auto-
mobile sector: the difficulties he met in doing so were almost prohibitive.
We have therefore chosen a different approach based on a systematic
comparison of innovation and growth rates in various sectors of manufacturing
industry. As an indicator of innovation performance, an international sample
of 500 innovations for the period 1953-1973 from a National Science Founda-
tion study (see Gellman, 1976) was used. As indicators of growth performance,
we used data by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW, 1973) on
industrial production in 30 sectors of manufacturing industry in the FRG from
1951 to 1977. Since the economy of the FRG is open and export-oriented, we
would expect that differences in the growth of individual sectors would be
correlated with the sectoral distribution of innovations from the international
sample. This correlation does indeed exist; Le., the one-tailed distribution of
innovations by sectors corresponds with differences in sectoral growth rates
of production; coefficients of correlation vary between 0.51 and 0.91 for vari-
ous sub-periods between 1951 and 1970. After 1970, with the growth boom
fading, the correlation gradually disappears (see Kleinknecht, 1984, p. 258).
Moreover, the one-tailed distribution of innovations by sectors during the
period 1953-1973 closely resembles the sectoral distribution of radical inno-
vations from the 1930s and 1940s (p. 254). In other words, during the
postwar boom, a set of growth industries (including electrical equipment and
electronics, chemicals and plastics manufacturing, automobiles, aircraft, or oil
refining) had a rate of innovation clearly above the average of total industry
in both sets of data. This finding is independently corroborated by the data
on new research labs, the above sectors introducing a high and increasing
number of new research labs during the interwar period (see Table 1.8.5). The
coincidence of a decline of general R&D expenditures in 1931-1934
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(Terleckji, 1963) and of an upswing in the figures of new research labs seems
to confirm that the interwar crisis triggered a reallocation of innovative
resources in favor of new growth industries. The sectoral innovation pattern
emerging from the crisis seems to have determined sectoral differences in
innovation and growth during the subsequent boom. This argument is further
supported by the finding that the one-sided distribution by sectors of the
500 innovation cases remained fairly constant during the entire investigation
period (1953-1973).
In a later study the sample of 500 innovation cases was classified accord-
ing to product versus process innovations. It proved that product innovations
were overwhelmingly concentrated within the growth industries. further-
more, during 1953-1973 a shift occurred within those growth industries from
product to process innovations (see Coombs and Kleinknecht, 1984). This
finding is consistent with the impression gained from British innovation data
by Freeman et al. (1982) in Figure 1B.2 above. The shift from product to pro-
cess innovation within highly innovative industries during the postwar up-
swing fits the idea of an industry life cycle, suggesting that, with an increas-
ing degree of maturity, growth industries lose their ability to generate
employment.
Another possible explanation of the upper turning point of the long wave
refers to a decline in profit rates. The possibility of a long-wave pattern in
profit rates has been discussed by various theorists, e.g., Fontevieille (1984),
Mandel (1973), Menschikov and Klimenko (1985). In their analysis of postwar
economic development in the FRG, Altvater et al. (1980) have tried to test
the Marxian hypothesis of a tendency of the profit rate to fall. They have
estimated the following profit rate indicator:
p ~ = yet - W)
C
where Y = industrial net production at constant prices, W = the wage rate
(Le., 1-W is the gross profit share in industrial production), and C = capital
stock. This profit rate indicator depends essentially on two factors: the
wage share in production and the capital coefficient, the former being an
approximation of the rate of surplus value and the latter approximating the
organic composition of capital. The development over time of the capital coef-
ficient depends on the relationship between the rate of increase in capit.al
intensity and the rate of increase in labor productivity. This formula is only
a rough approximation of the Marxian profit rate, of course. One of its weak
points is the measurement of the capital stock, but nevertheless, it might give
a reliable indication at least of the development of profit rates over time (for
a detailed discussion see Altvater et al., 1980). From an estimate of p' for all
FRG manufacturing, Altvater et al. conclude that, after a short increase
between 1950 and 1955, aggregate profit rates showed a tendency to fall from
1955 to 1977. Apart from a slight increase in the wage rate, the main factor
behind the fall in p' was the increase in the capital coefficient. This result
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for industry in the FRG is consistent with estimates of rates of return for a
number of other countries (see Hill, 1979).
Based on the calculations by Altvater et ai. and on data by the German
Institute for Economic Research (DlW, 1973) we have computed the annual
percentage changes in p' and its determinants (labor productivity, capital
intensity, capital coefficients, and profit shares) for successive business
cycles in manufacturing industry in the FRG from 1951 to 1977. Table W.6
covers the results for manufacturing as a whole and for the highly innovative
growth industries. It can be seen that for ·manufacturing as a whole the
"Marxian" process as described by Altvater et al. has indeed been working
from 1955 onward: p' is declining due to an increase in the capital coeffi-
cient. However, the highly innovative industries show a different picture.
For example, the automobile industry and electrical equipment have an almost
constant profit rate up to 1961. The profit rate in the aircraft construction
industry is still increasing during that period. The same holds in the case of
the chemical industry, oil refining, and plastics manufacturing, for which the
increase of p' even lasts during the 1960s. Only the precision engineering
and optics industry follows the path of total manufacturing and shows declin-
ing profit rates from 1955 onwards.
A fairly large literature about the "law" of the tendency of the profit
rate to fall has made abundantly clear that profit rates crucially depend on
the type of technical change. In terms of the above profit rate indicator,
"Marxian technical change" would consist of labor productivity growth rates
being lower than rates of increase in capital intensity, resulting in an
increase in the capital coefficient. The figures in Table 16.6 suggest that,
within highly innovative industries, due to high growth rates of labor produc-
tivity, this process of increasing capital coefficients started only in a later
phase of the postwar long-wave expansion; Le., highly innovative industries
have temporarily counteracted a rapid fall in the average manufacturing
profit rate during the postwar upswing.
From the above it can be concluded that, in the long term, industrial
profit rates depend crucially on the rate of increase in labor productivity.
The findings in Table W.6 are principally consistent with the idea of an
"industry life cycle" (d. Freeman, 1982): newly emerging industries initially
have high rates of both product and process innovations, which foster the
growth of sales. Growing sales figures again give extra incentives for expand-
ing R&D, and so on. This process of mutually reinforcing demand-pull and
technology-push effects, via capital and labor savings, exert a positive influ-
ence on the main determinants of profit rates, Le., on the capital coefficient
and the wage rate. This process may come to an end, however, to the extent
that an industry reaches a certain level of maturity and the rate of innovation
slackens. In the later stage of the industry life cycle, therefore, the Marxian
process of declining profit rates due to an increasing organic composition of
capital might become relevant. Moreover, the process of declining profit
rates may be enhanced by an upward move of wage rates due to the increasing
power of trade unions gained during a long-lasting prosperity period with a
tendency towards full employment or even labor scarcity. At the same time,
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as innovation performance declines, the scope for wage increases that do not
negatively affect profit rates will become smaller. However, Table 1.8.6 sug-
gests that profit rates are primarily influenced by changes in the capital
coefficient, and an increase in wage rates seems to playa less prominent role
- at least in manufacturing industry in the FRG.
For a long time it has been standard practice to consider the Marxian
theorem of the falling profit rate as a secular concept. However, several
authors have recently suggested Linking profit rates primarily to the long-
wave concept (see Fontevieille, 1984; Mandel, 1980; Menshikov and Klimenko,
1985). Menshikov and Klimenko have produced long-term data for the USA
that support the hypothesis of a long-wave pattern in average industrial prof-
it rates, and they are consistent with our data above for FRG manufacturing
industry. Certainly, the massive depreciation of capital during the long-wave
depression is an important factor that counteracts a secular fall in profit
rates. The thrust-wise technological progress associated with newly emerging
industries and technologies during the early upswing of the long-wave may be
another temporarily counteracting factor that deserves more careful con-
sideration in future research.
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Long Waves, Growth-Retarding Factors,
and Paradigms of the New Upswing
Wolfgang Baaske, Mushtaq Hussain, and Johann AIillendorfer
17.1. Introduction
The development process of the postwar years has been a spectacular and
unprecedented success. but after 25 years of prosperity the industrialized
countries are experiencing a slowdown in economic growth. This adverse
development has revived interest in the economic long wave or Kondratieff
cycle. The recession, which after World War II was expected to mean a few
years of below-average growth. has turned out to be a downswing in a long
wave whose upswing occurred in the period 1948-1973. The depression in the
long wave currently being experienced is a structural crisis. As noted by
Perez (1985), it is a syndrome of a serious misfit between the techncreconomic
subsystem and the socia-institutional framework; we are now witnessing a
negative interaction between these two spheres. In analyzing the current
depression we thus concentrate not on the "sources" of the slowdown, Le.,
changes in resources and other factors that are the immediate cause of
changes in output (e.g., changes in investment, capital accumulation. labor
supply, etc.), but instead we focus on the underlying "causes" of the slowdown
- the mechanisms that create an atmosphere that determines the adverse
development of these sources and thus slows down the growth rate. We
believe that these causes. or growth-retarding factors, can give us an insight
into the lack of positive interaction mentioned above. A mathematical
description of the dependence of the growth-retarding factors on the level of
economic development leads to differential equations. the solutions to which
show under certain circumstances oscillations resembling long waves.
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Empirical evidence and analysis of socio-psychological phenomena enable
us to differentiate four sets of growth-retarding factors, which originate from
four fields: state, megalomania, isolation, and leveling. We have analyzed the
nature of long-term oscillations in these growth-retarding factors and present
a socio-psychological feedback system leading to long waves.
17.2. Growth-Retar~Factors
In this analysis three data sets are used to determine the influence of each of
the growth-retarding factors on GDP growth rates. All data sets are cross-
sections of 19 GECD countries. The first set covers the period 1960-1970,
the second 1970-1981, and the thir'd 1960-1981.
17.2.1. Public expenditure
The rapid growth of the public sector in industrialized countries is often
cited as an important growth-retarding factor. In many countries, for as long
as records have been kept, the ratios of public revenues and expenditures to
GDP have tended to grow. When the share of public spending reaches very
high levels, then policy troubles are to be expected, not so much because of
demand for and the direct allocation of real resources to the public sector,
but because the initiative structure is badly distorted both by taxes and
social policy, and this tends to paralyze the innovative power of the
managerial firm. Polanyi (1968), in a study covering the 1950s through to the
1970s, showed that the average rate of return of nationalized industries was
less than one-third that of private industry. Hence if a greater part of the
economy is handled by government, and if government activities are less "effi-
cient .. (Leibenstein, 1981) than in the private sector, then average produc-
tivity will be lower than it would be otherwise.
During the 1960s high government expenditure was one of the most
important growth-retarding factors. As the following single regression shows,
more than 50% of the differentiations in the level of the average annual GDP
growth rate during 1960-1970 (GRGDP 60-70) among 19 countries studied
could be explained by the average government final consumption expenditure
in the period 1960-1967, expressed as a percentage of GDP (GFCE%GDP
60-67). In the 1970s a number of other factors had negative influence on GDP
growth rate. Rather than the level of government expenditure (which was
high enough for all countries), some of its derivatives (see below) grew in
importance. For the period 1960-1981, however, government expenditure
alone was responsible for not less than 45% of the explanation of growth slow-
down [see equations (17.1)-(17.3)]. The values in parentheses are the
corresponding t -statistics.
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GRGDP 60 -70 =12.08 - 0.49 GFCE%GDP 60 -£7 HZ =0.58
(-4.25)
GRGDP 70~1 = 4.95 - 0.11 GFCEIGDP 70-77 HZ = 0.16
( -1.82)
GRGDP 60~1 =7.67 -0.22 GFCEIGDP 60~1 HZ =0.46
(-3.80)
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Some economists have suggested that increased public expenditure takes
place at the expense of investment (see Bacon and Eltis, 1976; Smith, 1975),
and that affects growth rate. In our analysis we found this to have been con-
spicuously true in the 1970s, when the ratio of the growth rate of government
expenditure to that of gross fixed capital formation, at constant prices
(GRGFCE/GFCF), was clearly greater than 1 for all countries except Canada
and the USA (during the loo0s this ratio was less than 1 for most countries).
In a single regression this ratio is also significant in explaining 36% of the
differences in GDP growth rate in 1970-1981.
GRGDP 70~1 =4.33 - 0.49 GRGFCE/GFCF 70~0
(-3.08)
HZ =0.36 (17.4)
For the other two periods (1960-1970 and 1960-1981) this ratio for respec-
tive periods was not statistically significant.
A problem also arises if public expenditure grows more rapidly than the
GDP, in which case the government has two alternatives. The increase can be
financed by adding to the borrowing requirement, leading to inflation, or it
can be financed by increased taxation. In this latter case the wage earners
respond by claiming higher wages, which has been an important cause of infla-
tion in recent years. The ratio of growth rate of government expenditure to
that of GDP, at constant prices (GRGFCE/GDP) provides an explanation for
the GDP growth rate. Equation (17.5) gives the result of regression analysis
estimating the average annual GDP growth rate in 1970-1981 (GRGDP 70-81)
by this ratio of the same period:
GRGDP 70~1 =4.49 - 0.43 GRGFCE/GDP 70~1
( -1.99)
H2 =0.19 (17.5)
The result for 1970-1981 is much better than that for other periods.
Government expenditure on social security and welfare in the industrial-
ized countries has had a number of adverse consequences. Social security
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reduces the rate of savings, it reduces labor mobility, distorts work incen-
tives, and favors bureaucratic inefficiency (see Vaubel, 1981). Giersch and
Wolter (1982) cite Maddison (1982, p. 13), who reports a rate of 10% absentee-
ism in the Netherlands where benefits are generous, but only 2.5% in the USA,
where they are much smaller. This example can be seen to explain much
about the negative influence of social security generosity on the economic
growth of industrialized countries.
We have found that social security transfers, expressed as percentage of
total government expenditure (SOC%EXP), is f1egatively correlated with the
GDP growth rate in 1960:-1970, 1970-1981, and 1960-1981. The correlation is
strongest in 1970-1981:
GRGDP 70~1 = 5.34 - 0.06 SOC%EXP 73-77
(-2.35)
R2 = 0.25 (17.6)
These results confirm the theoretical considerations about the adverse
effect of high social security expenditures.
17.2.2. Megalomania
Many doubts have been expressed about the efficiency of large and complex
organizations. As enterprises grow, there is likely to be a gradual change in
their internal structures towards greater internal bureaucracy resulting in a
decline in productivity or growth retardation. Leibenstein (1981) asserts
that big firms enjoy monopoly privileges by having reduced pressure from
competitors so that the translation of inputs into outputs occurs at a point
further away from the minimum cost level.
Small is not only beautiful but also efficient. Olson (1983) shows that
small organizations have fewer adverse affects on the GDP growth rate than
large ones, while small groups make oligopolistic bargaining advantageous.
Trade unions and large professional associations reduce growth rates by limit-
ing entry into the industries and occupations they control. Olson adds that a
society with greater barriers to entry will grow less rapidly due to innovation
slowing and barriers in resource allocation needed to maintain Pareto-
efficiency. On the concept of "institutional sclerosis ", Millendorfer (1982)
adds a new medical term - namely, "institutional elephantiasis". Large organi-
zations can make non-optimal decisions and still survive; this explains their
adverse effects on growth rates.
It is difficult to find a comparable summary indicator with which to meas-
ure the degree of concentration in industry as a whole; thus, for our pur-
poses, we looked for feasible alternatives. Love (1979) lists the most impor-
tant companies in Europe in 1976, based on "size and significance within the
national economy in terms of turnover, exports, assets and labor force". The
number of these companies per thousand population (IMPCOM/POP), when com-
pared with GDP growth rates, gives significant results:
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GRGDP 70~1 = 4.15 - 0.08 IMPCOMjPOP 76
(-3.74)
R2 = 0.52 (17.7)
Assuming that the number of such companies does not change very quickly, we
see that this indicator explains 52% of the difference in GDP growth rates in
15 Western countries (excluding Canada, Greece, Japan, and the USA) in
1970-1981.
We have constructed another measure for all the countries studied that
reflects the average size of manufacturing establishments employing more
than 10 persons (M > 10). These values explain the GDP growth rate in
1960-1970 with high significance:
GRGDP60-70 =6.70 -0.02M >10
(-2.(5)
~ = 0.27 (17.8)
In fact, there exists an optimal level of concentration (which naturally varies
from branch to branch), and when this is exceeded (Le., when firms become
too large) they begin to act as barriers to further GDP growth. These results
confirm the hypothesis that high concentration, in any field of society, leads
to inefficiency and thereby slows down economic growth.
17.2.3. Isolation
Economic growth and a high level of industrialization in developed countries
have unfortunately led to a number of adverse social consequences. The most
important, and at the same time the source of several other social ills, is the
deteriorating quality of family life leading to isolation in society. Families in
today's industrialized countries are becoming weaker and more scattered, a
tragic consequence of which is suicide (Durkheim, 1983; Fuchs et aJ.., 1977). It
is therefore not a coincidence that, by and large, the richer the country, the
higher is the suicide rate (Naroll. 1983). The most striking instance of this
tendency is the high suicide rate among divorced people. As a proxy of
measuring worsening of the quality of family life leading to isolation, we stud-
ied two indicators, namely illegitimate birth rate (ILLBRTH) and divorce rate
(DIVORCE).
GRGDP 60-70 = 6.72 -0.23 ILLBRTH 63-£8
(-2.39)
R2 = 0.25 (17.9)
The average divorce rates for 1960-1970 and 1970-1980 have slightly
weaker correlations with the corresponding GDP growth rates (-0'.31 and
-0.35), but if we take the whole period together then it increases:
244 Long Waves, Growth.-Retard/1.ng Factors. and Paradigms
GRGDP 60~1 =4.89 - 0.61 DIVORCE 60~O
(-2.0)
(17.10)
Suicide rates are also negatively correlated with growth rates for all of the
periods analyzed here.
Hofstede (1978) has constructed four indicators to reflect individual
behavior patterns in various societies. One of these. the "individualism
index", opposes "a loosely knit social framework in society in which people
are supposed to take care of themselves and their immediate families only, to
one in which they can expect their relatives, class or organization to look
after them" (p. 11). This index (HOFIND) has a significant effect on the
growth rate:
GRGDP 70~1 = 8.53 - 0.04 HOFIND 77
(-2.80)
(17.11)
In Section 17.4 we observe that in addition to the strong correlation between
divorce and suicide. promiscuity also plays an important role as growth-
retarding factor.
17.2.-t. The process or leveling
One of the social developments associated with economic growth is the chang-
ing role of women in society. In analyses of the age-sex composition of the
labor force, Kendrick (1981) and Kendrick and Grossman (1983) show that the
increase in female labor force participation since the 1960s had a negative
effect on the growth rate in this period. Kendrick (1981), however, shows
that the effect of this shift was diminished in the period 1973-1975. The
change in the share of females in the total labor force from 1961 to 1970
indeed had a negative effect (R = - 0.28) on the GDP growth rate in the
corresponding period, but in the next decade, there was no correlation.
As another measure of the increasing role of women, we analyzed the
ratio of female/male death rates due to car accidents (F/M CARACC). Both for
1960-1970 and 1970-1981 there are high negative correlations between these
indicators and corresponding GDP growth rates.
GRGDP 60 -70 =12.08 - 0.22 F/M CARACC 64 -66 RZ =0.44
(-3.64)
GRGDP 70~1 =5.63 - 6.71F/M CARACC 75-78 R2 =0.22
( -2.19)
(17.12)
(17.13)
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Wage quotas. defined as compensation of employees as a percentage of national
income (WAGEQUOTA), also reflects. in a cross-country analysis, the process
of leveling. In a regression function it is significant:
GRGDP 70-81 =7.16 4:>.07 WAGEQUOTA 74
(-2.43)
R2 =0.26 (17.14)
The leveling process is of course connected with reducing inequalities in
the distribution of income. Such equality in incomes (Jain. 1975) is negatively
correlated with GDP growth rates for the 19 countries, but neither correla-
tion coefficients nor t-values are statistically significant.
17.2.5. Multiple regression analysis
The power of the various growth-retarding factors to explain the slowdown in
economic growth is relatively low. This leads to the question whether, instead
of a monocausal approach, combinations of the various factors might show
much better explanatory strength. We therefore combined all the above vari-
ables to obtain four sets of growth-retarding factors. Taking all variables into
account, factors from each of the four groups were standardized and com-
bined to form four synthetic variables: state, concentration. isolation, and
leveling.
Table 17.1. Multiple regression analysis in explaining the GDP growth rate,
1970-1981 (n =15, F =48.8, R 2 =0.95).
Independent variables
Slate 70-80
Isolation 70-80
ConcentraUon
Leveling
Regression coefficient
-1.04
-0.30
-0.26
-0.35
t-value
-9.74
-2.40
-2.99
-2.78
In Table 17.1 we present the results of estimates of the GDP growth rate
for 1970-1981 using the four synthetic variables. High (RZ) values reflect the
significance of the four sets of growth-retarding factors taken together. All
t -values are significant at the 95% level, and F-statistics at the 99% level.
Results for the 1960s are similar to those presented in Table 17.1. In Figure
17.1 we present the relationships of the four growth-retarding factors
separately as well as their combined effect on GDP growth rates.
17.3. Growth-Retarding Factors and Long Waves
All growth-retarding factors presented here are positively correlated with
GDP growth. They increase in value together with GDP, and after a certain
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Figure 1.7.1.. Graphic representation of the relationship between growth-retarding
factors and the GDP growth rate.
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period start acting as barriers to growth. How do these factors behave over a
long period of time and what consequences do they have on GDP? In the fol-
lowing we try to determine some mechanisms that lead to long-term oscilla-
tions.
17.3.1. Long-term oscillations
Let y denote GDP, so that (dy 1 dt)1 Y is the GOP growth rate. In Section
17.2 we estimated the following multiple regression function:
(17.15)
where z'" is the ith growth-retarding factor. Figure 17.1 illustrates this
linear relationship, and the results of estimates of this function are
presented in Table 17.1.
The growth-retarding factors (z",) can depend on the GDP in various
ways; in the following we present three possibilities:
(a) If the factors z'" depend linearly on the GDP, Le., if
(17.16)
then equation (17.15) can be written
Now putting a * for a o - E a", b Oc and b * for E a", b"" we get
dyldt = y (a* -b*y)
(17.17)
(17.18)
This is a Bernoulli differential equation, the solution to which can be
represented graphically by a logistic curve, the asymptote being the point
y = b * 1 a * [see Figure 17.2(a)].
(b) We have a different situation if the growth-retarding factors depend uponfin y, Le., upon accumulated wealth, Le., if
(17.19)
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then dZi I dt =ci In y. and
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dy/dtly =~
dt
=ao -Eaizi =aO-Eai(cO, +ciJlnydt)
= ao - Eaico, - Eaici Jlny dt
Putting k =E ai ci and u =In y, we get
(17.20)
(17.21)
The solution to equation (17.21) is a sinusoidal function and it can be
represented graphically by a sinusoidal oscillation [see Figure 17.2(b)].
(c) Perhaps the most probable dependency can be illustrated by combining
(17.16) and (17.19):
(17.22)
then
(17.23)
Therefore
(17.24)
Equation (17.24) represents a Lotka-Volterra differential equation, whose
solution can be illustrated by predator-prey oscillations [Figure 17.2(c)].
Figure 17.3 presents graphically the above relationships of growth-retarding
factors with income and wealth and their long-term consequences.
In any case the political conclusions are similar. In the first Bernoulli
case the asymptote of the logistic curve indicates the end of the fruitfulness
of the old paradigms of the former period: a new upswing is only possible with
new paradigms. In the other two cases the downswing of the oscillation occurs
for the same reasons; only the anticipation of the new paradigm of the coming
upswing can retard the downswing. In addition. in these cases the impact of
the growth-retarding factors must be diminished by investments for this pur-
pose. This new form of investment also leads to returns if the costs of dimin-
ishing the growth-retarding factors are smaller than the gains due to
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Figure 1.7.2. Long-term behavior of GDP growth rates: (a.) Bernoulli logistic curve;
(b) sinusoidal oscillations; (c) Lotka-Volterra differential equation.
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Figure 1.7.3. Feedback system of growth and growth-retarding factors.
improved efficiency. The question of long waves is. therefore. not so much a
theoretical issue but rather a challenge in the form of the practical economic
problems we have to cope with.
17.3.2. Sociopsychological feedback system
McClelland (1961) has constructed for a number of countries an "achievement
motivation index" in which a high quality of family life is a precondition for
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high achievement motivation. Alternatively, Fuchs et al. (1977) show that high
achievement motivation, 25-30 years later, leads to lower quality of family
life. They argue that highly motivated people have less time for their fami-
lies, particularly for their children, so that when the children grow up they
normally cannot lead a good family life.
Thus we have a negative feedback and something like a control circuit
with a delay of 25-30 years (see Figure 17.4). The feedback system works in
the sequence: (high) quality of family -+ (high) achievement motivation -+
(high) performance of the system -+ dominance of the system over the human
area -+ decreasing quality of family life -+ decreasing achievement motivation
... The delay of 25-30 years could be seen to be an anthropological constant
caused by interrelationships between generations. This delay leads to cyclic
oscillations with a period of 50-60 years, the existence of which was sug-
gested by the negative correlation between the "achievement motivation
index" of 1925 and that of 1950. Figure 17.4 points out empirically observed
relationships in the feedback system. Figure 17.4(a) shows a positive rela-
tionship between the motivation index for 1938 and per capita incomes 30
years later, Figure 17.4(b) shows a negative correlation between quality of
family life and per capita incomes, while Figure 17.4(c) illustrates a negative
relation between the motivation index for 1938 and the quality of family life in
1970.
Empirical support for the existence of such oscillations comes from Mar-
chetti (1982), who observed cycles of suicides with a period of 54 years. As
was mentioned above, suicides and divorces are correlated, and they also play
major roles in determining the quality of family life; if one of these variables
oscillates. the others should also do so. In this sense Marchetti's observa-
tions fit well in our framework of oscillations.
Schumpeter's description of long-wave upswings with new technologies
does not explain why these innovation pushes occur at all and why the wave
period is 50-60 years. We think that the above sociopsychological feedback
system is connected with economic long waves. and that oscillations in
creativity and motivation contribute to the innovation pushes of the same
length. namely, around 60 years.
17.4. Principal Plane Analysis
In order to determine the relationships between growth. growth restraints.
and other variables. data matrices are displayed in two projection planes
called principal planes. In multivariate data analysis this is a useful tech-
nique (Lebart et al., 1984; Gabriel et al., 1976) derived from principal com-
ponent analysis. singular value decomposition. biplot and cluster analysis.
In constructing the planes, some interpretation rules must be kept in
mind. In each plane. variables and countries are represented simultaneously.
A projection of a country point on the axis through the variable point and the
origin always recreates the original data. The length of the variable vector
shows the explanatory power of a plane as a percentage of explained variance
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of that variable. The cosine of the angle between two variable points is the
correlation coefficient between these two variables. The better the fit, the
better this relationship will be maintained in the projection of the map. Thus,
nearly parallel variable vectors mean high positive or negative correlation,
depending on the direction of the vector. Orthogonal variable vectors signify
independent phenomena. Different principal planes are related to different
issues: principal plane I is related to policy issues and social psychology,
while plane II is related to economics and institutional structures (see Figure
17.5).
Principal plane I has been discussed in Millendorfer (1985) and Fuchs et
al. (1977). Not all ["elationships of a principal plane can be interpreted in
terms of causality, but we can legitimately compare the relative positions of
two variables with respect to the entire set of countries (see Figure 17.6).
We confine ourselves to the following conclusions:
(1) Divorce and suicide rates are interlinked and correspond to the isolation
factor (see above).
(2) The roles of government expenditures and consumption have shifted in
time. Government transfers paralleled the strengthening of family ties in
the 1950s, but 25 years later the coincidence of state consumption and
isolation in Europe reached its maximum. The state sector itself has
become a growth-retarding factor, while at the same time it has led to
weaker family ties and thus greater isolation.
(3) In the early 1980s a reverse movement of these two restraints was visi-
ble.
Principal plane II fits GDP growth and growth-retarding factors for 1970-1980
to a two-dimensional subspace by the classical least squares method. Norway
and Japan show the highest, and Sweden and Britain the lowest growth rates.
The growth retardants - leveling, isolation, and concentration - form a group
and are clearly separated from state. It should be mentioned that high isola-
tion and low state in the USA and Canada is responsible for the fact that the
two vectors are non-parallel, as opposed to Figure 17.5, where the analysis is
conducted for European countries only.
Supplementary variables such as market orientation, per capita income,
and energy consumption are incorporated to illustrate the nature of growth-
retarding factors. Thus the claim for more market orientation would certainly
reduce the state restraints. Market orientation, therefore, is a necessary
precondition of growth. However, alone, it seems to be insufficient. In fact,
market orientation is quite highly correlated with Hofstede's individualism
index, a growth restraint, as argued above. Large units resulting from a long
industrialization period (measured by the time integral of energy consump-
tion) contribute to Olson's institutional sclerosis, and now are restraining
Sweden and Britain.
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17.5. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have tried to give, as far as possible. a complete account of
the causes of slowdowns in growth in the hope that it will help to identify the
real problems faced by modern industrial nations. The analysis of socio-
psychological phenomena leads us to issues concerning long-term oscillations
in a number of factors that have a direct or indirect influence on economic
growth. We have seen that the length of such cycles is determined by an
anthropological constant governing the dynamics of interrelations between
generations. There may be neither instrumental variables nor political tools
available to change the length of the cycle during a downswing, but what we
can do is minimize the severity of the downswing by anticipating the new para-
digm of the coming upswing. This upswing will be characterized by four
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principles that may be considered new paradigms of development (see Millen-
dorfer, 1985): the human-economic principle; the priority of immaterial over
material factors; finely structured formations rather than gigantomania; and
context and totality.
The implementation of these paradigms can only minimize the severity of
the present recession by constraining the growth-retarding factors described
here. This will open the way for a new upswing of what may be another long
wave.
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CHAPTER 18
Technoeconomic Succession and the
Economic Long Wave
Erik Mosekilde, steen Rasmussen, and MaGiej Zebrowski
18.1. Introduction
Since the Industrial Revolution some 200 years ago. Western economic
development appears to have been characterized by alternating phases of
expansion and stagnation with a period of 50-60 years (van Duijn. 1983; Ros-
tow, 1978; Freeman et at., 1982; Maddison, 1982). This phenomenon, known as
the Kondratieff wave (Kondratieff. 1935) or the economic long wave, can be
approached from basically three different points of view:
(1) The episodic viewpoint maintains that there is no real periodicity, and
that the variations that may be observed over long periods of time, par-
ticularly for certain price variables, can be explained in terms of wars
and gold discoveries. Significant technological breakthroughs may also
be implied as explanatory factors. These are all phenomena that to a
large extend occur independently of economic development, and at least
in the present context they should be considered as random exogenous
events.
(2) The structural change approach admits the existence of a certain
rhythmicity in economic development but does not subscribe to the idea
of a well defined period. Instead, this approach emphasizes qualitative
changes that occur from wave to wave. By replacing old technologies,
transportation means, energy sources, organizational forms. etc., each
upswing "restructures" society from the inside. It is also emphasized
that the geographical location of the dominant politicoeconomic center
often shifts from upswing to upswing.
258 Tech.noeconomic Succession a.nd th.e Long Wa.ve
(3) The coherent wave approach pictures the economic system as oscillat-
ing in a relatively well defined mode in which variations in consumption,
employment, production capacity, investment, etc., repeat themselves
regularly every 50-60 years. The oscillation is usually considered to
originate in economic instabilities, but the wave is accompanied by social
and political changes that feed back and affect the wave itself. The
years of economic upswing are thus characterized not only by massive
investments, rising stock prices, increasing employment and growing
prosperity, but during this period of optimism society usually becomes
more open and permissive, and liberal political and economic ideas are
adopted. Conversely, during the years of economic recession, the
society often becomes more conservative and introverted, while at the
same time economic inequalities increase.
Through the development of the National Model (NM; see Forrester,
1976), the System Dynamics Group at MIT has elaborated the wave picture in
considerable detail. It has been shown how bounded rationality in economic
decision making, combined with physical lags (e.g., in the acquisition of capi-
tal) create the potential for oscillatory behavior. By virtue of a number of
self-reinforcing processes, including the acceleration and multiplication
processes of ordinary Keynesian business cycle theory, the oscillatory
behavior is destabilized, and the macroeconomic system becomes capable of
performing self-sustained oscillations with a period of 50-60 years.
Sterman (1984) has presented the basic dynamic hypothesis of
Forrester's theory in simplified form. According to his treatment, an
increase in demand for capital leads to further increases through capital
self-ordering, Le., by the fact that the capital sector depends on its own out-
puts to produce more capital. Once capital expansion gets under way, rein-
forcing processes sustain it until nonlinear effects finally restrain the growth
and allow production to catch up with orders. By this time, a considerable
amount of excess capital has been built up, and the loops now reverse: a
reduction in orders reduces the demand for investments, leading to a contrac-
tion in the capital sector. Capital production must remain below the level
required for replacement until the excess capital has been fully depreciated
and room for new expansion created.
The strength of the wave picture is that it deals with systematic
processes controlled by interactions that to a large extend are well docu-
mented in the economic literature. The National Model has thus been able to
explain adequately observed changes in both nominal and real interest rates,
in real wages, and in capital-labor substitution through the various phases of
the wave. The model can therefore serve as a useful instrument for designing
policies to cope with the present economic imbalances.
A purely cyclical picture neglects the significant qualitative changes
that take place from upswing to upswing, however, and it fails to view the Kon-
dratieff wave as an integral part of the evolution of society. In fact, the
present society is quite different from that of the 1930s: material wealth has
increased immensely, women's participation in the workforce is much higher,
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social security has improved, international trade relations have changed, and
last but not least. most of the production methods, products, means of trans-
portation and communication, etc., upon which we now depend so heavily have
been introduced during the last 30-40 years.
For these reasons we consider the structural change description as the
more basic approach, and have therefore attempted to construct a simple
model in which the alternating phases of expansion and stagnation arise
through a series of unstable transitions by which discoveries, inventions and
innovations at the individual or company level explode into dissemination
waves that spread throughout the industrialized world.
A preliminary version of our model was presented at the System Dynam-
ics Conference in Oslo (Mosekilde and Rasmussen. 1984). In this chapter the
model is reformulated to give a more transparent definition of the variables.
At the same time, the model now interfaces directly with Sterman's model, so
that in the future it will be possible to combine the two models and obtain a
description that integrates the wave and the structural change approaches.
Since our model treats scientific discoveries. new inventions, and basic inno-
vations as random processes, it already includes certain elements of the
episodic points of view.
18.2. A Theory of Technoeconomic Succession
Based partly on earlier work by Kuznets and others, Mensch (1979) has
described how the development of the industrialized world can be pictured as
a succession of technoeconomic cultures. In this account, the first Kondra-
tieff upswing exploited the potential generated through the introduction of
cotton textiles and steam power between 1783 and about 1803, and the wave is
generally referred to as the "Industrial Revolution Kondratieff". The upswing
of the subsequent wave, the "bourgeois Kondratieff" (1843-1857) represents
the economic growth made possible through the introduction of wood-powered
locomotives, telegraphy, Bessemer steel, and Portland cement. The upswing of
the "neo-mercantilist Kondratieff" (1893-1913) is associated with the intro-
duction of coal-powered railroads, steamships, automobiles, electricity, and
tungsten filament lamps. Finally, the fourth upswing (1949-1967) is associ-
ated with motorization, air traffic, electric-arc steel production, computers,
and a variety of domestic appliances such as TVs, refrigerators, and washing
machines.
Graham and Senge (1980) suggest that each Kondratieff wave can be
associated with a particular type of primary energy. The use of wood as a fuel
appears to have peaked at the end of the first Kondratieff upswing. The sig-
nificance of wind and water power reached saturation at the end of the
second Kondratieff upswing, the use of coal reached a relative maximum in
about 1910, and the significance of oil presumably peaked around 1970, or just
at the end of the fourth Kondratieff upswing. In accordance with the National
Model, Graham and Senge see the periodic shifts in technology and the associ-
ated wave-like variation in the rate of innovation as a consequence of the
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50-60 year oscillation generated by self-ordering in the capital sector. Each
burst of capital build-up allows a new set of technologies to be utilized. but as
the build-up proceeds beyond its initial stages. opportunities for applying
new inventions deteriorate rapidly. Society locks itself onto a particular mix
of technologies: rapid expansion of the dominant industrial sectors reduces
incentives for investments in new and less tried techniques. commitment to a
particular type of infrastn.JCture makes it difficult to apply other forms of
transport or communication systems. engineers are taught to use the adopted
technologies, and administrators learn to tnJst them. In this period, the
society greatly favors improvements to existing technologies over the intro-
duction of basically new technologies.
During the subsequent downturn, innovation opportunities gradually
improve as existing capital becomes increasingly obsolete, and large and
strong institutions are brought to fall. Near the bottom of the wave. where
old capital is depreciated and the technologies of the previous expansion com-
pletely outdated, the possibilities for introducing basic new innovations reach
a maximum.
We certainly subscribe to most of these ideas, but we would like to stress
the qualitative changes associated with technological development, and we
would like to see the potential of a given ensemble of techniques and the
switch from basic to improvement innovations explicitly represented in the
model. In addition, we do not see the existence of capital per se as a hin-
drance to the introduction of new techniques: if a completely new type of
industry has to develop, it does not necessarily have to await the depreciation
of old capital. If the geographic location of the dominant politicoeconomic
center is going to shift (as it has done between some of the previous waves).
we do not think that the next upswing has to await the depreciation of infra-
stnJcture in the existing center.
As an alternative and presumably more general approach, we have there-
fore turned to the metamorphosis model developed by Mensch (1979). Figure
1.8.1 illustrates the main ideas of this model: Fundamental scientific
discoveries are considered to reflect spontaneous processes, and basic new
inventions are therefore assumed to be made randomly over time. For an
invention to acquire economic significance, however, it must be turned into a
basic innovation from which new industries can grow. This transformation,
Le.. the introduction of basically new techniques, is conditioned by the state
of the economy and particularly by the expectations of the techniques
already adopted. The time must be right, which means that exploitation of
the present ensemble of techniques must be approaching saturation.
Under such favorable conditions, many of the inventions accumulated
since the last economic upswing may be turned into practical applications
within a relatively short period of time. and together they lay the seeds for a
coming upswing. Completely new industries develop, and the most viable of
these start a rapid (exponential) growth. In the beginning, as long as the new
industries are economically insignificant, the competition for capital, labor,
and other production factors is weak, and the growth process is practically
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without constraints from the surroundings. However, as the new industries
start to become significant, the competition increases, some of the less
promising die out, and the incentives to introduce further new innovations
fade away. In this way, the society locks itself onto a particular set of tech-
nologies, and the interest shifts to improvement innovations.
This phase of rapid initial growth of new industries after the saturation
of the former complex of leading sectors is actually the phase of economic
stagnation. The economically significant industries have stopped growing, and
the new rapidly growing industries have not yet reached macroeconomic signi-
ficance. In particular, the new industries cannot yet absorb the workforce
laid off from the old industries.
Assuming the growth process to be exponential in its initial phases, the
economic activity of the rising new industries can be expressed as
Q(t} = Qinexp ~at I (lB.l)
where ex is the (linear) growth constant for these industries, and Qin is the
economic activity associated with the ever-present attempts to apply new
techniques. Qin is a measure of the readiness of persons and companies to
experiment with completely new products and methods, even in periods where
such ventures seem unnecessary. From a physical point of view, Qin
represents a source term of random noise through which the stability of the
technoeconomic system is continuously probed in much the same way as muta-
tions continuously probe the stability of a biological system (Allen, 1975). In
practice, Qin can be determined as the economic activity associated with
techniques of the next upswing at the end of a given upswing. We may think,
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for instance, of the total activity associated with upcoming information, bio,
energy, transportation, etc. techniques in 1973.
By solving (18.1), we obtain for the period of economic stagnation (Meyer
and Mosekilde, 1967)
(18.2)
~here Q th represents the threshold economic activity at which the new indus-
tries become macroeconomically significant. Assuming Qthl Qtn ~ 3D, corre-
sponding to an expansion of the new industries by a factor of 30 before they
acquire significance in the total economy, we obtain T st= 23 years for a =
15'%/year. Note, however, that because of the In-function, the value of a that
gives T st= 23 years depends only slightly on the ratio Qthl Qtn' For Qthl Qtn=
100, for instance, one has a= 20'%/year. We consider these estimates of
corresponding values of Qthl Qtn and a as reasonable and thus conclude that
the proposed mechanism can in principle account for the length of the stagna-
tion period.
The following years are the years of prosperity and economic growth.
The new industries have attained their leading position and are still growing
rapidly. As expansion proceeds, however, the industries gradually approach
the point at which the potential of the adopted technologies is fully
exploited. The exponential growth may then turn into logistic growth
described by
dQ I dt =/CQ(Q 0 - Q) (18.3)
where Qo is here the total potential of the adopted technologies, Q =Q(t) is
the exploited part of this potential, and /C ..... al Q0 is a constant that charac-
terizes the rate of exploitation.
Identifying the period of economic growth T gr with the period it takes
for the upcoming new industries to grow from the threshold of economic signi-
ficance Ql(~ 20'% of total potential) to near saturation Qz (say approximately
90'% of total potential), we have
(18.4)
The simple logistic growth curve may be somewhat oversimplified since, as we
have indicated, improvement innovations during the growth process will
expand the potential of the adopted technologies. As a first approach we may
describe this process by
(18.5)
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As before, Qo denotes the total potential for economic activities associated
with the currently adopted technologies, and Q is the exploited part of this
potential. Due to improvements, Qo is now a function of time. The constant /C1.
describes the rate at which improvement innovations are introduced.
The set of equations (18.3)-(18.5) has the characteristic feature of pro-
longing the growth period. If /C1. > /C, the saturation level recedes faster than
exploitation develops, and a new downturn never occurs. For a more reason-
able value of /C1. ~ /C/3, the length of the upswing in our model is extended
from 24 years to about 32 years, and the total wave period thus becomes T Ie ~
55 years.
18.3. A System. Dynamics Formulation
According to our assumptions, each Kondratieff wave is qualitatively different
from previous and from subsequent waves. Each wave has its own characteris-
tic infrastructure, leading industrial sectors, and typical production methods.
Since qualitative differences can only be handled through disaggregation,
each wave must be described in terms of its own flow and stock variables.
The System Dynamics flow diagram of Figure 1.8.2 shows how a potential
for innovations is generated through accumulation of inventions and basic
discoveries. As basic discoveries we consider significant scientific break-
throughs such as Hertz's discovery of radio waves, Pasteur's discovery of
micro-organisms, and the development of quantum mechanics. Discoveries of
new primary energy sources, new types of raw materials, and new production
methods are also included, and so is the appearance of ideas that can lead to
fundamental social and political changes (e.g., land reforms and parliamentari-
anism). Examples of inventions are the steam engine, the internal combustion
engine, telephones, airplanes, transistors, etc.).
In the model, inventions and basic discoveries are both generated
through Poisson processes (Mosekilde and Rasmussen, 1983), Le., we assume
that they occur randomly distributed in time. For simplicity, we consider
that all inventions generate the same innovation potential, which we arbi-
trarily choose to be 600. Similarly, all basic discoveries are assumed to gen-
erate an innovation potential of 4000. In the preliminary version of the model,
inventions are assumed to occur at an average frequency of 0.3/year, while
basic discoveries are assumed to occur at an average frequency of 0.03/year.
Thus the total innovation potential accumulated during a wave period, in aver-
age, amounts to (0.3 x 600 + 0.03 x 4000) x 55 ~ 16000.
Scientific discoveries are not usually applied at once but often precede
their practical use by 20-80 years. The basic discovery behind the locomo-
tive, for instance, was made by Watt in 1769, but it was not until 1824 that
Stephenson built his first locomotive plant (Marchetti, 1980). Certain
mathematical discoveries, such as Boolean algebra and some of Leibniz's
theories, have remained practically idle for centuries until, with the inven-
tions of the transistor, the integrated circuit, and the digital computer, they
suddenly became of central importance. One can also point to a long series of
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inventions that have never been used in practice, such as Leonardo da Vinci's
famous machines. In the model, inventions and discoveries therefore accumu-
late as ideas and basic knowledge from which new innovations can be gen-
erated. Some of the accumulated knowledge may become obsolete as time goes
on, and we have therefore assumed an exponential decay for the innovation
potential corresponding to an average lifetime of 80 years. It should be
stressed, however, that this time constant has no direct significance for the
periodicity of the long wave.
As basic new innovations we consider the first practical application of
new techniques, the introduction of new agricultural production methods, the
introduction of new types of consumer goods, the establishment of significant
trade agreements, the first successful formation of labor unions, etc., recog-
nizing that technological change in the present context must be given a very
broad definition. Innovation and introduction of new techniques create a
potential for economic activity. Exploitation of this potential involves the
buildup of new industries and infrastructures, the cultivation of new land, the
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production of new types of consumer goods, etc. It is not until this stage that
significant amounts of production factors (labor and capital) become involved,
and it is therefore exploitation of the generated economic potential that con-
trols overall economic development: periods in which the rate of exploitation
is high are economic growth periods, and periods in which relatively few new
possibilities are exploited are stagnation periods.
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upswing. Similar modules are used to describe preceding and subsequent waves.
As shown in Figure W.3, the adoption of new techniques through innova-
tions, and the buildup of infrastructure and production capital through
investments, are both modeled as logistic market penetration processes. The
rate of innovations is thus taken to be proportional both to the number of
innovations under present exploitation (economic potential of adopted innova-
tions) and to the accumulated knowledge (potential for innovations). The first
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factor gives amplification as the exploitation of already adopted techniques
requires additional innovations. The second factor provides a saturation
mechanism if the available inventions and basic discoveries become fully
exploited. Similarly, the rate of investments is proportional both to existing
production capital and to the economic potential of adopted technologies.
Our model is more profound than usual market penetration models, in
that it describes both how the logistic growth processes become possible as
instabilities arise in shifting parts of the system, and how the growth
processes initiate in the background noise of random attempts to adopt or
exploit new techniques. There will always be attempts, for instance, to turn
existing scientific knowledge into practical applications, and the rate of inno-
vation therefore contains a random noise term proportional to the intensity
or frequency of these attempts. Similarly, the rate of capital buildup con-
tains a noise term that represents the always present random attempts to
invest in the production of new types of goods and services.
Under normal circumstances, the economic system is fully occupied with
exploiting already adopted techniques, and attempts to introduce basic new
technologies seldom succeed. However, if an existing set of technologies
approaches saturation, the suppressing forces weaken, the system becomes
susceptible to new ideas, and through an unstable transition it yields to a
wave of new innovations. This creates a potential for new economic possibili-
ties in the face of which the economic system becomes unstable, and a wave of
exploitation unfolds.
The flow diagram of Figure 18.3 also shows how the economic potential
during its exploitation can increase through improvements to existing
technologies. This is modeled through the rate of improvement innovations,
which, in accordance with our discussion above, is taken to depend both on
the potential under exploitation (economic potential of adopted innovations)
and on the already exploited potential (production and infrastructure capi-
tal).
Finally, Figure 18.3 illustrates how society shifts its attention from
basic new innovations to improvement innovations as the production and
infrastructure capital of an upcoming wave becomes comparable to the total
production capital in society. This is modeled through the auxiliary variable
denoted "social attitudes toward innovation", a nonlinear function that
reduces the rate of basic innovations and increases the rate of improvement
innovations as the upcoming new industries mature, and society locks itself
onto the already adopted technologies.
Figure 18.4 provides an overview of the model structure for one particu-
lar Kondratieff upswing. This figure also shows how the random invention,
innovation, and investment frequencies can be made to depend upon the
overall economic capacity of society through feedbacks from total production
capital. Such feedbacks are required to produce secular economic growth in
the model, but they have not been included in the simulations presented
below.
Finally, Figure 1B.5 illustrates how the instabilities are directed
through the system from one module to the next. The first module is unstable
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from the outset, since it is assumed that a number of unexploited scientific
discoveries have accumulated. and since the model is initiated in a state
where society is susceptible to new innovations. After an incubation time, the
length of which depends both on the noise level (Le., the intensity of random
attempts to turn accumulated knowledge into new innovations), and on the gain
factor (Le., the innovation rate constant). a macroscopically significant poten-
tial for new economic activities develops. This innovation wave is assumed to
last for about 10 years. or about 1;5 of the total wave period.
By creating a potential for economic activities, a new instability is gen-
erated, and an exponential growth in production capital is initiated. After a
new incubation period, which again depends both on the random investment
frequency and on the gain factor (the investment rate constant), the
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production and infrastructure capital associated with the upcoming wave
reach macroscopic significance. Society now engages itself fully in the
exploitation of already adopted technologies, and the rate of basic innova-
tions falls to zero.
As the exploitation of first-wave technologies continues, a point of
saturation is approached. The economic growth rate then declines, and
society gradually becomes ready to accept a new set of technologies based on
scientific discoveries that have accumulated since the first innovation wave.
Hereafter follows the exploitation of second-wave technologies. adoption of
third-wave technologies, etc.
18.4. Simulation Results
Figure 18.6 shows a typical set of simulation results. For each of four subse-
quent waves we have here plotted the variation with time of the three state
variables, the accumulated potential for innovations, the economic potential of
adopted innovations. and the production and infrastructure capital. The fig-
ure shows how the curves for the economic potential of adopted technologies
and for the installed capital all grow out of insignificant background noise.
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Note how the model produces a relatively regular succession of upswings with
a 50-year period out of the external signals of random discoveries. Note also
how the economic potentials of adopted innovations show a double logistic
growth of which the first part is associated with basic new innovations during
periods of economic stagnation, while the subsequent enhancement is associ-
ated with improvement innovations during periods of economic growth.
Figure 18.7 shows the rates of basic innovations and the investment
rates associated with four subsequent Kondratieff waves. On this figure we
have also plotted the randomly occurring inventions and basic discoveries. It
can be seen, how basic innovations predominantly occur in periods with low
investment rates.
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To illustrate the significance of the random element in our model, we
have run a series of simulations with different initial values for Dynamo's
NOISE-function (see Figure 1.8.8, which is directly comparable with Figure
18.6). As defined by the amplitudes of the individual waves and their precise
time of occurrences. the behavior of the model strongly depends on the
sequence of random discoveries. However, the tendency to generate 50-60-
year waves out of these discoveries is maintained independently of the
NOISE-sequence.
E. MosekiLde, S. Rasmu.ssen, and M. Zebrowski 271
30 Third
wave
10050o
Second
C") 20 wave
0
~
.~
...
C
a.>
...
0
c.
.!:2
E
0
c
0
u 10UJ
Time (years)
Figu.re 1B.8. Accumulated potential for innovations (dolled curve), economic poten-
tial of adopted technologies (fine curve), and production and infrastructure capital
(heavy curve) with a different initial value for Dynamo's NOISE-function (cf. Fig-
u.re 1B.6).
18.5. Discussion
Considering the dissemination of new techniques as a series of unstable tran-
sitions through which inventions, innovations. and random attempts to invest
in new technologies at the individual or company level explode into waves that
spread throughout the industrialized world, we have been able to develop a
formal model of the economic long wave.
With this description, the qualitative changes in society from upswing to
upswing are accounted for. at least in principle. There is no precise wave
period since the amplitudes and accurate locations in time of the individual
upswings are influenced by the random distribution of inventions and basic
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discoveries. Nonetheless, there is a tendency for the system to develop in a
rhythmic manner with a typical period of 50-60 years.
This period is controlled by the rate constant for the buildup of produc-
tion and infrastructure capital (assuming this to be the slower of the two dis-
semination processes), and by the number of decades over which the rising
new industries must grow to attain macroeconomic significance. The more fre-
quent the random attempts to adopt and exploit new techniques, the shorter
will the wave period be, and the smaller is also the amplitude. According to
the model, the intensity of the wave could thus be reduced if society were
more open to experimentation with new energy sources, new transport and
communication systems, etc., particularly during periods of high economic
growth.
It is interesting to note that the value ex = 15-20%/year, which we have
to assume for the aggregated linear growth rate of upcoming new industries to
obtain a period of 50-60 years for the rhythmic growth process, precisely
corresponds to the value assumed in Sterman's (1983) model for the maximum
investment rate. In our model an increase in ex reduces the wave period,
whereas an increase in the maximum investment rate prolongs the wave period
in Sterman's model. The two models also differ widely in the significance they
give to capital lifetimes. It will therefore be interesting to see the outcome of
an integration of these approaches.
In their more detailed analyses, the MIT group has also discussed the
shift in capital/labor mix during the phases of the long wave (see Sterman,
1984). We believe that this shift is affected not only by economic factors
(such as aggregated factor prices), but that technological factors associated
with e.g., the buildup of new industries, the adoption of new production
methods, the introduction of new transport and communication systems, etc.,
are just as important. Also in this respect we would therefore like to see an
integration of the two approaches.
With the adoption of the structural change approach, the Kondratieff
wave becomes an integrated part of the long-term sociotechnoeconomic
development of society. It will therefore also be of interest to investigate
how determinants of long-term growth feed back and change the amplitude
and period of the Kondratieff wave. Such determinants could be associated
with the increasing complexity of society, with resource scarcity and pollu-
tion, or with the shift from material production to a service-oriented economy.
In addition, there is no guarantee, of course, that basic scientific discoveries
will continue to be made at more or less the same frequency.
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CHAPTKR 19
New Technology and
Regional Development
Peter Nijkamp
19.1. Introduction
In the history of economic thought technology has almost never been treated
as an explicit subject, but has mainly been regarded as a datum for economic
analysis (the so-called "data crown" hypothesis; see Eucken, 1950). In recent
years, however, a profound interest in the causes and effects of technological
changes - seen from an economic viewpoint - has emerged. The economics of
technological change has come to the fore as an intriguing research issue (see
Stoneman, 1983).
In the past, technological innovation has also been interpreted in the
context of Schumpeter's view of technological revolutions as driving forces
behind the Kondratieff cycles (see Kleinknecht, 1984). Clustered innovations
have in the past exerted a profound impact on Western societies (railways,
electricity, automobiles. etc.). The introduction of new technologies requires
a "basic science" connected to "technical exploitation", followed by "imagina-
tive laps" that precede all upswing phases in a Kondratieff long wave (see
Rothwell and Zegveld. 1981). Much scientific discussion has also emerged on
the question of whether new technologies are a result of a demand pull or a
technology push. A great deal of confusion in this field has arisen because of
a fuzzy use of the term "new technology", especially because the motives and
impacts of process, product, institutional, and managerial innovations may be
quite different.
Technology as the "society's pool of knowledge regarding the industrial
arts" (Mansfield, 1968) is, however. not a homogeneous knowledge asset, but is
marked by a wide variety of appearances ranging inter alia from small-scale
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to large-scale forms and from traditional to advanced activities. In the past,
much attention has been focused on new technologies since it is widely
believed that technological change may be one of the driving forces for new
economic progress in an era of stagnation and structural change (cf. Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Rosegger, 1980). However. the terms "new technology",
"advanced technology". or "high technology" are not unambiguously defined
and deserve closer attention. In this chapter an attempt will be made to
demarcate more precisely the meaning of the concept "new technology".
A second aim of this chapter is to analyze the locational patterns of
new technology. For instance, it has often been claimed that large metropol-
ises are losing part of their innovative potential with regard to large firms in
favor of medium-sized cities (see Malecki, 1983). In the light of the uneven
geographical distribution of the new technology sector, it may be an impor-
tant research objective to identify the economic motives for its locational
behavior.
Finally, a case study of the Netherlands on the location pattern of new
technology activities is described, in which it is concluded that the sector is
not necessarily located in large cities, but may exhibit a more scattered spa-
tial configuration although the sector is at least oriented toward the breeding
ground function of large cities (the "urban climate" or "incubator"
hypothesis).
19.2. New Technology in an Era of Change
Technology is not a datum in entrepreneurial behavior, but it may be one of
the instruments that improves the relative economic position of a firm.
Clearly, there must be a need for employing this instrument in a competitive
system. In addition, the financial resources, capital, and entrepreneurshIp
must provide the conditions for technological change. Other important
prerequisites for technological innovation are the availability of an appropri-
ate (external) knowledge infrastructure such as transfer centers, science
parks, and knowledge centers (Mouwen and Nijkamp, 1985), and a sufficient
level of (internal) RIIdJ investments (Andersson and Johansson, 1984).
New technologies imply that inventions are successfully transformed into
innovations that are technically feasible and commercially attractive. This
implies a successful implementation of new products or production processes,
and a successful introduction of related management and marketing changes
(including the search for new markets or new market segments). Conse-
quently, technological innovations also require the successful use of new
information technology (NIT), since the information infrastructure is an
essential ingredient in any (private or public) development strategy (Gillespie
et al., 1984).
Technological innovation is also closely linked to the product life cycle.
The various (successful) stages of a new product require special technological
changes and R&D efforts. First of all, the invention and introduction phases
of a product require a close orientation toward both R&D divisions and sales
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markets. Next. during the expansion phase. more attention is needed to
increase product standardization and labor productivity. given the competi-
tion with other entrepreneurs on the same markel. In the third stage, an
orientation toward more capital intensity and product export is necessary in
order to prevent a stagnation in sales. Finally, in the mature stage. both
domestic and foreign competition becomes so strong that - unless new market
segments are created through increased product specialization. or coopera-
tion with competitors is realized - a decline will commence.
Each phase of such technological innovations may have its own specific
R&D and technology requirements, as well as its own specific locational
requirements (Brotchie, et al., 1985; Stohr and Schubert, 1984). Consequently,
regional development is codetermined by the life cycle phase of a new tech-
nology (see Section 19.3). The demarcation of new technology - in contrast
with other technology - is not an easy task. In principle, two different
approaches can be distinguished. Le., the cross-section approach and the
selective sector approach.
The cross-section approach examines all sectors of the economy and
attempts to identify - on the basic of detailed surveys - the share of techno-
logical innovations (especially advanced technology) in each sector (for
instance, by assessing the R&D input in each sector). This is a useful
research strategy. although it is fairly time-consuming and does not always
give accurate answers (Kleinknecht and Mouwen, 1985; Mouwen and Nijkamp,
1985).
The selective sector approach tries to identify those sectors in the
economy that are characterized by a high degree of use of new technology
activities. The main problem here, however. lies in drawing up a definition of
new technological activities, in particular because a broad sectoral classifica-
tion would be unsatisfactory.
In the literature, various definitions of new (advanced or high) technol-
ogy have been given. Despite a certain vagueness or fuzziness in the termi-
nology (Haustein, 1982), various general attributes of new technology can be
identified:
(1) The use of highly skilled employees, many of whom are scientists or
engineers (Doody and Munzer. 1981; Rogers and Larsen, 1984).
(2) A high proportion of R&D expenditures on sales (Doody and Munzer,
1981; Hall and Markusen. 1983; Premus, 1982; Rogers and Larsen, 1984).
(3) A nationwide or worldwide market for the products (Doody and Munzer,
1981; Rogers and Larsen. 1984).
(4) A fast rate of growth (Doody and Munzer. 1981; Hall and Markusen, 1983;
Rogers and Larsen. 1984).
(5) A high degree of labor intensity in the production stage (Doody and
Munzer, 1981; Premus. 1982).
In conclusion, the new technology sector can mainly be found in technically
oriented industries based on scientific and technological practices that lead
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to a relatively high growth rate of value added. Examples of such industries
are chemicals, electronics, aircraft. and precision instruments.
It is clear that a sharp definition and identification of the new technol-
ogy is hard to give, because of rapid changes in many industrial sectors,
incomparability of technological information, a firm's specific position in a
product cycle, the lack of disaggregated empirical data on production
processes at the micro level (even at the level of divisions or plants within
one firm), and the lack of a sharp distinction between new technology prod-
ucts and processes (McQuaid and Langridge, 1984).
In this chapter the attention is focused on firms (or industrial sectors)
producing new technology products and which are to a large extent marked
by the above features. For practical reasons. in the empirical part the selec-
tive sector approach will be used. so that attention will be given to a selected
set of (fairly detailed and disaggregated) industrial sectors that comply with
the above mentioned features.
19.3. The Location of New Technology Firms
The locational analysis of new technology firms is still underdeveloped: a clear
theoretical framework is lacking, while various case studies provide sometimes
only anecdotal observations (Malecki and Varaiya, 1986). Nevertheless, some
structural spatial development patterns do seem to be emerging. New tech-
nology firms are increasingly dividing their activities into routine (or
standardized) and non-routine (or innovative) operations. The non-routine
(mainly R&D-oriented) activities tend to concentrate in only a few locations
marked by significant agglomeration advantages such as accessibility. For
instance, Hekman (1980) indicates that computer firms in the USA tend to
maintain their innovative activities in only a few regions (like California,
Texas, or Massachusetts). Standardized production and assembly operations
are either moving into small towns or peripheral areas or into low-wage ·Third
World countries (Bluestone and Harrison. 1982).
Next, non-routine activities in the new technology sector rely heavily on
skilled and professional labor inputs. so that the quality of the residential cli-
mate (including sociocultural amenities) also becomes a major locational motive
(Brotchie et al., 1985; Hall et al., 1983). Similar results were found by Oakey
(1981) in a study of the British instruments sector. who concluded that skilled
workers largely determine the location of production. This result was sup-
ported by Malecki (1984) and Oakey (1983). who observed that locational
preferences of technical personnel exert a large influence on the location
decisions of R&D. Such personnel appear to attach a high priority to cul-
tural, educational, and employment opportunities in urban areas.
With regard to routine activities, especially of multi-plant corporate
organizations, it is evident that low-skill labor is still the main input. In as far
as low-skill employment is abundantly present in various regions, it is mainly
the wage level that determines the locational pattern of these standardized
activities (Hansen, 1980). It should be added, however, that these activities
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are fairly capital intensive, so that aging and life cycle processes of capital
stocks may also exert a significant long-term influence on industdal location
patterns of new technology firms.
In addition, it has to be mentioned that a large concentration of new
technology activities may lead to congestion phenomena, especially if innova-
tive firms create spin-off effects that lead to an increase in routine activities.
Premus (1982), for instance, observed that in recent years there has been a
tendency for new technology firms in the USA to move from the Sunbelt states
to .the Midwest due to bottleneck factors (su~h as high wage rates, high land
rents, insufficient area for industrial expansion, high local taxes, and traffic
congestion). Clearly, this "crowding out" phenomenon may also be related to
the firm's position in the product cycle. Similar results were found in Scot-
land (Cross, 1981), the Netherlands (Hoogteijling et al., 1986; Wever, 1984),
and in the FRG (Wettmann, 1983).
Another (important) locational determinant of the new technology sector
is its orientation toward an accessible communications and information net-
work, so that this sector is either located at nodal points in a physical com-
munications infrastructure or in areas near research and educational insti-
tutes (Levy, 1983). This may also lead to job-hopping, as has occurred in
California's Silicon Valley.
A final relevant component of an innovation infrastructure of the new
technology sector is the availability of venture capital (Rothwell, 1982), espe-
cially in those countries that are marked by regional variations in the provi-
sion of venture capital. This may especially hold true for large countries (like
the USA) with segmented markets for venture capital. In small countries,
however, it is plausible to assume that regional differences in venture capital
hardly exist, so that this is not a location-specific factor (though it may be
generic determining factor for new technological innovations in the country as
a whole).
The foregoing remarks lead to the following propositions, which will be
further tested in an empirical study on the locational pattern of the new
technology in the Netherlands:
(1) Non-routine (R&D-oriented) new technological activities are sensitive to
communication, information, and accessibility, so that their location may
be expected at nodal points in a spatial network.
(2) Routine (standardized) new technological activities and operations may
exhibit a more scattered pattern due to crowding-out effects.
(3) New technological activities recruit highly skilled employees who attach
a high priority to a favorable residential climate near major urban
centers.
(4) The location of the new technology will not be influenced by the wage
level and the presence of venture capitai, insofar as in a small country
significant regional differences in these locational factors do not exist.
These propositions will now be examined in the context of a Dutch case study
on new technology.
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19.4. Location of New Technology in the Netherlands: A Test
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Following the above arguments, we consider first the operational demarcation
of high technology sectors in the Netherlands and the operational definition
of locational determinants of the new technology (Bouman et al., 1985).
The conventional sectoral subdivision of Business Week - Data
Resources is based on five categories: energy, agriculture, high technology,
services, and old line industries. For our case study, based on the above
selective sector approach, Table 1.9.1 lists activities in the Dutch economy
that are assumed to belong to the new technology sector by their four-digit
standard industrial classification. This classification is mainly based on the
design of new products; the use of high-tech products by other sectors is
left out of consideration, since use is not regarded as a new technology
activity per se (unless the use of such products is necessary for designing
more advanced new technology products, as is the case in the medical sector,
the robotics sector, and the optical industry).
Table 19.1.. New t.echnology sect.ors in t.he Dut.ch economy.
standard industrial
classiJ'ication code
3581
3593
3693
3694
3695
3771
3811
3821
3831
3841
Sector
office equipment.
weighing inst.rument.s and retail equipment.
elect.rical and elect.ronic measurement. and cont.rol
equipment. and elect.romedical equipment.
t.elecommunicaUons and signal equipment.
radio, t.elevision, and elect.ronic equipment.
aircraft.
medical, surgical, dent.al, and vet.erinarian inst.ruments
measurement. and cont.rol inst.ruments
optical and phot.ot.echnical inst.ruments
clocks and wat.ches
The spatial dispersion of new technology firms in the Netherlands has
been analyzed on the basis of a sample of firms in the sectors included in
Table 1.9.1 (provided by the Dutch Chamber of Commerce). The location of all
new technology firms could be derived from this sample, so that a detailed
insight into the geographical pattern of the sector in the Netherlands could
be obtained. Some results will briefly be presented here. Table 1.9.2 presents
a representation of the spatial dispersion at the provincial level in the Neth-
erlands, based on the location quotient (the ratio of the provincial share of
the new technology sector with respect to provincial share of the total indus-
trial sector).
Table 1.9.2 clearly shows that the new technology sector is over-
represented in the three industrialized, urbanized provinces (the so-called
Randstad or Rimcity), confirming the conventional wisdom that the new tech-
nology sector is very much oriented toward large-scale urban/industrial
agglomerations.
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Table 19.2. Localion quotienl for Dulch new lechnology firms.
New technology Industrial
firms establishments
Province No. :g No. :g Location quotient
Groningen 36 2.8 1499 3.2 0.88
Friesland 26 2.0 1860 4.0 0.55
Drenle 26 2.0 1005 2.2 0.90
Overijssel 76 5.0 3365 7.3 0.69
Gelderland 119 9.2 5748 12.4 0.74
Ulrechl 129 10.0 2902 6.3 1.59
Noord-Holland 268 20.8 8405 18.1 1.15
Zuid-Holland 340 26.4 9220 19.9 1.33
Zeeland 22 1.7 1026 2.2 0.77
Noord-Brabanl 159 12.4 7579 16.3 0.76
Limburg 73 5.7 3545 7.6 0.75
Zuid-Ysselmeer 13 1.0 253 0.5 2.00
However. it is interesting to study some results at a more spatially disag-
gregate level (the so-called COROP level marked by 40 nodal regions). These
results are presented in Figure 1.9.1. This map demonstrates a slightly dif-
ferent pattern. It is still evident that various nodal regions are character-
ized by an overrepresentation of new technology firms. Furthermore. various
regions outside the Randstad appear to have a fairly strong new technology
orientation as well. Consequently, ecological fallacy may lead to a biased
interpretation of the actual spatial distribution of new technology firms. The
Same pattern presented in Figure 1.9.1 Was obtained by examining the spatial
dispersion of the new technology firms in terms of employment. A first look
at Figure 1.9.1 suggests that the locational pattern of new technology is
closely related to the presence of an urban agglomeration marked by a high
degree of accessibility and of R&D infrastructure. Similar results have been
found for the USA by Premus (1982) and for France by Aydalot (1984), which
also suggest that the diffusion of high technology firms does not exhibit a
hierarchical distance-decay pattern from the center, but rather a multiple-
nuclei pattern. This pattern can be further analyzed by examining the loca-
tional determinants of the new technology sector.
An operational definition of the locational determinants discussed in the
previous section is far from easy. The following indicators based on available
data from the Netherlands have been used:
(1) Educa.tion. The regional share of highly skilled employees in the total
regional labor force.
(2) R&IJ infra.structure. The (weighted average) distance of each regional
main centre with respect to all R&D centers (university institutes, pub-
lic research institutes, technology and transfer centers, etc.).
(3) Amenities. A (weighted) sociocultural index constructed on the basis of
the regional availability of recreational facilities, monuments, and cul-
tural facilities (standardized for the number of inhabitants per region).
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(4) Venture capital. The regional supply of venture capital provided by
(publicly financed) regional development corporations.
(5) Urbanization. The share of the regional population living in large urban
centers.
An econometric test of the validity of these locational determinants at the
provincial level would lead to unreliable results in the light of the small
number of provinces (12); an adjusted approach has thus been adopted here.
From our literature survey it has become clear that at least a ranking of the
order of, importance of these locational determinants can be derived. In most
cases, an orientation toward large agglomerations is regarded as an extremely
important explanatory factor for the spatial pattern of the new technology
sector (indicator 5), followed by high-skill educational facilities (indicator 1)
and R&D infrastructure (indicator 2), while amenities (indicator 3) and ven-
ture capital (indicator 4) have usually a much lower ranking. Based on expert
views and intuition. the following weight coefficients have been used in an
explanatory model for the geographical distribution of the new technology
firms (Table 19.3).
By next calculating using a linear model the expected geographical
dispersion of new technology firms. based on weights in Table 19.3 and the
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actual regional observations on the locational determinants (1-5), a fairly
satisfactory result is obtained: 96% of the variance in the actual geographical
pattern of new technology firms is explained by the weights in Table 19.3. A
check by means of a regression model confirmed the results for the main indi-
cators (i), (2) and (5), while for the remaining indicators insignificant results
were obtained.
fuble 1D.3. Weights attached to locational determinants.
Location indicators
Weights
19.5. In Retrospect
(1)
0.25
(2)
0.2
(3)
0.1
(4)
0.1
(5)
0.35
The following conclusions can be inferred from the Dutch case study. Not all
propositions mentioned in Section 19.3 could be tested due to the limited
empirical data on the locational patterns and motives of new technology firms,
but the available data support the hypothesis that new technology firms tend
to locate at nodal points in an accessible network, with a strong orientation
toward large urban centers. This bias against the urban milieu is once more
favored due to the high-skill and R&D requirements of new technology firms.
Crowding-out effects could be observed in two respects: (1) the trend toward
a suburban location (with a favorable living climate) of new technology firms,
and (2) the trend toward an urban location in intermediate and/or peripheral
areas. Regional differentation of wage levels and of the supply of venture
capital could hardly be observed in the Netherlands, so that these factors
vanish as explanatory determinants of the geographical location pattern of
the new technology sector. Finally, due to lack of data on routine versus
non-routine data at the firm level, the spatial differentiation between routine
and non-routine new technologies could not be examined. The overall conclu-
sion is that the empirical evidence from the Netherlands supports most
hypotheses offered by the present literature, while the differences that do
occur are due mainly to the spatial scale of the country.
Our findings on the metropolitan orientation of the new technology sec-
tor have various policy implications: a regional development policy fOcusing
on new technology should take the metropolitan area as its geographical base.
In this area the conditions for new technology location have been favored by
supporting the development of contract information flows, since this deter-
mines the comparative advantage of the area (Brotchie et al., 1985). Such
agglomeration advantages are of utmost importance for the creation of
advanced knowledge and creativity (requiring inter alia advanced educa-
tional institutes and R&D centers). The economic potential of such agglomera-
tions is thus strongly determined by public overhead capital inducing the
development of the new technology sector.
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CHAPTI.:R 20
Scientific and Technological Cycles:
Program- and Aim-Oriented Planning
Yu. V Yakovets
20.1. Introduction
The radical, worldwide changes in science, technology, and economics that
have occurred since the mid-1970s have aroused the interest of researchers
into their causes, which may be rooted in the regularities of scientific and
technological progress. The literature on the subject is growing, and national
and international conferences are frequently held. In the USSR intensive
research is being conducted into these regular cycles of scientific and tech-
nological development (Gatovski. 1974; Kedrov, 1980; Rajkov, 1983; Sedov,
1977; Yakovets, 1984). This chapter deals with the theoretical background.
content, and applied aspects of the utilization of these cycles of development
that, in our view, are of paramount importance if we are to understand the
changes occurring in the world and to adapt ourselves to them effectively.
20.2. Theory of Scientific and Technological Cycles
Technology and science do not develop in a straight line or exponentially.
The pattern of development resembles a spiral where qualitative, revolution-
ary leaps are followed by periods of evolutionary expansion and the improve-
ment of a new generation of machinery. In this spiral-like movement one can
identify structural elements of various depths and duration and discover
quantitative measures of their sequence and periodicity.
The primary and most frequently observed form of qualitative leap in
technology is the machine generation change (Yakovets, 1984). At the core
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of such a leap lies the realization of a new, more effective technological idea
or invention that enables goods of better quality to be produced at substan-
tially lower costs. This machine generation change covers all fields of appli-
cation of a particular technology, and occurs on average every 8-10 years; in
new branches (such as electronics) such changes occur more frequently,
whereas in traditional industries (e.g., textiles or mining) they appear over
longer periods.
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In the life cycle of each machine generation five phases can be dis-
tinguished (Figure 20.1):
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(1) A zero or pre-production phase 0, which includes the elaboration and
testing of a new idea or invention and its translation into experimental
prototypes.
(2) In phase 1 the new generation of machines is mastered. This is the most
complex and difficult phase. since it is connected with the transforma-
tion of spheres of production. the application of the new technology. and
its high production and utilization costs.
(3) In phase 2 production rapidly expands. new models are created to meet
the requirements of various spheres of application, and prices fall
rapidly. All this extends the effective use of a new machine generation.
(4) In phase 3 the scale of production, costs, and price levels do not change
substantially, and effective growth rates become notably lower. but the
extent of the economic effect is greatest.
(5) In phase 4 the moral and technological aging of the machines takes place,
and further improvements and modification are no longer effective. It is
necessary to replace the old machines with new ones as rapidly as possi-
ble. and their development and introduction are timed and coordinated
with phases 3 and 4 of the previous generation (Figure 20.2). Only then
is continuity and effectiveness of technological progress assured.
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Marx first pointed out the cyclical nature of innovations in the produc-
tion technological base. The periodic, massive renewal of fixed capital caused
by a transition to a more effective technology in capitalist economies serves
as the material foundation for periodic overproduction crises (Marx and
Engels. 1961). Although the mechanism of capitalist cycles has recently been
considerably modified. it continues to operate. In socialist economies the
transition to a new generation of technology is planned and is thus devoid of
crises.
More comprehensive and complex technological leaps are manifested in
new directions of technological development, based on a qualitatively
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different principle, through which major scientific discoveries can be utilized
as basic innovations (e.g.. robots, biotechnology, lasers, microelectronics.
etc.). Several generations of machinery may be replaced (Figure 20.3), within
various spheres of application; this may take several decades and is generally
linked with the formation of new branches of industry. The development of
this form of technological cycle has five phases, the duration of each of which
is longer than that of the change in machine generations. The costs of mas-
tering the machines of the new direction may be higher but their economic
impacts are much greater. The onset of a new direction implies a partial tech-
nological revolution.
When several new technological directions converge over a relatively
short period, enriching and enhancing each other. we can speak of the emer-
gence of a general technological revolution (Figure 20.4). Initially, this
occurs in a group of leading sectors in the developed countries, then in a
wave-like manner it spreads rapidly from the epicenter, radically transform-
ing the material and technological basis of society, accelerating the rates of
economic growth, and increasing the efficiency of production processes. The
occurrence of such a revolution is connected with a scientific revolution, qual-
itative transformations in the training of workers (education revolution), and
in the organization of production (Figure 20.5).
On the whole, these radical changes express the main content of the
next stage in the development of productive forces, and ultimately bring
about - through complex and often contradictory interrelations - qualitative
leaps in economic and social relationships. Hence, the scientific-
technological cycle reveals the dialectical mechanism of the development of
productive forces as the material base for social progress.
Several such upheavals in the history of technological development can
be identified. In early human society the first of these were the development
of agriculture and the use of metals (bronze and iron). In the eighth to tenth
centuries AD the center of technological development was in the Far East, and
the shift to Europe in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries gave rise to
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the trade guilds. A revolution in manufacturing took place in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, and introduced a rigid division of labor. The
Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
laid the foundation for mechanized production as the material basis of capital-
ism. We can also observe technological changes of lesser importance in the
mid-1900s, and the electrical (electrotechnical) revolution of the late 1900s.
In the present century we have witnessed the greatest general technological
revolution of the 1940s and 1950s, and most recently in the 1970s.
The development of science is also cyclical, although the boundaries of
the phases and cycles are less distinct (Bernal. 1956; Kedrov. 1980; Rajkov,
1983; Yakovets, 1984). New theories periodically emerge, creating partial
scientific revolutions in various branches of knowledge, as well as general
scientific revolutions that radically change our views and signify new steps
towards recognizing the laws of the world around us and offer new ways of
applying them. Such revolutions began with the creation of the system of sci-
ences in ancient Greece (600-400 Be). Subsequently, scientific revolutions
occurred due to major discoveries in the Far East at the end of the first mil-
lenium AD; in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Renaissance Europe; in
the late seventeenth century preceding the Industrial Revolution; in the mid-
1900s; in the natural sciences at the turn of the century (in particular,
Einstein's theory of relativity and Planck's quantum theory); in the 1930s and
1940s; and finally the present general scientific revolution of the 1970s.
Technological and scientific cycles are closely interconnected: every
major step in technological development puts new scientific ideas into prac-
tice, while at the same time creating the necessity and providing the techni-
cal means for the next step in the development of science. The twentieth
century has witnessed a qualitatively new phenomenon in that revolutions in
science and technology have become so closely interwoven that it is now pos-
sible to refer to them as scientific-technological revolutions. However, sci-
ence and technology have each retained some independence in the general
stream of scientific-technological progress.
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As before, we can observe ever-shorter scientific-technological cycles
and intervals between them. In the first scientific-technological revolution
of the 1930s (Mensch. 1975; van Duijn. 1983) basic innovations were made. and
these were implemented in the 1940s. The 1950s was a decade of rapid expan-
sion and diffusion, and the 1960s was the period of maturity. By the mid-
1970s the economic potential of the technology created in the 1930s had been
mostly exhausted. and the final stage of the cycle began - the maturation and
aging of old technologies. at the same time as the development and mastering
of achievements of the new revolution. the effects of which are only gradually
being recognized.
The foundations of theory of technological revolutions were laid by Marx
in Capital and his other works. He studied the history of technology and its
basic stages of development. content. historical significance, and
socioeconomic implications using the example of the Industrial Revolution.
Engels interpreted many of the technological and scientific revolutions of the
past. and foresaw the implications of the electrotechnical revolution of the
late nineteenth century (Marx and Engels, 1961). Lenin also contributed
greatly to the assessment of technological revolutions. and described their
spiral-like development.
In the 1920s a discussion of long waves took place in the USSR. As noted
by Kondratieff and Oparin (1928), they are caused by the large-scale intro-
duction of significant inventions, while Schumpeter (1939) studied the cyclical
nature of technological and economic developments due to innovations. In
1956 Bernal published a study of the history of scientific and technological
revolutions, but interest in the phenomena diminished noticeably until the
mid-1970s, when a number of publications appeared (van Duijn. 1983; Mensch,
1975; Bianchi et al., 1985).
20.3. The Second Scientific-Technological Revolution
That the latter half of the 1970s marked a period of profound technological
change is now widely accepted, but there are several approaches to its
evaluation. Some consider it to be simply a further stage in the development
of the second scientific-technological revolution, without specifying its possi-
ble duration, while others believe it to be the beginning of a "third wave"
(Toffler, 1980). A~sessments of technological changes that have occurred in
the second scientific-technological revolution are centered on the following
fields (see Figure 20.6):
(1) Revolutionary developments in physics. biology (genetic engineering),
and technical sciences have provided possibilities for major break-
throughs. particularly in microelectronics and biotechnology.
(2) Changes occurring in the means of production. materials. and energy
sources (automated production using robots. flexible manufacturing sys-
tems, composite materials. energy-saving techniques. and new methods of
processing substances with minimal waste).
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F'i.gure 2.0.6. The structure of the second scientific-technological revolution.
(3) The developments in the service sector embrace many fields of applica-
tion (service industries. medicine, education, management, domestic use,
etc.).
(4) The periodicities of the waves of change are becoming shorter. At
present, this trend is difficult to demonstrate mathematically, but the
longer the period under investigation, the more clearly is this trend
revealed. The major cycles in the past are believed to have been 50-60
years long, but have fallen to 40-50 years long in the present century.
The third scientific-technological revolution is most likely to occur in
the 2010s.
Technological change presents an opportunity for increasing economic growth
rates through improved production efficiency. But considerable investment
capital is required, not all of which may provide immediate returns. The re-
structuring of the education system, reorganization of production systems,
reorientation of management to the use of new technology, overcoming psycho-
logical barriers, etc., are examples of problems that are being tackled in all
countries.
Accelerated automation of production has caused increased levels of
unemployment in many Western countries. In socialist countries the social
implications of a new scientific-technological revolution are different in
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principle, although they also face the problem of adaptation of workers to
new technology. These changes will affect all nations, including developing
countries, even though they are not yet ready to cope with new technologies
and expensive scientific-technological projects. All relevant assistance on
the part of the developed countries, as well as the UN, will therefore be
necessary.
20.4. Program-Oriented Planning
The solution to key problems in socioeconomic development, the acceleration
of scientific-technological advance, depends on the rate at which the innova-
tions of the scientific-technological revolution are adopted. The most effec-
tive method of achieving this is program-oriented planning, which was first
introduced by the USSR. For example, the GOELRO plan (the state plan of
Soviet electrification) introduced by Lenin was the first long-term program to
utilize the achievements of the electrotechnical revolution. Thus within a
very short time the USSR was able to overcome backwardness and reach the
heights of the first scientific-technological revolution at the same time as the
USA.
The advantages of program-oriented planning are that scientific-
technological efforts and capital investments can be concentrated in crucial
sections of the economy. Simultaneously, efforts can be made to restructure
the technical base, to train or retrain personnel, to change production sys-
tems, and to educate management. It also facilitates increased international
cooperation in order to develop collectively major scientific-technological
directions where resources of an individual country may be inadequate.
Finally, it enables technological change to occur efficiently and quickly.
In the USSR the current policy for science and technology is to intro-
duce new technological systems that are capable of raising labor productivity,
reducing consumption of raw materials, and increasing returns on investments
(CPSU, 1985). Further fundamental research is needed and its results rapidly
implemented, and the engineering industry needs to be expanded and
oriented toward the production of more efficient machinery and equipment.
All industrial branches of the national economy need to be re-equipped using
the latest technology, and the economy needs to be more receptive to scien-
tific developments. These are just some of the tasks formulated by the CPSU
in facing the problems of accelerating scientific-technological progress (Gor-
bachev, 1985).
In the USSR, program-oriented methods are becoming important in the
realization of a unified science and technology policy for the next 20 years,
based on a complex program of scientific and technological progress that can
be viewed as a series of long-term forecasts of scientific, technological, and
economic development as solutions to environmental and social problems. In
the future this is to be coordinated with a complex 15-20 year program of
scientific and technological progress for CMEA countries, which envisages
priority directions of cooperation in the fundamental and engineering
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sciences.
Scientific and technological programs are being elaborated at several
levels: all-Union programs that are incorporated in national economic plans,
branch programs that are included in ministerial and departmental plans, and
programs for the republics and regions, which constitute an integral part of
territorial planning. It is important that all these programs be in line with
the general strategy to master the new scientific and technological revolution
within a short period of time and to achieve the most rapid progress possible
so that they might supplement and reinforce each other.
In the investigation of regularities in scientific and technological pro-
gress and methods of their application, many complicated problems have
emerged. It would be useful if economists and historians of science and tech-
nology, as well as those who study patents, make joint efforts to determine
the length and extent of previous technological and scientific revolutions,
their structure, and their resultant economic and social effects. A study of
past experiences may reveal regularities and characteristics of these
processes, give appropriate assessments of the status of productive forces,
and suggest reliable forecasts of future scientific-technological revolutions,
both in general and in detail.
Similar investigations in the various branches of science and technology
would be also of use in that they may enable us to guide future scientific and
technological progress. It would be worthwhile to generalize experiences in
program- and aim-oriented planning in various countries and in the field of
international cooperation. Such investigations would be not only of cognitive
but also of applied importance.
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CHAPrER 21
Technical Innovation, Diffusion, and
Long Cycles of Economic Development
C. Freeman
21.1. Introduction
During the last postwar boom in the 1950s and 1960s, there was relatively lit-
tle interest in the idea of long cycles of capitalist economic development. But
in the last few years there has been a resurgence of discussion and debate
among economists about this phenomenon. and an increasing amount of empiri-
cal research both on the historical evidence and on contemporary aspects of
the worldwide slowdown in economic growth. This chapter discusses a nee-
Schumpeterian interpretation of long cycles, which is based on a research
project on "Technical Change and Employment" (TEMPO) carried out at the
Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex. England, from 1979
to 1984. In two books (Freeman et al.. 1982; Freeman and Soete. 1987). I and
my colleagues have attempted to show the connection between long cycles and
long-term trends in unemployment. This chapter deals with more general
problems of long-wave theory.
In his review of the long-wave debate, Delbeke (1984. 1985) points to the
variety of theoretical explanations of the long wave ("historical-institutional",
"growth-theoretical", "macroeconomic" and "sociological"). but also to the
need for an integrated theory. He points out that many long-wave theories
belong to more than one category, and that any classification system oversim-
plifies the complexity of the debate. The same applies to a classification sys-
tem based on more orthodox theoretical paradigms in economics - Keynesian,
monetarist, nee-classical, Marxist, Schumpeterian. etc. - even though some of
the participants are recognizably adherents of one of these schools.
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Within the diversity of explanations of the long wave, an increasing
emphasis on the role of technology is clearly discer'nible. Thus, for example,
while most Marxist economists stress the importance of changes in the rate of
profit and the process of capital accumulation (e.g., Mandel, 1975; Menshikov
and Klimenko, 1985), there is growing recognition that technical innovations
are one of the most decisive influences on the rate of profit. Kuczysnki (Ch. 5,
this volume) not only demonstrates that Marx and Engels made some important
observations about long-term swings in the growth pr"ocess of capitalist coun-
tries, but also argues that major changes in technology are the type of events
that bdng about the big structural changes associated with the long wave. He
emphasizes Marx's interesting distinction between minor fluctuations in the
rate of profit characteristic of short business cycles, which are not usually
sufficient to move capital out of old sectors, and the major changes that could
bring about a major structural reallocation of capital.
The descripf this chapter as "neo-Schumpeterian" should not be
taken therefore as a precise classification label; Schumpeter himself owed
much to Marx, and so does the approach described here. It is rather
intended to indicate the strong emphasis on the role of technical innovation,
which is generally accepted as one of the main characteristics of
Schumpeter's theory. The chapter attempts to take one step further the
analysis introduced by my colleagues at Siena in 1983 (Bianchi at al., 1985).
21.2. Schumpeler"s Theory of Long Cycles
One part of Schumpeter's theory would probably be accepted by almost all
economists: it would be difficult to disagree with his insistence that technical
innovations appear and diffuse very unevenly between sectors, over time, and
in space. However, the full implications of this uneven process of develop-
ment have not been absorbed. The uneven sectoral distribution and
occurrence of inventions and innovations is a commonplace for those working
with R&D statistics, patent statistics. or histories of inventions and innova-
tions. It is well known that industrial R&D in most countries is concentrated
in half a dozen "high technology" industries. Between one-quarter and one-
half of all industrial R&D and more recently of new investment in fixed assets,
excluding buildings. is now concentrated in electronic and computer-related
areas. Yet hardly any of these most active fields of innovative activity
existed ~t aU in the nineteenth century, and most of them did not even exist
before World War II.
Schumpeter insisted on the explosive growth of new technologies in some
sectors and relative stagnation in others. Once a major innovation had demon-
strated profitability, this led to imitative "swarming" behavior as many firms
rushed to get on the bandwagon of the new growth area. It was these spurts
of innovation-related investment which he believed led to cyclical phenomena
in the economy as a whole and to the changing location of technological and
economic leadership, both within and between countries. Thus, for Schum-
peter, economic growth was not a smooth development. but a succession of
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spurts and explosions; it was not merely accompanied by the introduction of
new products and processes, but was driven by these innovations. Moreover,
he did not make the distinction made by so many economists between "cycli-
cal" and "technological" unemployment. He maintained (1939) that "basically,
cyclical unemployment is technological unemployment ... linking up as it does
with innovation ... (technological unemployment) is cyclical by nature".
Schumpeter's "creative gale of destruction" necessarily involved the decline
of "old" industries and occupations and an extremely uneven process of struc-
tural adaptation with substantial time lags.
Although historians have always found Schumpeter's view of capitalist
dynamics rather plausible, it did not coexist easily with mainstream general
equilibrium theory and the emphasis of neo-classical economics on marginalism
and smooth processes of incremental adaptation. Schumpeter's own attempts
to reconcile his theory of technological innovation with Walrasian equilibrium
theory was rather an unsatisfactory compromise and led to a major weakness
in his theory of long cycles: the explanation of depressions.
When Schumpeter first published Business Cycles (1939), Kuznets, the
leading American economic historian, in a long and generally sympathetic
review (1940) of his book, pointed to some fundamental problems in his expla-
nation of Kondratieff cycles. First, he pointed out that for innovations to
have the effects on the behavior of the economic system that Schumpeter
predicted, they would have to be either very big innovations or "clusters" of
many innovations. As an example of the kind of innovation that might indeed
have the kind of long-wave effects that Schumpeter had suggested, Kuznets
mentioned railways, but he pointed out that there were very few such innova-
tions, whereas smaller innovations were occurring all the time in very large
numbers. Some of these might cause minor perturbations, but they would not
generate effects in the economy as a whole unless they were bunched.
Second, Kuznets raised this question: even if such very large and important
innovations could induce cyclical effects and could be identified and
separated from the myriad of minor innovations occurring continuously, why
should they have effects lasting several decades rather than years? Major
innovations or clusters of innovations might indeed cause a spurt of invest-
ment associated with li short-term business cycle, but why a long wave?
Finally, even if major innovations could generate boom effects in the
economy lasting several decades. why should depressions occur? Kuznets
asked ironically whether Schumpeter's heroic entrepreneurs got tired every
half century, but more seriously other critics have pointed out that he tended
to look at the deep depressions as pathological symptoms and that he did not
have a theory of depressions anything like so convincing as his theory of
boom induced by the "swarming" behavior of firms endeavoring to jump on the
bandwagon of new technologies.
These three questions highlight crucial problems, but the research and
the debate associated with the revival of long-wave theory have in my view
begun to provide some answers to all three.
Although he stressed the importance of "metamorphosis" rather than
cyclical development, a major contribution to the first and second points has
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been made by Mensch (1975). He suggested that radical innovations did
indeed cluster together and that they were bunched in periods of deep
depression, Le., the 1830s, the 1880s, the 1930s, and (he predicted) the
1980s. This bunching, according to Mensch, was brought about by the depres-
sions themselves, when firms were compelled to accelerate the introduction of
I"adical innovations because they could not continue to make a profit from
their existing activities. Mensch's theory has found some support both in
Western and Eastern Europe, for example from Mandel (1984), Kleinknecht
(1981), and Kuczynski (Ch. 5, this volume). However, the debate around his
pioneering book has given rise to theories of the timing and clustering of
innovations, which are, in my view. more likely to survive the test of empirical
research and theoretical debate than Mensch's first formulation.
In our view (Freeman et al., 1982), the empirical evidence suggests that
I"adical innovations occur more randomly over time than Mensch (1975) and
Kleinknecht (1981) maintained. Thus, although there was certainly a cluster
of radical innovations in synthetic materials and electronics in the depression
of the 1930s, there were also clusters of radical innovations in drugs, semicon-
ductors and integrated circuits, and scientific instruments in the 1950s and
1960s, and in biotechnology in the 1970s. Some empirical studies also suggest
that the carrot (strong demand stimulating higher profit expectations) may be
a more important inducement mechanism for radical innovations than the stick
(deep depression inducing radical innovations). Moreover, Mensch's theory
suggests that big booms are built on the radical innovations that are made in
the preceding depression. But this is not necessarily the case, because the
impetus to "swarming" and to major surges of investment often takes longer
than a few years after the first arrival of a radical innovation. The technical
problems and false starts associated with the first arrival of radical innova-
tions are well known and often take many years to resolve.
In understanding the relationship between innovation and growth cycles,
it is not the date of the first arrival that matters so much. but the difJusion
process. The major spurts of investment and market growth that character-
ized the great booms. of the 1850s and 1860s, in the belle epoque (before
World War I), and the 1950s and 1960s, were all based on clusters of radical
innovations, some of which were made before as well as during the depressions
- railways in the 1820s, or even earlier; electrical innovations in the 1860s
and 1870s; consumer durables and mass-produced passenger cars in the first
decades of the century. It is unlikely that the biotechnology innovations of
the 1970s and 1980s will have any substantial effects on world economic
growth before the next century, but they could well have a major influence
then. If we are hoping for a major upswing of the world economy in the late
1980s and 1990s. then it cannot be based primarily on biotechnology, but it
could conceivably be based on a cluster of radical innovations, such as those
made in the 1940s, 1950s. and 1960s - computers, robots, integrated circuits,
and optical fibers.
This already begins to answer the second point made by Kuznets as well
as the first - empirical research on diffusion of innovation does indeed sug-
gest that diffusion processes. especially for radical innovations, do often take
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decades, rather than months and years. This is particularly true if one takes
into account not only individual products but also technological systems, Le.,
clusters of technically and economically interrelated innovations. This points
to the need for a taxonomy of innovations that goes beyond Mensch's distinc-
I
tion between incremental and radical (basic) innovations and includes a third
category of technological revolutions, or changes in technological paradigm.
We may thus define the three categories as follows (Freeman and Soete. 1985):
(1) Incremental innovations. These occur more or less continuously,
although at differing rates in different industries, but they are con-
cerned only with improvements in the existing array of products and
production processes. They are reflected in the official measures of
economic growth simply by changes in the coefficients in the existing
input-output matrix. Although their combined effects are extremely
important in the growth of productivity, no single one has dramatic
effects.
(2) Radical innovations. These are discontinuous events, and their diffu-
sion may often take a cyclical form. New materials, such as nylon or
polyethylene, or new products and services, such as TV, are examples of
such radical or "basic" innovations (Mensch, 1975).
(3) Technological revolutions. These "creative gales of destruction" are
at the heart of Schumpeter's long-wave theory. The introduction of
electric power or steam power are examples of such deep-going transfor-
mations. A change of this kind carries with it many clusters of radical
and incremental innovations. as for example in electric power generation
and transmission, as well as in electric motors and domestic appliances.
A vital characteristic of this third type of technical change is that it
must have pervasive effects throughout the economy, Le., it must lead
not only to the emergence of a new range of products and services in its
own right, but it must also affect every other branch of the economy by
changing the input cost structure and conditions of production and dis-
tribution throughout the system. It is the extension of the effects of a
new technological system beyond the confines of a few branches to the
economy as a whole, which constitutes one basis for major upswings of
the world economy and which justifies the expression "change of para-
digm" or "change of technological regime". This type of change involves
new rows and new columns in an input-output table, as well as changes in
the coefficients. Information technology clearly belongs to this class.
We may thus define the characteristics of a technological revolution as fol-
lows:
(1) A drastic reduction in costs and improved productivity potential of
many products and services. In some areas this will be an order of
magnitude reduction; in others, much less. But it provides the essential
condition for Schumpeterian "swarming", Le., widespread perceived
opportunities for new profitable investment.
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(2) Scope jor an entirely new range oj products and services and jor a
dramatic improvement in the technical characteristics oj many
other products and processes. This affects improved reliability, accu-
racy, speed, and other performance characteristics, and leads to the
design and redesign of numerous products and processes.
(3) Social and political acceptability. Although economists and technolo-
gists tend to think narrowly in terms of the first two characteristics,
this third criterion is extremely important. Whereas the first two
advantages are fairly quickly perceived, there may be long delays in
social acceptance of revolutionary new technologies, especially in areas
of application far removed from the initial introduction. Legislative,
educational. and regulatory changes may be involved. as well as funda-
mental changes in management and labor attitudes and procedures. For
this reason the expression "change of paradigm" perhaps best conveys
the full flavor of this type of technical change. The interplay between
technoeconomic characteristics and the socioinstitutional framework is a
major consideration in assessing the time lags involved in the adjustment
of the system.
A technological revolution therefore represents a major change of paradigm.
affecting almost all major managerial decisions in many branches of the econ-
omy. Several authors have used the expression "technological paradigm". but
probably the most thorough and systematic exposition of the idea is in the
work of Perez (1983. 1985). She defines a "technoeconomic paradigm" as a
new set of guiding principles. which become the managerial and engineering
"common sense" for each major new phase of development.
Criticizing Schumpeter's narrow economic theory of depression, Perez
suggests that depressions represent periods of "mismatch" between an emerg-
ing new technoeconomic paradigm (already quite well advanced in a few
branches of the economy) and the institutional framework. The widespread
profitable generalization of the new technoeconomic paradigm throughout the
system is possible only after a period of change and adaptation of many social
institutions to the potentialities of the new technology. The big boom periods
of economic expansion occur when such a good "match" between the new tech-
noeconomic paradigm and the socioinstitutional framework have been made.
These ideas of paradigm change and of "mismatch" during depression and
good match during boom go a long way towards answering the criticisms voiced
by Kuznets and others of Schumpeter's original theory. However, some prob-
lems certainly still remain. For example, a number of critics have argued that
there is no clear-cut evidence that new technological paradigms do increase
productivity or profitability in the economy as a whole, and specifically that
since a general fall in productivity and profitability occurred in the OECD
countries in the 1970s, precisely during a period of rapid diffusion of
computer-based technology, other factors must be more important. One weak-
ness in this argument is already apparent from what has been said about lags
in institutional readjustment, but to deal with this more thoroughly it is
necessary to move to a more disaggregated level of analysis.
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21.3. Productivity and Profitability in the Long Wave
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A great deal of empirical research needs to be carried out to demonstrate in
detail the variations in profitability and productivity growth associated with
the introduction and diffusion of new products, processes, systems, and
industries. In this section it is possible only to present a general theoretical
argument and to give a number of examples based mainly on UK experience
from the TEMPO project.
Following Marx, Schumpeter argued that the introduction of new prod-
ucts or processes enables the innovating firms (if they succeed in overcoming
early teething problems) to reap exceptionally high profits, based on a tem-
porary monopoly. However, because of the swarming and bandwagon effects,
these abnormally high profits would ultimately be eroded or "competed away".
Examples of exceptionally high innovative profits can be found among railway
companies in Britain and the USA in the 1850s and 1860s, among electrical
equipment companies at the turn of the century, and among chemical com-
panies producing synthetic materials (nylon and polyethylene) in the 1950s.
At one time leI derived more than half of its corporate profits from
polyethylene.
A particularly good example is given by Klein (1977): the introduction of
the assembly line by Ford to produce the Model T. The price of the model fell
from $850 in 1908 to $360 in 1916, while profits were sometimes as high as
300%/year, and the market share increased from 10% in 1909 to 60% in 1921.
The basic innovation was an organizational one, but this was related to a whole
cluster of interrelated technical innovations:
Once lhe organizational change was made, the automobile firms found
many opportunities for developing more efficient machines by making
them more aulomatic ... literally dozens of cases can be found in which
better machines permitted output per worker lo increase by a factor of
between two and ten.
A similar example is that of IBM with the 650, 1401, and 360 series of comput-
ers in the 1950s and 1960s. These made IBM one of the most profitable and
fastest-growing large corporations in the world, even though the firm was not
the first to introduce electronic computers or integrated circuits.
However, both in the case of the automobile industry and the computer
industry, not all those who jumped on the bandwagon made giant profits. Some
made losses and, as the industries matured, many were driven out of business.
The Schumpeterian swarming argument does not require that all firms embark-
ing on a new type of production make exceptionally high profits, only that
some of then perform so well in the period of high growth that there are clear
profitability and productivity signals to encourage imitators. It is generally
agreed that the advances in microprocessor technology have made possible
performance characteristics that are superior by orders of magnitude from
earlier generations of electronic equipment. Why is it then that in a period of
rapid diffusion of microprocessor technology, overall productivity growth in
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the economy of most countries has been slower than it was in the 1950s and
1960s, and the average rate of profit has tended to fall?
It was argued in Section 21.2 that technical change is extremely uneven
among firms, industries, and countries. Furthermore, we are arguing that a
long-wave upswing occurs not as the result of technical innovations in one or a
few industries, nor indeed as the result of the rapid growth of a single indus-
try, such as the US automobile industry in the 1920s, or the US computer
industry in the 1970s, but rather as the result of the diffusion of a new tech-
noeconomic paradigm (or "style") from a f~w leading sectors to the rest of the
economy, and especially to the capital goods industries and related services.
This brings out a fundamental difference between our approach and that
of Mensch, and also of Schumpeter himself. Schumpeter discussed the inter-
nal combustion engine and electricity as both important "engines of growth"
in the third Kondratieff upswing without making much distinction between
them. For us, there is a fundamental difference. The technoeconomic para-
digm that characterized the third Kondratieff wave was, in our view, based on
electrification and the diffusion of electric power throughout the economy,
including both industrial and widespread domestic applications. The "Fordist"
mass production paradigm, on the other hand, although it certainly emerged
during the third Kondratieff cycle, and was an important auxiliary source of
growth in the 1920s in the USA, did not become the prevailing dominant
paradigm until after the major structural crisis of adaptation in the 1930s,
and the emergence of Keynesian techniques of regulating the system's
behavior. The automobile industry, consumer durables, petrochemicals, oil
refining, plastic mass-produced articles, etc., and all the related infrastruc-
ture and services, were in our view the "engines of growth" of the fourth
Kondratieff upswing, not the third, even though many of the innovations were,
of course, first introouced during the third. But their worldwide diffusion
was possible only on the basis of many social and institutional changes that
permitted the generalization of an energy-intensive mass proouction and con-
sumption paradigm.
By the same token, the extremely rapid growth of the computer, semi-·
conductor, and TV"industries in the 1950s and 1OO0s certainly did not mean
that information technology was the dominant technological regime or para-
digm in the economic system as a whole. Far from it; the newly emerging tech-
nological paradigm created acute problems of structural adaptation for the
system as a whole, including the (now) older mass production industries and
services. Information technology can only become the dominant tech-
noeconomic paradigm as a result of a successful process of social and institu-
tional change, which is costly and difficult to accomplish.
It is only in this perception that it is possible to address the question of
the labor proouctivity slowdown in the 1970s and 1980s, the decline in capital
proouctivity (in our view a much neglected but extremely important
phenomenon), and the associated decline in the rate of profit, which was per-
ceptible already in the late 1960s. In order to understand these phenomena
it is absolutely essential to move to a disaggregated level of analysis, since
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what we are discussing is the extremely uneven diffusion of a new technologi-
cal paradigm from a few leading sectors to the economy as a whole.
In our TEMPO project we attempted to study the long-term changes in
labor and capital productivity in the principal sectors of the British economy
(the 40 industries distinguished in the Cambridge growth model) from 1948 to
1984. The following account is based on the five-volume report of that
analysis (Soete, 1985; Clark, 1985; Guy, 1984; Freeman, 1985; Smith, 1985) and
the full summary (Freeman and Soete, 1987). In our view, although there are
important national variations, the broad picture described below is charac-
teristic of all the major DECD industrial economies.
When we analyze changes in labor productivity and in capital produc-
tivity over the past 20 years at a sufficiently disaggregated level, then we
find the following picture:
(a) The sectors with the highest growth rates in labor productivity are
the electronics industries, and especially the computer and the electronic
components industries. These industries also make the greatest use of their
own technology for design, production, stock control, marketing, and manage-
ment. They are the only industrial sectors that show a substantial rise in
capital productivity and have demonstrated the advantages of the new para-
digm for everyone else.
(b) In those sectors that have been heavily penetrated by microelec-
tronics, both in their product and process technology, there is also evidence
of a considerable rise in labor productivity, and even some advance in capital
productivity in the most recent period. This applies, for example, to the
scientific instruments, telecommunications, and watch industries, which have
now virtually become a part of the electronics industry.
(c) In sectors where microelectronics has been used on an increasing
scale over the past ten years, but older technologies still predominate in
product and process technology, there is a very uneven picture. Some firms
have achieved very high productivity increases, some have stagnated, while
others have actually shown a decline in productivity. This is the case, for
example, in the printing, machine-building, and vehicles industries. This
uneven picture is completely consistent with Solter's (1966) vision of the
spread of new technologies within established industries through new capital
investment. In many cases information technology is introduced in a piece-
meal fashion and not as part of an integrated system. First, one or a few CNC
machine tools are introduced or a few robots or word processors in one
department; these are small "islands" of automation. This is not yet
computer-integrated manufacturing or office systems and does not yet achieve
anything approaching the full potential productivity gains. There may even
be a temporary fall in productivity, because of the lack of the necessary
skills in design, in software, in production engineering, in maintenance, and in
management generally. Problems of institutional and social adaptation are
extremely important, and flexibility in this social response varies greatly
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between countries, as well as between enterprises. Among DEeD countries,
Japan and Sweden appear to have been particularly successful in making prog-
ress in this area of "mechatronics", but the USA, which has been successful
in achieving productivity gains in the first two sectors above (although much
less so than Japan), has been rather unsuccessful in the mechatronics area,
with the partial exception of defense-based industries such as aircraft.
(d) Sectors producing standardized homogeneous commodities on a flow
production basis in rather large plants have made considerable use of infor-
mation technology in their process control systems and in various management
applications. They were indeed among the earliest users of minicomputers for
these purposes. This applies, for example, to the petrochemical, oil, steel,
and cement industries. This has helped them to achieve considerable
improvements in their use of energy and materials, but the gains in labor pro-
ductivity have often been less than in the 1950s and 1960s, while capital pro-
ductivity usually has shown a marked decline. To understand this phenomenon
it is essential to recognize that these industries are amongst those most
heavily affected by the shift from an energy-intensive and materials-intensive
mass production technological paradigm to an information-intensive paradigm.
At the height of the consumer durables and vehicle consumption boom of the
1950s and 1960s, they were achieving strong labor productivity gains based on
big plant economies of scale. But with the change in technological paradigm,
the slowdown in the world economy, and the rise in energy prices in the
1970s, they now often face problems of surplus capacity and high unit costs
based on below-capacity production levels [but see (h) below for those cases
in which surplus capacity has been eliminated].
(e) Service sectors that are completely based on information technology
(software services, data banks, computerized information services, design ser-
vices, etc.) are among the fastest growing and (for individual firms), most pro-
fitable activities in the leading industrial countries. But although their
growth potential is enormous, they so far account for only a small proportion
of total service output and employment. Productivity statistics are extremely
difficult to generate, but inferential evidence suggests high rates of growth.
(f) Service sectors that have been considerably affected by information
technology (banking, insurance, and distribution), although the diffusion of
new technology is extremely uneven, both by firm and by country, showevi-
dence of significant gains in labor productivity. This phenomenon is impor-
tant because hitherto it has often been observed that the service sector of
the economy was not capable of achieving the type of labor productivity gains
achieved in manufacturing. Information technology now offers the potential
(and in some cases already the reality), of achieving such gains outside
manufacturing. However, the progress of technology depends heavily on insti-
tutional and structural changes.
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(g) In most service sectors, information technology still has diffused
only to a small extent, and these areas are still characterized by very low
labor productivity gains, or none at all. The stagnation in labor productivity
in these sectors may be attributed to the lack of information technology, but
it certainly cannot be attributed to the impact of information technology.
These account for by far the larger part of the tertiary sector.
(h) Finally, in many industrialized economies some sectors have shown
labor productivity gains over the past ten years, which are due far more to
structural rationalization than to the direct impact of new technology. Exam-
ples are in the textile and food industries and also some of those sectors dis-
cussed in (d) above. where plant closures and rationalization have been imple-
mented. Since in any industry there is always a "tail" of low-productivity
plants, a significant rise in average labor productivity can always be
achieved simply as a result of scrapping the older generations of plant. even
without any further technical improvements in the more recent plants. which
can now work closer to full capacity.
Summing up this discussion. it is not difficult to see that the slowdown in
average labor productivity"gains over the 1970s and 1980s, which has been a
worldwide phenomenon by comparison with the 1950s and 1960s (see Maier,
Ch. 6, this volume), is precisely the aggregate outcome of a structural crisis of
adaptation or change of technoeconomic paradigm, which has accentuated the
uneven development in different sectors of the economy. On the one hand.
the previously dominant energy-intensive mass production paradigm or "tech-
nological regime" was reaching limits of productivity and profitability gains,
due to a combination of exhaustion of economies of scale, erosion of profit
margins through "swarming", market saturation in some sectors, diminishing
returns to technical activities (Wolff's law) and cost pressures on input
prices. On the other hand, the new paradigm, which offers the possibility of
renewal of productivity gains and increased profitability, has so far deeply
affected only a few leading-edge industries and services.
The full realization of the productivity gains that can be achieved as a
result of information technology depends on the diffusion of the new paradigm
throughout the economy. This in turn will be possible only as a result of many
social and institutional changes, which will involve interrelated organizational
and technical innovations, as well as a large increase in new skills and a
transformation of the existing capital stock.
Schumpeter already emphasized the importance both of organizational
innovations and of technical innovations. and of their interdependence. This
combination is the major characteristic of a change of technological paradigm,
such as the introduction of information technology, and leads to changes in
management structure as well as process technology. Schumpeter, however.
did not develop the notion of a "paradigm" change, and it is here that Perez
(1983, 1985) has made an important original contribution.
An interesting historical analogy to the case of information technology is
provided by the experience of electric power. Although Mensch (1975) was
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correct in drawing attention to a cluster of radical innovations in the 1880s,
the major economic effects of electrification came much later with the growth
in the share of electricity in mechanical drive for industry from 5% in 1900 to
53% in 1920. This was possible only after the acceptance of a major change in
factory organization from the old system based on one large steam engine
driving a large number of shafts through a complex system of belts and pul-
leys, to a system based first of all on electric group drive and later on unit
drive (Le .. one electric motor for each machine). Under the old system all the
shafts and countershafts rotated continuously no matter how many machines
were actually in use. A breakdown affected the whole factory. Devine (1983)
has documented this cnange in some detail. He points out that:
Replacing a sleam engine wilh one or more electric motors, leaving the
power dislribution system unchanged, appears to have been the usual
juxtaposition of the new technology upon the framework of an old one ...
Shaft and belt power distribution systems were in place, and manufactur-
ers' were familiar with their problems. Turning line shafts with motors
was an improvement that required modifying only the front end of the
system ... As long as the electric motors were simply used in place of
steam engines to turn long line shafts the shortcomings of mechanical
power distribution systems remained (p. 357).
It was not until after 1900 that manufacturers generally began to realize that
indirect benefits of using unit electric drives were far greater than the
direct energy-saving benefits. Unit drive gave far greater flexibility in fac-
tory layout since machines were no longer placed in line with shafts, making
possible big capital savings in floor space. Unit drive meant that trolleys and
overhead cranes could be used on a large scale unobstructed by shafts. coun-
tershafts, and belts. Portable power tools increased even further the flexi-
bility and adaptability of production systems. Factories could be made much
cleaner and lighter, which was very important in industries such as textiles
and printing, both for working conditions and for product quality and process
efficiency. Production capacity could be expanded much more easily.
21.4. Conclusions
These examples of structural changes and policy changes associated with the
widespread introduction of new technology are relatively straightforward
compared with the fundamental problem of restructuring the world economy
and especially of putting North-South relationships on a new basis. It is here
that the uneven development of the world economy is most evident and raises
the most intractable problems.
The establishment of the IMF and the World Bank and the general adop-
tion of expansionary Keynesian policies after World War II created a fairly
stable framework for the growth of the world economy. Large-scale public
and private investment in Third World countries also encouraged the efforts
of many of these countries to catch up with leading DEeD countries. However,
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in the 198os, these rather favorable conditions for the poorer countries to
improve their situation no longer exist. The burden of debt repayment has
now become so great that it constitutes a major source of economic and politi-
cal instability, especially in Latin America and Africa. There is now a net out-
flow of funds from many Third World countries, and a net inflow into one of
the richest countries, the USA, which finances the enormous deficit in US
foreign trade. This deficit is also related to the relative failure of the US
economy to adapt to the new paradigm outside the military area, by com-
parison with the much more successful adaptation by Japan, resulting in the
high Japanese surplus. This situation cannot be sustained and points to the
need for fundamental structural change in the international machinery for
adjusting international payments and capital transfers as well as to major pol-
icy changes with OEeD countries. The real resources available to the IMF and
the World Bank are now grossly inadequate compared with the vastly
increased volume of international trade and investment.
A recent report of the Inter-American Development Bank (September
1985) has highlighted these critical problems confronting the world economy
and has warned that IMF measures to deal with the crisis have been short-
term palliatives, not long-term solutions. Albert Fishlow points out that Latin
America faces a burden of debt service repayments double the level of
reparations that Germany found impossible after World War 1. It will be
remembered that Keynes made a devastating critique of the German repara-
tions arrangements and pointed out that they would result in world economic
collapse and would probably lead to a second world war. Only a recovery of
productive investment and technical innovation in Latin America could sustain
the growth needed to finance even a much lower level of debt repayment.
The Third World countries are also experiencing difficulties in develop-
ing the new information technology industries to sustain their competitive
power. However, as Perez (1985) has pointed out, the new technologies do
actually offer some major advantages to Third World countries, provided they
modify their trade, industrial, and technology policies. In sectors such as
software engineering and telecommunications equipment. there are big new
opportunities for developing countries, both in local applications of informa-
tion technology and in world markets. But these "catching up" efforts of
Third World countries require some resolution of the basic structural problem
confronting the entire world economy. This implies new measures to facilitate
the international transfer of technology, as well as a resolution of the debt
problem.
But as in the 1880s and 1930s, in confronting a major structural crisis of
adaptation, there are many alternative courses, and the outcome will depend
on the balance of social and political forces. There are strong pressures to
restore the general rate of profit, not so much through technical change and
imaginative social improvements, but by a combination of military expendi-
tures, increased protectionism, and reduction in the power of trade unions.
This creates an urgent need for all those in the world who wish to avert such
dangerous nationalistic and militarist solutions, to develop imaginative pro-
grams for the growth of the world economy, involving the widespread use of
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the new paradigm, for improvement in the living and working conditions for
the majority of the wodd's population.
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PART III
The Role of Financial and
Monetary Variables in the
Long-Wave Context

CHAPTER 22
Long-Term Trends in the Belgian
Money Supply. 1877-1984
Jos Delbeke
22.1. Introduction
This chapter is an interim report on a research project that aims to analyze
long-term fluctuations in prices, money and credit, and the incidence of these
variables on and from the real sector. We present here some historical time
series data on the money supply M1 of Belgium and, starting from an inspec-
tion of the data, our aim is to provide scope for model construction and simula-
tion.
We follow a two-fold strategy that is unusual in current long-wave
research. First, we have explicitly chosen not to undertake sophisticated
statistical manipulation; indeed, we are convinced that this way always
presents difficulties, namely, a too-small sample, filtering, detrending, and so
on. We prefer to be as careful as possible not to construct waves, and have
thus opted for a cycle-oriented research. Second, we have tried to make
explicit the most important variable behind the general price level - the
money supply. We have actualized the basic inspiration of Dupriez (1947) and
applied the money base framework of Brunner and Meltzer to the series we
could reconstruct from 1877 up to 1983.
22.2. The Money Base Framework
To analyze the quantity of money and credit available in an economy, Brunner
and Meltzer developed an interesting framework by reconciling the traditional
demand and supply hypothesis. They treat the money base by the authorities
314 Long-Term 'l'rend$ in tILe BeLgian Money SuppLy
as dominant. but they take explicitly into account the allocation behavior of
the banks and the public by analyzing the multiplier (Verheirstraeten, 1977).
We use the M1 definition of the quantity of money. since enlarged defini-
tions do not necessarily seem to be superior. Moreover, in our data. the role
of time deposits is only important after World War II. The money base or
high-power money is defined as the net monetary liabilities of the government
in the hands of the public and the banks. The reason for the name "base" is
that this government money is used as a basis for multiple deposit creation by
the banks.
The basic equation of Brunner and Meltzer can be summarized as follows
(Verheirstraeten. 1977. pp. 94-95):
M1=Rm1=B--k_+~p-+_1-­
k + P + r (1 - t) (22.1)
Equation (22.1) shows that the money supply can be interpreted as the prod-
uct of the base money B and the multiplier m, which is dependent on the
currency ratio k. the postal deposits ratio P. the reserve ratio r. and the
time deposit ratio t. For our analysis this equation can be rewritten in
growth rates; thus:
log M1 =log B + log m1
dM1 = dB + dml + e
M1 B m1
(22.2)
Equation (22.2) shows that the growth rate of M1 can be divided into the
growth rates of the base money and the multiplier, and an error variable.
This enables us to analyze which variable is the cause of a change in M1.
The growth rates of the base money and the multiplier can be analyzed in
the same way. The sources of the base can be written as follows:
B = IR + sgs + AJ) + 0 (22.3)
where IR =international reserves, sEB =government securities in the cen-
tral bank portfolio, AJ) = rediscounting of bills of exchange by the central
bank, and 0 =is a rest variable. After some manipulations we get:
dB _ d.IR IR dSgB sgs dAD AJ) dO 0
- ---'-+---' --+--'-+-'-B IR B SgB B AJ) BOB (22.4)
In other words, equation (22.4) shows that the money base growth rate can be
divided according to the part of each source. The same can be done for the
multiplier. as follows:
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dm 1 15k 151'1~ =e{ml, k)' k + e{ml, p).-;-
t5r t5t+ e{ml, r)' - + e{ml, t)· - + e
r t
(22.5)
where e =the multiplier elasticity of a particular ratio. For the development
of the elasticities; see Verheirstraeten (1977, p. 142).
In conclusion, we can state that the growth of the money supply can be
analyzed according to its sources, Le., foreign influences, central bank
action, or the behavior of the banks and the public.
22.3. The Evolution of the 1I11l0ney Supply
We have reconstructed a homogeneous series of the Ml money supply since
1877, and we applied the Brunner-Meltzer model to it. Unfortunately, we
were unable to go back to at least 1873, which is considered an important
turning point (Dupriez, 1977).
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Figure 22.1. The money supply M1 and base money B, 1877-1983.
In Figure 22.1 the data for Ml and B are shown for the three sub-
periods: prewar (before 1914), interwar (1920-1939), postwar (1950-1983).
From 1877 to the mid-1890s, Ml and B fluctuate around a horizontal trend.
Thereafter, the trends of both have positive slopes, which is larger for Ml
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than for B, indicating the growing role of the multiplier. Moreover, Ml seems
to have a time lag on B. During the interwar period, the constant increase in
Ml until 1931 is followed by a significant contraction in 1931-1934 and a
recovery of the money supply in 1934-1936. The base has the same pattern,
although with one important exception: instead of a contraction in
1931-1934, we observe only a stagnation. The postwar figures show continu-
ous and stable growth patterns, and illustrate the uniqueness of the period.
Only in the 1980s does the Ml figure stagnate, preceded by the base. The
distance between the curves is again increas,ing, indicating a growing multi-
plier.
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Figure 22.2. The m 1 multiplier, 1877-1983.
In Figure 22.2 we can observe very clear, long-term fluctuations in the
multiplier. In the prewar period, ml increases from 1.39 to 2.8, but with a
remarkable stagnation between 1883 and 1896. This rise has to be attributed
to the substitution of gold and silver for uniform bank notes, a policy concomi-
tant with the development of central banking. However, this trend was tem-
porarily interrupted, presumably because of a lack of confidence during the
stagnation of the 1880s. After World War I, this trend continues to rise until
1928, when a remarkable and persistent decline begins. In the postwar
period, the multiplier shows the opposite trend: a slow but continued
increase from 1.3 in 1950 to 2.1 in 1982, with two minor decreases in
1971-1973 and 1978.
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In conclusion, we can state that a clear long wave emerges between the
maxima of 1928 and 1982. If we take into account the historical particu-
larities of the nineteenth century, we can observe an analogous tendency
from 1877 onward. It is important to note that this movement comes through
without any statistical manipulation.
Inspection of the absolute data of Ml, Band ml over the last century
shows that clear movements can be discerned. However, for analyzing them
further, a more operational unit of time is needed. Various authors (in our
view rightly) argue that the cycle has to be the medium for studying longer
movements (Dupriez, 1947). We follow this suggestion also for empirical rea-
sons: it is crucial not to compare lower and upper turning points of business
cycles in order to avoid manipulated long-wave construction. We do not have a
generally accepted dating of business cycles for our period. such as the US
dating by the National Bureau of Economic Research, so we have to construct
them. We have chosen the troughs for dating, since they can be deducted from
the annual growth figures of the Ml money supply (Table 22.1).
Ta.ble 22.1. Juglars in the M1 money
supply (according to troughs).
Prewar Interwar Postwar
1878 1921 1950
1880 1924 1954
1882 1929 1957
1885 1932 1960
1892 1934 1967
1898 1937 1969
1901 1973
1907 1979
1909 1983
1912
We then analyzed for each cycle which part of Ml growth is caused by
the growth of the money base and the multiplier, respectively. These results
are summarized in Figure 22.3. From this figure, it can be seen that the
growth figures of Ml, B, and m1 do not follow constant trends. Long periods
of absolute and relative increases and decreases are observable. Although no
absolute contraction happened after 1945, the growth rates have been declin-
ing since the late 1970s. The money base analysis seems to be fruitful in
showing the origins of Ml fluctuations. An important hypothesis of this
method, namely, that the base is the dominant source of Ml change, is gen-
erally correct but has to be modified. Indeed, the multiplier growth is not
unimportant and can even dominate the evolution of M1.
Between the long-term fluctuations in the growth of m1 and B, there are
important time lags resulting in compensating and amplifying effects on Ml
growth. During the mid-1880s. the recovery of the base preceded that of the
multiplier, and both work in the same sense thereafter. However, after 1900,
the base growth starts to decline, while the multiplier change kept rising
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Figure 22.3. Contribution of base money B and multiplier m 1 to the growth rate of
the money supply Ml, 1878-1983 (cyclical averages).
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until it achieved a share of 79% of M1 growth in 1909-1912. Presumably the
base stimulates the M1 recovery, but once a reasonable growth is realized, the
multiplier becomes the major source of continued M1 expansion.
During the interwar period, the most extreme M1 growth figures can be
noted, namely, +12.2% in 1924-1929 and -7% in 1932-1936. The high base
growth is remarkable; it compensates for the neutral (1920s) and negative
(1930s) role of the multiplier. When the base growth fails to continue this
task, as in 1929-1932 and especially in 1932-1934, the effect on M1 growth is
disastrous.
After 1945 (and also after 1935), the base again induces M1 growth, while
the multiplier slowly becomes more important. After this recovery they work
in the same sense, although the base influence is dominant. However, after
1973, the slower base growth is partly neutralized by the increasing role of
the multiplier, which becomes dominant in 1979-1983, with a share in M1
growth of more than 80%. In fact, this is the basic pattern of the periods
1878-1885 and 1909-1912, where a low or even negative M1 growth can be
temporarily avoided.
As a preliminary conclusion we can state that a serious decline or a too-
slow expansion of the base money is temporarily corrected by the multiplier.
In other words, the time lag in the behavior of the public and the banks acts
as a buffer, so that the evolution of the base generally precedes that of the
money supply. The crucial question to be asked, then, is which are the deter-
minants of these evolutions in the base and the multiplier.
22.4. The Sources of B and m1 Growth
22.4.1. Detenainanta ot money base change
The major source of long-term fluctuations in the growth of the money base
are the international reserves and the central bank, which finance the
private sector; government financing is clearly a more recent phenomenon and
has grown to unprecedented levels in the last decade, dominating the growth
of the base. Nevertheless, over the whole period, it shows a certain anti-
business cycle behavior (Figure 22.4).
The influence of international reserves seems to be particularly strong
during the contraction and recovery cycles of the money base. Empirically, it
is very difficult to analyze the sources of this evolution, since we only have
rough balance of payments for the interwar period and, of course, complete
information for the postwar period. From qualitative historical sources, how-
ever, we can presume that before 1914 these international reserves were dom-
inated by capital earnings (Chlepner, 1930), during the interwar period by hot
capital (Van der Wee and Tavernier, 1975), and since 1945 by the trade bal-
ance.
The rediscounting of bills of exchange by the central bank shows a pro-
cyclical behavior, with the exception of the 1930s. In the cycles 1901-1912
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and 1967-1969, it becomes the dominant source of base money, compensating
for the declining role of international reserves. Moreover, the contribution of
this rediscounting to the base money creation shows a clear long-wave pat-
tern. This behavior of private banks. approved by the monetary authorities.
is a strong amplifier of the long-wave pattern in the growth of the money base
and of the money supply. For Dupriez. therefore. this financing of private
banks by the central bank plays a crucial role in his explanation of long
waves. It stimulates the credit supply during the expansion and therefore
helps to create this expansion. while the opposite is true in times of contrac-
tion.
22.4.2. Determinants of the multiplier change
This analysis can be conducted two ways. Here we look for the influence of
the intermediate determinants of the multiplier, Le., currency, postal depos-
its, reserves, and the time and savings deposits ratio. In the future, the
analysis will be enlarged to include the so-called ultimate determinants of the
multiplier. Le., income. wealth, and interest rates. The influence of the
immediate determinants is shown in Figure 22.5.
Over the whole period, the influence of the currency ratio is very impor-
tant and shows regular, long-term fluctuations. In other words, the behavior
of the public in choosing more or less currency vis-a.-vis demand deposits, is
a strong determinant of the multiplier as well as of the growth of the money
supply. The postal deposits ratio follows the currency ratio passively, and its
influence on the multiplier is marginal. The same can be said of the time and
savings deposits ratio, although it should be noted that it has a distinct influ-
ence on the M2 money supply, particularly during the postwar period. In con-
clusion, we may state that in the long term, public confidence in the sound-
ness of the banking system, most of all via the currency ratio, should not be
neglected.
In the twentieth century, the role of the reserve ratio of the private
banks becomes more important. In particular, it is the dominant factor in the
1920s and 1930s. Even if we add the postal and time deposits ratios to the
currency ratio in order to know the "global" influence of the public, the domi-
nance of the reserve ratio is not always threatened. Since it has a distinct
negative function from 1924 to 1934, we can say that the private banks lose
their confidence earlier than the public; when the latter also becomes more
pessimistic, the negative multiplier change dominates the contraction of the
money supply. From 1934 on. the confidence of the banks is restored before
that of the public. During the postwar period, the bank behavior is rather
neutral, when the Korean crisis is taken into account. However. in 1969-1973
international monetary events alarm the banks before the public is aware that
something is happening. At the end of the 1970s, both regain their confi-
dence.
Thus, by comparing the most important contributions to the multiplier
change, namely the reserve and currency ratios, we can observe a distinct
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time lag of ± 5 years between the two. As a result, compensating and amplify-
ing effects emerge. However, the experience of the 1970s is not exactly the
same as that of the 1930s. Indeed, the cycle of 1979-1983 shows a restora-
tion of confidence, Le., it seems to be more analogous to the cycle of
1909-1912. This "early" recovery could then be attributed to the trust
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created by the government, which avoids massive failures by offering subsi-
dies, and by the monetary authorities, who give signals of being ready to play
their role of lender of last resort.
Another hypothesis could be that the experience of the 1970s and 1980s
resembles more the period 1878-1~85. Then, the banks and the public
seemed to work together in order to compensate for the sudden contraction of
the base. This explanation is compatible with the development of new forms
of money recently stimulated by technological development, e.g., electronic
money. The implication of this latter hypothesis could then be that a mone-
tary crisis is still to come, but on the conditional hypothesis that the
observed long-term fluctuations continue into the future. Nevertheless, in
our view, it remains crucial to know which of these hypotheses is the most
likely.
22.5. Conclusion: Toward a Typology
The recovery of the money supply growth rate is caused by an increase in
base money, and this is determined by an influx of international reserves. In
a small, open economy such as Belgium, the crucial variable is the competitive
position. This restoration of international reServes, however, can be realized
by a trade balance surplus (as in the postwar period) or by net imports of
capital earnings (as in the prewar period). In other words, the core of the
recovery phase is the restoration of competitiveness of Belgian investments,
either at home or abroad, or both.
Once the growth of the money is under way, all other ,determinants follow
and stimulate the growth of the money supply. The growth of the money base
is, apart from international reserves, enhanced by the development of the
internal sources, Le., the financing by the central bank of private banks (via
rediscounting) and later of the government (via open market operations or
money financing of the budget deficit). The significance of the latter, how-
ever, has only recently been recognized. Once the base growth recovers, the
confidence of the private banking system is restored, and credit expansion
becomes a growing source of money. This optimism spreads to the public,
which becomes convinced of the solidity of the recovery. In other words; the
expansion of money growth finds its origin in a "virtuous circle", a spiral of
optimism.
After some time, the growth of international reserves falls, and the basis
of the "virtuous circle" begins to" shrink. But the growth of the money base is
only stagnating or undergoing'a slight decline because internal sources substi-
tute for the diminishing international reserves: the central bank increases
its financing of the banks and the government until they become dominant
sources of base money creation. However, the slower growth of the base and
its origin do not escape the attention of the banks. They increase their
reserves, which have a negative effect on their money creation possibilities.
Finally, the "virtuous" circle becomes a "vicious" one, when the public
realizes that the basis for their optimism has disappeared. This realization
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becomes more widespread when the growth of the money base slows down or
even becomes negative: the central bank is no longer able to compensate for
the declining role of international reserves with internal sources. or even
tries to diminish them with the aim of coping with inflation. The public loses
its confidence in the soundness of the banking system, and the private banks
increase their reserves to reassure the public. The multiplier. being the
major source of money, shrinks by the combined negative action of the
currency and reserve ratio. The growth of the money supply declines sharply
or even becomes negative. This deflationary spiral. whose ultimate cause lies
in the loss of international competitiveness, works as a boomerang on the real
sector as a credit squeeze accompanies the monetary contraction of the
money base, and the money supply can start again.
In this scheme. the present situation is difficult to interpret: either we
are still in a prolonged recession, which will be followed by a depression, or
we will be witnesses to a crucial institutional change. The external sources
are substituted for internal ones, not so much by financing the banks, but the
state. Until now, this high base growth has been able to avoid a monetary
contraction; although the base growth rate has recently fallen, the confi-
dence of the banks and the public has not been shaken, but has even been
restored after the turbulence of the early 1970s. This same policy has also
been successful in avoiding a credit squeeze.
The cost of this successful operation seems to have been twofold. The
overbuilt internal sources of money base have created inflation. Since the
multiplier remains high, credit is widely available; but too much is used to
finance the high debt position of firms, including marginal ones, and the
government. Thus, a rapid recovery of competitive positions by market forces
is postponed. We believe that a credit crisis has the advantage (although it is
the only one) of discriminating between solid and marginal firms within a short
time. On the other hand. a stagflationary solution requires a long time, as the
need for a restructuring policy is felt later, and only then can design and
implementation be started. That could be why a long wave could again be a
long one.
Whether a depression is still to come, or institutional change, will in our
view depend on the further ability of governments to avoid a crisis of confi-
dence in the banks and the public. A too-tight and sudden deflationary policy
to control budget deficits and inflation could cause a negative multiplier
change, which, in addition to a smaller money base, could result in a violent
monetary crisis.
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Relative Prices and Technical Change:
A Suggested Approach to Long Waves
Massimo Di Matteo
Over the last decade there has been an increasingly widespread feeling that
conventional static economic theory is unable to offer a convincing analysis of
the evolution of economic systems and reliable proposals for remedies to the
situation of stagflation. As a consequence, in the last five or six years there
has been renewed interest in the analysis of long waves described by Kondra-
tieff (1926, 1928), which were consigned to oblivion after World War II. As
early as 1913' Pareto wrote a paper, taking France as an example, which
sketched very clearly the argument that the world economy was character-
ized by long-term oscillations. The idea was that a study of long-term tenden-
cies, or the forces and mechanisms that shape and govern them, would help in
answering in a more satisfactory way the questions posed by the real world.
Before suggesting a framework for analyzing long waves, I discuss the
existence of Kondratieff cycles themselves, since many economists question
them both on statistical and more general grounds. The latter claim that long
waves are nothing more than historical episodes that correspond to different
stages in the evolution of capitalism as a result of external forces rather than
internal mechanisms. It is interesting to note that this argument was put for-
ward at the same time as the pioneering contributions by Kondratieff were
published (see Day, 1976). This is certainly a serious objection, and it is diffi-
cult to make the case for one position or the other. I think that there is no
need (even if it were possible) to settle the matter on a priori grounds
because we can adopt the Kondratieff intuition as a temporary working
hypothesis, leaving it to researchers to judge whether or not simple mechan-
isms can be found that are consistent with long waves. Meanwhile, it is worth
exploring the consequences of adopting the hypothesis in terms of the light
that may be shed on the workings of the capitalist system. This procedure
has the advantage of helping to establish a dialogue between historians and
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economists on a topic that certainly needs a joint effort in order to be dealt
with satisfactorily. It is clear that the longer the period under examination,
the more difficult it is to find (or extract) a set of general laws that apply to
different nations at different stages of development; but on the other hand
some regularities and similarities can be detected and should be studied care-
fully. In this case what is left unexplained could well be the peculiar ele-
ments that can be understood and clarified with the help of a detailed histori-
cal analysis.
There is also the statistical debate (see Soper. 1975). The main reason
for the lack of agreement among scholars is that. in comparison with the
length of the cycle to be detected, the available times series are too short to
apply spectral analysis, and the elimination of the trend is often a doubtful
procedure. My position is as follows. I distinguish (following Kondratieff him-
self) between long waves in prices and in physical production. Whereas the
existence of the latter is much in doubt. the former is widely recognized. It
is often stated that, unless it can be proved that the economic system does
oscillate in real quantities as well, the long-wave hypothesis must be totally
rejected. I do not share this view. First, long waves in output can be
detected at least for some countries and for world production (Bieshaar and
Kleinknecht. 1984). Second, something more can be said about price move-
ments. As Rostow (1978) has forcefully argued, oscillations in the terms of
trade between manufactured goods and raw materials can be detected in the
evolution of the capitalist economy. More precisely, he showed the existence
of alternations in the value of the ratio between the price of commodities pro-
duced in the industrial sector and the prices of raw materials and foodstuffs.
Accordingly, one can distinguish in world history roughly five periods in
which foodstuffs and raw materials prices increased with respect to those of
manufactured commodities (A-periods), and four periods where the opposite
held true (B-periods). The periodization chosen by Rostow is as follows (A-
periods only): I. 1790-1815; II. 1848-1873; III, 1896-1920; IV. 1936-1951; and
V, 1973-... If Rostow's chronology is accepted (and I think it should because
it is statistically sound) one is in search of a set of elements that account for
such a pattern and the corresponding movements in production (see Rostow
1960. 1979, 1980).
Thus it is clear that of the various scholars, I have some sympathy for
Rostow's approach. This is not to deny validity of the analyses of Schumpeter
(1939, and his followers), Mandel, Forrester, Freeman, etc. I have simply
chosen a general view common to the one shared by Rostow and at the same
time offer some considerations on a mechanism that could be important in
shaping economic evolution. I do not want to discuss and criticize Rostow's
arguments since my purpose is to offer something which, building on Rostow's
intuition. is (I hope) less unconvincing. The model put forward by Rostow and
Kennedy (1979) omits many interesting elements like unemployment, oligopolis-
tic markets, and endogenous technical progress. It would be highly desirable
to construct a model that captures all the important elements. but that task is
beyond my ability. I therefore outline a set of elements that could make up a
picture, drawing partly on previous work by Di Matteo and Ruiz (1986).
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For the sake of clarity let me split the analysis into several parts. It
has been observed that the various phases of a cycle may be due to different
causes, so that my procedure will not be considered totally unsound. As a
first step, I introduce the Harrodian warranted and actual growth paths.
According to Harrod (1973) it is possible under suitable assumptions that war-
ranted and actual growth paths tend to coincide without having necessarily
wildly unstable behavior in the economic system. The equality between the
two growth rates can be trough cycles and, for positive or negative growth
rates, it constitutes a very simple description of the behavior of the system
in a first phase where we leave the natural rate of growth out of account and
concentrate insteaq on natural resources. (In the following I assume two com-
posite goods - natural resources and manufactures.)
It is important to start from an observation regarding the neoclassical
theory of exhaustible resources. The latter is centered on the Hotelling rule,
which states that under perfect competition the price of an exhaustible
resource must grow steadily at a rate that is dictated by the rate of irttcrest.
Whatever the merits of this approach, it takes for granted that the definition
of an exhaustible resource as something whose amount is fixed is sufficient
for the analysis. Though logically impeccable. this line of argument does not
apply easily to the real world where we witness situations that are far from
being as clear-cut as the application of the theory requires. Gordon (1967)
noted that for the theory to be adequate the owner of the resource has to be
sure that the resource will actually be exhausted in a period of time near
enough to affect his behavior. In other words, user costs may be considered
negligible under proper circumstances. and therefore the owner of the
resource will follow different optimal decision rules. In this case it could be
perfectly legitimate to treat the resource as any other produced commodity.
The above argument is correct, I believe: the introduction of natural
resources will then not alter the Harrodian story in any significant respect.
Along the growth path, prices can be fairly constant with wages growing pari
passu with productivity. We abstract from complications arising from the
changing structure of demand and different rates of productivity. The story
does not have a happy ending, however, as soon as the situation described
above ceases to hold. When would one expect this change to occur? One could
imagine that as a result of cumulative growth the economic system would come
near to the natural resource ceiling, at which point the attitude of the owner
of the resource may change since he now feels that the time when exhaustion
will occur is not too far away. To describe what would happen following this
switch, we need another piece of theory. One is tempted to employ anyone of
the economic growth models with an exhaustible resource that proliferated
after the first oil crisis. Although models like those developed by Stiglitz
(1974) have given some interesting results (a long-term appreciation of the
resource price with respect to the produced commodity price), I nevertheless
do not regard them as suitable for my purpose since they overlook the
macrolevel and the importance of technical progress. Moreover. the nonex-
istence of perfect competition in industrial and resource markets forces me
to introduce different hypotheses.
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Figure 23.1.. Model relalions (Di Matteo and Ruiz, 1966). K = investments, C =au-
tonomous expenditure, Sm. = output of manufactured goods, Cm. = consumpllon of
manufactured goods, W = wage rate, P fa = price of manufactured goods, Pp =
price of oil.
With respect to oil, Di Matteo and Ruiz (1986) elaborated a medium-term
model that attempts to capture some aspects of the recent past [1]. The model
is a simple integrated macromodel, Le., a dynamic aggregative model where the
prices of oil and manufactured goods are endogenous in a context of market
imperfections. Relative prices do affect aggregate demand. Figure 23.1 sum-
marizes the relations of the model (the monetary sector is not taken into
account). We have a stock adjustment equation where desired capital is a
function of expected demand (which in turn depends on current demand) via
an expectation function based on adaptive expectations. Then we have a Phil-
lips' curve where wage changes are explained by the level of output and
changes in the price of the manufactured good. The latter is based on a
mark-up equation where both oil and labor inputs are linked to outputs via
fixed coefficients. The demand for the manufactured good depends directly
on income and also on the price ratio in a way that I summarize below. Finally,
the price of oil is determined by the willingness of the owner to supply more
oil in the unit period (and therefore to exhaust his resource earlier). At the
same time the price charged by the owner reflects changes in the price of the
manufactured good so that the owner's revenue is in "real" terms.
From the theory of consumer behavior in a two-good economy, we know
that the price coefficients of the demand function are opposite in sign. If the
share of oil in the consumers' income is high (low) then an increase in the
price of oil will lower (raise) the demand for the manufactured good. In our
model we chose the second alternative, since oil is a small share of the consu-
mers' budget. If we wish to adapt our model to the more general problem of
resources (in the spirit of Ros tow) , then the opposite holds.
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The specification of the sign has important implications for the stability
conditions of the model. In the oil case, it is easy to find a set of economically
meaningful sufficient conditions for stability, whereas in the Rostow case the
situation is unclear: stability cannot be completely excluded but the
economic interpretation is not so easy. In the latter case the working of the
model can be outlined briefly. Suppose that for some reason the price of the
natural resource is higher than its equilibrium value. Then the demand for
consumer goods falls and sets in the multiplier accelerator mechanism. Next,
cost effects have to be taken into account. An increase in the resource price
raises the price of the manufactured good, which raises consumer demand and
this increases wages, and thus prices. This in turn reinforces the rise in the
natural resource price owing to the indexation effect, so that the price of the
latter can continue to move away from the equilibrium level unless the previ-
ous rise in consumer demand reverses the whole process.
At this point one could argue that models showing a high probability of
exhibiting unstable behavior should be discarded altogether since in reality
we do (or could) not observe such explosive movements. However, even
unstable models can serve a useful purpose; indeed, any model gives a one-
sided representation of the economic system. It would be the end of economic
science the day when we had a complete dynamic model of the way any econ-
omy works. It would be a mistake to assume that parameters do not change
with time. If we approximate a nonlinear phenomenon by means of connected
linear pieces, it is clear that the approximation ceases to be valid after a
while, so we could interpret instability as a signal that the model is a partial
one and that it overlooks some important elements.
Returning to our framework, we could expect two things to happen.
First, there should be a movement towards a particular form of technical pro-
gress. Hicks (1932) conjectured that a rise in the price of a factor of produc-
tion would be itself "a spur to invention and to an invention of a particular
kind - directed to economizing the use of a factor which has become rela-
tively expensive" (p. 124). Following that hint [2], many tests have been con-
ducted and, by and large, Hicks' approach has been found not to be incon-
sistent with observed facts (see Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978). Thus there is a
strong presumption that after a while innovations that lower the input coeffi-
cient of natural resources in commodity production will occur. Although this
modification is not made in the formal model (because of the mathematical
awkwardness), this might lead to a reversal in the tendency of natural
resource prices to rise. On the other hand, the latter event could be rein-
forced by the lifting of the natural resource barrier due to the previous price
rise, which presumably has the effect of encouraging investment, e.g., in the
discovery of new oil fields.
In the following the convenient but restrictive assumption of a single
natural resource is abandoned in order to bridge the gap between economic
theory and historical analysis. During the unfolding of the process described
above, another parallel process has to be considered, although it is treated
separately since it can not be accommodated in a formal model but should not
be overlooked. Rosenberg (1976, 1983) stressed the existence of a form of
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endogenous technical progress that I will relabel endogenous qualitative
technical progress. It is endogenous since it is largely determined by
socioeconomic factors rather than by autonomous scientific research and
inventions. Drawing on extensive historical data he provides many instances
where threats of factor limitations tend to stimulate innovative efforts
towards either economizing on that factor or finding a substitute. He does
openly reject Hicks' analysis of the cause of the technical change, but I do
not think the two explanations necessarily conflict. I share Rosenberg's view
that technical innovation is one of the ways an economic system has to adapt
itself to changing patterns of resource availability over time. The latter fact
is not reflected in price changes by necessity (so that even if the model out-
lined above were not unstable, induced technical progress is still possible).
Thus the existence of a shortage (or the belief in its existence) could
not only produce the change in behavior discussed by Gordon (1967), but also
could set in a process of technical change. In particular, Rosenberg (1976)
imagines a situation where a qualitatively different input (e.g., a new energy
source) starts being used in the production process of the manufactured good.
In this way one could mark the specificity of each cycle where just one
resource (or a few) will be substituted, thus fulfilling the condition for the
realization of a new phase in the evolution of the economic system. It has
been observed (Robertson, 1915) that each cycle is characterized by a par-
ticular industry or group of industries that leads the cycle itself. Also, the
development of a particular industry or group of industries in each cycle is
correlated quite often and intimately with the availability of certain kinds of
raw materials and particular sources of energy. It therefore may be possible,
via a structural analysis of the economic system, to single out those crucial
types of raw materials and sources of energy that can have the effects
described, although of course they will differ from cycle to cycle. The pro-
cess above would look like stripping the petals of a daisy, one after another!
In this chapter a discussion of lags and time patterns has been carefully
avoided, not because I am unaware of their importance, but because a serious
discussion would necessitate a good deal of further research. In particular, it
is clear that the process of technical change takes a considerable amount of
time to start and to be completed, according to Rosenberg. On the question of
periodicity I have nothing to say, but I feel less guilty since my approach
shares the same difficulty as other approaches to the long-wave phenomenon,
as noted by Rosenberg and Frischtak (1984).
Notes
[1]
[2]
In our model variables move around a trendless equilibrium, but the model can
be reframed so that variables move around a steady slate path.
Hicks' intuition was confirmed with the proof by Binswanger (1974) that under
reasonable assumptions (essentially decreasing marginal returns to research)
a rise, say, in the price of labor will lead to the adoption of a new technique
with a labor-saving bias. This approach can be compared with that of Marx
(see Ca.pita.l, Vol. 1, ch. 23).
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A Monetary Model of Long Cycles
Pekka. Korpinen
24.1. Introduction
The reasons for the slow growth in the world economy since 1973 are not yet
fully understood. In search of possible explanations, the long-cycle
hypothesis has attracted renewed interest.
Long-term fluctuations were first observed in price levels and other
monetary variables (Tooke and Newmarch, 1928; Jevons. 1887; Wicksell, 1936;
Cassel, 1932), but Kondratieff (1935) was one of the first to integrate mone-
tary and real factors into a general long-cycle hypothesis. His preliminary
theoretical efforts concentrated around long-term fluctuations in prices and
interest rates, loanable funds, and long-term investments (Garvy. 1943, pp.
207-208). In contrast to Kondratieff, Schumpeter (1939) laid the foundation
for the theory of long cycles based on innovations and technical change, allot-
ting monetary factors as secondary. The majority of the contemporary long-
cycle/wave researchers (e.g.• Mensch, 1975; Mandel. 1975; Forrester. 1976;
Rostow. 1978; Freeman. 1981; van Duijn. 1983) follow Schumpeter in the sense
that key explanatory factors lie outside the monetary field.
In this chapter (see also Korpinen. 1981) reasons for long-term fluctua-
tions in economic activity and employment are sought first from changes in
price levels. monetary policy. and interest rates. A model is specified in
which. through the introduction of monetary variables, a Harrod-type bal-
anced growth path can be turned into long-term oscillations around a moving
equilibrium.
The motivation for concentrating on monetary factors arises from the
following observations. In the 1970s there was a shift towards a less accommo-
dative monetary policy stance in several major industrial countries. especially
in the USA. Subsequent increases in nominal and real interest rates led to
334 A Moneta.ry Mod.el ofLong Cycles
distortions in debt-equity ratios and consequently to debt crises for nations,
governments, important sectors such as agriculture and energy, and large
firms of "old industries". For the most part, the adjustment took the form of
reduced investment expenditure. High interest rates and unemployment have
also led to rapid disinflation and in some cases (e.g., in commodity prices) to a
straight deflation.
From the historic point of view, real interest rates can remain high for a
considerable time. In fact, over the last 200 years real interest rates have
followed the pattern of long cycles amazingly well (see Shiller and Siegel,
1977), so it is not unreasonable to have real interest rates among the key
explanatory variables.
24.2. The Model
Following Harrod (1939) we assume that the equilibrium output Y grows Y a
constant fraction 1/ k of incremental capital I. It is further assumed that
wages Ware consumed, and profits x are invested. If the labor force is con-
stant and productivity (Y/ N) grows at a constant rate y, steady growth is
warranteed when x = kY. So what would happen, say, if the Harrod-type
growth process gets out of balance? In order to answer that question we need
a set of equations to describe basic behavioral relationships outside the
equilibrium path.
We start with the demand and supply of money. We assume that the
velocity of money is inversely proportional to the interest rate:
alPMd =-_.=..:....:..:....-_-1 + {3 (R - y) (24.1)
where Md is the demand for money, Y is national income in real terms, P is the
price level, R is the interest rate, y is the productivity growth rate (a con-
stant, equal to the "natural rate of interest "), and a (inverse of the techno-
logical velocity of money) and (3 are positive coefficients. The rate of accom-
modation of the money supply depends on the wage inflation.
alPM = -----===--==--
s 1 + "1(W - y) (24.2)
where W is the relative increase in money wages (W / W), and 7 is a positive
coefficient.
The supply of and demand for money determine the interest rate:
R =A +BW (24.3)
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where A =(1 - "1/ fJ) Y and B ="1/ fJ. The equilibrium condition for the
market for goods and services is
Y = C + I (24.4)
where C is the volume of consumption and I is the volume of investment. The
consumption function is based on the notion (a la Kalecki) that "workers
spend what they get and capitalists get what they spend".
C =wN (24.5)
where w is real wages and N is employment as well as the employment rate,
because the labor force is assumed to be constant and the measurement of
labor force is normalized at unity.
The investment volume is assumed to depend on the growth of output,
profits, and interest rate.
I = kY + «5 (7T - kyy) - «R - y) Y (24.6)
where k is the capital-output ratio, 7T is real profits (= I), kfjY is "natural"
real profits, and «5 and ~ are positive coefficients.
The growth rate of nominal wages depends on productivity growth. the
share of profits (or wages), and the change in employment.
w= y + 17 (x - ky) + v tV (24.7)
where x is the share of profits, ky is the "natural" share of profits, and 17
and v are positive coefficients.
The rate of inflation is determined by unit labor costs and the change in
the mark-up factor, which depends on the capacity utilization ratio described
by the employment rate.
p = w- y + IC(N -N) (24.8)
where IC and N are positive coefficients. From equation (24.8) we get
(remembering that Vi =W- P and z =Vi - fj)
z = IC (N - N) (24.9)
where z is the relative change in the share of wages (x = 1 - z).
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Equations (24.3)-(24.7) lead to
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N =D (ky -1 + z) D = 0" -1 - (B TJk - (Bv (24.10)
Equations (24,9) and (24.10) form a nonlinear Lotka-Volterra system, which
has an equilibrium point (N, 1 - kY). If the system is in equilibrium. both the
capital stock and output grow along the Harrod's warranted growth path. In
this case capital, output, and productivity all'have the same growth rate (Y).
24.3. Properties of the Model
In order to analyze the properties of the model we first solve the equations of
the trajectories of the system (24.9) - (24.10). Eliminating time and integrat-
ing, we get
IC Ii log N - IC N + (D - Dky) log z - Dz = log c (24.11)
where c is an integration constant. Equation (24.11) can also be written
N"ii
e#CN
=c (24.12)
Equation (24.12) describes the trajectories (given the initial condition), that
form a closed curve, if D > O. Nand z reach their maximum and minimum
values on the trajectories when z =1 - ky and N =N. The movement along
the trajectories is counterclockwise. If D < 0, then the equilibrium point is
not a center, but on "the knife edge": disturbances lead either to cumulative
inflation and full employment, or deflation and increasing unemployment.
The numerator of D is always negative, since 0" has to be smaller than 1.
Therefore. the sign of D depends on whether k ~ or S I;B v. One could
assume that the capital-output ratio (k) is somewhere around 4. Since the
values of I; and v are probably somewhere around 1. the value of B has to be
quite high in order to turn a unstable growth process into a cyclic one. The
value of B depends on how sensitive the money supply is to wage inflation, as
well as on how inelastic the velocity of money is in relation to interest rates.
It is only through a "sadistic" monetary policy, which allows interest rates to
skyrocket, that the cumulatively inflationary long upswing phase is turned in
the model to disinflation and finally a deflationary long downswing.
The next property of the model to be analyzed is the length of the cycle.
Even though there also exists an explicit solution (Frame, 1974) to the length
of the cycle in the Lotka-Volterra system, there is an easy way to obtain an
approximate solution using a linearized version of the model. We can transfer
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the equilibrium point of the system
N =D (ky - 1 + z)N z =IC (N - N)z
to the origin by letting n = N - N and v = z - 1 + kY.
it = DNv + Dvn v = -1C(1 - ky)n - ICnv
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(24.14)
When only the linear terms of (24.14) are taken into account, the solution of
the system is
n =c1 cosVDNIC(1-ky)t +cz sinV DNIC(1-ky)t
v =ca cos VDNIC(1 - ky) t + c 4 sinV DNIC(1 - ky)t
The length of the cycle (T) can be calculated from the formula
(24.15)
It is difficult to say a priori anything specific about the quantitative
values of some of the parameters. In order to reach the range of 40-60 years,
acceleration of inflation has to be slow, Le., both '7 and IC should be very
small. In practice this means that workers increase wage demands only gradu-
ally when the share of profits increases, and that capitalists are cautious to
increase their mark-up over unit costs when demand is strong. As the length
of an inflationary phase, 20-30 years is not necessarily in contradiction with
empirical observations before and after the two world wars. By assuming that
prices react slowly, one is in a sense eliminating short cycles and describing
only long-term fluctuations in the price level. It is possible that a similar
model structure with different parameter values could also be used to
describe the so-called stop-go cycle.
24.4. A Further Development
The initial conditions of the model affect the amplitude of the cycle, but not
the average values over time of employment (N) and distribution of income (z).
On empirical grounds one can question the fact that the cycle is symmetric to
the axis in the sense that the two values of employment assigned to each value
of the share of wages always have the same average, Le., the equilibrium value
(see Korpinen. 1981, p. 152). One would perhaps want to see a trade-off
between employment and a share of wages (profits). If wages are pushed to
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their maximum. where there are no profits, one would expect employment to
be below average. In the following we achieve this result, but at the cost of
complicating the model.
By using real a interest rate (R - P) instead of nominal interest rate in
the investment function (24.6), the model can be described as follows:
i = IC tfil - N)
N =F +Gz +HN
where
F = [1 + (B - 1) ("!] - 6](1 - ky) + (ICN
k + (1 - B) {"v
(24.9)
(24.10)
G = - 1"1 + (B - 1) {"Tl - 6]
k + (1 - B) {"v
H = -{"IC
k + (1 -B) {"v
Equations (24.9) and (24.10) form a dynamic, almost linear system (for a proof
see Korpinen. 1981, p. 148) that has an equilibrium point (N.l - kfi), Le .. as in
the model (24.9)-(24.10). Using the same reasoning about the magnitude of
the parameters as in the previous model, the system can be proved, using
Liapunov's first method (Boyce and Di Prima, 1969, pp. 394-395), to be an
explosive spiral (Figure 24.1).
N
N* = iiJ
;=0
N = 0
'-----------------I~
Figure 2A.1-.
A
x* =ky z
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Even though monetary variables playa key role in the model, it is not correct
to call it monetarist. It is even difficult to speak of the effects of monetary
policy since the money supply is totally endogenous in the model.
In order to try to give a causal interpretation. let us call a period with
high interest rates a "monetarist" regime and a period with low interest rates
a "Keynesian" regime. The monetary squeeze under a monetarist regime works
its effect on price levels through investment, employment, and income distri-
bution. Disinflation or deflation is gained only by substantial and long-lasting
losses in production. A Keynesian era is characterized by low interest rates,
increasing employment, and a rising share of profits, which lead to militancy
and greater demands by workers. The ongoing class struggle has a cumulative
momentum of its own. Inflation accelerates, and the tone of monetary "policy"
starts to change.
The price and wage mechanism described by the model refers to a closed
economy, Le., to the world as a whole. If world market prices are given, as in
the case of a small open economy with fixed exchange rates, then higher nomi-
nal wages should lead to higher real wages (as postulated in Goodwin's 1967
model, which in a sense is the opposite case of our model). Without "given"
outside markets, prices are basically determined by costs, of which wages are
the most important part.
The distribution assumption in the foregoing analysis is similar to
Kaldor's (1955) growth model, in which the relation between prices and money
wages depends on the total demand (investment). The idea here is that per-
petually high employment increases the degree of monopoly (prices in relation
to price costs; see Kalecki, 1943). In the normal business cycle recession, the
degree of monopoly might continue to increase temporarily since overhead
costs are relatively higher; but during the long depression phase unused
capacity will eventually bring a halt to the monopolistic pricing process, cul-
minating in cut-throat competition.
Moving outside the model, it is plausible that economic policy has a ten-
dency always to be late and therefore "wrong". If the reality determines
consciousness and consciousness determines action, there is an unavoidable
lag. The writings of Smith (1776) and Ricardo (1817) were made during an in-
flationary long upswing, but their recommendations (hard currency, laissez-
faire) were still applied during a deflationary period. Tooke (1926-57) and
Keynes (1936) made their contributions during a deflationary long downswing,
but their policy recommendations were mainly followed in an inflationary
environment. This leads to the theory of long cycles in its simplest form: the
same mistakes are repeated by every second generation. The economic poli-
cies of the 1970s and the 1980s resemble surprisingly those of the 1920s and
the 1930s, as well as those of the 1870s and 1880s or, even further back, of
the 1820s and 1830s.
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The emphasis on monetary factors in this chapter does not imply that
innovations and other technological factors are unimportant: it is simply too
difficult to analyze all the relevant variables simultaneously. It may very well
be that monetary factors are relatively more important in explaining the
turning point from a long upswing to a long downswing, whereas the accumula-
tion of unused technological possibilities might have comparative advantages
in explaining the resumption of growth.
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PART IV
Modeling the Long-Wave Phenomenon

ClfAPTER 25
Catastrophe Theory Applied to
the Analysis of Long Waves
L. Klimenko a.nd S. Menshilcov
Menshikov and Klimenko (1985) suggested a model of long waves using the US
economy as an example. The model has four variables: labor productivity,
capital intensity of labor (capital-labor ratio), profit rate, and profit per unit
of labor time. The model deals with growth rates of these variables. func-
tional relationships are described by linear differential equations, and param-
eters are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) using time series for
1889-1982. The model (model 1) generates long-term fluctuations of approxi-
mately 50 years. Variables describing the velocity and direction of technical
progress - labor productivity and the capital intensity of labor (see FiguTe
25.1) - playa decisive role in determining the turning points in the cycle.
Changes in the relationships between these variables, Le., in the
capital-output ratio, determine (with a certain lag) the turning points in the
profit rate and gross national product (GNP). Through capital intensity the
profit rate also determines changes in the output-capital ratio. The
shortcomings of model 1 are due to its linearity, which accounts for smooth
and dampened oscillations. Proximity to actual dynamics is achieved only
when additional exogenous variables and stochastic shocks are introduced.
In this' chapter the same statistical series are used in a nonlinear
analysis of economic fluctuations by means of the catastrophe theory (Poston
and Stewart, 1978). It is known from catastrophe theory that any smooth
dynamic process may be locally approximated by polynominals whose order
depends on the number of parameters, and represents n -dimensional surfaces
that have specific features such as folds, pleats, etc. Movement along such
surfaces, in spite of smooth parameters changes, may lead to sudden transfor-
mations from one regime to another, Le., to bifurcations or "catastrophes".
In a capitalist economy fluctuations in output exhibit various periodici-
ties that can be explained by various primary factors: fluctuations in general
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Model 1
Model 2
x
x
F'igure 20.~. Causal relationships in models 1 and 2.
inventories and stocks of consumer durables (3-4 years), renovation of fixed
capital invested in production equipment (8-10 years), waves in the construc-
tion of production buildings and structures (18-20 years), and general revolu-
tions in the technological basis of production (50-60 years). The amplitudes
of these fluctuations vary, and the waves of different periodicities are super-
posed on one another, such that they either increase or reduce the overall
intensity of changes in output. The deepest crisis in the history of the capi-
talist economy occurred in 1929-1933, but none of the empirical models known
to us has been able to simulate this crisis with adequate accuracy. The steep
decline in production during this crisis has been largely simulated by intro-
ducing stochastic (unexplained) influences that could themselves be manifes-
tations of the crisis.
What new elements can catastrophe theory add to the analysis of fluctua-
tions in a capitalist economy? Catastrophe theory makes it possible to find
such values of the control variables of the system, which determine either a
smooth or a bifurcational reaction of the internal variable to smooth changes
in control variables. The area of change in control factors, which accounts
for bifurcational change in the internal variable, is called the critical or
catastrophe area.
The first attempt at such analysis was made by Mensch (1979, 1983), who
used US statistical series for 1900-1934 to construct synthetic variables
expressing extensive and intensive directions in technical progress. He
assumed that the potential production function is described by a polynominal
of a certain concrete type. From his analysis Mensch found that around 1918
the US economy experienced a qualitative transition to a new economic
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optfmum. Mensch's theoretical curve followed fairly closely deviations from
the trend of the actual industrial production index (coefficient of determina-
tion = 0.78).
Unlike Mensch, we have used time series for 1889-1982 to estimate
directly coefficients of a fourth-order polynominal, which expresses the func-
tional dependence of the GNP on profit rate, labor productivity, and capital
intensity, Le., on indicators of the rate and the direction of technical pro-
gress (see Figure 25.1). The most strongly fluctuating of these variables is
the profit rate, and this was chosen as the internal variable to follow the
bifurcations in economic performance. It is assumed that the actual movement
of GNP is close to optimal points corresponding to changes in the profit rate.
Labor productivity and capital intensity are control factors.
It is known from catastrophe theory that a dynamic system that depends
on two control variables contains the specific feature of a pleat, and the typi-
cal family of functions describing it has the form:
(25.1)
where u are the internal variables and t 1 and t 2 are the control parameters.
Thus, it is reasonable to approximate the movement of GNP by equations of
the type:
(25.2)
or
(25.3)
where X = output, or "GNP, or gross private domestic product (GPDP), P =
profit rate, Y = labor productivity, K =capital intensity, and L = employ-
ment. Let us assume that employment L enters the equation linearly and does
not introduce additional specifics in GNP movements other than a long-term
growth trend. We now check a hypothesis according to which the GNP moves
along a path that is close to the optimal points of functions (25.2) and (25.3)
relative to the profit rate. The form of these functions allows the possibility
of one, two, or three optimal points (within ranges that actually exist in an
economy). The area where this possibility exists is determined by the rela-
tion between intensive (labor productivity) and extensive (capital intensity)
factors of technical progress. Drastic changes in the profit rate, and thus
rifts in the transition from one level of output to another, are explained in
the model by changes in the relation between optimal output and profit rate
caused by the general economic situation.
The totality of all values of P, Y, and K, corresponding to optimal values
of X, constitute surfaces of two types:
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(25.4)
(25.5)
For any given values of Y and K, equations (25.4) and (25.5) have three solu-
tions. If there are no complex roots, then there are three optima (two maxima
and one minimum. two minima and one maximum. and one or two flexion points)
of X by the profit rate, which are the object of our analysis. We are con-
cerned only with positive roots, since only they correspond to actual condi-
tions. We now determine which of the optimal points corresponds with which
of the calculated roots; how close are the observed profit rate values to the
roots. We thus determine which of the theoretical optimal points is closest to
the actual condition of the economy. It will also become clear when (Le., at
which values of factors Y, K, and P) a bifurcational transformation occurs in
the actual economy to the alternative optimal point, what is its direction
(upward or downward), and extent (Le., how large a fall or increase in out-
put). If the solutions contain complex roots, then there exists only one
optimal point. If the corresponding profit rates are far from their observed
values, then we must conclude that our hypothesis of closeness to optimal
points is not upheld for the period in question.
Rewriting equation (25.4) as functions for K [or (25.5) for Y] and dif-
ferentiating by P, we obtain critical profit rate values Per under which, given
various values of Y (or K), the possibility exists of bifurcational changes in
the profit rate, and a sudden transformation from one optimal point of the
profit rate can be calculated from
96a 1 a 31t /a Z4 (25.6)
Z _ (-6az [6a z]2p. - -±--
er a4 a4
(25.7)
The corresponding critical areas of change, or catastrophe areas, are found
from
(25.8)
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where P ~r and P;r have two values. Using observed values of Y (or K), we can
obtain the areas !Kcr ' Y, P~r I and !K, Vcr' P;r I whose borders determine pos-
sible values of Y, K, and P, leading to sudden changes in output. This method
was used to analyze relations of the type (25.2) and (25.3) at different times.
The estimated equation for the entire period 1889-1982 is:
x =1.664P4 - 50.234P3 + 0.636P2 K + 74.95PY + 0.701L - 34702 (25.10)
(4.2) (7.5) (6) (17.8) (12.3) (7.8)
where R 2 =0.999, S =0.5 X 104, F =7668, and DW =0.53. The figures in
parentheses are t-statistics; R 2 =coefficient of determination; S =standard
error; F = Fisher statistics; DW = Durbin-Watson statistics.
The solution to equation (25.5) for observed values of Y and K in
1889-1982 gives three real roots for the first 42 points (Le., before 1930),
and one real negative root for almost all other points. Two of the three real
roots are positive and one is negative. Since the coefficient at p 4 is positive,
it follows that X has two minima and one maximum. From their alteration it fol-
lows that the negative root corresponds to one of the minima X, the smaller
positive root to the maximum, and the larger positive root to the second
minimum. As the relationship between Yand K changes in time, the two posi-
tive roots approach each other. After they converge at a point close to 1931,
there remains one real negative root that corresponds to the first minimum in
the previous period.
Assuming theoretical profit rate values in 1889-1930 to equal one of the
positive roots closest to the observed values of P, we obtain theoretical GNP
values for every year in question (see Figure 25.2). This theoretical time
series follows the observed series extremely well, and the direction of change
in both series coincides for each year. Thus our hypothesis that actual
economic development followed paths close to the local maximum of function
(25.10) is confirmed for the period 1889-1930. After 1930 the economy
apparently underwent a qualitative change, and its path may have lain close to
other local optima that are not described by function (25.10).
The critical profit rate values corresponding to function (25.10) and to
observed values of K are within gradually decreasing intervals (0.8; 14.3) and
(4.6; 10.6) (see Figure 25.3). Observed profit rate values lie within the critical
area until 1939, after which they leave.
A similar situation occurs in the sub-period 1889-1930. GNP dynamics
are approximated by the polynomial
X = 5.09p 4 - 101.21P3 + 5.96p2 y + 15.91PK + 0.~7 L - 12552
(7.2) (11.6) (8.4) (6.1) (13.9) (3.4)
(25.11)
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where R Z = 0.999, S = 0.2 X 104 , F = 804, and DW = 1.4. Unlike the polyno-
mial used for the full period in function (25.11), Y is a parameter at pZ and K
at p.
Solving equation (25.4) for function (25.11) and using observed values of
Y and K, we obtain three real roots for the first 30 points (Le.. before 1918)
and only one real negative root for the rest of the period. The three roots. as
in the equation for the full period, correspond to two minima and one max-
imum. However, unlike the full period where the actual movement of the econ-
omy was close to the theoretical maximum throughout 1889-1930. model
(25.11) produces a different movement: (a) a qualitative change in output
occurs as early as 1916 (instead of 1930); and (b) the actual movement before
1916 follows two optimal paths: a maximal in 1889-1898 and a minimal in
1899-1916.
Critical profit rate values are within decreasing intervals from (0.7; 9.2)
to (2.4; 7.6), and observed profit rate values are close to the critical values
throughout the entire period before 1916. The observed values of capital
intensity reached their upper critical levels around 1916. A similar result
occurred in the overall period around 1930 when actual labor productivity
values coincided with the maximum critical values.
The equation estimated for 1939-1982 is of type (25.3):
x =1.94p4 - 62.63p3 + 0.47pzK + 66.61PY + 2.09L - 147573
(2.4) (3.7) (3.6) (14.2) (19) (18)
(25.12)
where R2 = 0.999, S = 0.3 X 104 • F = 856, and DW = 1.17. The solution to
equation (25.5) for function (25.11) produces three real roots in 1939-1956
and one real negative root in the remaining period. The movement of the
economy in 1939-1949 is close to the maximum corresponding to the smaller
positive root, and both roots merge by 1956. However, around 1950 [similar to
1899 in model (25.11)] the economy changes to the minimum optimum and later
(around 1956) moves away from paths described by optimal points.
Critical profit rate values are determined by decreasing intervals (0.8;
15.2) and (2.2; 13.8). Throughout the period. excluding only 1939 and 1940,
observed values are close to critical ones, but the actual values of capital
intensity reach maximum critical values around 1956.
For further clarification of the dynamics of the GNP and deeper analysis
of turning points. the sub-periods 1889-1939 and 1939-1982 were further
subdivided: 1889-1939 into the intervals 1889-1916 and 1916-1939; and
1939-1982 was extended slightly back in time and divided into the intervals
1933-1957 and 1958-1982. For estimating the equation for 1933-1957 the war
years 1939-1945 were excluded.
The model for 1889-1916 is:
x = 2.19P4 - 41.6zp3 + 0.56p2 K + 109.08PY + 0.45L - 18107
(3.5) (4.2) (2) (4.2) (7) (8.2)
(25.13)
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where R 2 =0.999, S =0.5 X 104, F =2542, and DW =0.83. For the entire
period the roots of equation (25.5) in this case are real. The choice of one of
them served to closely approximate the actual GNP movement. and thus to
uphold the hypothesis of closeness to optimal points (see Figure 25.4(a).
Before 1900 the economy is close to the maximum point vis-a the profit rate;
in 1901 1906, 1907, and 1916 it is close to the minimum; and in other years it
returns to the minimum. This result correspondences well with conclusions
made for the whole period 1889-1939.
The critical area of changes in the profit rate. unlike the result for
1889-1939, widens from (-0.8: 10.3) to (-1; 10.5). However, as in the previous
case, around 1916 actual productivity is equal to its maximum critical value.
The estimated model for 1916-1939 is:
x = 5.BB p4 - 109.29p3 + 0.5BpZ K + B6.19PY + 0.63 L - 20455.9 (25.14)
(11.9) (13.B) (2.5) (14.7) (11.7) (9.1)
where RZ =0.999, S =0.1 X 104• F =340, and DW =1.98. Three real roots
are obtained from the solution to equation (25.5) for this model. As in other
cases, the smaller positive root corresponds to the maximal optimal point, the
larger positive root to the minimum. In the early part of the period
(1916-1929), the economy moves close to minimum GNP vis-a-vis the profit
rate, whereas in the crisis of 1930-1933 the economy moves to the local max-
imum [see Figure 25.4(b)].
The critical area of changes in the profit rate is between the intervals
(0.4: 8.8) and (0.6; 8.6). As in other cases, the transfer to an alternative tra-
jectory occurs when the higher boundaries of the critical area are reached.
In 1936 the economy returns to optimal points corresponding to the local
GNP minimum in relation to the profit rate. Stable movement in the vicinity of
this optimum continues until 1956-1958, as can be seen from the following
model for 1933-1958:
x =1.47p4 - 52.56P3 + 3.93p2y + 9.975PK + 1.96 L - 12452B.9 (25.15)
(3) (B.7) (5.2) (2.6) (11.2) (6.5)
where R2 =0.999, S = 0.1 X 104 , F =4321, and DW =2.05. In this case there
are three optimal points throughout the period. The only positive real root
corresponds to minimum GNP in relation to the profit rate, which is the and
DW = 2.05. In this case there are three optimal points throughout the period.
The only positive real root corresponds to minimum GNP in relation to the pro-
fit rate, which is the continuation of the optimal regime started in 1935.
The theoretical profit rate values are very close to observed values.
Correlation between theoretical and actual GNP is high [see Figure 25.4(c)].
The critical area of changes in the profit rates lies between the narrowing
intervals (17.4: 1.8) to (14.4; 4.8). Real profit rate values approach the criti-
cal area, starting in 1942. Unlike the turning points of 1916 and 1930, the
actual value of capital intensity in 1956 is far from its critical value.
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The estimated model for 1956-1982 is:
x = -5.03P4 + 53 p3 + 4.67 ply + 6.53PK -+ 2.31 L - 219103
(4.7) (2.5) (13.5) (3.5) (22.0) (9.0)
(25.16)
where eZ = 0.999. S = 0.18 X 104 • F = 9173, and DW = 1.8. Unlike all the
other models considered above, this one has two maxima and one minimum. Out
of the three real roots two are negative. starting in 1960 (while in 1956-59
two roots are complex). The only positive root represents maximum GNP in
relation to the profit rate [see Figure 25.4(d)]. The results are summarized in
Ta.ble 25.1.
Table 2ti.1.. Results of model simulations.
No. of real Period of real
Period of positive positive X m1n Xmax
estimation roots roots period period
1889-1982 (94 years) 2 1889-1930 1889-1930
1889-1930 (42 years) 2 1889-1916 1898-1916 1889-1898
1939-1982 (44 years) 2 1939-1956 1950-1956 1939-1949
1889-1916 (28 years) 2 1889-1916 1901-1901 1889-1900
1902-1905
1906-7, 1916 1908-1915
1916-1939 (24 years) 2 1916-1939 1916-1929 1918
1936-1939 1930-1935
1933-1958 (26 years) 1 1933-1958 1933-1958
1956-1982 (27 years) 1 1960-1982 1960-1982
What substantive conclusions follow from this analysis?
(1) When long periods (40-90 years) are considered. the models enable fairly
accurate simulations of real dynamics of output to be made only for
approximately half of the period. However, it is logical to assume that
when these models cease to describe actual GNP behavior close to one of
the optimal points, serious changes occur in long-term economic condi-
tions. For example. the models for 1889-1982 and 1889-1930 show that
around 1916 and 1930 long-term turning points are observed in the rela-
tive dynamics of labor productivity (Y) and capital intensity (K). In both
cases the output-capital ratio (Y/ K) reached its local minimum. Such
conditions are characteristic of a transition to the opening phase of a
new technical revolution in production.
(2) During approximately half of the long periods. the real output dynamics
stray far from trajectories indicated by theoretical optimal points, so
that the analysis must be supplemented by observing shorter periods of
25-30 years. In this case the real movement, as a rule, is closely simu-
lated by theoretical trajectories during the whole period under con-
sideration.
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(3) The most interesting cases are when there is a bifurcation in output from
a local minimum (in relation to the profit rate) to a local maximum, and
back. These appear three times in the period 1889-1916; in two of the
three cases (1889-1901 and 1906-1907), the bifurcations coincided with
actual recessions in the economy. In period 1916-1939 output was mostly
close to the minimum as related to the profit rate, but in the crisis years
1930-1935 it changed to the maximum optimal point. This can be
explained in the following way.
The capitalist economy is a combination of monopolistic and non-
monopolistic sectors and components. When business conditions are favor-
able, a new economic structure is created and aggregate demand, on the
whole, leads supply, the tendency to use monopoly advantages is extremely
strong, and situations prevail in which it is possible for monopolies to achieve
higher profits by limiting output. On the contrary, under unfavorable busi-
ness conditions, when the old economic structure is undergoing a crisis and
new technologies start to emerge in clusters, the monopoly situations associ-
ated with the old structure may be destroyed by objective market forces, and
highly competitive situations tend to prevail even in some highly monopolized
sectors. This occurred in 1930-1935 and evidently also in some previous
recessions.
Consider Figure 25.5(a), which shows the typical situation occurring in
the models, as described above. For every observed combination of K and Y
there exist two different optimal output points that are consistent with two
levels of P. The maximum optimal point in GNP is achieved when P is at its
local minimum, and the minimum optimal point in output corresponds to the
local maximum. Figure 25.5(b) is a reminder of the simple example of relative
conditions of monopoly and free competition. Under free competition output
Xi is determined by the intersection of the curves of supply and demand. But
this is not the point of maximum profit, which, under a monopoly, is assured
by smaller output X2 and higher price. Under prevailing monopoly conditions
actual output tends to be closer to the local minimum (X~, whereas in a pre-
vailing competitive situation it tends to be closer the local maximum (Xi)'
These diagrams show only the possibility of bifurcation, since they apply
only at a given moment of time. Actual changes from one optimal point to
another occur from one point in time to another. Therefore, what is a change
from minimum to maximum GNP in a crisis is really a fall in the actual level of
output (and profit).
Consider Figure 25.6(a) which shows actual and theoretical profit rates
in the period 1889-1916. The prevailing mode of operation of the economy
here is competitive, particularly in the 1890s, when cartels and trusts were
still in their formative period and when the long recession of 1873-1895 was
giving way to a ne!i long recovery. Then, on two occasions (1901 and
1906-1907) there were bifurcations from a predominantly competitive to a
predominantly monopolistic mode. In both cases, however, the latter did not
last and was broken by cyclical crises (belonging to short and medium waves).
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Figure 25.5. Maximum and minimum optimal points in (a) output and (b) profits.
These crises, although they coincided with long upturns, were fairly strong by
historical standards. It is of this period that Lenin (1964), writing in 1916,
indicated that cartels aggravated economic crises instead of making them less
vigorous. Note that the theoretical values, even those representing one of
the two real positive roots, follow year-by-year changes in the actual move-
ment; only the big leaps are better described by a change to the other root.
Figure 25.6(b) extends this analysis to 1916-1937. It is apparent that
at some time during World War I the prevailing competitive mode changed to a
predominantly monopolistic one, which was seriously broken only by the crisis
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of 1929-1933. The movement of the theoretical values, at least, for the larger
real root, becomes rigid and replicates changes in the actual profit rate less
accurately. This is also true of later periods. After World War II all models
have only one root corresponding to real paths of the economy, and thus the
possibility of a leap in the mathematical sense is absent. This may reflect a
new situation, when monopolistic tendencies in the economy are actively sup-
ported by the state (conditions of state-monopoly capitalism).
However, it should be noted that for the postwar. as for earlier periods,
there were both movements close to minimum output in relation to profits,
reflecting relatively more favorable long-term business conditions
(1939-1956), and movements close to maximum output in relation to profits,
when long-term business conditions were becoming relatively less favorable
(1960-1982). This apparent change in the mode of operation of the economy
coincided with actual changes from the phase of upturn to downturn in the
long wave.
But although the optimal regimes in the two models that are used to
approximate the postwar period (1933-1958 and 1956-1982) are definitely
different, the transfer from one to the other is not directly registered in the
overall model for the postwar period (1939-1982); the latter refuses to sup-
port the general hypothesis only after 1956. It is worth noting that the model
for 1956-1982 starts its operation in the maximum regime only after 1960, but
again refuses to support the existence of a different regime before 1960.
Apparently the transition from one regime to another does occur in
1956-1960, but we have not yet been able to model it.
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CHAPTER 28
Structural Change and Long-Term
Fluctuations in Economic Growth
W. Krelle, R. Dobrinsky, J. Gajda, H. Ross, 1. Sz~kely, and H. Welsch
26.1. Introduction
The last decade was and the next decades will be periods of substantial struc-
tural economic change: newly industrialized nations emerged, East Asia
became a leading economic center, new products and production technologies
were developed, energy and environmental problems were recognized, and
unemployment and short- and long-term cycles were much in evidence. Thus
IIASA decided to look into the problems of structural change and long-term
economic fluctuations. In February 1985 a joint Bonn-IIASA research group
was established at Bonn University, in collaboration with research groups in
several industrialized countries, to analyze and forecast economic structural
change at the world level. This chapter outlines the theoretical background
and approach of the project, shows how long-term fluctuations may arise, and
presents some preliminary results of the project.
26.2. A Theory of Long-Term Fluctuations
28.2.1. 1b.eoretical background: A two-country growth lDodel
We begin with a two-country growth model and analyze the equilibrium growth
path. Changes in the determinants of this growth path give us the main rea-
sons for structural change, and cyclical changes in these determinants help
explain long-term fluctuations in economic growth.
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Consider two countries vis-a-vis the rest of the world, each of which
produces goods under a neoclassical production function. The gross domestic
product (GDP) Y( of coun try i is produced by labor L( with efficiency"(, and
with capital Kt( produced within the country and capital Kj ( imported from
the other country. Domestic secondary inputs are netted out; imported
secondary inputs may be subsumed under imported capital. Thus we assume
(26.1a)
where F( has the usual neoclassical properties (quasiconcave, non-negative,
homogeneous of degree one). Because of the homogeneity property, we may
rewrite equation (26.1a) as
(26.1b)
The product of each country may be used for consumption as weU as for
investment in both countries. The products are assumed to be different.
Labor and capital are assumed to remain within each country, but commodities
move freely across the border. The exchange rate floats freely and is deter-
mined by the equality of foreign currency demand and supply on the exchange
market. Firms minimize cost and households maximize utility, which deter-
mines the demand functions for primary factors and commodities. The exog-
enous variables are the savings (or investment) ratios:
/
s1:= -!!. + E...
Y1 e
/22S2:=--+~
Y2 P
(26.2a)
where /(j : = investment goods produced in country i and invested in country
i, P :=P 21 P 1 = ratio of price levels of countries 2 and 1, e := exchange
rate = price of the currency of country 1 in terms of the currency of country
2 (country 2 =the country considered, country 1 =the rest of the world).
W U : = L( 1 L( = rate of growth of labor supply in country i
W 7f( : = iT(1"( == rate of technical progress in country i
wpt : =p(1p( =rate of inflation in country i
(26.2b)
(26.2c)
(26.2d)
and, of course, the initial conditions L o' "0' and Po' If we want an equilibrium
growth path at the global level. we also have to assume that
(26.2e)
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which is not unreasonable in the very long term. Details of the model may be
found in Krelle (1985a) and Krelle et al. (1985). It can be shown that this
model determines the equilibrium growth path of all endogenous vadables as
functions of the exogenous variables and that the model is stable in the
relevant region [see Krelle (1985a)]. The main features of the solution are:
(1) The equilibrium growth rates of both countries are equal.
(2) Real wage rates, interest rates, capital labor ratios, wage-profit ratios,
capital coefficients, GDP and GDP per capita are and remain different. in
general. There is no tendency for the standards of living in both coun-
tries to become equal.
(3) The global-level GDP is higher with foreign trade than without it, and
this also applies for each country separately. In exceptional cases con-
sumption per capita may nevertheless decline in one country (see Krelle,
1985a).
(4) The relative purchasing power parity theory (PPPT) of the exchange rate
is valid.
If capital movements are considered, the real interest rates will be equal in
bol>h countries, all other results remain unchanged. Free mobility of labor is
required to equalize real wage rates on the equilibrium path, in general. The
Bonn-IIASA world model is a 23-country (or coUntry group) model constructed
along these lines. The real part of it is described briefly below.
28.2.2. 'lbe real part or the Bonn-IJASA world model: An overview
The basic tool is a Cobb-Douglas-type production function for each country i.
Thus, equation (26.1a) is specified and modified as:
(26.3)
where IMR 1. = real imports of secondary inputs (raw materials, energy, etc.).
The exogenous variables are the same as in (26.2). The GDP Y1. of country i is
subdivided into sectoral products Y1.j' such that Y1. =2: j Y1.j' Sectoral pro-
duction Y1.j is a function of total production Y1.' labor productivity Y1.1 L1.'
consumption per capita C1.1 L1.' capital-labor ratio K1.1 L1.' export ratio
EX1. I Y1.' import ratio IM1. I Y1.' and similar variables:
(26.4)
such that 2:j fJ1.j =1.
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Several types of functions fJii have been tried (linear. exponential.
etc.). The sectors considered include agriculture. mining. manufacturing.
electricity and gas. construction. and services. Similarly. the commodity
structure of exports and imports are estimated by functions explaining this
structure.
28.2.3. 'lb.e monetary part of the Bonn-IIASA world model: An overview
For market economies the price level in each country is explained by the
money supply (exogenous). the real GDP (as determined above), and the veloc-
ity of money. which in turn is explained by the rate of inflation. the capital
coefficient. the purchasing power. interest rate disparities. and other vari-
ables. The exchange rate index 6Z of the currency of country 2 with respect
to all other currencies is explained by:
(26.5)
where 11" = Wp 1 + We - Wpz = the purchasing power disparity. we : = eIe;
p =T 1 + we - T Z = the interest rate disparity. T i = interest ra.te in coun-
try i; flWy =Wy1 - Wyz = the growth rate differential, Wyi :=Yi lli; and
A = the net creditor or debtor position of country 2 (= the net assets or
the debts of country 2 divided by the GDP of country 2). The individual
exchange rates eii of each currency with respect to each other currency can
be obtained from the time series of 8i for each country i. If the arbitrage
conditions
i.i.k =l ..... n (26.6)
are fulfilled, and if the exchange rate index ei of currency i is a weighted
average of all exchange rates with respect to currency i.
ii = ~ (Xii e ii i =2 ..... n (Xii ~ 0i jii
~ (Xii =1
i jii
(26.7)
the exchange rate e u for each country i =2.....n with respect to currency 1
is determined by
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11 e =A -1 a
where
-
-a23e z a Zn
11 e Z1 a Z1
-a3Z e3 -CX:3n
1
= a = A =
e
III ~nlJ la~lJ
-anz -an 3
-
en
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(26.8)
Unfort.unat.ely, t.he det.erminant. A is sometimes very small. Therefore. in a
newer version of t.he model we use a behavior equation instead of the identity
(26.8) to recover the exchange rates eu from the exchange rate indices e(.
This behavior equation explains e( 1 by the ratio e( I e1 of exchange rate
indices and a weight. adjustment. factor. which reflects the importance of the
t.rade relations between country i and country 1.
For the CMEA countries other methods are used to determine exchange
rates and the price levels. For DECD countries capital flows and interest
rates are also determined endogenously (see Krelle, 1985b; KreLle and Welsch,
1985).
28.2.4. Determinants of long-tenD economic growth and structural
change
Long-term fluctuations in economic growth are considered to be fluctuations
in the equilibrium growth path of an economy. We have outlined above a global
model where the equiiibrium growth paths of all economic variables, aggre-
gat.ed (such as GDP. export.s, imports) as well as disaggregat.ed variables (such
as agriculture, manufacturing), are determined by four exogenous variables
(or time series): the savings or investment ratio, labor supply growth rate, the
rat.e of technical progress, and the rate of growth of money supply (or the
rate of inflation) of each count.ry. We now consider 23 countries (or groups of
countries) which together make up the whole world. Thus t.here are 23 X 4 =
92 time series (or in this simple case, constants) that must. be predet.ermined
in order to solve the system in t.he forecasting period. If all exogenous vari-
ables are const.ant., t.he system should settle down t.o an equilibrium growt.h
pat.h. If they show long-term fluctuations. the system should produce long-
term fluctuations for the aggregates as well as for all sectors. We now show
that long-term fluctuations in the savings ratio and in the rate of technical
progress are likely to occur.
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28.2.5. Long-te~nuctuatiODB in economic growth
The investment ratio and the rate of technical progress depend on the
"degree of activity" within the society, which (following Schumpeter) may also
be called the "degree of entrepreneurship" (see Schumpeter, 1914, 1926,
1939). It is highly correlated with a preference for work and risk, with a
spirit of optimism and a small discount rate for the future, as opposed to a
preference for leisure and safety, a spirit of pessimism and a high discount
rate for the future. We measure this degree of activity by an index a, which
might be considered as the reciprocal of the average disutility of work in the
society. The rate of technical progress w1f : = fr/1I", as well as the investment
ratio s, depend on a:
The dependence of s on a may be derived from a Ramsey-type model of
optimal capital accumulation (see Ramsey, 1928; Krelle, 1984, 1985a). The rate
of technical progress also depends on a, since the rate of introducing new
technologies depends on the degree of risk that the society is willing to take,
and on investment in research and development (Krelle, 1984).
Thus if a fluctuates in the society, the equilibrium growth paths change
with respect to the level as well as to the rate of growth. Since growth is
stable on the equilibrium path, the system will slowly converge to a new
equilibrium path, as shown in Figure 26.1 (dotted curve).
GDP
o
Actual growth path
2 3 4 5
Y(as)
Y(a4 )
, Y(a3)
Y(a 2 )
Y(a, )
t
Equilibrium paths
Periods
Figure 26.2. Equilibrium growlh paths.
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Fluctuations in a are due to the process of transfer of knowledge and
values within the society. We assume that knowledge is created by people
mostly working in research and development institutions, and it is transmitted
to others by the communication system. Similarly and connected with
knowledge, valuations are "invented" and transmitted to other people who
adapt their own valuations and convey them again to other people. This pro-
cess may be described by an interdependent system of linear difference equa-
tions and, in general, the solution will be cyclical. For society as a whole this
process may be approximated by a simple linear second-order difference
equation:
where b1. > O. i = 1,2, and b z > bf /4. The characteristic roots are
conjugate complex
The solution is at =r t [A'cos9't + B·sin9't]. where
r =ybz 9' =arccos ..J (bf / 4)/ bz
and A and B depend on the initial conditions. If b z = 1 we get pure sinusoidal
fluctuations; if b z < 1 the system requires external shocks in order to show
steady fluctuations. For b 1 =1.9, b z =0.925 the frequency of the fluctua-
tions is about 40 years, if the period is one year. This seems to be a reason-
able order of magnitude for long-term cycles.
26.3. Status of the Bonn-nASA Research Project
Of course a theory as suggested above should be tested, and the Bonn-IIASA
project provides the preconditions. In this section the preliminary results
obtained so far are presented.
28.3.1. Empirical results: The real part of the Bonn-nASA world 1R0del
The parameters of the production function (26.3) have been estimated for aU
23 countries and country groups under consideration. For the socialist coun-
tries net material product (NMP) was used instead of GDP. In all cases in a
first step imported raw materiai IMR 1. has been approximated by total imports
IM1.' The assumption of a constant growth rate W wi of technical progress
requires a specification 7T1. (t) = a Oi ' exp (w 1ri ' t). In equation (26.3)
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technical progress is written in the form of Hicks' neutral technical progress.
Since we are using a Cobb-Douglas production function, this is also a Harrod
neutral progress. and the classification of 1T1. (t) as labor efficiency is justi-
fied. But note that the growth rate of the labor augmenting technical pro-
gress 1f1. (t) from the specification Yt = 11. [(1f1. . L1.)' K1. ,1M.,,] is normally
higher than the growth rate of Hicks' neutral progress 1T1. from
Y1. =1T1. . 11. (L1..K1.,1M1.)' In the case of Cobb-Douglas functions
W Wi = (1/ 0.1) . w,,1. where 0.1 < 1 is the production elasticity with respect to
labor; w,,1. is always given as a percentage.
An assessment of the estimates was made with respect to different sta-
tistical criteria and economic plausibility:
(1) Standard error of estimation (SEE) or RZ , where the latter is normally
very high because of the tendency of all time series to grow.
(2) Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics and sometimes plots of the residuals to
decide whether autocorrelation might be due to some economic cycles
that are not explained by the equation.
(3) t-statistics for the coefficients.
(4) Positive elasticities and reasonable parameters sizes: for market
economies a "reasonable" size of the production elasticities is that of
the factor cost shares. Both coincide if the marginal productivity
theory holds.
When multicollinearity prevented a joint estimate of all parameters. values of
w"'" were fixed exogenously and the estimate with the best fit was selected.
In general, the approach can be deemed successful because at least one satis-
fying equation was obtained for each country or country group. Two examples
are presented in Table 26.1.
Ta.ble 26.1.
W" =1.0 az =0.399 as =0.188 cxt =1-az-as
(13.37) (8.68) = 0.413
Rc
Z
=1.0 DW =1.32
w" =1.5 az =0.431 as =0.196 cxt =1-az -as(4.84) (3.1) =0.373
Rc
Z =0.98 DW =1.21
GDR
(1960-1982)
Other Mid-East
and North
African
developing
countries
(1962-1981)
Further research showed that the assumed constant growth rate of
technical progress is somewhat restrictive when explaining historical trends.
Many facts indicate that technical progress was higher in the 1960s than in
the 19708. Two approaches were made to deal with this in the production
function: (i) the estimation period was split up into two shorter ones to which
different growth rates were fitted; and (li) the growth rate was specified to
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be a linear function of time: w 7fi (t) =w7fi + c5. t. The first approach
resulted in considerably lower growth rates for" the period 1973-1982 com-
pared with those for 1960-1972. The statistical results improved in most
cases. The second approach always led to a negative value of 0, implying a
decrease in the growth rate. The results are shown in Table 28.2 by some typ-
ical examples.
Table 2-6.2.
---_._--~------~---------~---------------~---~--~------
UK w rr = 1.38 0= -0.044
(1960-1982) (2.32) (2.59)
0'.1 = 0.614 0'.2 = 0.238 0'.3 = 0.147
(6.7) (2.53) (3.29)
Rc
2 ~ 1.0 DW = 2.17
Hungary w7f =0.75 c5 = -0.011 O'.t =1 - O'.z - ~ =0.282
(1960-1982) O'.z =0.357 ~= 0.361
(6.78) (10.08)
R 2 - DW 1.26c - 0.99
Developing w 60 - 78 =2.50 w79 -e1 = 1.0
Asian countries 0'.2 =0.462 0'.3 = 0.135 O'.t = 1 - 0'.2 - 0'.3 = 0.403
excluding (4.92) (2.40)
India (1960-81) Rc2 = 1.0 DW = 1.5
The production structure is modeled by the production sector functions PiJ
(26.4), which present the shares of GDP (NMP) produced in the different sec-
tors of the economy. Production sector functions have also been estimated
for all 23 countries and country groups.
Since the production sector functions explain sector shares, they
should be estimated according to certain r'equirements, the most important of
which are:
o ~ Pij ~ 1 and L Pij =1
j
These requirements have been used where necessary to impose restrictions on
the parameters of the estimated equations.
Three types of functional relationships have been tested for the produc-
tion sector functions: linear. exponential, and Cobb-Douglas type; the out-
comes of these tests can be summarized as follows. The linear functions can
be estimated with parameter restrictions that guarantee that the summing up
requirement is always met, but the non-negativity checks showed that these
functions very often yield negative ~a.lues for combinations of values of the
explanatory variables that may occur in the forecast period. The exponential
type of Pij functions did not meet the Pij ~ 1 condition in quite a few cases.
In general, the functions specified in Cobb-Douglas form best met the main
requirements, and this specification seems most appropriate for the produc-
tion sector functions of the countries and groups of countries.
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Ta.ble 26.3. Estimales of production seeler functions for agricullure and manufac-
luring, using lhe estimaled equation (26.8).
Sector/Area 0.1 as 0.4 0.5 R2 DW
Agriculture
USA -1.354 -0.261 0.96 1.39
(27.11) (2.05)
GDR -0.625 -0.486 0.696 0.92 1.16
(3.24) (1.33) (2.1)
Developed -0.670 -0.139 0.97 1.77
Latin (13.18) (1.1)
America
Manuj'acturing
(induslry lolal
for CMEA)
USA 0.579 -0.085 -0.191 0.51 0.77 1.69
(4.84) (1.84) (3.03) (5.53)
GDR 0.137 0.076 -0.166 0.02 1.04
(4.0) (1.05) (2.51)
Developed
Latin 0.128 -0.170 0.387 0.84 1.21
America (3.76) (3.08) (3.86)
Within each estimated production sector function, different combinations
of explanatory variables have been tested. and the selection has been made
according to the common statistical criteria as in the case of the production
functions (see above). In some cases it was necessary to omit some explana-
tory variables due to multicollinearity or low statistical reliability of the
estimated parameters. As an example, Table 28.3 presents the estimation
results using equation (26.8):
for the production sector functions for two of the most important economic
sectors: agriculture and manufacturing (industry total, in the case of the
CMEA countries) for three of the countries and country groups.
26.3.2. Empirical results: Exchange rates and capital nows lor OECD
countries
At present, exchange rates have been modeled for the DECD countries
represented separately in the model, Le., the USA. FRG. Japan, France. UK.
Italy, Netherlands. Belgium/Luxemburg. and Canada.
W. KreLLe et at. 369
The theoretical basis for exchange rate determination is a two-country
model, where each country produces a specific good and has its specific
money and an interest-bearing asset (see Krelle and Welsch, 1985). For each
of these items, demand functions are derived from utility or portfolio optimi-
zation. Their arguments are available income, the exchange rate, the price
ratio, and the relative creditor or debtor position. The exchange rate equa-
tion is derived by su bs tituting the appropriate demand functions into the bal-
ance of payments equation and solving for the exchange I·ate. After some
approximations and linearizations, this procedure yields the estimation equa-
tion (26.5), which states that in long-term equilibrium growth (with constant
1T, p, !:J.w1l , A), the exchange rate is determined by relative purchasing power
parity. Deviations from purchasing power parity are due to monetary dis-
equilibria, differences in growth rates, and foreign debts.
Ta.ble 26.4. Exchange rale index paramelers for lhe FRG. (The eslimaUon melhod
was in all cases OLS, the estimalion period 1970-1982; figures in parenlheses are
t -values).
a o a 1 a 2 aa a 4 a 5 a6 a 7 DW R2C ~
1.321 -0.013 0.025 0.010 -1.308 1.53 0.969 2.34
(22.72) (2.58) (4.14) (3.69) (4.10)
aMAPE - mean absolute percentage error.
Table 26.5. Exchange rale index paramelers for olher counlries.
Japan France UK Italy Netherlands Belgium Canada
DW 1.19 1.51 1.12 1.16 1.94 1.53 0.96
R2C 0.893 0.944 0.978 0.993 0.923 0.8Bo 0.B92
MAPE 14.13 1.34 2.57 2.09 1.55 1.39 2.52
In order to implement this approach in the multi-country case, we esti-
mate the exchange rate index of each country with respect to all other coun-
tries. The index is defined as a weighted average of the individual exchange
rates, where the weights are averages of export and import shares. This
index formula can in turn be used to determine the individual exchange rates
from the estimated exchange rate indices. Parameter estimates for the
exchange rate index of the FRG according to equation (26.5) are given in
Table 28.1, and for other countries in summary form in Table 28.5.
In general, the fit is quite good. All parameters have the right sign. The
DW-figures for all estimates lie in the indifference region; thus we cannot
reject the hypothesis that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the
residuals. (fhe region for acceptance of this hypothesis is empty for some
countries, due to lack of degrees of freedom.) Except for Japan, all estimated
parameters are significant according to the t -values. Since the t -test is only
valid in the case of normally distributed residuals, we also applied the ~-test
on normal distribution. The normal distribution hypothesis could in no case
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be rejected at the 0.95 significance level. Variations of the estimation period
showed that the estimates are also sufficiently stable. In recovering the indi-
vidual exchange rates, Le., the price of the US dollar in terms of the various
other currencies, we obtained the mean absolute percentage errors in Table
28.6.
Table 28.6.
FRG Japan France UK Italy Neth8rlands B8lgium Canada
MAPE 5.74 7.05 5.67 6.17 4.67 5.30 5.93 3.99
Since they are influenced by the errors in all estimated equations, they are
larger than the MAPE for the exchange rate indices.
Capital flows are treated in the model in the form of balances since we
do not have data on the inflows and outflows separately. The estimation equa-
tion is (see Krelle and Sarrazin, 1983):
B'C = a 1PY + a 2 1TY + 0. 3 lSY + a4P-l ~Y
+ a51T_l~Y + a6lS_1~Y + 0. 7 (EX-1M)
(26.9)
where B'C is the balance of capital flows (inflows minus outflows), Y, EX and
1M denote nominal GDP (of all countries considered), nominal exports and
imports, respectively, lS is the ratio of the change in foreign reserves to nomi-
nal GDP, and the other notations are as above. The equation was estimated
with good results for the FRG, and for others the preliminary results are
quite promising.
28.3.3. Empirical results for CMEA eIchange rates
The definition of exchange rates in East European CMEA countries poses spe-
cial problems. The values of exports and imports are published basically in
units of "valuta currencies" (except for Hungary since 1976, and Poland since
1982), which are not related to the units of domestic currencies. Imported
goods with the same dollar (valuta) prices can have different domestic prices.
This is roughly equivalent to variable subsidies and taxes associated with dif-
ferent commodities. The exchange rates of CMEA countries remained
unchanged until 1971 and since then have moved in a similar, although non-
identical fashion. It is important to find an explanation for their behavior;
our behavior function links the exchange rate of the Soviet valuta rouble (=
FXDA16) to the dollar position on the international market (= FXSE01, which
is the exchange rate of the US dollar with respect to special drawing rights)
and to the US price level (= P'GDP01):
W. KreLLe et aL.
P'GDP16FXDA16 = (ao + a1 . FXSEOl + a2 . P'GDP01) . P'GDPOl
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which is a linearized version of the purchasing power parity hypothesis. The
exchange rates of the other East European CMEA countries are linked to that
of the valuta rouble FXDA16 in the same manner (see Table 26.7).
Table 26.7. Exchange rates of the CMEA countries.a
-_._------
Country CONST FXDA16b PGDRJ1° DW R2 C MAPE
--:::a------~--- ----
1.096 1.55 0.93 1.684USSR -0.976 0.889
(11.7) (8.8) (37.3)
Bulgaria -0.839 0.805 1.068 1.62 0.95 1.205
(14.6) (10.3) (38.1)
Czecho- -0.902 1.015 0.881 1.00 0.94 1.479
slovakia (14.3) (11.8) (28.6)
GDR -0.554 0.517 1.037 1.38 o.Bo 1.949
(6.4) (4.4) (24.4)
Hungary -1.101 0.650 1.463 1.41 0.94 2.258
(B.8) (3.B) (24.0)
Poland -0.B02 0.919 0.907 1.95 0.90 1.598
(11.2) (9.4) (25.8)
Romania -0.688 0.483 1.228 1.72 0.96 1.417
(11.4) (5.9) (41.7)
a t -ratios are shown in parentheses.
b The exchange rates FX... were expressed as indioes, with the basis year 1975.
c Related price levels (P'GDPt, t - 16,71,72,73,74,75,76) of CMEA oountries were set equal
to 1.
d For the USSR, FXSEOl was used instead of FXDA16.
Although they are still preliminary, these results support the
hypothesis that the dollar and rouble exchange rates are the leading causes
of adjustments in the value of East European valuta currencies. The estimates
seem acceptable from the point of view of their fit, signs of coefficients, and
of the test statistics of the estimates. They clearly indicate the possibility of
deriving values of the CMEA valuta currencies from the real value of the pur-
chasing power of the US dollar. Of course the problem of linking these rates
to the domestic market remains_ Directions for further improvements (intro-
duction of domestic prices, net foreign assets, debts) can be found in Krelle,
1985b).
26.4. Concluding Remarks
It has been shown that a world model may be constructed that is capable of
producing equilibrium growth paths for all countries. These paths depend on
the savings (or investment) ratios, rates of technical progress, rates of
growth of labor supply, and the rates of inflation of all countries. These
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differ from country to country, in general, and therefore GDP per capita, real
wage rates, interest rates, and other economic variables are and will remain
different, in spite of the free flow of commodities between countries. Kondra-
tieff cycles are explained as long-term fluctuations in equilibrium growth
paths due to cyclical movements of exogenous variables, especially the savings
ratio and the rate of technical progress. These cycles arise from the
transfer of knowledge and valuations within the society. The theory can be
tested by a world model of the kind envisaged in the Bonn-IIASA project.
References
Krelle, W. (1984), Waves oj Entrepreneurial Activit'll Induced by Transfer oj
In,j'ormation and Valuation (Bonn: Zeilschrift fUr Nationalokonomie) Suppl.
4, pp. 71-92.
Krelle, W. (1985a), '/'heorie des wirtscha,ftlichen Wachstums (Berlin: Springer).
Krelle, W. (1985b). Bonn-IIASA Resea.rch Project on Economic Growth and struc-
tural Change: The World Model in Detail, 2nd version.
Krelle, W. and Sarrazin, H.T. (1983), Capital flows and the exchange rate in Bonn
Model II, in L. Kleine and W. Krelle (Eds), Capital Flows and E:z:change Rate
Determination (Bonn: Zeitschri,ftjUr NationaUikonomie), Suppl. 3.
Krelle, W. and Welsch, H. (1985), Exchange rate determination for interdependent
economies, Zeitschri,ft fUr Nationalokonomie [Journal oj Economics], .5,
363-383.
Krelle, W., Dobrinsky, R., Gajda, J., Ross, H., SZ~kely, I., and Welsch, H. (1985),
Economic structural Change. The Bonn-IIASA Research Project: '/'heoretical
Background and Actual status. Discussion Paper, Bonn.
Ramsey, F.P. (1928), A mathematical theory of saving, Economic Journal, 38,
543-559
Schumpeter, J. (1914), Wellenbewegungen des Wirlschaflslebens, Archiv fUr 80zi-
alwissenscha,ften und Sozialpolitik, 38, 1-32.
Schumpeter, J. (1926), Theorie der wirtscha,ftlichen Entwicklung, 2. Neubear-
beitete Auflage (Miinchen and Leipzig).
Schumpeter, J. (1939), Business C'l/cles (New York: McGraw-Hill).
CHAPTER 27
Outline of a Formal Theory of
Long-Term Economic Cycles
Gerhard 0. Mensch, Wolfgang Weidlich,
and GUnter Haag
27.1. Introduction
As unemployment persists in many regions and industries in the developed
world, the Kondratieff-wave model has returned into favor with those who
wish to say why unemployment crept in and persists. The trouble is that the
gradualism built into the long-wave concept overshadows the true causality:
The underlying change in industry structure, and the swiftness of possible
reversal to full employment if investors are not discouraged by wrong notions
of gradualism. The main objective, thus. of this chapter is to bring back hope.
There exist faster ways to full employment than suggested by the wave model.
Schumpeter's fundamental insights into the dynamics of economics is
that the economic nonequilibrium process may be viewed as a superposition of
long- and short-term cycles. This is a mechanistic concept. The micro-
economic reasons for the appearance of these cycles are very different.
Their formal treatment thus necessitates both micro-economic and macro-
economic concepts.
Short-term economic cycles, with periods of only a few years, may be
viewed as arising within a quasi-stationary phase of a long-term cycle. In such
a phase the total structure of the economy remains quasi-stable. The develop-
ment in that phase is viewed as driven by an ensemble of products. and
market growth is promoted by competing entrepreneurs who are capitalizing
on the driving forces of technological progress and are checked by market
constraints. Therefore an appropriate description of these short-term
processes consists in a mathematical theory about the decision framework of
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interacting entrepreneurs. Most important are their decisions on expansion-
ary or rationalizing investments undertaken because of the pressure in the
markets. Such a theory has been implemented by the authors, in several
papers in recent years.
Long term economic cycles. if they exist, are expected to arise for
other. deep-lying structural reasons. The main "phases" of long-term cycles
(recovery, prosperity, recession, and depression) have been analyzed in
detail by Kondratieff, Schumpeter, and many others.
With respect to the definition and sequence of these phases, Mensch
(1975) came to differing conclusions. His metamorphosis model built upon the
well known observation of leading industrial economists that each product in
its individual life cycle passes through several stages from technological pro-
generation to technological maturity. He related the organic growth model of
technological change on market levels with microeconomic notions of invest-
ment (including investment in innovation, product development, technology
transfer, basic research, etc.). Distinguishing "basic innovations" (which give
birth to new industries), "improvement innovations" (in established indus-
tries). and "pseudo innovation" (when markets mature), Mensch (1971, 1972)
developed a longitudinal model of industrial evolution. The idea is that at any
time, within any economy, there is a manifold of competing commodities on the
market, and these can be ordered according to their level of immaturity.
There can be found a distribution of products ranging from young, developing,
and prospering, to mature, aging, and obsolete products. In a nutshell, the
concept of immaturity (= 1 - maturity) operationalizes innovations by tying it
in with the notion of imperfect markets.
This approach we shall employ here. The main insight is that each phase
of the long-term cycle can be characterized by the maturity distribution of
the product manifold typical for this phase. For instance. in an era of gen-
eral economic prosperity one finds that a majority of products are also in the
prospering phase of their life-cycles, while in a recession the majorify of
relevant products are in an aging phase, implying pseudo innovation, market
congestion, stagnation, decline.
The main idea on the generation of long-term macroeconomic cycles with
the above sequence of phases can now be identified. Within an economy there
must exist dynamic principles of metamorphosis. leading to interdependencies
between "generations" of products in similar stages of their inherent
development. In passing through their life cycles, these products may even
cluster, and then more or less simultaneously traverse the stages of innova-
tion, prosperity, and aging. Mensch's metamorphosis model suggested: basic
innovations tend to occur in clusters, triggering subsequent sequences of
improvement and, -later. pseudo innovations. In the aggregate, this timing and
synchronization creates the observed phases in the long-term cycle.
At this point it is important to stress that one seemingly simple explana-
tion of product clusters must be rejected: inputs of new basic ideas, nameiy,
basic inventions, which later give rise to basic innovations and a series of new
products, do not generally appear in clusters. Availabie data show (Mensch,
1975) that the flow of newly arising basic laws and ideas is relatively smooth
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and stationary. Not a science push, but an entrainment into the economic
process leads to the formation of product clusters and corresponding phases
of the long-term cycle; at least in the past that was the causal direction in
most cases observed.
27.2. Construction Principles for Models of Long-Term Cycles
The above description of industrial transformation suggests several elements
that could be used to build a mathematical model of long-term cycles. Since
the life cycles of products (a "meso-economic", semi-aggregate concept
between micro- and macro-economics) play a fundamental role in the under-
standing of long-term economic processes, it seems appropriate to choose
them as the central concept of a model. The main contribution in this chapter
is to separate the causal dynamics of product development into two forces:
(a) the intrinsic dynamics describing the "natural metamorphosis" of a
pr'oduct over its technological maturation process and evolution of its market
share; and (b) the interaction dynamics describing how the product's life
cycle is influenced by its technological and market interaction with the mani-
fold of competing commodities at different stages of maturity. Hence we dis-
tinguish between intraindustrial (branch-specific) and interindustrial (cross-
sectional) interaction dynamics between product life cycles.
Our long-term-cycle model architecture combines longitudinal elements
of "innovation potential" and "technical constraints" with cross-sectional
"market opportunities" for selling to buyers in other industries, and "cost
constraints" on purchases from supply industries. The core of the proposed
model consists of a set of coupled differential equations for the life cycles of
interacting commodities. The interaction terms are chosen in a manner to
describe the mutual promotion or suppression of interacting products at dif-
ferent stages of maturity. This mutual influence may lead to either accelera-
tion or retardation of the development of certain groups of products. In this
way, notions of eCGmomies and diseconomies to scale combine with notions of
speed of change and substltition. The hypothesis is that the intensity of
interaction will also lead to a synchronization effect so that bundles of
products adapt their development stage and finally form clusters of innova-
tions.
We hope that our model will be able to explain the self-organization of
temporal structures - in terms of groups of products of synchronized matu-
rity - and hence the generation of economic pulses that establish the phases
of long-term cycles and on several levels of aggregation.
27.2.1. Intraindustrial dynamics
The mathematical formulation of these ideas can be outlined as follows. The
starting point is an appropriately standardized description of the intrinsic
dynamics of a single product life cycle. In this first step only the "self-
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action" of the product's technological development and of the development of
its market share is taken into account, regardless of the influences of its
specific interactions with competing products. The typical form of such an
idealized and isolated branch cycle of a product i is described by the func-
tion
(Z7.1)
which satisfies the differential equation
(Z7.2)
where 111. is a diffusion or development rate parameter, and mi (t) is a normal-
ized measure of the degree of maturity of product i, whose domain of defini-
tion is
(Z7.3)
The meaning of these definitions becomes clear if we plot the function (Z7.1)
and identify its parts with the evolutionary stages of the product's life cycle
(see Figure Z?1).
to
+1
Product ageing
Ef Market finalization
-~------------~~----­
Rationalization :
Market saturation:
/ I
Technical maturation :
t; I til
-1
Market prosperity
/
Improvement innovations
Beginning market expansion
--~--~-----------------
E;
Basic innovation
Onset of product life cycle
Figure Zl.1. Slages of an isolated slandard producllife cycle.
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Obviously the rate of development of very young and very old products is
slow, while the maximum rate m(t = t i ) = vi is reached at time t i in the
period of rapid technical maturation and maximal market expansion. Other
equations of motion have also been proposed to describe "natural" or "stan-
dardized" product life cycles. All of them have the typical S-shaped form of a
development function. Consider, for example, the well-known logistic equation
for n (t), which can be viewed as a measure of the market share of the prod-
uct:
dn· ( )dt == n =2 vn 1 - n I K
with the standard solution
(27.4)
(27.5)
where n (-00) =0; nCO) =no; and n (00) =K.
It turns out that equation (27.4) is equivalent to equation (27.2) after the
transformation:
n = K (m + 1)
2
(27.6)
Equation (27.2) will be used hereafter because it is more amenable to our pur-
poses.
Before proceeding further, equation (27.2) has to be modified to take
into account the fact that the lifetime of a product does not extend from ( -(0)
to ( +(0), as does the solution (27.1) of (27.2), but that there is a well defined
onset time tio of the product cycle, namely the time of the basic invention. In
many cases a more dr less well defined finalization time t1.1 also exists, when
the product reaches a steady state in the market and a constant share in the
economic process. Both effects can be included by adding an initiation term
t 1 and a finalization term t f to equation (27.2)
(27.7)
where t 1 =m i (t io ) «1 and t f =[1 - m i (t1.1)] «1, and where the initial
condition chosen is
mi (-00) = -1 (27.8)
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A basic innovation occurs at t1.o' That event triggers the branch cycle.
The IS-function terms in (27.7) give rise to the step in m1. from m(t < t1.o) = -1
to m1. ( t1.o) =(-1 + Et). the beginning of the cycle, and to the step in m1. from
m (t1.1) = (1 - Er) to m (t > t1.1) = 1, the finalization of the cycle. The solution
to the modified equation (27.7) is now exactly as shown in Figure 2:7.1, namely,
m1. (t) = -1 for
m1. (t) =tanh [vi (t - t1.)] for
m1. (t) = +1 for
-00 < t < t1.0
t1.o S t S t1.1
til < t < + 00
(27.9)
In concrete models the onset time t1.o and the finalization time t1.1' as
well as the development rate vi and the time of maximal prosperity t1. are
chosen for each product according to economic data (for abstract normative
models, however, one may make simplifying assumptions). The step constants
E1 and Er are then determined by
(27.10)
We are now describing groups of branch cycles. To obtain a first impression
of the situation in an economy in terms of its product composition, let us make
the customary. simplified assumption that the Life cycles m1. (t) of products i
are noninteracting and hence obey equation (27.7) with solution (27.9). Fur-
thermore, we assume equal rates vi =v and equidistant distribution of prod-
uct onset times t1.o (an alternative assumption would be a random distribution
of onset times with constant mean density per time interval). We thus obtain
Figure 2:7.2(a), which depicts birth and growth of new industries as a succes-
sion of branch cycles. That is the longitudinal pattern under these simplified
assumptions. Of great interest now is the cross-sectional pattern. At any
time T, p(m; T) dm describes the number of products in the interval
(m ,m +dm); then p(m; T) is the density distribution function. It has some
remarkable properties. First, the number of products in the interval dm is
proportional to the time dt . that a product spends in dm. i.e., to dt = dm / m.
Hence, p(m; T) must be proportional to 1/ m. Inserting (27.7), one finds that
(27.11)
except for the fringe domain Im I ~ 1, where the initiation and finalization
steps occur. Second, equation (27.11) shows that products in very early or
late development phases are more common than those in the prosperity phase.
simply because each product stays longer in the early innovation or late
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Figure Z1.2. Ensembles of (a.) noninteracting and (b) interacting product life cy-
cles.
stagnation phases. This can be seen from the product distribution at time 'T
in Figure 27.2(a). Third, the density distribution is the same at all times t.
Products in different phases have different weights for the economic
process. Products in their prosperity phase provide a much higher volume of
business than those in the early innovation phase, when market shares are
small, or in the late stagnation phase, when supply per unit of output is
smaller in highly rationalized production. Therefore, instead of p(m; 'T), a
"renormalized" density function p(m; 'T) is introduced. It incorporates the
weights of products in different phases. Then p (m; 'T) gives a more realistic
picture of the branches' relative importance for the state of the economy.
The simplest choice for weighting is to multiply p(m; 'T) by (1 - m 2), because
it puts the weights in the "middle". Then one obtains the renormalized den-
sity function
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p(m;t)
.~
m
Figure Zl.3. Weighl.ed product density function p(m; T) for noninteracting product
cycles.
P (711.; T) =(1 - 711. 2) 15 (711.; T) =const (27.12)
which has been depicted in Figure 27.3.
This constancy and time-invariance of the cross-sectional density pat-
tern is a very important property, because it flies in the face of any experi-
ence. Hence, it must be based on highly implausible assumptions. The func-
tion (27.12) is valid only in the limiting case of noninteracting and equidistant
entry of new product cycles. Nearly the entire literature on product life
cycles implies these conditions, as does mainstream economics if it does not
specify a better set of entry assumptions.
27.2.2. Interindwrt.ri.al interaction dynamiC8
We now give up the assumption of isolated product life cycles. As suggested
above, the oscillatory long-term dynamics of an economy is generated by the
interaction between life cycles. Therefore, in a second and important step,
equation (27.7) will now be extended by including interaction terms between
product life cycles. The general form of the equation of motion for inter-
dependent life cycles mj (t) then reads:
(27.13)
where the first term
(27.14)
describes the self-formation of the product life cycle by its internal dynamics
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according to equation (27.7). while the second term [amj / at) contains
Inler
the interaction of mj (t) with all other product cycles at time t. There exist,
of course, numerous ways of specifying this term. As a first approach we pro-
pose the following form for the interaction term:
(27.15)
where supporting and detracting forces are defined as
(27.16)
The key interaction variables m ij are
(27.17)
They will now be explained in connection with the first and second terms on
the right-hand side of (27.15). These two terms express the accelerating or
retarding total action forces exerted on mj by all product cycles mi at more
mature (mi > mj ) or at younger (mi < mj ) stages than mj .
First, there is the individual force Fj~ that cycle m i exerts on mj'
according to (27.16). It is assumed to factorize into influence parameters hav-
ing different functional dependencies on m i and mj'
Second, there are the terms S(mij } and S(mji }. where Sex} is the step
function.
S (x) = 1 for x > 0 S (x) = 0 for x < 0 (27.18)
They set the boundary conditions, as they automatically ensure that Fjt ';l 0
only for m i > mj , and Fii. ¢ 0 only for m;. < mj'
Third. the factors E± (m j ) describe how the sensitivity of product j to
the influence of others depends on the degree of maturity m j itself. These
factors express the "cross-elasticities ".
Fourth. the factors C± (m;.) incorporate the dependence of force FA on
the degree of maturity m;. of product i interacting with product j. More gen-
erally, C:t:(m;.,.) could also depend on m;. ;: dm/dt and m;. ;: dZm/dt Z, since
the influence of i on j will depend strongly on the "dynamics" of product i as
expressed by its maturation rate mi and acceleration m;.. However, as soon
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as one neglects the interaction terms [amj I at ]tnter in (27.13), mi and nii can
be readily expressed by mi using equation (27.7) for isolated life cycles:
(27.19)
If the self-dynamic terms [am I 8t ]tntra in (27.13) dominate, while the interac-
tion terms [am I at :!tnter play the role of perturbations. equation (27.19)
remains approximately valid also in the case of the full set of equations
(27.13). Hence, one may consider C *' (m i ; mi ,nii ) as a function of m i only
after substituting (27.19) for mi and nii .
Finally, the terms D *' (m ij ) take into account that the influence of i on j
may strongly depend on the "maturity distance" mij between products i and
j. For instance, the aging of obsolete products will have a stimulating and
accelerating influence on the development of younger products, and vice
versa. These factors thus express the "generations gap" and conflict.
Detailed models built on the basis of equations (27.13)-(27.17) will, of
course, require explicit assumptions about the form of coefficients
C*'(m i ), E±(mj ) and D±(mij ) in accordance with observations about the
interactions between product cycles. Results of computer calculations with
such explicit models, however, are beyond the scope of this chapter and will
be published elsewhere.
Instead, we now deduce the effects of interactions between product
cycles - as introduced in (27.13) - on the renormalized product density func-
tions p (m; 7") introduced in (27.12). We have seen that this distribution func-
tion is a constant for noninteracting and equidistantly introduced product
cycles, as shown in Figure 27.8. What happens if we modify these assump-
tions?
A seemingly minor change in the sequence of entry of new branches
dramatically changes the overall pattern of industrial metamorphosis. If we
assume clustered entry of new industries, we get bundled growth in the new
industries. This self-organization of branches has been depicted in Figure
27.2(b). Now the cross-sectional density functions vary with time. In fact, a
cluster of basic innovations creates pulse and ripple effects in improvement
innovations, which spread through the economy's industrial base, causing
growth and transformation. Hence, long swings and industrial metamorphosis
can be explained: Long swings result from propagating long-term pulses of
the density function p(m: t). Figure 27.4 shows these pulses for a sequence
of the four characteristic phases t 1 (prosperity), t 2 (recession), t 3 (depres-
sion), and t 4 (recovery).
This completes the delineation of our formal theory of long-term cycles.
The density function p (m ; t) for the (renormalized) maturity distribution is a
central quantity. Many other macroeconomic variables are functions of it. It
is, therefore. to be expected that the understanding of the long-term dynam-
ics of p (m ; t) in terms of interacting product life cycles as indicated above
will promote a comprehensive and quantitative understanding of the dynamics
G.O. Mensch., W. Weidlich., and G. Haag
(a)
p(m,t, )
(c)
m
(b)
(d)
383
m
m m
Figure Zl.4. Density function pulses. (a) t 1 (prosperity); a prevalence of
prospering products. (b) t z (recession); a prevalence of aging products and lack
of innovallons. (c) t 3 (depression); aging products becoming obsolete and the on-
set of innovalions. (Ii) t 4 (recovery); development of an innovalion cluster toward
prospering products.
of relevant processes within long-term economic cycles. The linkage is
strongest via investment theory.
27.3. Relations Between Maturity and Strategic Investment
New business develops in imperfect markets (immature industries) when firms
undertake innovations. Then they invest. They invest if they face a threat
or an opportunity. The concept of the maturity variable mi (t) connects to
the notion of expectations. Expectations are not static. They are dynamic
pictures of the future, and they should thus be related to variables that are
particularly sensitive to changes in the degree of maturity of products.
In order to make the connection between innovation and investment. the
notion of "strategic" investment is important here. In neo-classical and
Keynesian economics. the notion of "induced" investment prevails: Total
investment is viewed as a multiple (fraction) of desired total output or total
capacity (flow and stock models). We define "strategic" investment as
"microeconomically induced" by recognized imperfections in the market seg-
ments served by companies.
Viewed as such, two aspects matter concerning the total volume of
expenditures for investment purposes, on the one end, and the net effect of
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all investment efforts after competition has cancelled some of the benefits of
rivaling investments in contested markets. As is well known from the discus-
sion of the investment multiplier, expenditures may be additive, the net
effects are non-additive.
If competition is a two-frontier battle at the demand side and at the sup-
ply side of a contested market, then perceived sales opportunities may
trigger expansionary investments E, and expected cost competition will
trigger rationalizing investments R. These we denote "strategic" and postu-
late: the sum total of strategic investment I is I =E + R, whereas the net
effect of that composition of investment is proportional to E:R (Mensch,
1979).
The basic proposition here is that the rate and direction of innovative
investment activity (E, R) change over time. This has been suggested before
by economists in the Harrod, Domar, Robinson school of thought, as well as by
managerial economists such as Abernathy and Utterback. In a nutshell, an E-
bias drives branch growth via demand pull, whereas an R-bias in interrelated
branches slows down growth in some supplying industries (factor squeeze) but
accelerates growth in others (such as those who supply office automation, new
manufacturing systems, robots, etc.). For an empirical validation of this view,
see Chapter 29 in this volume.
We have thus set the stage for linking demand-induced product innova-
tions and cost-induced process innovations to the level I and composition
(E, R) of investment. We model long-term motions of industry by proposing
that the evolution of branch i is an advancement in the maturity variable
mi (t) caused by strategic investment, notably by the long-term components of
the expansionary and rationalizing investment, Eio (t) and RiO (t), respec-
tively. Eio (t) and Rio (t) do not contain short-term oscillations of branch i.
The (long-term) total strategic investment lio in branch i is defined as
above as
(27.20)
and the expansionary (e) and rationalizing (r) shares of these quantities are
defined as
(27.21)
with ei (t) + r i (t) =1. The basic proposition now means that we expect, at
early stages in the life of product i, e i (t) to be rather large (near i), and at
aging stages it will be small (near 0). The converse holds for r i (t). For exam-
ple, see Figure 29.4(b) in this volume. In a normative economy these variables
can be linked to the level of maturity. In this way we begin by defining mi (t).
Hence,
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Figure Z1.5. Expansionary and rationalizing investment shares and the maturity
parameters in the ideal product life cycle.
(27.22)
These quantities are depicted in Figure 27.5. where we have inserted (27.22)
into form (27.1) of mi(t), and have neglected the interaction of mi(t) with
other products for the moment.
For the evolution over time of total strategic investment, we assume that
"strategic" expenditures for creating new demand and containing cost in the
ith branch is proportional to the increment of change in maturity (= "pro-
gram"):
(27.23)
as is depicted in Figure 27.6. The time of maximal prosperity of a product
line comes when approximately ei ~ r i' or when mi (t) =O. This occurs at
time t i , when total strategic investment in branch i reaches its maximum. Of
course a distorted maturity function mi (t) will also distort the symmetry of
lio (t).
The evolution of Eio (t) Rio (t) over time now follows from (27.21), with
(27.22 and 27.23):
(27.24)
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t
Figure 27.6. Total strategic investments as a function of time in the ideal product
Ufe cycle.
t
Figure 27.7. Expansionary and rationalizing investments for the ideal product U"e
cycle.
as is depicted in Figure Z?7. This completes the deduction of the investment
dynamics that underlie long-term swings.
Often, instead of the total strategic investment 11.0 (t) of branch i, only
the total investment Ii (t) is known, where
(27.25)
I1.a (t) is additional, tactical investment. If this is seen to be partially propor-
tional to E1.o (t) and partially to Rio (t), one can write
(27.26)
where the positive coefficients 0:1. and Pi may be specified for each branch
i. Inserting (27.26) and (27.24) into (27.25), one obtains
(27.27)
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which means that the shape of Ii (t) is modified against that of lio (t) by the
influence of ei (t) and r i (t).
In general, li(t) is not symmetrical around t i • even if lio(t) was so.
Inserting (27.27) into (27.24). Eio(t) and Rio(t) can also be expressed as
(27.28)
27A Application
In our post-8chumpeterian econometric work on employment, investment.
innovation. and transformation. Eio (t) and Rio (t) are considered to be central
causative variables for the whole economic process in branch i. It is also to
be expected that A io (t). the trend in labor force working in branch i.
depends on E io and Rio' as does production Pio(t).
A linear employment function.
(27.29)
which incorporates that expansion. tends to increase and rationalization
tends to reduce the total labor requirements. If. under ideal circumstances.
time series for Aio(t). Eio(t). Rio(t). t = 1.2.....N. were available. u i • Vi' and
Ci might be optically fitted by requiring:
N
~ 1Aio (t) - CUi Eio (t) - Vi Rio (t) + Cd 12 = min
t =1
(27.30)
Finally. we wish to clarify the employment multiplier malaise that trou-
bles mainstream economics (see Figure 27.8). Equation (27.29). together with
lio(t) = Eio(t) + Rio(t) [equation (27.20)]. can be inverted for E io and Rio'
yielding
(27.31)
so that instead of 1Eio' Rio I. the variables 1Aio ' lio 1can be used to describe
the evolution of branch i. Evidently any time path in the (Iio I Aio ) plane is
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Figure Zl.8. Moving proportions of employmenl and inveslmenl in five counlries:
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e). Data sources: Mensch (1979. pp. 233-235); statistical Abstracts
of the USA, 11T16 (Series 1303); and fLO Yearbooks, 5Ber, 66er, and 76er.
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transformed into a time path in the (Eio / Rio) plane, and vice versa, by the
transformation of coordinates (27.31). Hence. we have provided here a formal
theory of long-term tr'ansformation that explains the mind-boggling picture of
(I, A) trends in several Western countries first published by Mensch (1979).
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CHAPTER 28
Kondratieff and the Theory of Linear Filters
Rainer Metz
The discussion of long waves began with the publication of Kondratieff's essay
in 1926, in which he examined 22 economic time series for Germany, France,
England, and the USA with regard to the existence of long cyclical fluctua-
tions. He noted that the movement of the elements examined showed great
cycles from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. The movement is cyclical in nature, which means that it clearly differs
from long-term changes in the series, which Kondratieff called the general
tendency or secular trend. The essential feature of this long wave is that the
different periods alternate in a cyclical way and thus seems to be law-
governed. In contrast, the trend, whose course is also subject to certain
changes, is not cyclical, Le., it does not show a set pattern of upswings and
downswings. Using his statistical analyses Kondratieff gave a fairly detailed
description of the nature of these cycles.
(1) The length of the cycles fluctuates between 48 and 60 years.
(2) The cycles for the different series are highly synchronous, Le., the
upswing and downswing phases of the various indicators largely run
parallel to each other.
(3) Long waves are an international phenomenon: the periods of these
cycles are almost identical for all European capitalist countries.
Although Kondratieff admitted that the method he used to analyze the statis-
tical data allowed an error of 5-7 years in determining the exact time of the
turning point, he was convinced that the cycles were not the casual result of
that method. Kondratieff's statistical procedure in particular was subject to
severe criticism soon after the publication of his essay, and in the following
these problems will be discussed in more detail. To this end, Kondratieff's
methodology is briefly described here.
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The basic tendency of all series that develop in a certain direction is
eliminated. Kondr'atieff determined this tendency with the method of least
squares by adjusting first- to third-<iegree polynomials to the corresponding
series. Unfortunately, he did not adequately explain his choice of different
trend equations adjusted to the various series, an omission that has drawn
much criticism. Moreover, in his price series he eliminated neither the trend
nor the short-term fluctuations. Since he based his analysis of long-term
price cycles on original price data he has often been reproached for working
arbitrarily.
After the trend has been determined, the purely cyclical movement can
be produced by subtracting the trend value from the original values. The
time series obtained in such a way, however, show not only long waves but also
short-term cycles and random fluctuations. Kondratieff attempted to elim-
inate these by smoothing the trend-free series using a nine-year moving aver-
age; the long waves in pure form are the result of this statistical process.
Critics have pointed to both the arbitrary use of the procedures and
their weaknesses; for example, Anderson (see Weinstock, 1964) highlighted
the completely arbitrary choice of polynomials for trend approximation. In
addition, Heiler (19B1) pointed out that in most cases it has not been possible
to substantiate the choice of a specific trend function statistically. In hi~
work on Kondratieff cycles, Weinstock (1964) concluded that Kondratieff's
results are too dependent on the applied procedures of trend elimination, so
that it cannot be proved that Kondratieff's long waves are not just the result
of statistical manipulation. The main problem in this context lies in finding a
method of trend elimination that is particularly appropriate for the represen-
tation of long waves. In Weinstock's opinion, such a method has not been
found, and so the problem remains unresolved (see below).
Apart from the problem of adequately determining the trend, criticism of
Kondratieff's statistical procedure has also center'ed on the question of
whether the long waves were artificially produced by multiple smoothing pro-
cedures. The danger that artificial cycles can be produced through these
(transformation) prC¥:edures has been discussed as the "Slutzky-effect" (see
Slutzky, 1937). For example, Nullau (1976) tried to prove that Kondratieff had
produced the cycle artifically by continued smoothing. Garvy (1943) also crit-
icized Kondratieff's methodological procedure in detail, particularly the arbi-
trary way in which Kondratieff determined the turning points of the long
waves. These turning points were calculated from the original series and not
from the smoothed trend-free series, giving the impression that the results
were intentionally manipulated in order to make the different cycle phases
nearly identical. Three essential points of criticism are discussed here:
(1) The problem of an adequate trend determination.
(2) The examination of statistical procedures with regard to a possible
"Slutzky effect".
(3) The problem of determining the upper and lower turning points and, con-
sequently, the upswing and downswing phases of the cycles.
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After it was recognized that the once highly praised spectral analysis was
completely useless in analyzing empirical evidence for long waves (see, e.g.,
van Duijn, 1983), the discussion on adequate trend determination has become
more important in recent years. The most serious objection to the use of
spectral analysis is that it can achieve reasonable results only if the time
series being analyzed is stationary, Le., trend-free. Since almost all economic
time series show a more or less strong trend, they cannot be analyzed by
means of spectral analysis. Those scientists who nevertheless utilize this
method somehow try to eliminate trends from the series beforehand, but
results achieved in this way vary considerably, and are sometimes even con-
tradictory. As far as this procedure is concerned, its results are completely
dependent on the way in which the trend is eliminated. As in all classical pro-
cedures of time series analysis, the problems of spectral analysis concentrate
on the question of the adequate determination of the trend.
Intensive occupation with the characteristics of statistical procedures
of time series analysis has shown that traditional methods are completely
inappropriate in analyzing the phenomenon of long waves. This has led to the
development of new techniques in which time series analysis is mainly con-
sidered to be a filter design problem (Stier, 1978, 1980). These considerations
resulted from the fact that the current methods of time series analysis can
also be regarded as filters; e.g., moving averages, polynomial trend approxima-
tions, and the calculation of first differences. Thus we can define a filter as a
mathematical procedure that is used to change a given time series: each value
of the time series is replaced by a new, transformed value. The various pro-
cedures have different characteristics, Le., depending on the procedure
applied, the transformed time series will take a different course. The filter
theory deals with these (filter) characteristics in more detail.
The term frequency is the key to understanding this theory. In the sim-
plest case, frequency means nothing other than the reciprocal of the duration
of an oscillation; e.g., the frequency of a cycle with a periodic duration of 60
years is exactly 1/60 or 0.01667. The longer the duration of the oscillation,
the smaller is the corresponding frequency. The shortest measurable dura-
tion of an oscillation of a series is always 2 time units and consequently has a
frequency of 0.5 (the frequency can obviously have values ranging from zero
to 0.5). A frequency of zero indicates that the corresponding oscillation is
theoretically infinite. Frequency values can be calculated for long waves in a
similar way. According to Kondratieff, the frequency of the long wave ranges
from 0.0166 (= 1/60) to 0.0208 (= 1/48). If these frequencies are plotted, the
frequency band corresponding to the long waves turns out to be extremely
small compared with the many possible oscillation components of a time series.
For the representation of the historical course of a long wave, time series
oscillations are sought whose frequencies are in this domain. The duration of
the oscillations on the left of this frequency band is longer than that of the
long wave. These oscillation components are called a "trend". The filter
theory aims to develop a technique that enables the representation of only
those frequencies as a trend whose values are on the left of the frequency
band of the long wave. Such a procedure can also be called a trend or low-
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pass filter. An important methodological advantage of filter analysis is that
one can prove which frequency components are represented as a trend and
which are eliminated or filtered out by the various methods. This charac-
teristic of filter procedures can be examined by means of the so-called
transfer function, which can be calculated for many procedures; its course
indicates which oscillations are transmitted into the filtered series and which
are not. Investigations of current procedures have shown that they do not
achieve a clear separation between the trend and the long waves (see Schulte,
1981). As far as these procedures are concerned, the trend always contains
at the same time potential long waves; thus it is impossible to prove the
existence of long-term cycles in trend-free values even if they existed in the
original series.
A further disadvantage of many procedures is that special oscillation
components are amplified when the time series is transformed. If a filter pro-
cedure has such characteristics, there is always a danger that cycles will
turn up that did not exist or were indistinct in the originaL series. It can be
proved that the fil ters applied by Kuznets and Hoffmann to verify "long
swings" have such Slutzky effects, especially in the frequency band of the
"long swings" (see Konig and Wolters, 1972). According to these considera-
tions, an adequate trend filter must meet the following requirements:
(1) It should only eliminate those oscillations as a trend whose period is
longer than that of the long wave.
(2) It should not amplify any oscillations.
(3) All potential long-term cycles should be transferred unchanged, Le.,
they must be represented as time series.
In other words, the transfer function of the procedure we are looking for
must take the value 1 from the frequency 1/60 and must be zero for all fre-
quencies from zero to less than 1/60. If the value of the transfer function is
1, the corresponding fre<tuencies are exactly transformed in the filter output;
if it is zero, the frequencies are completely eliminated. Schulte (1981) intro-
duced a procedure of trend elimination that clearly shows these characteris-
tics, and achieved for the first time an exact separation between the trend
and the long waves.
Metz (1983) analyzed several economic time series with regard to the
existence of long waves with this procedure. Even though the effect of this
filter is impressive, it is difficult to interpret the trend eliminated by the
filter in a reasonable way. Surprisingly, the trend calculated from the series
has again a more or less wavy course. At that time it was not possible to
explain this strange trend course, but since then the reasons for it have been
explained. The filter causes a temporal shift in the different oscillations (see
Schmidt, 1984). In concrete terms, this means the following: Let us assume
that the delay of a cycle with a period of 52 years is 26 years. The peaks and
troughs are delayed through the filter each time for about 26 years, so that
whenever the original series has a peak, the filtered series has a trough; and
vice versa. This characteristic of the trend filter is responsible for the
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wavy course of the trend, but it is obvious that such a procedure is com-
pletely inadequate in representing and analyzing long waves.
Schmidt (1984) has developed a technique that not only achieves an
exact separation between trend and long waves as does the Schulte filter, but
which also guarantees that the transformed oscillation components are not
temporally shifted. In several papers I have discussed the effect and possi-
bilities of this procedure for the analysis of long waves in industrial times
(Metz, 19B4b; Irsigler and Metz, 1984) and preindustrial times (Metz, 1984a:
van Cauwenberghe et aI .• 1984). In these articles I have also shown its advan-
tages compared with the classical component model. Determination of the
trend turned out to be the main problem in analyzing long-term cycles. in that
it should be guaranteed that (1) the trend course can be interpreted in a rea-
sonable way from both an economic and an historical view, and (2) the long
waves are not enclosed in the trend.
With this filter, we have a procedure at our disposal whose lack was, in
Weinstock's (1964) opinion, the reason why the problem of representing long
waves empirically has so far been left unresolved. In the following I attempt
to determine the trends for some of the time series analyzed by Kondratieff
using this procedure, in order to show whether the long-term cycles identi-
fied by Kondratieff were actually the result of statistical manipulation. To
this end, I first of all determined the trends for some of the series Kondra-
tieff had analyzed: commodity prices (1780-1922), price of Consols [Konsoli-
dierte staatsanleihen] (1816-1922), and pig iron production (1840-1914) in
England: price of the Rente [from the Annuaire statistique] (1814-1922),
total foreign trade (1827-1913), and coal consumption (1:827-1913) in France.
The trends were determined with the aid of a trend or low-pass filter in such
a way that they only contained oscillations with a duration of more than 65
years. Consequently, potential long-term cycles have to be proved in the
trend-free series.
The trend-free values can be represented by means of a trend elimina-
tion procedure or high-pass filter. Analogous to the trend definition. the
high-pass filter eliminates all oscillations with a duration of more than 65
years. The long-term cycles can be represented as oscillations with periods
ranging from about 60 to 12 years; this is done with the aid of a band-pass
filter. The lower limit of 12 years was chosen according to Kondratieff's pro-
cedure, who achieved a similar effect with the use of a nine-year moving aver-
age. A comparison of the transfer functions of the applied filters with the
frequency band of the long waves shows that the long-term cycles we are look-
ing for are left untouched and not eliminated either by the procedure of
trend representation or trend elimination. Since the technique applied here
does not delay the filter output, the filter can be considered an ideal pro-
cedure for representing long waves.
[In the following figures, trends are estimated with a low-pass filter, and
long-term cycles with the aid of a band-pass filter (BP). The amplitude
characteristics (in years) of the filters used are denoted BP, beginning of
passband; BS, beginning of stopband; EP. end of passband; and ES, end of
stopband.]
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The results of the calculations were as follows. The trend in commodity
prices in England is marked by clear trend phases that tend to fall until
about 1900 (Figure 28.1), but these trend phases cannot be described as
cyclical movements because the corresponding oscillations fluctuate between
65 years and infinity. Leaving aside Kondratieff's dating of the turning
points, a trend upswing from 1780-1807 becomes visible, whereas Kondratieff
dates the upswing of the first long wave to the period between 1789 and 1814.
The following downswing lasts until about 1842. It is succeeded by a new faint
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upswing ending in 1865, another downswing, and a new upswing that begins in
about 1896. If these results are compared with Kondratieff's dating of long
waves, it is evident that the long waves in commodity prices are trend phases
that cannot be interpreted as cyclical movements; our cyclical movements fol-
Iowa somewhat different course (Figure 28.2). The following long-term cycles
can be ascertained (trough = T; peak = P): A first cycle extends from 1791 to
1800 (P) to 1825 (T). A clearly marked cycle follows until 1848 with its peak in
1839. The cyclical movement of the next period does not indicate clearly the
existence of long-term cycles, but the level of the shorter cycles rises
slightly until about 1902.
If the prices of the Rente in France and Consols in England are com-
pared with the trends calculated by Kondratieff, the r'esults shown in Figure
28.3(a) are obtained. The trend calculated by Kondratieff fits the course of
the English consols much less closely than the trend according to our' defini-
tion. Consequently, an exact separation of the trend from the long-term cycle
is not guaranteed by Kondratieff's trend approximation; the result is that
trend fluctuations are once more falsely interpreted as cyclical movements.
We calculate that the trend of the Consols rises to the year 1843, tends
to fall until 1863, rises again until 1891, and falls steeply thereafter. Once
again. these changes in the trend course cannot be interpreted as cyclical
movements from a statistical point of view. Comparing our results with
Kondratieff's cycles reveals clear differences [Figure 28.3(b)]. We calculate
that a first cycle can be dated to the period 1817-1818 to 1834-1835, fol-
lowed by a long upswing to 1855. The succeeding upswing lasts until the year
1889 and shows, especially after 1875, a distinct 14-year cycle that peaks in
1882. A lo-year upswing follows, which breaks off in 1897 and turns into a 21
year downswing lasting until 1917.
Similar strong differences between our and Kondratieff's results can also
be found in the Rente price series in France. Kondratieff represents this
series trend as a straight line. As Figure 28.4(a) clearly shows, this trend
already anticipates the result - proof of the existence of long waves - that
he could have achieved if he had dated the long waves according to the course
of the original series. However, if the trend is calculated according to our
definition. the long waves clearly prove to be trend phases. The trend shows
two distinct upswing and downswing phases that cannot be measured as cycli-
cal movements. Regarding the cyclical movements. the completely different
trends may lead to different interpretations [(Figure 28.4(b)]. The two big
cycles dated by Kondratieff dissolve into several shorter ones. The longest
ascertainable cycle has a duration of 25 years, starting in 1848 and ending in
1873. and is succeeded by a further cycle whose trough is deeper than that of
1873, so that the end of this long cycle could be dated to 1888. The fact that
the shorter cycles influence the trend-free movements more than the long
waves is obvious. For this reason Kondratieff succeeds in verifying long waves
in the three series investigated here, only because the chosen trend obvi-
ously cannot represent the existing trend phases adequately.
These trend phases therefore remain in the trend-free series and are
erroneously described as cyclical fluctuations. According to our trend
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definition and the filter method, long-term fluctuations can be clearly deter-
mined as trend phases that cannot be definitely measured as cyclical fluctua-
tions for the period analyzed.
An examination of the series for French foreign trade, French coal con-
sumption. and English pig iron production yields completely different results.
Apart from slight divergences, the trend estimated by Kondratieff is
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confirmed by our calculations (see Figures 28.5-21J.7). In contrast with the
value series, these series show a distinct growth that determines the trend
course. Except for English pig iron production gince 1870, the trend shows a
nearly linear course. Kondratieff's dating of the long waves is confirmed by
our calculations, at least regarding French foreign trade and coal consumption
[Figures 28.5(b) and 28.6(b)]. Since these series are extremely short, we have
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to differentiate. The foreign trade series (1848-1875) and coal consumption
(1844-1877) reveal only one long-term upswing and one long-term downswing
between 1875-1899 and 1877-1893. respectively. These three series there-
fore confirm the existence of long-term upswing and downswing phases that
can be clearly distinguished from the trend for the period 1848-1890.
The essential feature of these upswing and downswing phases extending
over several short-term cycles is the predominance of short-term cycles, as
examplified in the series for pig iron production in England [.Figure 28.7(b)].
Finally. we wish to check Kondratieff's hypothesis about long waves with
the aid of the series analyzed here. The maximum cycle length, which Kondra-
tieff fixed to 60 years, cannot be confirmed by our calculations. Such a long
oscillation can only be ascertained if the peaks and troughs of the trend
phases discernible if the value series are considered.
In addition, Kondratieff thought that the cycles dated in the different
series were highly synchronous; we could not examine this hypothesis in
detail, but Figure 28.8 confirms that international business cycles develop in
a synchronous way. In this figure. which shows the long-term cycles in pig
iron production in England, France, and Germany from 1840 to 1914 (Metz,
1984b), the synchronous character of the cycles is obvious, especially in Eng-
land and Germany; the intensities of the amplitudes are also very similar. If
the peaks and troughs are dated, the "cycle leaders" can be determined
exactly; this is most obvious for the 1890s - the turning point for England was
in 1892, France in 1899, and Germany in 1902.
If, however, the courses of the cycles of various indicators are com-
pared. this parallelism is dissolved; .Figure 28.9 illustrates the long-term
cycles in commodity prices in England. French foreign trade. and pig iron pro-
duction in England. Kondratieff's assertion that the upswing and downswing
phases of various economic indicators run to a great extent parallel to each
other must therefore be modified. The empirical results indicate only that
there is an international connection between the same production sectors.
As our calculations have clearly shown, Kondratieff's hypothesis of long
waves must be modified considerably. We do not know, however, how Kondra-
tieff would have interpreted the empirical results achieved with the filter,
but it is certain that it would have been more difficult for him to regard the
long waves in the way he did - as intersectoral and international cycles with
highly synchronous courses and uniform duration of about 48-60 years.
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CHAPTER 29
Transfers Between Industrial Branches In
the Course of Schumpeter-Mensch
Long Swings
Herman Wold and Klaus Kaasch
(with comments by Gerhard 0. Mensch)
29.1. Introduction
Schumpeter's transformation theory (1912. 1954) is an analysis of industrial
development: economic innovations come in fits and spurts. which generate
long waves and short-term business cycles. The first phase of a long wave is
expansive: industrial production. employment, and capital investment
increase under "competitive destruction ". But as the pattern of demand sta-
bilizes, production is more and more rationalized by increased capital invest-
ment; the price per unit product falls; demand increases; output rises. Later
the increasing level of employment is first retarded, and then diminishes as
rationalization proceeds. In the course of the change from increasing to
decreasing employment per unit of output, there are shifts in the relative lev-
els of activity in different industrial branches. The supply side undergoes
transformation. Schumpeter's vision of development was greatly admired by
many economists, but a common feeling was that it was a tragedy that he was
unable to formalize it as a general theory.
Mensch's (1975) historical studies of economic evolution give evidence of
Schumpeterian fits and spurts. They show that the social inventions and
scientific discoveries that underlie basic innovations flow in a more or less
continuous stream, whereas the basic innovations themselves cluster in rela-
tively short "windows in time". There is gradual (continuous) emergence of
possibilities for innovation, going hand in hand with speed-up and slow-down
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(discontinuity) in the rate and direction of basic innovation. Mensch's long-
swing model, which thus is an alternative to the Kondratieff-wave model.
incorporates a bi-equilibrium system (Mensch. 1980, 1986). The two equilibria
of Mensch's bi-equilibrium (BIEQ) model are the expansive phase of increasing
production and increasing employment. and the capital-intensive phase of
increasing production per worker and decreasing employment per unit of out-
put. The main contribution is that during a stalemate in technology. progress
turns into a bifurcation. Then. the series of rationalization innovations tend
to yield diminishing utility and inferior returns as firms and plants in estab-
lished industries mature and become more inflexible. If inflexibility manifests
itself in too many branches of industry (structural encrustation). the economy
becomes structurally ready for the breakthrough of a new cluster of innova-
tions.
These notions of rapid transitions from high to low levels of employment
and capital utilization. and changes in the level and composition of production
and investment. have been formalized in our BIEQ-PLS model (Wold and
Mensch. 1983). It uses data on industrial branches. or groups of branches.
and performs simultaneous analyses of several groups of branches. combining
BIEQ and a nonlinear generalization of the basic PLS (partial least squares)
algorithm of W. Wold (1973. 1985). Total industrial activity in the USA is
modeled as weighted aggregates of branch data on employment. investment.
and production. Shifts in the weights in the course of Schumpeter-Mensch
long swings indicate shifts in and across branch activity. and slow versus swift
transformations. The BIEQ-PLS model is unique in being able to provide quan-
titative information on shifts in branch activity in the course of the Schum-
peterian wave. This research aim was spelled out by Wold and Mensch (1983).
but was not carried through operationally. This chapter pursues this objec-
tive and provides experiments with somewhat disaggregated US data.
29.2. The BIEQ Model: A Briefing
The PLS model of H. Wold is the original method of theorizing with both
observed and latent (computed) variables. The BIEQ-PLS model uses data on
industrial production Pt. iabor At, and investments It observed over time
t =1.....T and standardized to zero and unit variance over t. Denoting
estimated production by Xt • the BIEQ model obtains latent variables Xt by
solving the third-degree equation
(29.1)
where expansive investment E t and rationalization investment Rt are other
latent variables obtained by the oblique rotation of observed labor At and
investment inputs It:
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cos(1' - 0) [
co~1' -sin 0] [AtI
-sm I' cos 0 It
(29.2a,b)
Note that Et and Rt denote the "extensifying" and "intensifying" (Ricardo)
effects of the investment mix. The basic idea of Mensch's approach is that
they have to be inferred from related observations. The composition of
investment (Et , Rt ) is used for causal analysis.
For- an estimation of the goodness of fit, the BIEQ-PLS algorithm uses R 2 ,
defined by
(29.3)
R 2 serves as a provisional criterion in the evaluation of the model. As will be
seen, the fit is excellent. The actual evaluation involves two intricate steps.
First, equation (29.1) is solved for each t, giving either one or three solutions
Xt . In the expansive phase there is one solution Xt , which increases with t.
In the rationalization (capital-intensive) phase there is again one solution Xt'
which increases with t. When there are three alternative solutions Xt , Le.,
when the economy is structurally unstable and given to rapid transitions,
back and forth, from full employment equilibrium to underemployment equilib-
rium, one must be chosen. In making those choices in bifurcation situations,
we have incorporated "hysteresis ": that solution is chosen which, by con-
tinuity, extends the prevailing trend (lower or higher trend level).
Applying this model [(29.1), (29.2a,b)] to US data between 1947 and 1002,
we can ask when apd why Xt is at times unique, and at other times two- or
three-valued. Figure 29.1 illustrates the "cusp" of a BIEQ. In the (E, R)
diagram, the time path (Et , Rt ) is plotted. A passage from one to three solu-
tions Xt occurs when the curve enters the cusp. A phase transition (passage)
from one equilibrium to the other occurs when the curve leaves the cusp over
the South rim. In other words, for the solution Xt to have a discontinuity, it is
necessary that the (E, R) curve pass through and drop out of the cusp. The
discontinuity occurs when the curve leaves the cusp in a critical way - when
the E: R ratio falls below a threshold level. In Mensch's terms: when the
rationalization bias dominates innovative activity, the economy slips into an
underemployment equilibrium. In Mensch et al. (1980), we showed that West
Germany underwent such a slip. Furthermore, our US analyses indicate that
while US industry on the whole did not slip into underemployment equilibrium,
some branches of industry did; and some regions did, where there was a high
incidence of "declining" industries. On the other hand, some West German
408 Transfers Between Industr1.at Branch.es
E E
(b)
'----- '--_-----.JR
2.9110
Cusp
o
(a)
1.912
o f----------+~!"------'\__-----I R
-1.398 L -'----_----'--------'--_---'--_
-2.149
Figure 29.1-. Illustrations of the (E. R) time path and the "cusp". (a.) The path
penetrates the cusp. giving rise to a jump In Xt . (b) The curve runs outside the
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industries enjoyed full employment. while total industry settled into an
underemployment equilibrium.
If we regress Xt linearly on Pt over t =1•...•T. we obtain
Xt =a. + b P t + e t
giving
(29.4)
R 2 = 1 - var(e) (29.5)
Since the R 2-criterion is vulnerable to discontinuities in highly nonlinear
models. we employ the well known Stone-Geisser cross-validation test. The
SG test assesses Q2 for predictive relevance [see equation (29.7)]. Allowing
the angular variables "'I and 15 to vary. a search procedure determines "'I and 15
so as to give Q2 maximum value.
The rotation in equation (29.2b) can be performed by regression, Le..
(29.6a.b)
If we use oblique rotation as a first approximation. the four coefficients are
restricted by two identities,
(29.7a.b)
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This reduces the need for information, because in first approximation we need
to assess only two free parameters (see Wold and Mensch, 1983).
29.3. Partial Least Squares (PLS)
Linear models with latent variables (LVP models) were first introduced by
Wold (1973, 1982. 1985). The basic PLS algorithm for estimating linear LVP
models is an iterative sequence of OLS (ordinary least squares) regressions,
linear operations, and square root extractions. The predictive relations of
the LVP model are subject to Wold's predictor specification. In contrast
with the stringent assumptions of ML (maximum likelihood.) estimation, the PLS
assumptions are very general, so that PLS modeling has a wide scope in theory
and practice.
For model evaluation PLS has adapted Tukey's (1958) jackknife assess-
ment of standard errors and the cross-validatory test for predictive
relevance introduced by Stone (1974) and Geisser (1974). The PLS adaptation
of the Stone-Geisser (SG) test for predictive relevance is given by
(29.8)
where fit is a trivial estimate of Yt; for example, fit = y. Tukey jackknife
standard errors for model parameter estimates are obtained as a by-product
of the SG test criterion, Q2.
In maximum-likelihood. (ML) model evaluations, the null hypothesis is that
the model is true. Models are never exactly true, hence the null hypothesis is
rejected sooner or later as the sample size increases indefinitely. This factor
limits ML models. In contrast, the SG test applied to PLS asks whether the
model has predictive relevance; if Q2 ~ 0, the answer is no; if Q2 > 0, the
affirmative answer is a matter of degree. PLS models leave the door open for
further improvement of the model.
There is a large literature that develops the jackknife and the SG test
on the stringent ML assumptions, but in fact the jackknife and the SG test are
much more general (see Bergstrom and Wold, 1983). Hence, PLS modeling is
general in scope, not only with reference to estimation, but also to model
evaluation.
Outside the realm of controlled experiments, the ML assumption of
independent observations is often unrealistic, bringing an underestimation
bias into the classical ML formula for standard errors. Bergstrom and Wold
(1983) report an econometric model with 34 parameters where the classical ML
formula underestimates the standard errors by some 10.3%.
ML modeling is an errors-in-variables approach: LS (least squares) and,
in particular, PLS modeling is an errors-in-equations approach. In the PLS
approach to an LVP model, each latent variable is indirectly observed by a
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block of manifest variables called indicators; each variable is estimated as a
weighted aggregate of its indicators. Hence, if the model is highly nonlinear
[example: equation (29.1)], PLS provides information on "goodness of the
model", whereas ML fails if a latent variable is ambivalent [example: Xt is tri-
valued in equation (29.1)].
The maximum-likelihood inference from the estimated model is sensitive
to the realism of the hypothetical model (specified, multivariate distribution
and independent observations). In contrast, the jackknife and the SG test
refer to the computer output of the model as it comes, as aJait accompli; Le.,
the tests are informative and valid whether or not the estimation method is
consistent. When the method is inconsistent, as is the case with PLS estima-
tion, this is expected to bring an automatic reduction in the Q2 value of the
SG test. Hence, our quantitative analyses give clues as to how better to model
reality.
The ML methods of model evaluation are asymptotic and are valid for
indefinitely large samples. The jackknife and the SG test are valid for any
sample size, and even for quite small samples. An extreme case in point is the
PLS model, which has N = 10 observations, 27 manifest variables, two latent
variables, and the SG test shows the model to be predictive, ~ =0.42 (Wold,
1985).
Scientific model building emerged in econometrics in the 19S0s and
1940s. Lorentz (1984) reviews how activities in weather forecasting during
and after World War II were thoroughly influenced by the advent of model
building:
It took me some time to recognize that rigor, while essentiai in pure
mathematics, can be stifling in some applications. ... The conflict
between mathematical and meteoroiogicai procedures has been at ieast
partly resoived in the ensuing decades, in a manner which might not have
been anticipated. The new eiement is the widespread use of models. ...
To a considerabie extent the adoption of modeis in meteoroiogy
represents oniy a change in attitude. What was once regarded as an
approximation to the system of equations governing the atmosphere is
now considered to be the exact system for a model of the atmosphere.
The mathematically minded investigator often finds this arrangement
more satisfying, since, once he has settled upon a modei, he can retain
j'ull mathematical rigor in studying its behavior [emphasis added].
Scientific model building proceeds in four stages: (i) model specification; (ii)
model estimation; (iii) model evaluation; and (iv) applications. PLS modeling
aims at full rigor in the context of stages (i)-(iii). The BIEQ-PLS modeling
effort includes (iv).
29.4. BIEQ--PLS: Generalizing Mensch"s Hi-equilibrium Model
The above gives a formal exposition of the BIEQ-PLS approach. Figure 292
illustrates an application to US data for 1947-1982. The discontinuous jumps
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Figure ZO.2. J3 data for manufacturing. mining, and transportation. standardized to
zero mean and unit variance over time: (a.) labor, ABt; (b) investment, IBt; (c) pro-
duction. PBt ; (d) detrended data.
in BIEQ-PLS are not in line with the gradual long-wave model of Kondratieff.
Schumpeter. and many disciples. In order to include phase transitions and
rapid swings in economic activities, an improvement in the long-wave approach
is required. One improvement involves bi-equilibrium dynamics; another one,
disaggregation.
Data for all industry are broken down into B branches:
production Pt =Pit + + PBt t =1. ....r
labor At =A it + + ABt (29.9)
investment It =lit + + IBt
Figure 29.2 shows US data on labor input. investment expenditures. and
production, for 1955-1975. for three branches: mining. manufacturing, and
transportation. In order to test the effect of aggregation of sub-industries
412 'l'r~n$Q'ers Between l"dustrf.~LBr~"ch.es
\ (a) (b)\
\
\
I
I,
\
I,
I
//\ /
~
Figure 29.3. Observed (weighted) production P; and estimated production :ft' for (a.)
J3 data. and (b) J4 data.
(disaggregation). we distinguished "J3 data" [= all three branches separated:
see Figure 29.2 (a)-(d)] from "J4 data" (= two branches: manufacturing and
mining combined. and transportation). Figure 29.3 shows how. as a result of
the different disaggregations J3 and J4. our production estimates differ. Note
that our J3 and J4 data cover only three branches. whereas our formal model
breaks all industry into B branches. opening up an avenue toward structural
change analyses on more disaggregated levels.
The BIEQ-PLS estimation is an iterative procedure. with steps
s = 1.2..... each with forward and backward substeps.
In the forward substep. total industrial labor is defined as a latent vari-
able At. which is estimated by a weighted aggregate:
t = 1..... T (29. lOa)
where modified weights w~ll are used in the next forward substep. Similarly.
for total industrial investment.
(29.10b)
To paraphrase. the BIEQ-PLS algorithm regards total labor At and total
investment It as unobserved latent variables, which are estimated by manifest
branch data. The forward substep proceeds as shown above using At,It·
instead of At,It, and obtaining estimated production Xt for each t = 1.... , T.
In the first forward substep, all weights are made equal to unity,
W~ll = 1 will = 1 b = 1..... B (29.11)
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In the backward substep, the Xt obtained in the forward substep is
regressed over t on the branch pr'oducts:
(29.12)
where the systematic part gives the estimate of the (latent) total production:
(29.13)
Next, using the proxies Et , and Rt obtained in the forward substep. we
transfor'm equation (29.1) into a multiple regression over t:
(29.14)
The resulting regression coefficients s 1 and s 2 transform the forward proxies
Et and Rt into their backward counterparts:
(29.15)
Next. the inverse rotation equation (29.3) gives the backward proxies At" and
It":
(29.16)
where M is the oblique rotation matrix of the forward substep.
Finally. computing the multiple regression
(29.17)
and similarly for It. the regression coefficients w~~ and w;~ give the weights
for the next forward substep.
The iterations s = 1.2.... continue until they are stopped by a conven-
tional convergence criterion. say,
(29.18)
Once the BIEQ-PLS model has been estimated., many relevant pieces of
information can be recorded. including
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(1) Graphs: At. It. Et • Rt Pt. Xt • At, It. with t =1..... T.
(2) Plots: (Et • Rt ). (Pt. Xt ), (At. At). etc.
(3) Stone-Geisser test Q2 in equation (29.6) for the comparison Pt versus Xt .
(4) Optimizing angles)' and <5 (cl. Section 29.2).
For t = 1, ... , T:
At = estimated industrial labor [equation (29.10a)].
It = estimated industrial investment [equation (29.10b)].
X~ = solution to equation (29.1).
Pt = estimated industrial production [equation (29.13)].
Correlations over t = 1.... , T:
r (A • • A). r (I • • I). r (Pt. P).
correlations over b = 1, B: r (W a.' Wi.)' r (Wa .' Wp .). r (Wi .• w p.)'
Rank ordering over b =1 B: wall' will' Wpll.
29.5. Empirical Results I: Validity
In reporting our applications of the BIEQ-PLS model. we focus on typical
results and emphasize the comparison with Schumpeter's theory. First. we
turn to the question of how to modify the BIEQ-PLS model in order to extend
the tendency of built-in gradual change that is part of the Kondratieff-wave
model. In Mensch's model, Schumpeter's "process of creative destruction" is
usually in disequilibrium ("expansionary bias ": E >> R; or "rationalization
bias": R » E). and the bias may swiftly change over from one to the other
(phase transition - cyclical and/or structural change). The concept is very
rich in possible patterns of change. The most notable difference from the
"gradual" long-wave model is that the Schumpeter-Mensch swings may occur
rather suddenly. In'light of the present unemployment levels in many regions
and countries. a rather sudden boost E »R is. indeed. what people hope for.
We now evaluate (1) convergence and (2) goodness of fit. Convergence of
the BIEQ-PLS algorithm is satisfactory in our data. In our experiments we
studied the entire period and five subperiods. The convergence is more rapid
when we include only four. three, and two subperiods. respectively. For both
J3 and J4 data. the Q2 test is stable to two decimal places after ten iterations.
In short: PLS works efficiently.
For the comparison of Pt versus Xt , and observed versus estimated total
production. the correlation is typically high in our data. R 2 > 0.90. There is
some reduction. as expected. when evaluating the comparison by the Q2 test.
Using data for 1947-1982. J3 and J4 give Ql :: 0.79. In short: BIEQ-PLS
works well.
The close agreement between actually observed and PLS-estimated pro-
duction in US manufacturing. mining, and transportation. 1947-1982. is shown
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in Figure 29.8, for both the J3 and the J4 disaggregation methods. Therefore,
the postulated causality should be regarded as empirically validated theory.
29.6. Empirical Results ll: Causal Inferences
Mainstream economic theory of both Keynesian (macroeconomic) and neo-
classical (microeconomic) leaning suggests that more investment creates more
employment through the multiplier effect, alias Okun's Law. As is well known,
this may be true for industry including all services, but false for specific
industries. Figure 29.4 shows that it is false for manufacturing, mining and
transportation combined. The Schumpeter-Mensch theory, on the other
hand, suggests that in the expansive phase new labor M t and expansive
investment Et incre~se, while total investment It and rationalizing investment
Rt grow slowly or even stagnate; whereas in the rationalization phase M t and
Et decrease while It and Rt increase. The plots in Figure 29.4 agree with
these implications of the Schumpeter-Mensch long-swing theory. The swing in
(Et ' Rt ) as depicted in Figures 29.4(b) and 29.1 causes the change in input
proportions and output levels depicted in Figures 29.8 and 29.4(a).
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Figure 29.4. (a) Labor At' and investment I;; (b) expansive E; and rationalizing R;
investment.
We now turn to changes in branch activity in the course of the
Schumpeter-Mensch wave. Figure 29.2 gives some evidence of such changes:
mining shows decreas ing levels of labor A it' whereas labor levels rise in
manufacturing A 2t and transport A 3t ; similarly, mining investment Iu l"ises
sharply. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in the light of Figure 29.5, such
changes are not brought to the fore by the BIEQ-PLS model as it stands.
Underlying equation (29.1) is the assumption that profits (sales - costs)
as a function of production X take the form
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-IR >>E-1-E-R-1-E >>R
Equation (29.1): One solution Three solutions One solution
S, S2 S3
-------
t" T
Expansive Gradual Full
phase rationalization rationalization
-
Figure 29.5. The lhlrd-degree curve for estimaled production X =X(R, E), and the
lhree phases (1, t), (t", T) and (t', t'), where equation (29.1) has one or three
solutions X(R, E), respectively.
c = 1.. X 4 - 1.. R X2 - EX
4 2
(29.19)
Profits are close to a competitive equilibrium (minimum) when X = X(R, E) is a
solution to equation (29.1): there are either one or three solutions. Typically,
there is one solution in the expansive phase, when all revenue is reinvested,
and one solution in the phase of full rationalization, when profits are squeezed
out. These are the two equilibria of the BIEQ model. In theory, labor-saving
rationalization is a gradual process, but this is not always so. In the BIEQ
model, the expansive stage may end with a discontinuous jump (see Figure
29.1), namely, if the E:R-proportion falls below a threshold level. Then the
economy may fall into "slumpflation" (M. Friedman). In Mensch's terms: "the
supply side shrinks. "
Let S l' S 2' and S 3 denote branch activity in the three phases of Figure
29.5, defined by E versus R. Then if we adopt the proxy assumption that
there is no rationalization in the first phase where E »R, and that gradual
and full rationalization proceed with the same speed in the second and third
phases, then
(29.20)
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provides an unpretentious index for "intrawave shifts" in branch activity.
The index can be computed for labor, investment, or production.
Table 29.1 shows the index I ws obtained from our" J3 and J4 data. A nega-
tive I ws indicates that the branch activity is relatively high in the expansive
phase and diminishes in the course of the rationalization phases. In the J3
data, I ws is negative for A 1 , indicating that in the course of rationalization
mining activity (as measured by labor A) decreases relative to manufacturing
and transport. For mining activity (measured by investment 11 ) the same ten-
dency is apparent. although less pronounced. For production P, the J3 data
indicate that the activity changes are parallel in the three branches.
Ta.ble 29.1. J3 and J4 data. Branch activity in phases S1' S2' and ~3 of the
Schumpeter-Mensch wave, and index I ws of shifts in branch activity.
Data. J3 Data. J4
S1 S2 S3 I ws S1 S2 S3
A 1 1.092 -0.698 -0.393 -1.500 -1.075 -0.430 -0.107 1.000
A 2 -1.151 0.041 1.110 1.500 -0.718 1.182 1.147 1.236
A 3 -0.498 -0.656 1.154 0.647
11 -0.338 -0.719 1.057 0.480 -0.927 -1.005 -0.025 0.421
12 -1.015 0.111 0.904 1.500 -0.191 0.952 1.196 1.082
13 -1.045 -0.163 1.208 1.297
P1 -1.098 -0.106 1.204 1.368 0.379 0.490 -0.421 -0.535
P2 -1.063 0.081 0.982 1.500 -1.016 0.042 0.526 1.641
P3 -1.072 -0.154 1.225 1.312
The J4 data are the same as J3, with mining and manufacturing combined.
For investment I, the J3 and J4 data indicate much the same branch activity
changes in the course of the long wave, but not so for labor A and production
P. I ws indicates that branch activity (measured by labor A) is much more
stable in J4 than in J3 data. For production P, in contrast with the J3 data,
the rationalization process brings a marked shift in the transportation sector
as compared to mining and manufacturing.
In fact, in expansionary phases of the economy, the supply side unfolds
differently than in recessive periods. Recessive structural change is not just
"slumping" or "shrinking" but "breaking". The implications for the theory of
capital (both theory of stock and value) seem obvious. and they obviously are
in need of further study.
29.7. Concluding Remarks
Of course, the results of this pilot study of the BIEQ-PLS model reported
here are no more than trifling examples of the type of information provided
by this approach. The analysis yields insights into questions such as these:
(A) Why do some regions or countries prosper while others decline?
(B) Which industries, and what innovation strategies in these industries, will
carry another phase transition that promises full employment?
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The next round of analysis will be extended to more comprehensive US
data, and to data for West Germany and Sweden. Some points that require
further investigation include the following technicalities:
(1) The oblique rotation, equation (29.2b), is too rigid. There are several
ways to improve the model, which should further improve the good R 2
and Q2 achieved with equation (29.2b).
(2) As often happens in econometric mudel building, the variables have very
different scales, so that in linear models it is customary and appropriate
to standardize the variables to zero mean and unit variance. The BIEQ
and BIEQ-PLS models are nonlinear and the estimation is influenced by
the standardization, so that some attention to scale effects is required in
further studies.
(3) Schumpeterian theory raises the question of whether rapid reversals
affect all the variables in play, or whether a subset of the variables
remains unaffected by the swing. This question is part of the scaling
problem mentioned in (2) above, and is part of the policy and strategy
problems implied.
This chapter showed that the bi-equilibrium/partial least square
approach passed the acid tests of (i) model specification, (ii) model estimation,
and (iii) model evaluation. It is ready for (iv) applications to said policy and
strategy problems.
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CHAP'l"KR 30
Dynamic Prograrmning of Socioeconomics
and War: A Computer Experiment
Pa:ul P. Ora,'ig a.nd Kenneth E.F Watt
30.1. Introduction
The world armaments industry is operating at record output. At enormous
expense, the Soviet Union and the United States have through joint effort
designed and constructed a device proposed many years ago by Herman Kahn
- a doomsday machine. The machine is now in place; it could go off at any
instant. Yet arms expenditures continue to rise. In the United States we now
spend annually about $6000 per family of four. More than half of our federal
budget is spent paying for past and present military expenses. The situation
is similar in the Soviet Union. Despite these massive and growing outlays. our
future - all of our futures - are less secure now than just a few years ago.
There are relationships between economic activities of nations and arma-
ments. The goal of our work is to explore some very simple models that will
(we hope) provide some new insight into these connections. Wolfgang Pauli.
the physicist who developed the theory of spin in atomic systems. once
observed (so it is reported) that "it is very hard to make predictions, espe-
cially about the future". Our goal is not to make predictions. We seek
insight.
Several scholars have particularly influenced our work. Richard Bellman
explored the application of dynamic programming to human systems (Wilkinson
et al., 1973). The strengths and weaknesses of large-scale modeling are well
described in work done for IIASA (Meadows et al.. 1982). The MIT group under
Jay Forrester has illustrated both the problems of complexity and the prom-
ise of simplification of large-scale models.
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Figure 30.1. War deaths correlated with consumer price index, 1800-1960.
30.2. The Models
At the IIASA Siena Conference on Long Waves in October 1983, we presented
work exploring the correlations between certain socioeconomic variables and
war deaths (Craig and Watts, 1985). The key results are shown in Figure 30.1.
Four economic cycles are found in the US consumer price index, with the
peaks and valleys in excellent agreement with long-wave dates as summarized
by van Duijn (1983). The qualitative conclusions are captured in Figure 30.2.
Here the solid lines point to economic turning points. the upward arrows to
the times of maximum annual war deaths. and the downward arrows to the
times when annual war deaths were at minima. The consistency of the pattern
peace ~ recession ~ war ~ good times ~ peace' ..
is apparent. This regularity motivates our work.
It is all too easy to build models that are, or are perceived to be, opaque.
The problems of computer models have been well documented, for example, in
the history of the Limits to Growth model in the IIASA Energy Model.
Our goal is to develop simple models focusing on a few issues. We want to
find out the extent to which we can mimic certain dominant types of
socioeconomic behavior using sparse assumptions. Figure 30.3 shows the flow
diagram - though not the internal structure - of the model. We focus on the
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Figure 30.2. War and peace correlated with economic long waves (solid lines =
economic peaks and valleys; upward arrows = maximum annual war deaths; down-
ward arrows =low annual war deaths).
interaction between productive capacity and arms production. The model con-
tains four production sectors: capital, consumption, military, and energy.
Production capacity in each sector is constrained by some limiting resource:
physical plant, available labor, or energy. [Energy is included as an example
of a depletable resource that can be renewed (or replaced) by sufficient
investment in research and development. Our intent here is to explore ideas
related to those of Cesare Marchetti (1985).] In the results discussed in this
paper the energy sector is disconnected, and resource depletion plays no
role.
In each model year productive capacity increases due to allocation of
new productive capacity, and decreases due to obsolescence (retirement).
Although, as Figure 30.1 shows, there is a systematic trend toward
ever-larger numbers of deaths in wars, yet wars themselves do not occur with
regularity. As Singer and Small (1972) demonstrated, the occurrence of wars
(though not their size) is random. More precisely, the onset of wars is
described by a Poisson distribution. This fundamental observation about the
historic occurrence of war is captured in the model by introducing a random
variable.
Each year a probability of war occurring is computed. This probability
is proportional to the product of the size of the existing military stock times
the rate of change of military production. The chance of war is high when
stockpiles are large, or when they are increasing fast. Occasionally the ran-
dom procedure leads to war, at which point resources are shifted toward the
military sector.
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Figure 30.3. Model flow diagram based on four production seclers: capital, con-
sumption, military, and energy.
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Decisions on how to operate an economy are heavily governed by percep-
tions. In depressions there exist both the capital and the labor to produce
goods. Without optimism. there will be few purchases and little capital invest-
ment. The economy stagnates. We include this behavioral phenomenon in a
quantity we call "optimism". Optimism is a multiplier that affects investment
and employment. Optimism is high when employment is high. Optimism is low
when the economy is declining. when unemployment is high, or when consumer
output is low. When war breaks out, optimism (at least regarding jobs in the
military sector) increases.
Low optimism is expressed in the model by reluctance of in vestors to
invest. When optimism decreases. the utilized fraction of the available capital
stock decreases. This decreases the number of jobs, which in turn further
decreases optimism.
The policy part of the model (the government) attempts to escape from
this downward spiral by stimulating investment (thus creating jobs) in one
area over which it has control - the military sector.
Each year a forecast is made, and new policies are implemented. The
only policy variable in the model is the allocation of productive resources
among the four industrial sectors. Allocations to the military sector are par-
ticularly important. They increase when war occurs, thereby removing
resources from other sectors and allowing them to deteriorate. When war is
over, there is need to build up decayed sectors, and this permits economic
growth for some time.
Model parameters are very roughly based on the USA. They are adjusted
so that, if war is forbidden, steady growth occurs.
Our original goal was to use the model to explore strategies for dealing
with resource depletion and the effect of memory on planning decisions. We
were interested in the idea that the decisions individuals make as adults are
conditioned by the conditions that existed when they were growing up. Thus
persons growing up in bad times may tend to think conservatively, while those
who grow up in good times tend to be more expansive. Thus long lag times
would be introduced.
We soon learned that such richness (complexity) is not required to
obtain interesting results. Policy in the present version of the model is based
only on short-term forecasting. We now turn to results. We present results
for a single model. The differences in the runs result from the random ele-
ment in the algorithm that calculates the onset of war.
Figure 30.4(a) shows the gross national product over a 200-year period.
The vertical scale is logarithmic. War is indicated by the dark regions below
the x-axis. At the beginning of the run the economy was sliding. Policy
changes intended to arrest this decline led to increases in investment in the
military sector. This increased the chance of war, which soon occurred. Dur-
ing the war the economy deteriorated. Once the war ended, many jobs were
available to rebuild the infrastructure. About 40 years of peace ensued,
which was finally broken by a series of wars. Over the 200-year period. there
were seven wars and a 1.5% per year long-term upward trend in the gross
national product.
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Figure 30.4(b) is another run on the identical model. While the detailed
results differed from the first run, again there were seven wars. The longest
period of peace was 30 years. The average economic growth rate over the two
centuries was about the same as before.
Figure 30.4(c) shows a sustained economic decline over a 50-year period.
By the end of the long decline, the economy was in poor shape. Optimism was
low, and unemployment was high. The probability of war continued to
decrease, as available resources for investment in the military declined.
Nevertheless, eventually a war occurred. When it ended, recovery took place
very quickly. The remainder of the chart is similar to the other runs. Over
the two centuries modeled, average economic growth rate was about the same
as before.
30.3. Conclusions
Despite its extreme simplicity, the model shows considerable variation in
behavior. It mimics some of the major trends found in industrial societies.
The inclusion of a single random element in the simulation appears to capture
something important about modern societies.
An objection sometimes raised is that our approach may be relevant to a
world without nuclear weapons, but is irrelevant today. We think the
relevance remains. "War" appears in the model as a reallocation of national
treasure from areas that help the society to grow, into nonproductive areas.
Actual warfare is not required. The only requirement is a sector that can con-
sume resources and that is under governmental policy control. Infrastructure
repair would serve as well. To a considerable degree so also would shipment of
goods overseas.
If the world view explored in this model has even a modest relation to
reality, it suggests that new methods for stabilization of economies are
desperately needed. Having one's society at risk to random adverse events is
not so bad if the consequences are modest. Today they are not.
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The Long-Wave Debate
For over a century, some economists have pointed out that up-
swings and downturns in economic activity (along with some key
economic variables) seem to follow a surprisingly regular pattern -
a pattern sometimes labeled simply "Kondratieff long waves" in
honor of the Russian economist who first rigorously described some
of the phenomena leading to these changes.
What might be the causes and consequences of these long-term
fluctuations? What is the relationship between these so-called long
waves and other structural changes, technical revolutions, financial
and monetary variables? Finally, if the mechanisms of long waves
can be understood, will it be possible to avoid the recurrent reces-
sions in economic development that are as painful for the less
developed countries as for the developed ones - be they socialist
or capitalist in orientation?
By invitation, an international panel of distinguished scholars met in
Weimar, GDR, to discuss these fascinating questions about the
existence and nature of long waves. This conference was organized
and sponsored joirHly by the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, and the Institute of
Theory, History and Organization of Science of the GDR Academy
of Sciences, Berlin. A select group of 30 contributions comprise
The Long-Wave Debate, which thus represents the state of the art in
the theory and empirical observation of long-term economic
cycles.
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